

# FADING AWAY?

The Political Role of the  
Army in Indonesia's  
Transition to Democracy  
1998 – 2001

IDSS Monograph No. 8

Tatik S. Hafidz



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DEMOCRACY  
1998–2001

Tatik S. Hafidz

INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

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## FOREWORD

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The collapse of President Soeharto's military-based authoritarian regime caught many Indonesians and foreign observers by surprise. During the first part of the 1990s, conventional wisdom assumed that Soeharto would turn out to have been President-for-Life, unlike his predecessor Soekarno who accepted that title but failed to live up to its promise. Although by the mid 1990s there was much questioning of Soeharto's rule, it was only after the devastating consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis and El Nino climatic conditions hit Indonesia in 1997 that the New Order seemed to be tottering. But even then, Soeharto received the unanimous endorsement of the MPR for a further five years as late as March 1998, only two months before his actual fall.

The fact was that Indonesia was not ready for the 'democratic transition' that was suddenly imposed on it by Soeharto's forced resignation. No alternative government was waiting in the wings to establish a new democratic regime. Neither of Soeharto's first two successors was able to form an effective coalition to ensure a stable government and their brief presidencies were marked by disturbed, even chaotic, conditions. The streets of Jakarta and many provincial cities were regularly filled with demonstrations which were occasionally accompanied by violence. And the breakdown in order in several outlying provinces facilitated the outbreak of mass violence involving ethnic and religious communities. The predictions of foreign observers that Indonesia was at the point of national disintegration were sometimes echoed by Indonesians themselves, especially after the exit of East Timor.

Despite these unpropitious circumstances, some progress was made. Although President Habibie had not revealed strong democratic tendencies during his two decades as a senior member of the New Order government, he felt that he had little choice but to remove the New Order's restrictions on political parties, social organizations and the press, and he ordered the release of many political prisoners. And most crucially, he agreed to the holding of genuinely free legislative and presidential elections in 1999 which, despite the dire predictions of many observers, were almost entirely free of serious violence. The democratic character of these elections was demonstrated by the failure of the incumbent president to gain re-election and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid, a man who had never served in a New Order government and had a record of taking up democratic causes in the past. But Gus Dur, as he was known, proved to be no less eccentric in style than Habibie and he soon managed to dissipate much of the goodwill that he had enjoyed at the beginning of his presidency. By the first half of 2001, Gus Dur had alienated not only his political enemies but also many of his friends and, in an atmosphere of high tension and threatened

mass violence, he was eventually impeached and replaced by his vice-president, Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati's presidency was greeted with relief rather than enthusiasm. She was not expected to embark on an exciting new phase of democratic reform but at least it was hoped that her government would dampen the constant upheaval of the previous three years.

Tatik Hafidz's book is concerned with the last years of the Soeharto presidency and the governments of his first three successors, especially the first two. As a leading journalist with a succession of weekly or fortnightly magazines—*Editor* (until it was banned by Soeharto in 1994), *Tiras*, *D&R*, and *Tajuk*—and the daily *Media Indonesia*, Tatik was able to observe these developments closely. She is well-acquainted with most of the leading personalities who appear in her story and has interviewed them often over many years. Hers is therefore an inside account in the sense that she had good access to leading actors and has been able to present their versions of what happened. In particular, she provides many insights into military politics and the ups and downs of military reform. As a good journalist, however, she never relies on a single source but checks each source against others. The result is a fascinating picture from the perspective of major participants in the making of this history.

The reader might wonder how Tatik was able to extract so many frank observations from the tough and wily political and military figures she interviewed. Some readers might even form a perception of an aggressive and persistent journalist who finally gets the story she wants. Such a stereotypical picture could not be further from the truth. The real Tatik, whom I have known since the early 1990s, is soft-spoken, self-effacing and very polite. It might indeed be these qualities that have allowed her to persuade her informants to provide such frank comments on their own roles as well as those of both their allies and rivals.

**Harold Crouch**  
*Australian National University*  
*Canberra, Australia*

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This research began with a compilation of notes I took while working as political journalist covering Indonesian politics since 1990, and took its shape during the defining moment in Indonesian history following the departure of President Soeharto, which set the demise of the New Order regime in 1998. The present manuscript was completed after a stint at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and extensive field research from 2002 to 2004. It owes its existence to the encouragement, advice, and support of numerous people. Although only a few of them can be acknowledged here, I would like to take this opportunity to thank them.

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Of course, in thanking all those who have helped to make this research possible, I also absolve them of responsibility for any of its deficiencies.

I dedicate this book to my mother, Maryam Hafidz, my family, and to the loving memories of my late father Hafidz Alim and my late uncle A. Chumaidy. Indeed, it is their support and ceaseless prayers that have strengthened me throughout the long process of bringing this research to your attention.

**Tatik S. Hafidz**  
*Jakarta*  
*October 2005*

# SOEHARTO AND HIS MILITARY HITMEN

## 1990–1997

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**I am a red-and-white ABRI. I am proud to tell you that because the colour of the military is red and white, and its duty is to protect the nation as stipulated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution.**

– Lieutenant-General (*retd.*) Harsudiyono Hartas, former ABRI's  
Chief of Socio-political affairs<sup>1</sup>

**They call me the green ABRI, and I am proud of it. In fact, the green ABRI is more “red and white” than the red-and-white ABRI, because Islam teaches that love for the homeland is just a part of our love of Allah.**

– General (*retd.*) R. Hartono, former Army Chief-of-Staff<sup>2</sup>

On 25 June 1991, President Haji Muhammad Soeharto, still clad in pilgrim's white robes, astonished his countrymen when he spoke eloquently about the religious aspects of the *hajj* to Indonesian audiences, shortly after completing the rituals of his first-ever pilgrimage to the Holy Land. In a televised broadcast nationwide, the 70-year-old ruler of the world's most populous Muslim nation looked very much a *santri*, with no trace of the *kejawan* traits that he was often associated with.<sup>3</sup> It was a significant moment in the political and cultural history of the New Order, as it seemed to have broken all clichés about Soeharto and his complex and sometimes confusing attitudes towards Islam.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, the pilgrimage appeared to culminate in a series of overtures that Soeharto had made since the early 1980s to the Muslims. In 1982, he took over the chairmanship of the Foundation of the Dedication of Pancasila Muslims (Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila), which has since built “pancasila mosques” at a rate of 30 a year.<sup>5</sup> In 1989, a new Education Law that enshrined the role of religious education was passed and a *sharia* (Islamic laws) court was set up. Later, he personally intervened to let Muslim schoolgirls in state schools wear the *jilbab* (Islamic headscarves) to classes. Most important of all, perhaps, he decided to supervise the inception of the Association of All-Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990.

Soeharto's policy reversal to resurrect political Islam came as a shock, mostly because he has devoted the first 15 years of his rule to sideline it and limit its civil influence. Indeed, most Western literature on the early years of the New Order portrayed

a military-dominated regime led by *kejawan* officers that was essentially hostile to Islam.<sup>6</sup> In what follows, we will examine the complicated relations between the New Order's troika of power—Soeharto, the army and Islam—and how they have reshaped Indonesian politics in the last decade of his rule. Thus, it is very intriguing to ask the question: Did Soeharto correct the wrongs when he brought political Islam back to the arena, or did he simply open the Pandora's box of religious radicalism?

## THE "HIJACKED" REGIME

Soeharto came to power following an alleged aborted coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965 that ended the two-decades-long rule of Indonesia's first president, Soekarno.<sup>7</sup> In the elaborate power struggle that preceded the rise of a military-backed regime, the PKI was banned and its supporters purged in one of the worst "genocides" in human history. Hundreds of thousands of alleged communist supporters were believed to have died and ten of thousands of others were forced to live for years in mass detention.<sup>8</sup> Worst of all, relatives of former PKI supporters were subjected to continuous socio-political discrimination and intelligence surveillance, until the policy was officially lifted in 2000.

Leaders of two major Islamic political parties, the modernist Indonesian Muslim Council (Masyumi) and the traditionalist Ulama Renaissance (NU), which were pitted against the PKI under Soekarno's balancing power strategy, played influential roles in Soeharto's ascent to power.<sup>9</sup> The Masyumi Party, which dissolved itself in 1960 under Soekarno's threat to ban the party, lent its support to the new regime in the hope for a political revival.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, after a short period of indecision, the elderly *ulamas* of the NU Party, who supported Soekarno's Guided Democracy and his political axis of Nationalism, Religion and Communism (Nasakom), acquiesced to the party's junior leaders who took active parts in the anti-Soekarno movement.<sup>11</sup> With active encouragement from the army, the NU's youth wing of Ansor became the frontrunner in the mass killings of PKI supporters in East Java.

But Soeharto and his army advisers soon came to realize that traditional and political Islam could pose a hindrance to modernization.<sup>12</sup> Born into a poor peasant family in Central Java, Soeharto grew to be more accustomed to *kejawan* culture, which partly explained his early distrust of a stricter form of Islam.<sup>13</sup> The army, for its part, was traumatized by a series of violent attempts at establishing an Islamic state, most notably the State of Islam/the Indonesian Muslim Army (DI/TII) rebellion led by Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo in 1945–1960, hence its inherent suspicion of political Islam.<sup>14</sup> The army considers both the communists and radical Islamists as threats to national stability, branding them with the labels "extreme left" (*ekstrem kiri*) and "extreme right" (*ekstrem kanan*) respectively.

Thus, from the outset, the army-backed New Order had seen political Islam as a potential threat to its longevity, the "lesser of two devils", as one policy paper called it. Produced by the influential think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the paper predicted that political Islam would compete with the army (the other devil) to fill the power vacuum left by the demise of the PKI. Accordingly, the paper advised the government to team up with the army to eliminate the threat of political Islam. The paper found its way to Soeharto and his inner circle through the president's trusted adviser, Lieutenant-General Ali Moertopo.

Moertopo was undoubtedly one of the most controversial political figures in the

New Order's history. He had served under Soeharto's command in the Central Java regional military command in early 1960s and became his trusted intelligence officer prior and during the PKI Crisis. Later, Soeharto made him a private assistant (*Aspri*), head of Special Operations (*Opsus*), the New Order's notorious free-wheeling intelligence body, and deputy head of the Co-ordinating Board of National Intelligence (*Bakin*). Known as a man with a proclivity for intelligence activities and a grand political ambition, Moertopo founded the CSIS, a think tank run by Catholic-Chinese intellectuals formerly under the tutelage of a Dutch-born intelligence trainer named Father Beek. He also mobilized a group of Chinese businessmen to finance the think tank as well as both its overt and covert activities.<sup>15</sup> Under his patronage, the CSIS grew to become so influential that it earned a sobriquet *dapur politik Orde Baru* (the New Order's political kitchen) as it provided a strategic framework for the New Order's political and military intelligence activities.<sup>16</sup> With his positions, intellectual backings and nearly unlimited operational funding, Moertopo became Soeharto's most powerful intelligence chief. Sharing Soeharto's apprehension of political Islam, Moertopo strove to ensure that the potential threat of the "lesser devil" would be contained.

As a result, the first two decades of the New Order witnessed the implementation of a series of policies directed at de-politicizing Islam. The process was conducted through a combined strategy that some Indonesian analysts likened to Snouck Hurgronje's colonial Islamic policy devised to conquer the Acehese rebellion.<sup>17</sup> A Dutch anthropologist, Hurgronje advised that to win the hearts and minds of the devout Acehese, the Dutch Colonial Government must let religious practices continue unhindered, but it must crush any Islamic political activities.

Thus, the New Order encouraged cultural Islam to flourish and strove to ensure that religious facilities were accessible nationwide, but worked very hard to squeeze the life out of political Islam. In 1967, the government refused to reconstitute the Jakarta Charter.<sup>18</sup> A year later, it rejected attempts at resurrecting the Masyumi and launched a covert intelligence operation to ensure that a cooperative leadership, the government-sanctioned successor, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), was put in place.<sup>19</sup>

In 1973, the government forced the amalgamation of all political parties into two parties and skilfully manipulated their internal differences to weaken them. The four Islamic parties were merged into the United Development Party (PPP). The NU that made up the largest faction in the PPP was forced to accept the Parmusi's leadership of the party, resulting in constant internal party tensions.<sup>20</sup>

In the next decade, however, the PPP continued to voice Muslims' frustrations over what they saw as the New Order's anti-Islam attitude and positioned itself as the de-facto opposition party. Therefore, in 1984, the government required all organizations to adopt the state ideology *pancasila* as their sole principle (*asas tunggal*), which effectively stripped the PPP of its Islamic credentials. Many Muslim organizations rejected the policy and organized open rallies of protest, which eventually prompted massive arrests.<sup>21</sup>

Besides ensuring political compliance, the New Order security apparatus launched covert intelligence operations under Moertopo's supervision to create, co-opt and eventually clamp down on radical Islamic groups aimed at discrediting political Islam.<sup>22</sup> Whilst Islamic radicalism is indeed endemic, as shown by repeated attempts at establishing an Islamic state, evidence is now available to support the claim that the New Order's intelligence apparatus had framed a number of Islamic insurgencies in the 1970s and 1980s.

The strongest evidence is in the case of the Holy War Command (*Komji*) that staged a series of violence from 1971 to 1977. According to security authorities, former DI/TII leaders had abused the government's clemency to reconstitute the banned movement. But Muslim leaders suspected that the *Komji* movement (which appeared under several different names) was Moertopo's intelligence creation used to discredit the PPP ahead of the 1977 elections.<sup>23</sup>

In January 1977, the military launched a massive crackdown on the movement, rounded up its leaders and brought them to separate trials. But the trials shed light into the intelligence ploy as *Komji* leaders began to reveal their true identities. In their defence plea, they confessed that they were recruited by *Bakin*. "I am not a trader nor am I a farmer. I am a *Bakin* operative," said Danu Muhammad Hasan, one of the leaders.<sup>24</sup> But the court rejected the plea, maintaining the official version and sentenced the *Komji* leaders to several years' imprisonment, including life imprisonment for its top leader, Haji Ismail Pranoto or Hispran. Nevertheless, later accounts given by Soemitro and the former head of *Bakin*, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Sutopo Yuwono, confirmed Hasan's version—that they were *Bakin* recruits and the *Komji* movement was indeed an intelligence creation.<sup>25</sup>

The tension between the government and the Muslims continued until the late 1980s, during which a fresh series of Islamic insurgencies such as the Imran Movement (1982), the Tanjung Priok Incident (1984), the BCA Bombings (1984) and the Warsidi Affair in Lampung (1989). Due to their experience with the *Komji* movement, many Muslim leaders suspected that those violent incidents were also intelligence creations used to discredit Islam.<sup>26</sup>

The New Order's hostility towards Islam left a deep sense of betrayal among the Muslims. And, as Hefner observed, the influential roles played by the Moertopo-CSIS-army axis in early years of the New Order left many Muslim leaders with the feeling that the New Order had been "hijacked" by an anti-Islam alliance of *kejawan* army officers, Catholic intellectuals and Chinese minority.<sup>27</sup> Suspicions aside, it can be argued that the New Order's repressive attempts at eliminating the threat of political Islam served only to harden its opposition and helped to create pockets of radicalization in the generally moderate Muslim community that lasted long after the regime fell. It is worth noting that Islamic insurgencies began to recede when Soeharto started to make rapprochement towards the Muslims.

## THE CLEAVAGE OF COLOURS

The establishment of the ICMI in December 1990 marked Soeharto's policy shift. Founded by prominent Muslim scholars, including Prof. B.J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology and a future president who was later elected its first chairman, the ICMI declared itself as a mass organization devoted to bring together Muslims from all *alirans* and to elevate the welfare of Indonesian Islamic society.<sup>28</sup> It has been said that the idea of the ICMI sprung from spontaneous discussions involving five students of Brawijaya University in the East Java town of Malang. With the help of some sympathetic Muslim activists they approached Habibie, known as one of Soeharto's closest confidants, who immediately put it into action.<sup>29</sup>

Recent information, however, suggests that Soeharto was not only supportive of the ICMI but also directly supervised its inception.<sup>30</sup> The military was apprehensive of the idea and ABRI Chief (*Pangab*) General Try Sutrisno advised the president against allowing the ICMI's formation, citing that it could pose as a potential threat to

national stability. But Soeharto bluntly rebuffed him, saying that the government had to accommodate the aspiration of Muslims.<sup>31</sup> Sutrisno had no options but to tag along and attended the meeting. A few weeks later, however, he sent a subtle signal of defiance. Upon receiving a delegate of ICMI functionaries who paid him a courtesy call, he issued a statement calling for allegiance to *pancasila* and a commitment to religious pluralism.<sup>32</sup> Three years later, as vice-president, he reiterated his position when he called for ICMI members to remain vigilant so that they would not fall “into the trap of a narrow communal-sectarian behaviour”.<sup>33</sup>

Under Habibie’s patronage, the ICMI quickly spread its wings, prompting an initially quiet but swiftly open discontent in the military, as he had never been a popular figure among the generals.<sup>34</sup> As Minister of Research and Technology, he put all strategic industries under his control, including military-related projects. Later, he secured a final say in the purchase of almost all major armaments, long considered by the generals as their undisputed domain.<sup>35</sup>

Some generals saw Soeharto’s policy shift as a diversion (*penyimpangan*), if not betrayal, of the ABRI’s cherished principle of *Sapta Marga* (the Seven Pledges), which maintains a commitment to ethnic and religious pluralism. By preferring one religious group to another, they argued, the government had diverted from the principle revered in *pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Moreover, they suspected that some elements of “extreme right” groups deliberately joined the ICMI bandwagon to manipulate it for their political comeback.<sup>36</sup> But other generals supported the move, arguing that it would correct the wrongs of the New Order’s earlier policy to sideline Islam. The establishment of the ICMI, they insisted, would symbolize the complete integration of Islam into the state of Indonesia, which would end its earlier political marginalization.

The division led to the emergence of internal factionalism known to the public as “*ABRI merah putih*” (the red-and-white military) and “*ABRI hijau*” (the green military). The red-and-white army generally refers to officers who have pledged to uphold the *Sapta Marga* as opposed to the green army, who are more inclined to Islam.<sup>37</sup> The military officially denied that such factionalism had ever existed. In an article written in 1998, Salim Said, a noted military historian, supported the denial. Quoting ABRI’s chief of information officer (*Kapuspen*) Major-General Syarwan Hamid’s statement in 1995 that ABRI remained united, Said argued that the division was meaningless as ABRI’s ideology remained the *sapta marga*, *sumpah prajurit* and *dwifungsi*.<sup>38</sup>

But, in an interview almost a decade later, Hamid acknowledged that “institutionally, there is no such thing as red-and-white army and green Army. But in daily realities it was very much real”. Former ABRI Chief General (retd.) Edi Sudradjat, widely acknowledged as a respected member of the red-and-white camp, confirmed it, saying that although the terms were created by military outsiders, it had serious implications as it did create deep division within the military.<sup>39</sup> And, as we can see from the two generals’ remarks quoted in the beginning of this chapter, the “cleavage of colours” was too apparent to be dismissed as non-existent and it obviously affected the institution, although it was well kept under the disguise of hierarchy and unity of command.

## An Ally Turned Nemesis

What prompted Soeharto to resurrect the power of political Islam that he had forced to lay dormant for more than two decades? Was it because he sensed a declining support from the army and hence the need to cultivate a counterbalance? Or did he genuinely strive for Islam now that he has fully embraced its teachings?

A brief survey of the literature shows that the first view gains more audience,<sup>40</sup> while the second is shared widely among Soeharto's supporters.<sup>41</sup> There was certainly some truth in both views as well as some flaws. As Soeharto learned more about Islam, his earlier suspicion somehow subsided and he was prepared to give more roles to Muslims. But he was too shrewd to simply act out of faith. Thus his decision to court Islam was also driven by his realization that he could no longer rely only on the military, particularly when he did feel challenged by a certain faction within the institution. He needed to propel Islam as a counterbalance, even though his control over the military had never actually been eroded. A historical reconstruction revealed that Soeharto's policy shift was influenced by his perception over the challenge and threat mounted by his trusted ally turned nemesis, General Leonardus Benyamin Moerdani.

A Catholic Javanese of Eurasian descent, Moerdani made his first step into the inner circle when he was called back from South Korea in 1974 to assume a new duty as intelligence assistant to the Minister of Defence and Security (*Menhankam*). At that time, Soeharto was sorting out the political debris of the Malari Affair. After dispensing with Soemitro and his supporters, Soeharto built a coterie of loyalists around him, such as Admiral Sudomo (*Pangkopkamtib* and deputy commander of the Armed Forces), Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama (head of *Bakin*) and Moerdani, whilst maintaining Moertopo as deputy head of *Bakin*.

With those military hardliners as his political spearhead, Soeharto moved decisively to silence his critics. Responding to mounting students' protest rejecting Soeharto's presidential re-nomination for the third time in January 1978, Sudomo ordered the military to storm campuses in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, and sent no less than 34 student activists to jail.<sup>42</sup> In March 1979, Soeharto disbanded the Fosko TNI-AD, a grouping of retired army generals who criticized his abuse of *dwifungsi* and ABRI's support of Golkar.<sup>43</sup> A few months later, he replaced Army Chief-of-Staff General Widodo, who lent an active support to the group, with a weaker figure, General Poni-man. And in 1980, he isolated the Petition of Fifty, a loose alliance of prominent civilian and military critics and subjected its members to a "civic death" by denying them civic and economic rights.<sup>44</sup>

A Moertopo protégé, Moerdani was quick to become Soeharto's most trusted army man, holding three key intelligence positions almost at the same time: assistant for intelligence in the Department of Defence and Security (since 1974), head of Strategic Intelligence Centre (since 1977) and deputy head of *Bakin* (since 1978). Soeharto entrusted him with a wide range of tasks, from supervising military operation to the takeover of East Timor in 1974/1975, to keeping an eye on his boss, Defence Minister and ABRI Chief, General M. Jusuf.<sup>45</sup> Although he was one of the three generals who helped Soeharto to secure power from President Soekarno, Jusuf had grown increasingly critical of Soeharto's leadership, especially his abuse of the military. Despite his disagreement with some points in the Seskoad Paper, Jusuf was supportive of Widodo's idea to "purify" the implementation of *dwifungsi*.<sup>46</sup>

Soeharto treated Moerdani with a certain affection, almost like a father to a son. He asked Moerdani to watch over his children, including his son-in-law, the young army officer Prabowo Subianto.<sup>47</sup> In 1983, Soeharto appointed the Catholic general ABRI Chief, to replace the estranged General Jusuf, a decision that shocked even Moerdani, given his lack of command and territorial exposures.<sup>48</sup> During his tenure, Moerdani accumulated unprecedented military power in his hand—he was the ABRI Chief, *Kopkamtib* Commander and, above all, he retained control over all intelligence activities.

But on 10 February 1998, after a private meeting with the president, Moerdani told

the press that he was being retired from active duty and would be promptly replaced by Army Chief-of-Staff General Try Sutrisno.<sup>49</sup> The replacement came as a shock. Although Moerdani had reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 on 2 October 1987, his tenure had been extended for one year.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, the transfer of duty took place one day before the MPR general session (Sidang Umum MPR) was scheduled to “elect” the president and vice-president, beginning on 1 March, whereas previously such strategic change took place only after the session was over.

More political suspense was still in the offing. On 2 March, the PPP nominated its chairman Haji Jailani Naro as the vice-presidential candidate.<sup>51</sup> The usually sedate session was stirred as Naro’s nomination broke a two-decades-long taboo on direct opposition to Soeharto, who had decided that his candidate was State Secretary and Golkar chairman, Lieutenant-General (ret’d.) Sudharmono. It sent the nation into a political frenzy. Only a few minutes after the MPR re-elected Soeharto for the fifth consecutive time, Brigadier-General Ibrahim Saleh, a military representative, interrupted the session to protest Sudharmono’s candidacy, forcing Major-General Harsudiyono Hartas, his superior, to drag him down to prevent further embarrassment.

Nevertheless, the brief display of “democracy” ended when Naro was persuaded to withdraw his candidacy after intensive backroom dealings. On 11 March 1988, Sudharmono was sworn in as Indonesia’s fifth vice-president.<sup>52</sup> Later, Moerdani was appointed Defence Minister, an administrative post without direct control over the troops.

As more formerly classified information now emerge, it is obvious that Naro’s nomination and Saleh’s interruption were conducted with a high degree of military backing, Moerdani’s, to be precise. In his as-told-to-autobiography, Moerdani defended his objection to Sudharmono’s candidacy, arguing that Soeharto had hinted that he would permit more than one candidate to emerge. In a brief meeting after Sutrisno’s installation as the ABRI Chief on 29 February, Moerdani even suggested that ABRI should nominate Sutrisno, whom he called “the chairman of the military party”, as vice-presidential candidate.<sup>53</sup>

Responding to Moerdani, Sudharmono wrote in his autobiography that Soeharto had personally informed him of his vice-presidential candidacy on the morning of 27 February. Later in the evening, the president briefed Golkar leaders who met him for consultation. Yet, when Sudharmono met Moerdani for a coordination meeting the next morning, attended by the same Golkar leaders, the General informed him that ABRI had yet to decide on the candidacy as he had just returned from an overseas trip and had not yet consulted the president. For a few weeks, Jakarta’s political scene was tense due to ABRI’s indecision on Sudharmono’s candidacy. Sudharmono found out much later from “his friends” that ABRI’s decision to support his candidacy was taken at the eleventh hour, when Moerdani finally gave in during a heated debate among the military’s top brass, saying that he was “forced to be loyal” to the president.<sup>54</sup>

The saga continued as Moerdani decided to send a signal of defiance. According to Hartas, Moerdani bypassed him and his boss, *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Sugiharto, and sent a letter of instruction that an “interruption” should be carried out during the MPR session, that led to the Ibrahim Saleh episode.<sup>55</sup>

For many years, political observers debated the reason why Moerdani decided to launch an all-out challenge against Sudharmono. The popular theory was that Moerdani had found out about Sudharmono’s past communist link. He informed Soeharto privately of it and advised him against nominating Sudharmono but the president ignored him.<sup>56</sup> But a careful reading into the carefully chosen wordings of their biographies reveals that Moerdani and Sudharmono had been engaged in fierce political rivalry.

As State Secretary, Sudharmono introduced Presidential Instruction (*Keppres*) No. 10, under which all contracts over a certain value had to be approved by the State Secretariat, and through which he effectively diverted lucrative business contracts from military hands to his own civilian business cronies.<sup>57</sup> As Golkar chairman, he brought in more civilian politicians, including some devout Muslims, into the party and steered it away from reliance on the military. Although Moerdani had advised in favour of reduced military involvement in Golkar, he resented Sudharmono's idea to propel the party into a "single majority" without minimum military supervision.<sup>58</sup> After Sudharmono became vice-president, Moerdani continued to work quietly behind the scenes to discredit him and blocked his chances of ever ascending to presidency.<sup>59</sup>

Still, we need better explanations as to why Soeharto lost faith in Moerdani and why the normally cool-headed intelligence general risked a confrontation with his former mentor. Again, the popular theory was that Moerdani had angered Soeharto when he warned him about his children's uncontrolled business activities.<sup>60</sup> Given their closeness, however, it is unlikely that this was the primary reason.

In an interesting article in 1998, Salim Said made a convincing argument that the real reason behind the tension was the fact that Soeharto suspected that Moerdani had been building up power, which could pose a threat to his own rule.<sup>61</sup> Moerdani's control over intelligence activities—a vital element in an authoritarian regime—had made him a potential challenger and his enigmatic disposition amplified the perception. And, in line with the tradition of the Javanese monarch who would never allow the emergence of "twin suns" (*matahari kembar*) in the political horizon, Soeharto would never allow the rise of any potential challenger.<sup>62</sup>

Recent information even suggested that Soeharto had been suspicious of Moerdani's political ambition and his alleged clandestine attempts at "taking over power by force" as early as 1984. In anticipation of Moerdani's possible moves, he had assigned a secret team led by Lieutenant Colonel Prabowo Subianto to keep track of his activities.<sup>63</sup> But tension between them heated up after the 1987 general elections when Moerdani was suspected to have provided tacit support for the PDI.<sup>64</sup> Soeharto was obviously aware of Moerdani's plan in the 1998 Assembly session and decided to dismiss him as a pre-emptive measure.

Said also noted that there was another important, if not the most important, dimension in the fear of Moerdani: his Catholic background. Many Muslim leaders suspected his CSIS links and the fact that he had inherited Moertopo's former intelligence network exacerbated their distrust. Internally, many Muslim generals complained that Moerdani had discriminated Muslim officers against their non-Muslim colleagues and pointed out that it helped to create religious factionalism within the military. Hence, Soeharto's apprehension of Moerdani's perceived challenge converged with Muslims' suspicion of the Catholic General. Thus, after nearly two decades of confrontation, Soeharto and the Muslims, civilian and military alike, found themselves natural allies facing one common adversary.

## The Greening of the Military

From then on, Soeharto moved to solidify his Muslim base. In September 1991, a few months before the general elections of 1992 were held, he personally "screened" Golkar's provisional list of legislative candidates, which the media called the greening (*ijo royo-royo*) phenomenon. In his position as Chairman of Golkar's Board of Advisors (*Dewan Pembina*), Soeharto reserved the right to select and approve Golkar's legisla-

tive candidates. He took out 11 names, including four candidates from the CSIS, and substituted them with some ICMI functionaries.<sup>65</sup> His obvious inclination towards the ICMI prompted speculation that he would prefer Habibie than Sutrisno as his vice-presidential candidate. Moreover, Habibie appeared as a better choice after Sutrisno's image was tarnished following the outbreak of the Santa Cruz Incident when soldiers fired at unarmed demonstrators in the East Timor capital of Dili on 12 November 1991. Sutrisno blamed the riots on international conspiracy to discredit Indonesia and claimed that only 19 people were killed.<sup>66</sup>

The riots took place when Soeharto was on a rare international tour. It tarnished his image just as he was lobbying for the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and building up his international profile. Upon returning home, he ordered an independent investigation on the riots. In late December, Sutrisno's credibility was put to the test when the National Investigation Committee (KPN) reported that at least 50 people were killed in the riots and dozens more still missing, a clear rebuttal to Sutrisno's earlier version. In an unprecedented move, Soeharto exercised his constitutional right as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to order the establishment of a military honorary board (DKM) to investigate violations of military conduct and honour. Led by the commander of the Army's Staff and Command School (*Seskoad*), Major-General Feisal Tanjung, the DKM reported its findings in February 1992, which led to the dismissal of two army generals responsible for security in East Timor, Major-General Sintong Panjaitan and Brigadier-General Rudolf S. Warouw.<sup>67</sup> Although no action was taken against Sutrisno, many observers predicted that the incident would weaken his chance for ascending to vice-presidency.

Thus, when the Team of Eleven held a closed voting session to decide on the vice-presidential candidate in February 1993, Habibie outvoted Sutrisno slightly.<sup>68</sup> But when the result was reported to him shortly after the internal voting was over, Soeharto made a startling decision: he chose Sutrisno as his vice-presidential candidate and kept Habibie in his job as Minister of Science and Technology. One member of the Team of Eleven immediately broke the good news discreetly to Sutrisno.<sup>69</sup>

Yet, a few days before the MPR session began in March, the *Kassospol* Hartas announced ABRI's nomination of Sutrisno as vice-presidential candidate before Soeharto revealed his choice. Most observers saw it as the "Saleh Episode Part Two", a deliberate attempt by the military to put a pressure on Soeharto.<sup>70</sup> Some others suspected the hand of Moerdani, who in a speech in Jogjakarta in May 1990 called for a "leadership change" at the end of Soeharto's term in 1993, at work.<sup>71</sup>

The truth was less dramatic. Hartas had learnt from Sutrisno about Soeharto's decision before he came up with his statement. The military, however, suspected attempts by Habibie's supporters to change the decision. Hence Hartas' *fait accompli* was meant to block the move, not to challenge the president.<sup>72</sup> In the end, Soeharto displayed his quality as master of the game. He made Sutrisno his vice-president, a prestigious yet largely symbolic position, but he reduced the military presence to a bare minimum and gave Habibie an upper hand in policymaking as more ICMI functionaries were admitted into the Cabinet.<sup>73</sup>

At the same time, Soeharto began to reduce Moerdani's influence in the military in a move the media called "de-Benny-ization" and searched for a candidate to carry out the task. Sutrisno, who once served as the president's adjutant, but spent much of his career under Moerdani's tutelage, was apparently too weak to live up to the expectation. Thus, on 9 February 1993, Soeharto replaced Sutrisno with Army Chief-of-Staff General Edi Sudradjat.

At first, Soeharto seemed to think that Sudradjat would be able to perform the task. But the highly respected general turned out to be a master of his own. Unlike Moerdani and Sutrisno, who developed close personal ties with Soeharto, Sudradjat maintained a strict business-like relationship with the president. Described by his peers as a true professional soldier, Sudradjat resisted Soeharto's attempts at involving himself in the military's personnel changes, including his de-Benny-ization policy.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, during his tenure as the Army Chief-of-Staff, Sudradjat proposed a "back-to-basics" concept where he emphasized the need for the army to improve its professionalism, which had been weakened by its excessive involvement in politics.

Thus, Soeharto exercised the famed Javanese strategy of *nghlurug tanpa bala, menang tanpa ngasorake* (to attack without force, to win without causing humiliation) to remove Sudradjat gradually. On 22 March, he appointed Sudradjat as Defence Minister to replace the outgoing Moerdani.<sup>75</sup> Sudradjat was allowed to set a historical record by holding both positions as well as the job of Army Chief-of-Staff for two weeks. But, on 10 April, he was relieved of the position of Army Chief by Soeharto's brother-in-law, Wismoyo Arismunandar, and, on 21 May, as ABRI Chief by Feisal Tanjung.

Tanjung's ascent to the military's helm raised many eyebrows. Unlike Sutrisno, who served as a presidential adjutant, and Sudradjat, who graduated at the top of his class, Tanjung was neither close to the Palace nor the army's top-notch officer. Many military officers suspected Habibie's hand in it, pointing to the fact that Feisal had attended Fuhrungsakademie, the (then) West German Army's Staff and Command School, in Hamburg in 1971, almost at the same time as Habibie. Sudradjat even suspected that Habibie had been preparing the way for Tanjung for quite some time as he fitted into his political agenda.<sup>76</sup>

Recent information, however, suggests that Tanjung's ascent to the top had indeed been prepared for a long time. But it was Soeharto's son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, who "rescued" Tanjung from his "exile" in the *Seskoad* and brought him to Jakarta's political centrestage.<sup>77</sup> Prabowo and his colonel friends appeared to carry out Soeharto's instruction to keep an eye on Moerdani and sought to find a Muslim figure strong enough to stand up against him.<sup>78</sup> The son of a Muhammadiyah leader in the North Sumatran capital of Medan, Tanjung was known as an apolitical field soldier.<sup>79</sup> One of Prabowo's associates, Lieutenant Colonel Ismed Yuzairi, arranged a visit by Tanjung and *Seskoad* officers to Habibie's pet project, the National Aviation Industry (IPTN) in Bandung in early December 1991. They hoped that Habibie would bring Tanjung into Soeharto's inner circle.

The introduction seemed to be fruitful. On 31 December, Tanjung was appointed chairman of the DKM to investigate the Santa Cruz Incident—as we have discussed earlier.<sup>80</sup> Another associate, Lieutenant Colonel Kivlan Zen, began to approach the Minister of Transportation Azwar Anas, one of Soeharto's closest confidants, to lobby for Tanjung. It was Azwar Anas who eventually managed to persuade the president to promote Tanjung as ABRI's Chief of General Affairs (*Kasum*) on 27 July 1992, paving his way to become *Pangab*. As a reward, Prabowo and his associates enjoyed a few privileges in their military careers.

Whoever brought him into Soeharto's inner circle, Tanjung appeared to be capable at carrying out his task. Under his direction, the process of de-Benny-ization was accelerated. In January 1994, for example, the Strategic Intelligence Agency (*Bais*) was liquidated and replaced by a less powerful body, the military's Intelligence Agency (*BIA*), in an obvious attempt to break Moerdani's strongest bastion.<sup>81</sup> Tanjung conducted a series of reshuffles directed at hastening the departure of "Moerdani-contaminated

officers”. More importantly, he admitted more Muslim generals into key positions, reversing Moerdani’s policy of reliance on officers of Christian and ethnic minority backgrounds.<sup>82</sup>

The greening (*penghijauan*) process appeared to culminate when, in February 1995, Soeharto replaced his brother-in-law as Army Chief by Lieutenant-General Raden Hartono, the son of a Nahdlatul Ulama *kiai* from the predominantly Muslim island of Madura. As always, there was no explanation for Arismunandar’s departure, except that he had reached the mandatory retirement age of 55.<sup>83</sup> But the fact that Hartono was a graduate of the Military Academy in 1962 (Class 3), thus Arismunandar’s senior (Class 4), undermined ABRI’s official claims that it was a “regeneration” process.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, Hartono hailed from the armoured unit, while most Army Chiefs of Staff usually hailed from the more prestigious infantry unit, especially the elite *Kopassus* unit.

As it became clear that Soeharto would replace Arismunandar with Hartono, some prominent military figures, including Defence Minister Sudradjat and Vice-President Try Sutrisno, raised their objections. Sudradjat went personally to Soeharto and asked him to reconsider his decision, arguing that Hartono was not the most eligible officer for the post.<sup>85</sup> Soeharto, however, refused to heed their objections. Many observers suspected the hands of the First Family behind Hartono’s rise to the army’s top post—this time, Soeharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti “Tutut” Rukmana, who was known to have established a close friendship with him.<sup>86</sup>

The rise of Tanjung and Hartono signified an unprecedented phenomenon of devoutly Islamic military leadership in the history of the New Order. Whereas under Moerdani, Muslim officers were apprehensive to display their piety for fear that it would jeopardize their careers, Tanjung openly displayed his Muhammadiyah background in a number of formal occasions. In his four-year tenure as *Pangab* (May 1993 to June 1997), Tanjung attended at least 55 Islamic functions, during which he delivered official speeches highlighting the close relations between ABRI and Islam. In 1997, he wrote a book entitled *ABRI-Islam, True Partners*, in which he declared that “the integration between ABRI and the people, manifested especially in the unity between ABRI and Islam, are too strong to crack. They are rooted strongly in the nation’s history and culture.”<sup>87</sup>

Hartono did even more. He accepted media accolade of his being a “*santri* general” seriously and asserted that Muslim soldiers and officers must be proud of their identity. He was televised visiting *pesantrens* more often than he went to his soldiers’ barracks. He also encouraged his Muslim staff to greet each other in the *salam* way and organized prayers in the workplace. Moreover, under Hartono, the pace of de-Benny-ization in the army was further accelerated through frequent personnel rotations.<sup>88</sup> Several writers argued that the incessant changes were a necessary structural change in response to the swollen size of the officer corps.<sup>89</sup> While the analysis was technically correct, Hartono openly admitted that the de-Benny-ization and the greening of the military policies were natural attempts dedicated at rectifying Moerdani’s mistake of alienating Islam.<sup>90</sup>

Thus Arief Budiman, a noted Indonesian political scientist, suggested that the greening of the military was a part of Soeharto’s grand political re-orientation: from reliance on the Ali Moertopo–Catholics–Chinese axis to the Habibie–Islam–indigenous axis.<sup>91</sup> Habibie seemed to emulate Moertopo’s strategy in building his power base. Under his patronage, the ICMI established an Islamic national newspaper, *Republika*, in which Soeharto sat as a member of its Board of Trustees and helped to mobilize public funds to finance it and a think tank, CIDES (Centre for Policy and Information Studies). ICMI activists acknowledged that the moves were meant to counter the influ-

ence of the Moertopo-linked CSIS and the Catholic-oriented *Kompas* daily. Such was the influence—and fear—of CSIS, that it also prompted the green generals to establish their own think tank, CPDS (Centre for Policy and Development Studies).<sup>92</sup>

Coincidentally, Soeharto was dispensing with the so-called “Berkeley Mafia”, a group of market-oriented economists under the tutelage of his long-time economics adviser, Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro. In the later period of his rule, he replaced pro-market “technocrats” with pro-state “technologists” under the leadership of Habibie and State Minister of National Development Planning Ginandjar Kartasasmita. Habibie came up with his economics initiatives known as “Habibienomics”, in which he envisaged a “quantum leap” in economic development through the establishment of high-tech projects.<sup>93</sup> Both Habibie and Ginandjar were known to favour indigenous Muslim businessmen as opposed to Soeharto’s earlier reliance on the Catholic-Chinese conglomerates. In line with Budiman’s logic, a “greener” military was crucial to ensure the process.

### Soeharto’s Hitmen

The green camp, however, was by no means monolithic. In fact, they were deeply fractured due to their conflicting interests, which made them entirely dependent on Soeharto. With military leaders a generation younger than his own, Soeharto’s control over the institution was unprecedented. While he dealt with military adversaries of the 1945 Generation in a “co-opt and conquer” way, as was demonstrated by the cases of Soemitro, Moertopo, Moerdani and even Sudradjat, Soeharto faced practically no resistance from the Tanjung-Hartono generations as they looked up to him as sons would a father.

When the 1945 Generation was still in control of the military, Soeharto would let his generals conduct personnel changes through the Council for High Ranking Promotions and Duty Rotations (*Wanjakti*), save for the Chiefs of Staff positions. But the age gap with the post-1945 Generation presented the ageing president with some difficulty in commanding direct loyalty as he had done with officers of his own generation, whom he either knew well personally or had served under his command. Thus, he needed a layer of “middlemen”—usually his children or confidants—to whom he relied upon for information. This, in turn, exacerbated internal factionalism as the officers were engaged in fierce competition over direct access to the Palace. Soeharto consciously nurtured competition and tension among the military officers to ensure his control over the institution. As a result, the military’s standardized mechanism to select and promote its officers was seriously disrupted.

A closer look into the military elite configuration in the period of 1995–1997 reveals a highly politicized and deeply divided institution due to Palace intervention. The green generals, for instance, competed to develop channels to the Palace while at the same time cultivating their own support base among the different Muslim groups and communities. Tanjung was known to have forged close ties with Habibie, while Hartono built his political access through Soeharto’s eldest daughter, Tutut. As a much younger officer, Prabowo initially appeared to rely on them for support, but as he climbed his career ladder he too began to cultivate his own power base.

While Tanjung drew his support from the ICMI, Hartono tried to maximize his NU background to reap political support from the largest Muslim organization, despite strong resistance from its leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. Prabowo, on the other hand, embraced the hardline Muslim organizations that his father-in-law had formerly sidelined, such as the Indonesian Council for the Propagation of Islam (DDII) and Masyumi’s former

youth wing, the Indonesian Muslim Students (PII).<sup>94</sup> Another influential officer, the *Kassopol* Syarwan Hamid, who had unusually never served as presidential aide, appeared to accommodate the interest of the more powerful generals. Inevitably, their subordinates were drawn into the competition, resulting in the emergence of conflicting political cliques within the institution.

Similarly, the red-and-white camp was equally divided. In the military headquarters, the camp was represented by ABRI's *Kasum* Lieutenant-General Soeyono and *Pangkostrad* Lieutenant-General Wiranto. Both Soeyono and Wiranto had served as Soeharto's adjutants and were known as Palace loyalists. But the core members of the camp were retired army generals who became disillusioned with Soeharto, including Edi Sudradjat, Co-ordinating Minister of Socio-political Affairs (*Menko Polkam*) General (retd.) Soesilo Soedarman and the increasingly estranged vice-president Try Sutrisno.

While Sutrisno and Soedarman refrained from criticizing Soeharto due to their close personal ties, Sudradjat came forward as a loyal but critical voice in the Cabinet. He appointed two former *Kassopols* Harsudiyono Hartas and Hariyoto P.S., who had been dismissed at Soeharto's instructions, as his informal advisers.<sup>95</sup> Later, he lent tacit support to the establishment of the Foundation for National Brotherhood Harmony (YKPK), a rainbow coalition of prominent civilian and retired military figures who expressed their concern over what they perceived as the Islamicization of Indonesian politics through the ICMI. Former Army Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant-General (retd.) Bambang Triantoro and Matori Abdul Jalil, a seasoned NU politician, were elected its chairman and secretary general respectively.<sup>96</sup>

Another faction within the red-and-white camp was the critical military legislators, such as Major-General (retd.) Samsuddin, Major-General (retd.) Raja Kami Sembiring Meliala and Brigadier-General Rukmini Kusumo Astuti, who used Parliament as a launching pad against Soeharto at the expense of their political careers.<sup>97</sup> With tacit support from Moerdani, who maintained a low political profile after his defeat in 1988, members of military faction (Fraksi ABRI) launched an initiative for political openness, initially aimed at discrediting Soeharto's authoritarian rule but later snowballed into a collective call for greater political freedom. They relentlessly attacked the government's tight political control, arguing that in the so-called New World Order that emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union, global agenda would be focused on democracy and human rights.<sup>98</sup>

But those military "reformers" were outmanoeuvred when Soeharto took up the issues and repackaged them into his own adaptation of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*. He widened the valve of political liberalization, including an eased restriction on the press and Parliament, and a foresighted decision to establish the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in 1992. In October 1993, he shocked most political observers when he picked a civilian politician, Minister of Information Harmoko, to replace Lieutenant-General (retd.) Wahono as chairman of the military's political arm, Golkar. Few analysts believed that Soeharto has become a born-again democrat and that he moved genuinely to demilitarize Indonesian politics. Rather, they suspected that he was angered by Wahono's failure to maintain Golkar's performance in the 1992 elections. Golkar collected 68 per cent votes in 1992, a drop from 73.2 per cent in 1987, partly due to the PDI's spectacular performance.<sup>99</sup>

Harmoko's election reflected Soeharto's strategic success in putting the military under his control, while at the same time shifting the balance of the civilian-military pendulum. Unlike its previously sedate party elections, Golkar's 1993 Congress was the first open opposition to Soeharto since Moerdani's failed attempt in 1988. Initially,

few military generals believed that Soeharto was serious when he indicated his choice of Harmoko, a former editor with no ties to the military, to lead the New Order's most important political machine. Moreover, Soeharto also appeared to endorse military candidates to contest the election, including some of his close confidants, Soesilo Soedarman and State Secretary Moerdiono.<sup>100</sup>

However, a few days before the Congress began, words were spread that Soeharto had instructed Habibie, the acting chairman of the Dewan Pembina, to secure Harmoko's election. It drew strong opposition from the red-and-white generals, who suspected that Soeharto was now moving to include Golkar in his grand political reorientation. Although Harmoko was not known as a devout Muslim (he was heavily criticized for a slip of tongue in reciting the Al-Fatihah, a verse in the Holy Qur'an, in 1996) and was keen on demonstrating his *priyayi* background, he sat at the ICMI's Advisory Board. Thus, he was seen as Habibie's ally in Golkar.

In anticipation of a possible presidential succession in 1998, the generals suspected that Harmoko's rise to Golkar's chairmanship was meant to pave the way for Habibie's ascent to presidency. In a shocking interview with *DeTik* Magazine, Major-General Raja Kami Sembiring Meliala, who sat as the deputy head of the military faction in Parliament, expressed the camp's sentiment. He said that the military would never let the presidency go to a civilian and that Harmoko and Habibie were merely Soeharto's cronies, without whose support they would simply "vanish". He also indicated that the military would launch an all-out effort to block Harmoko's election.<sup>101</sup>

Thus, the congress was turned into a theatre of "war of colours". In his capacity as chairman of the Congress' seven men electoral board, Habibie tried to secure support for Harmoko. But he faced strong challenge from the red-and-white generals, who fought for Soedarman. As 21 out of 27 provincial chairmanships were at the hands of retired military officials, only 13 branches indicated their intention to nominate Harmoko.<sup>102</sup> Faced with possible humiliation, Soeharto decided to intervene. He sent a handwritten disposition, instructing ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung to secure Harmoko's election. Soedarman was informed of Soeharto's decision, which he accepted on the condition that his honour must be preserved.<sup>103</sup>

In the final round, Harmoko was elected Golkar's first civilian leader in a convincing victory. In his inaugural speech, he promised to increase the party's performance in the upcoming 1997 elections to 70.02 per cent.<sup>104</sup> Later, he admitted Soeharto's two children, Tutut and Bambang Trihatmojo, into the party's central executive boards. He also began to sideline Wahono's supporters and replaced them with his own loyalists and ICMI activists in a process termed by some observers as "de-Wahono-ization".<sup>105</sup>

As the more critical voices of the red-and-white generals were subdued, the two-decade long effort at maintaining the military's autonomy, especially its political neutrality vis-à-vis the president, finally came to an end. The last open debate on the issue took place in October 1995 between *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Muhammad Ma'roef and his predecessor and Army Chief-of-Staff General R. Hartono.<sup>106</sup> A Sudradjat protégé, Ma'roef was a red-and-white minority among the predominantly green officers in the ABRI leadership. Delivering a keynote speech at a closed-door meeting in the ABRI headquarters in Cilangkap on behalf of the *Pangab*, who was on a presidential tour abroad, Ma'roef declared that "ABRI's political aspirations are channelled through *Fraksi ABRI*".<sup>107</sup> Although this was a normative statement, it implied that the military would not automatically synchronize its political aspirations with that of Golkar's. In other words, ABRI wished to maintain its political

neutrality, thus reviving the theme of the Seskoad Paper of the 1970s.

It was unclear whether Ma'roef had intended to fight for ABRI's neutrality or merely acted out of carelessness, but his statement drew a prompt protest from Hartono, who was also present at the meeting.<sup>108</sup> In a heated debate that followed, Hartono criticized the implication of such a statement and raised suspicion that "some elements within the ABRI were trying to divert its political support from Golkar to another party".<sup>109</sup> Navy Chief Admiral Tanto Kuswanto intervened to end the debate. But, in a clear indication of further weakening of the red-and-white camp, Ma'roef was relieved from his post three months later by Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid. Many military insiders believed that the debate at Cilangkap had contributed to Ma'roef's fall.

A few months later, Hartono reasserted his stance on "ABRI's unquestioned support of Golkar". In March 1996, while accompanying Tutut on her political tour, he made a statement before Golkar members that "every ABRI member is a cadre of Golkar and there is no need for him or her to be dubious about stating their allegiance to Golkar". He delivered it in a provocative manner in which he was clad in the party's yellow attire. No less shocking was his additional statement that "as Golkar cadre, my duty is to receive instructions from Mbak Tutut".<sup>110</sup>

Interestingly, his statement drew criticism from both Golkar and the military leaders as well as retired military officers and political activists. In a party meeting attended by Tutut, Harmoko criticized Hartono's statement, arguing that it contradicted Golkar's rules, which decreed that active servicemen were prohibited from participating in political activities. Harmoko even released a press statement to clarify Golkar's position on the issue.<sup>111</sup> Similarly, the *Kassospol* Syarwan Hamid also issued an official release on behalf of the *Pangab*, contradicting Hartono's statement and emphasized that it was made on a "personal capacity".<sup>112</sup> Other officers were upset that a four-star general had explicitly expressed ABRI's subordination to Golkar, while each military cadet knew that it was ABRI that founded Golkar. They quietly dubbed Hartono the "Yellow Military" (*ABRI Kuning*).<sup>113</sup>

While some academics have theorized that such a heated controversy over Hartono's statement reflected problematic implementation of *dwifungsi* in the changing Indonesian polity, the truth appeared to be much simpler.<sup>114</sup> Hartono's colleagues had long suspected that his real motives were political, as was obvious from his statement that "he would receive instructions from Mbak Tutut". In other words, Hartono used ABRI-Golkar relations to strengthen his access to the Palace through his close personal friendship with Tutut.<sup>115</sup> The suspicion seemed to be confirmed when Hartono won the debate despite criticism from Tanjung, Hamid and Harmoko. In October 1996, he attended the opening of Golkar's leadership meeting, accompanied by the other three Chiefs of Staff, all clad in the party's yellow jackets.<sup>116</sup>

The "Yellow Military Episode" underlined the obvious fact that ABRI was now reduced simply to Soeharto's political tool or hitmen (*centeng*), thus ending two decades of turbulent relationship between the president and the military. With all key institutions now under his full control, Soeharto began to re-design the New Order's polity, including the military's role in it. In 1995, he commissioned the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI) to conduct an unprecedented comprehensive study on the election system, ABRI's representation in Parliament and the future of *dwifungsi*. Later, he ordered a cutback of the military's parliamentary seats from 100 to 75. In private discussions with his confidants, he began sounding the possibility of a democratic transition to a civilian rule.<sup>117</sup>

His consistency indicated that rather acting out of emotional displeasure with his

generals, Soeharto actually employed a two-fold strategy when he began his political liberalization policy. By shifting the civilian-military balance towards the former, he erected another column in his power pillars, in which one would counterbalance the other, thus cementing his grip on power. At the same time, he comprehended that after the fall of Soviet Union, democracy would become the new international buzzword. There lay the paradox of Soeharto's openness policy: while he appeared to adjust his rule to anticipate it, he kept his hands on the valve lid, ready to stop the process if it jeopardized his political interests. In other words, his short-term goal to hold on to power superseded his enlightened foresight to democratize the country that he had served for more than half a century.

## THE PARADE OF NAKED POWER

The period of openness came to a sudden halt in the mid 1990s, at the time when Soeharto's power was at its zenith. As his power grew unchecked, Soeharto became less sensitive to criticism and he resorted more to coercive approach than exercising his adaptation of Sultan Agung's delicate co-opt-and-conquer strategy admired by his friends and foes alike. In what follows, we will discuss three political events that best illustrate Soeharto's changing attitudes and the ABRI's role as his hitmen: the press ban of three weeklies in June 1994, the failed attempt to unseat Abdurahman Wahid from the NU leadership in December 1994 and the forced ouster of Megawati Soekarnoputri from the PDI leadership in June 1996.

### Killing the Messenger

The year 1994 saw the opening salvo of a parade of Soeharto's coercive powers when on 21 June he ordered the banning of three popular weeklies—*Tempo*, *Editor* and *DeTik*—and effectively ended the five-year-long “press freedom”. The official reason given was that the weeklies had failed to operate under the terms of their business licenses, but few believed the excuse.<sup>118</sup>

The three weeklies had been very aggressive in reporting the open rift between government officials—considered taboo under the New Order's list of dos and don'ts—over the purchase of 39 used warships from the former East German navy, costing between USD10 million and USD12.7 million each. Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie proposed for a total USD1.1 billion in refurbishment cost, but Defence Minister Edi Sudradjat said it was too expensive and Minister of Finance Mar'ie Muhammad declared that the government could only provide a quarter of the required fund.<sup>119</sup> The controversy heated up when, on 7 June 1994, one of the ships nearly sank near the Bay of Biscay, off northern Spain, when they were on their way to Indonesia.<sup>120</sup>

The warship controversy culminated Habibie's frequent conflicts with a number of military generals over defence projects. It also presented a dark picture of massive corruption involving government officials and Soeharto's cronies over lucrative arms purchases. Recent information reveals that it was Soeharto's son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, who first proposed to buy the ageing warships, along with the Salim Group as his business partner in 1992. They proposed a total cost of USD1.3 billion.<sup>121</sup>

Soeharto, however, decided that Habibie could use his German connections to obtain a better deal and win political support from minority leaders in the Bundestag as the anti-Indonesian lobby in Germany strongly opposed Chancellor Helmut Kohl's decision to sell NATO weapons to an authoritarian regime. NGO activists occupied

the dockyard and managed to force German authorities to strip the warships of their original weapons before they were shipped to Indonesia. Soeharto sent Habibie and a technical team headed by *Kasum* Lieutenant-General Feisal Tanjung to negotiate the purchase, bypassing Sudradjat's arms procurement department and Navy Chief Admiral Tanto Kuswanto.

The team succeeded in obtaining a bargain price of USD18.75 million to USD12.7 million for each ship. But as the 15-year-old warships were designed for European terrain, the cost of refitting them and additional costs of building new naval dockyards and deepwater ports increased the total budget to nearly USD1.1 billion. The team, however, submitted a second proposal and shaved the figure to only USD482.35 million, suggesting that the earlier figure was marked-up. But Mar'ie remained unimpressed, arguing that the state's budget was extremely tight, and slashed the proposed budget to USD319 million.<sup>122</sup> The controversy ended when, in a ceremony welcoming the arrival of the controversial ships in Lampung on 14 June, Soeharto defended his decision to let Habibie conclude the deal without involving the Department of Defence and the Navy. He accused those who complained about the purchase of the warships did so to pit one government official against the other (*mengadu domba*) and that he would deal with them in time.<sup>123</sup>

Sensing Soeharto's anger, the three "noisy" weeklies laid low. Instead of pursuing the stories, they carried more entertainment news. But it was too late, as Soeharto had made up his mind. On 21 June, the editors of the three weeklies were summoned to the office of Minister of Information Harmoko. They were told that their publication licenses had been revoked.<sup>124</sup> The sudden end of the press freedom sparked a number of conspiracy theories about who was actually behind it, with many fingers pointing to Habibie.<sup>125</sup> The truth, however, was simple: it was Soeharto who ordered the ban.<sup>126</sup> In fact, Habibie tried to prevent it, preferring to take the three publications to court.

After the ban, two Soeharto's cronies, businessmen Muhammad "Bob" Hasan and Abdul Latief (who happened to be Minister of Manpower), bought the licenses of two of the closed publications, *Tempo* and *Editor*, and resurrected them under the names *Gatra* and *Tiras* respectively.<sup>127</sup> But the ban failed to silence the increasingly critical public voices. Just like the cruel king in the folk story, Soeharto had killed the messenger simply because he disliked the message. But the revolution of the information age has made it difficult for authoritarian regimes to stop the dissemination of "subversive" political news. And, as McCargo correctly pointed out, the killing of the messenger had somehow helped to set the chain of events that later led to the demise of Soeharto's New Order.<sup>128</sup>

## Operation Green Dragon

A few months after silencing the noisy press, Soeharto was engaged in a bolder move to subdue the political influence of the charismatic cleric and a future president, Abdurrahman Wahid. In December 1994, Indonesia's biggest Muslim organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama, held its 29th congress in a quiet village that is home to a well-known *Pesantren*, Cipasung in the West Java town of Tasikmalaya. The congress was scheduled to elect a new leader to succeed Wahid. Arguably the most influential leader of the NU, Wahid had reinvented it from a grouping of traditionalist *ulamas* into a progressive organization that has gained international recognition as a tolerant and inclusive Muslim movement. But his controversial personality and erratic behaviour won him more foes than friends at home.

Wahid came to the helm of the organization through the NU's 27th Congress held

in the East Java town of Situbondo in 1984, amidst heightened tension between the government and Muslims over the *asas tunggal*. As the grandson of NU's founder Kiai Hasjim Asj'ari, Wahid was expected to rejuvenate an organization that was beleaguered by intense internal conflict and political infighting within the PPP. With support from a group of young NU intellectuals known as the G Group (*Kelompok G*), he proposed that the NU take an equidistant position from all political parties and accept the *asas tunggal*.<sup>129</sup> The move received strong encouragement from respected senior *ulamas*, including the highly respected Kiai Ahmad Siddiq, the drafter of an eloquent argument explaining the NU's decision to support the *asas tunggal*, which won praises even from Muslim leaders who fought to reject it.<sup>130</sup>

The government strongly encouraged the NU's softer stance on the *asas tunggal* as it helped to weaken the PPP. Hence, its support for Wahid, who was then only a young inexperienced politician compared to the long-serving incumbent chairman, Idham Chalid. In a tight election, Wahid won the NU chairmanship through a tacit intelligence operation supervised by the man who would become his close friend and ally, the influential ABRI Chief General L.B. Moerdani.<sup>131</sup>

In the first five years of his leadership, Wahid steered the NU closer towards the government, ending nearly two decades of strained relationship. But after his re-election in 1989, Wahid began to feel disillusioned with the New Order and began to express open criticism of the regime, especially after Soeharto supervised the establishment of the ICMI. In 1992, he founded the Forum of Democracy (Fordem), a loose alliance of pro-democracy activists committed to maintaining Indonesia's ethnic and religious pluralism. Despite Habibie's repeated personal invitations to join the ICMI, Wahid openly criticized its inception, arguing that it would open a Pandora box of political primordialism. He even wrote a personal letter to Soeharto, warning him that the ICMI could be misused by radical Islamists to emulate the so-called Algerian Scenario. In 1992, the Islamist party, Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS), won Algier's first free and fair elections but was denied victory by the military who clamped down on the movement. Soeharto rejected the letter, which Wahid later called as a "stupidity".<sup>132</sup>

Thus, realizing that Soeharto was displeased with him and that he had served two terms, Wahid was actually prepared to step down as the Cipasung congress drew near. In conversation with his military contacts, he set a condition that his successor must not be drawn from Idham Chalid's camp.<sup>133</sup> Wahid personally endorsed his brother-in-law, Fahmi Saifuddin, a government official and the son of former Minister of Religious Affairs Saifuddin Zuhri to be his successor. He would be content to lead the board of religious advisers (*Dewan Syuriah*), which he would empower with certain executive authorities.

The government, however, refused to dance to his tune. From the first day of the congress, it was obvious that Soeharto wanted him replaced. When Soeharto arrived at the meeting venue, Wahid was not among the NU dignitaries who greeted him. More significantly, Wahid was denied a chance to deliver the welcoming speech and he was seated in the visitors' row.<sup>134</sup>

Inevitably, the congress became a "battlefield" for many competing interests. The *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Hartono was in charge of the entire "socio-political operation" (*operasi sopol*) to unseat Wahid. He was assisted informally by a group of CPDS intellectuals and ICMI staffers. ICMI's newspaper, *Republika*, carried stories and opinions endorsing Wahid's replacement, which drew anger from Wahid's supporters, who boycotted its free delivery and threw stacks of the newspaper into a pool at the congress venue.<sup>135</sup>

As the green camp launched an all-out effort to unseat Wahid, their red-and-white

rival mobilized a defence for him. Defence Minister Edi Sudradjat and his adviser, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Hariyoto P.S., stayed in the congress vicinity and prevented attempts to use military force to mount pressure on Wahid.<sup>136</sup> When they found out that Wahid's adversaries were using money to buy votes, Sudradjat decided to disburse funds into Wahid's personal account.<sup>137</sup> Finally, in an open election marred by allegation of money politics, Wahid outvoted Abu Hasan, his political financier turned nemesis, and was elected NU chairman for the third consecutive time.<sup>138</sup> But Soeharto refused to receive Wahid and the new NU leadership at the Palace, as was the custom of that time, indicating his displeasure with Wahid's re-election.

Taking advantage of the obvious tension, Hasan fought back. He set up a breakaway faction called the Co-ordinator of Central Executive Board of Nahdlatul Ulama (KPPNU) and started to establish provincial branches. But his organization never really took off as the government has somewhat refrained from interfering directly in the NU conflict, despite Wahid's open resistance. In late September 1996, a series of riots occurred in several NU pockets in Situbondo, East Java, and Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok, West Java. Wahid accused that some ICMI individuals and certain military elements of masterminding the riots and launching an intelligence operation code-named Operation Green Dragon to unseat him.<sup>139</sup>

Another factor that may have saved Wahid from Soeharto's wrath was his famed political zigzagging. A master of political survival strategy, Wahid went through his informal channels to approach Soeharto and managed to arrange a "political handshake" with the president when they met in *Pesantren* Genggong in the East Java town of Probolinggo on 2 November 1996. One month later, he organized a mass prayer (*istighotsah*) in Surabaya, in which he prayed for Soeharto's health and welfare.<sup>140</sup> More importantly, he went to approach the president's aspiring politician daughter, Tutut, and offered her the support of the NU. The public was taken aback when in 1997 Wahid began escorting Tutut to tour the NU *pesantrens* and called her the "future leader". The strategy worked well and Wahid continued to lead the NU until he relinquished his leadership after he was elected president in 1999.

## Operation Red Dragon

If Wahid had been successful in resisting Soeharto's political manoeuvring, Megawati Soekarnoputri was less lucky. The daughter of former president Soekarno, Megawati was elected PDI chairman in December 1993, a result of the government's faulted strategy to depose her predecessor Soerjadi—who would, ironically, become her forced successor—in the party congress in Medan five months earlier.

Soerjadi incited Soeharto's wrath when he launched a campaign called ABS (*Asal Bukan Soeharto* or "Anyone but Soeharto"), which cemented the PDI's image as the party of change and helped propel its spectacular performance in the 1992 elections. Buoyed by popular support and tacit encouragement from Moerdani's faction in the military, Soerjadi played the game a bit too far: he refused to endorse Soeharto's presidential re-nomination until the very last minute.<sup>141</sup> Moreover, he let his party nominate himself as its presidential candidate in a leadership meeting in Bogor in January 1993, although it was later withdrawn. Soerjadi's obvious "political rebellion" led to the government's decision to unseat him.

It began with attempts at implicating Soerjadi in an abduction case involving some PDI functionaries. After meeting Soeharto only two days before the Medan Congress began on 21 July, Feisal Tanjung declared that Soerjadi was "legally defect" and thus

unfit for re-election as PDI chairman.<sup>142</sup> Armed with the government's backing, Soerjadi's opponents tried to unseat him in the four-day congress in Medan. A seasoned politician, Soerjadi fought back and secured the floor's support for his re-election. But the congress ended in a deadlock when a party splinter rejected his re-election and, with apparent military backing, stormed the meeting venue. The government then refused to acknowledge the result, citing reason that the election process was invalid.

Recent information suggests that Soerjadi's re-election was somewhat due to Soeharto's rule of ambiguity. Six months before the Medan Congress was held, the *Kassospol* Hariyoto P.S. reminded Minister of Home Affairs Yogie Suardi Memet to ask for Soeharto's preferred candidate for the PDI chairman, realizing that the president must have been angered by Soerjadi's ABS campaign. Memet met Soeharto but received no signal that he would object to Soerjadi's re-election. Hariyoto, however, was not convinced. He went to Moerdiono with the same question and was given the same reply. So Hariyoto instructed all *Pangdams* to mobilize support among the PDI's regional delegates to endorse Soerjadi's re-election. When Moerdiono informed him of Soeharto's objection to Soerjadi's re-nomination at the very last minute, it was already too late to cancel the order. In a frantic attempt to prevent a violent confrontation, Hariyoto tried to persuade Soerjadi to step down and warned him of the possible consequences that he would face if he refused. But Soerjadi was undeterred.<sup>143</sup>

The PDI saga continued until the government came up with a proposal that a party's extraordinary congress be held in Surabaya in December 1993 to resolve the issue. Initially, the government came up with its candidate, Budi Hardjono, and tried to block the rise of the PDI's rising star, Megawati Soekarnoputri. But after consulting Soeharto, Memet announced just a few hours after the congress began on 2 December that the government "had no objection" to Megawati.<sup>144</sup> The government's ambivalence, however, created confusion among party delegates, which in turn led to another round of violence and deadlock although Megawati was eventually elected as the de-facto chairman since she won more than 80 per cent of eligible party votes. In order to resolve the stalemate, the government-sanctioned caretaker decided to hold another extraordinary leadership meeting in Jakarta at the end of the month.

At this point, Soeharto was torn in a dilemma. He was still unsure that Megawati's election as PDI chairperson would not resurface the repressed yet popular pro-Soekarno sentiment. But he knew that he would risk further political uncertainty if he had moved to block her way, and that such a move would be detrimental to the image of his openness policy. Considering that Megawati was known as a meek and inexperienced politician who could be controlled easily, he finally ordered Hariyoto to endorse her election but added that "you may need to change it [the leadership] again later".<sup>145</sup> In an attempt to bridge the gap between their two prominent families, Tutut made a much-publicized visit to Soekarno's gravesite and later, on 15 December, invited Megawati for a cosy 20-minute chat.<sup>146</sup>

The military carried out Soeharto's order to secure Megawati's election. Hariyoto invited Megawati to his office and informed her of the new decision. He advised her not to include "leftist elements" in her party roster, to which she agreed. In the next few days, they held regular meetings at around 7 p.m. at military premises, in which Megawati dutifully consulted her candidates with Hariyoto and the head of BIA, Major-General Arie Sudewo. Megawati also agreed not to repeat Soerjadi's mistake in campaigning for ABS. ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung then instructed *Kopassus* Commander and BIA director Brigadier-General Agum Gumelar and Jakarta military commander Major-General Hendropriyono to ensure the security of the PDI's extraordinary meet-

ing. Hendropriyono and Gumelar assembled PDI functionaries and ordered them to support Megawati's election as PDI chairman. Thus, on 4 December, Megawati was elected chairperson of the PDI, presiding over party functionaries thoroughly screened by the military.<sup>147</sup>

But the honeymoon was short-lived. Despite her inexperience with politics, Megawati began to demonstrate her independence from the government's pressure. Thus, less than a year later, in January 1995, the West Java regional military intelligence (*Bakorstanasda*) released a classified report that a local PDI chairman was allegedly linked to the banned PKI. In February, Megawati's husband, Taufiq Kiemas, was publicly accused to have participated in a leftist student activity in 1966. Jusuf Merukh, Megawati's internal adversary, alleged that at least 300 party functionaries were linked to past communist activities.<sup>148</sup>

Classified military intelligence data just released indicates that a smear campaign was directed at discrediting Megawati. At the same time, she was facing mounting challenges from within her own party. In January, Merukh declared a breakaway faction, PDI Reshuffle, followed by mysterious kidnapping of the PDI's Secretary-General and a Megawati loyalist, Alex Litaay. In the following months, the media reported increased internal party factionalism, including the emergence of dual-party leadership in the East Java chapter, and speculated about "external interference" in it.<sup>149</sup>

In October, Soeharto called for national awareness against the so-called "newly-styled communism" (KGB) and "formless organization" (OTB). Shortly after that, his ministers and generals chorused in, issuing warnings that leftist elements have infiltrated many political and mass organizations. They even made accusations that, in some cases, "extreme left" elements have joined forces with the "extreme right" and the "new left" intelligentsia to destabilize the government.<sup>150</sup> There was no doubt that the warning was aimed, among others, at the PDI, which seemed to precede a deliberate military operation against the party.

There had been some theories on why Soeharto changed his mind and moved against Megawati. One semi-official version claimed that Soeharto was genuinely concerned about the resurgence of communism through the PDI. In private conversations with his close confidants, Soeharto had often expressed his concern that Megawati's PDI was struggling to implement her father's idea of *marhaenism*, which he saw as a local variant of communism.<sup>151</sup> His position was echoed by the government and military officials who openly came up with an accusation that Megawati was too weak to prevent extreme left elements from infiltrating her party.<sup>152</sup>

Although Soeharto's concern could be understood in the context of his government's strict anti-communism policy, the allegation of "leftist infiltration" on Megawati's PDI was disputed by the fact that her party roster had been thoroughly screened by the military prior to her ascent to chairmanship. Thus, there must have been more pressing reasons that forced the government to take such a high-risk political gambit. Another popular theory was the "twin suns theory", which says that Soeharto could not allow Megawati to emerge as a serious political contender to his daughter, Tutut, who was aspiring to higher political office. But, while personal considerations might have influenced his decisions, Soeharto was too astute a politician to simply act out of emotional impulse.<sup>153</sup>

Therefore, it was more reasonable to argue that Soeharto was concerned that under Megawati's popular leadership, the PDI would jeopardize Golkar's ambition to recapture its lost seats in the 1992 elections.<sup>154</sup> The fear was exacerbated by the fact that Megawati had developed a close political friendship with the government's staunchest critic,

Abdurrahman Wahid.<sup>155</sup> The government obviously considered them serious political threats as they could mobilize their large masses to destabilize the regime. Hence the need to eliminate that potential threat.<sup>156</sup>

Recent information even suggests that there was a plan to conduct joint intelligence and socio-political operations involving the police, BIA's directorates A and C<sup>157</sup>, ABRI Chief's Security Unit (*Dispam Pangab*) and all socio-political units in the regional military garrisons. Supervised by the *Kassospol* Office, the three stages operations were aimed at removing Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid from their respective offices. Code-named "Sociopolitical Operation Red Dragon and Green Dragon", which referred to the PDI and NU respectively, the operation was scheduled to take place from 14 March to 31 July 1996. Details of the operation were provided in a written operational order (*surat perintah operasi*) drafted by the *Kassospol* Office. The ABRI headquarters then formally issued the document to all *Pangdams* and regional governors invited to attend a special briefing on 14 March. The document was also made available to the three Chiefs of Staff and the Police Chief.

But Army Chief Hartono, who claimed that he was not fully consulted about the operation, opposed it on the grounds that it could exacerbate tension between the government and the masses of NU and the PDI. In a move that clearly demonstrated acute internal rivalry, Hartono asked Tutut to arrange him an urgent private audience with Soeharto immediately after receiving the document. He was granted an audience on 26 March and presented Soeharto with the document. According to Hartono, Soeharto was upset and ordered Tanjung to abort the operation. Shortly after that, all operational documents already in circulation were recalled to the ABRI Headquarters.<sup>158</sup>

It remained unclear, however, whether the operation was really aborted or merely modified. The ABRI's socio-political officers denied that it had ever taken place. In separate interviews in 2001, Syarwan Hamid, the *Kassospol* at that time, his two former staffs, Major-General (retd.) Suwarno Adiwijoyo and Brigadier-General Budi Harsono denied that their office had drafted the document and supervised the operation. But former head of *Bakin* Lieutenant-General (retd.) Moetojib acknowledged the existence of the document and confirmed that the operation was executed. He confirmed that his organization was not involved although *Bakin* was supposed to coordinate all intelligence activities. He called it "a fatal mistake" that such a sensitive operation was detailed in a widely distributed document, as socio-political and intelligence operations were normally conducted in absolute confidentiality.<sup>159</sup>

It was possible that the operation did not take place as initially planned because its details had been known to outside parties. The fact that the document was made available to so many parties had made it possible that it was later leaked to unintended readers, such as the media and a few political leaders, including Wahid.<sup>160</sup> But it was equally possible that the operation was executed with some modification.

In May, several PDI functionaries led by Fatimah Achmad and Buttu Hutapea openly called for Megawati's resignation from party chairmanship, with obvious government backing.<sup>161</sup> They demanded that an extraordinary congress be held to judge her leadership, citing reasons that she had failed to carry out the mandate of the Surabaya congress.<sup>162</sup> On 20 June, a government-sanctioned congress was held in Medan and four days later the PDI resurrected Soerjadi to the party chairmanship, the same man that was deposed at the same place three years earlier.

Was the government that desperate to resurrect the deposed Soerjadi? Strange as it may sound, the answer is yes. A politico-historical reconstruction of the PDI affair based

on presently available official documents, private notes and interviews with relevant sources reveals that the entire PDI debacle resulted from a hastily planned and poorly executed military operation and a sharp division among Soeharto's own advisers. In fact, the 27 July Affair provides best illustration of Soeharto's control of ABRI and how military leaders were drawn into fierce rivalries to win his favour.

The decision to unseat Megawati was taken at a meeting in the ABRI headquarter in April 1996.<sup>163</sup> The entire operation was conducted under direct command from ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung in coordination with Minister of Home Affairs Yogie Memet and other relevant departments and institutions. Tanjung and Memet reported to Coordinating Minister of Socio-political Affairs Soesilo Soedarman who, in turn, was responsible to Soeharto. Syarwan Hamid acknowledged that he supervised socio-political operations to replace Megawati with Soerjadi but insisted that he carried out the government's order.<sup>164</sup>

The socio-political operation had to be concluded before preparations for the May 1997 elections began. The deadline was set at June 1996 because it was the time when all political parties were required to submit their lists of provisional legislative candidates to the National Election Committee (KPU) for screening and approval. They had to prevent Megawati from submitting her list of candidates and ensure that the PDI's list would be filled with people acceptable to the government.<sup>165</sup>

Under tremendous time pressure, military operators were left with limited time to devise the plan. Faced with the PDI's acute internal factionalism, they found it hard to find an alternative candidate to face Megawati. Their preferred candidate was Fatimah Achmad but the seasoned woman politician declined the offer, realizing that her ethnicity would hinder her from winning the support of the Java-based party grassroots.<sup>166</sup> They offered it to Merukh but the businessman-cum-politician demanded that the party roster be filled with his loyalists, which was unacceptable to the military. They approached Soetardjo Soerjogoritno. Although he was critical of Megawati's leadership style, the veteran politician refused to participate in any attempt to unseat Soekarno's daughter.<sup>167</sup> Finally, they arrived at the bitter realization that the only feasible candidate was the politician that they had kicked out earlier, Soerjadi. As PDI chairman, the seasoned politician had built an entrenched support within the party. After all, he was the one who brought Megawati to the PDI's centre stage.

A true Machiavellian, Soerjadi agreed to run against Megawati when a military lobbyist approached him while he was on a *hajj* in Mecca, hoping for a political revival. He set the conditions that Soeharto must first approve him and that he would receive all necessary support. Soeharto's approval was secured through Harmoko, which was followed by the disbursement of funds and provision of a security umbrella.<sup>168</sup>

An operational plan was then devised to hold an extraordinary congress to unseat Megawati. During an internal party meeting on 3 June, Megawati made a fatal blunder, which reflected her political inexperience. Initially, she agreed to hold the extraordinary congress in which, according to the party's regulation, she had the authority to pick its steering committee. But after consulting her husband, she backtracked and refused to attend the congress. The military operators were extremely relieved. "We actually panicked. It would have been difficult to engineer the result of the congress if she had picked her loyalists to sit at the steering committee," one military operator who was involved to the process recalled.<sup>169</sup> In her absence, the government-sanctioned Medan congress was held amidst tight security, which later witnessed the return of Soerjadi to the helm of the PDI.

## The 27 July Raid

The unfeeling display of naked power against Megawati angered her supporters and pro-democracy activists. On 20 June, they held massive street protests near the Gambir railway station in Central Jakarta, which ended in riots. Two days later, PDI supporters occupied the party's headquarters in the elite Menteng area near the private complex of the Soeharto family. They staged the freest speech forum ever held in many years, claiming that the Commander of the Jakarta Regional Military Command (*Kodam Jaya*), Major-General Sutiyoso, approved it, provided that it was held within the headquarters premises.<sup>170</sup>

The forum drew huge masses and was turned into an open theatre of public protest against the regime. It lasted for more than a month, during which the government worked to devise a plan to end the increasingly unruly protest. The military made accusations that the forum had been infiltrated by "leftist elements" but the previously effective mechanism to silence government's critics failed to intimidate Megawati's supporters. Thus, a carefully planned military operation was executed to take over the government-owned headquarters on 27 July 1996.

On that fateful Saturday morning, Jakarta was awakened to the shocking news about the raid on the PDI headquarters, which spread quickly thanks to modern information technology. By midday, thousands of angry masses were gathering around the devastated headquarters, protesting against the raid. A clash broke out. By noon, the capital was besieged by the worst mass riots since the Malari Affair. Despite widespread public scepticism, however, the government denied its involvement in the raid. It blamed the raid on a clash between the two PDI supporters, and the subsequent riots on a little-known group of leftist sympathizers, the People's Democratic Party (PRD), which led to the largest "red purge" since the 1960s.

But the official version was widely questioned when Soeyono was suddenly replaced as *Kasum* three weeks later, after he was injured in a motorcycle accident exactly one day before the raid took place. Soeyono was a former presidential aide who was once touted as a *Pangab* candidate, thus his replacement indicated that a high-level military intrigue was at play. In a shocking interview with *Tiras* magazine, Soeyono disclosed that his replacement was due to Soeharto's ire at "his refusal to cooperate in the operation" because he failed to provide the operational fund requested by Sutiyoso to restore security in the capital.<sup>171</sup> Soeyono claimed that he was the victim of "a killing-the-sitting-duck game" and that the false information was fabricated by his military rivals who used the accident to get him out of the *Pangab* competition."<sup>172</sup> This was the first high-level acknowledgement of a high-level military rivalry and that the 27 July Affair was an "operation" and not an internal PDI affair, as was officially claimed.

The Komnas HAM delivered a further blow to the government's claim of innocence when it released its preliminary investigation on 31 August. Despite the severe constraints it faced under the New Order's tight security policy, Komnas HAM concluded that the 27 July riots occurred as a direct consequence of the Medan congress and the forced takeover of the PDI headquarters, which was conducted jointly by pro-Soerjadi supporters and security apparatus. Then, in its final report published on 12 October, the Komnas HAM also unveiled the intelligence operation to use a group of *premans* (hoodlums) in the 27 July raid, which confirmed that it was indeed a military operation.

More evidence of military involvement in the 27 July raid was exposed when the case was reopened under a freer political atmosphere after Soeharto's fall from power. In response to public demand to seek justice for the victims of the 27 July Affair, the

police decided to reopen the case shortly after Megawati was elected vice-president in October 1999.

But the inquiry illustrates the difficulties that justice authorities faced when resolving past human rights abuses. Aside from the fact that there had never been any written documentation on the operation, most high-ranking police and military officers suspected to be involved in it denied their parts and blamed each other for the debacle. After summoning 58 high-ranking military and police officers as well as former PDI functionaries, the police submitted more than 1,000 pages of dossier to the Office of the Attorney-General in May 2000 for prosecution. It was reported that the police had named six high-ranking military and police officers and three middle-ranking officers as suspects.<sup>173</sup> But in the end, only a few former PDI leaders, including Soerjadi, were named as suspects and put in temporary detention. Later, the Attorney-General's Office returned the dossier to the police with a note that it was inadequate and incomplete for prosecution. It took them three years to complete the process and bring the case for prosecution.<sup>174</sup> However, as none of the dossier was made available to the public, save for some pieces obtained by the media, it is impossible for the public to control the objectivity of the process.

Thus, the incomplete investigation left a lingering question: Who was actually responsible for the 27 July raid?

Most research on the subject saw Soeharto as the *dalang* (puppet master) behind the 27 July shadow play (*wayang*). In 2002, for example, an American writer began the first paragraph of his book with a provocative line suggesting that Soeharto had given a direct order to “raid the PDI Headquarters”, unfortunately without providing solid evidence to support his claim.<sup>175</sup> Two years earlier, an LIPI research team did a much better job. They examined press reports on police investigations and arrived at the conclusion that “Soeharto was indeed responsible for 27 July Affair”.<sup>176</sup> However, the research failed to present the extent of Soeharto's involvement as it was based more on secondary data.

Thus, it is interesting to analyse Soeyono's “bestselling” as-told-to-autobiography, as it offers a rare insider's view.<sup>177</sup> Unlike his *Tiras* interview, Soeyono now openly acknowledges that the 27 July raid was a military operation and that it was a logical sequence in the intense political rivalry between Tutut and Megawati. But he disputed the popular claim that Soeharto had given direct orders to raid the PDI headquarters, arguing that the president had consistently instructed those involved to resolve the dispute in accordance to existing legal procedure. Soeyono also insisted that ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung took the same stance. As the *Kasum*, he had never heard or known of any preparation for a military operation to raid the headquarters until it happened.

Soeyono reasserted the claim he made in the *Tiras*' interview seven years earlier that he had been a victim of an internal military intrigue due to intra-class rivalry and his being a red-and-white officer, which resulted in his exclusion from the 27 July operation. He also alleged that Soeharto's decision to replace the Head of BIA Major-General Syamsir Siregar and his deputy, Brigadier-General Achdari, shortly after his own replacement as *Kasum* was due to the same intrigue. It was said that on the evening of 31 July, Soeharto received a report claiming that “the 27 July riots were the creation of BIA”. Syamsir Siregar dismissed the report as baseless and that it was fabricated to discredit him. Like Soeyono, he also claimed that he was excluded from the entire 27 July operation.<sup>178</sup> Both Siregar and Achdari hailed from Soeyono's Class 5 (1965) and were known to belong to the red-and-white camp.

To support his argument, Soeyono pointed to two key events where the government's position on the PDI affair was made to support his argument. The first was the 19 July meeting in the evening between Soeharto and his top generals, including Feisal Tanjung, R. Hartono, Soeyono, Syarwan Hamid, Sutiyoso and Jakarta Police Chief Major-General Hamami Nata, held at his Cendana private residence. According to Soeyono, during the one-hour meeting Soeharto discussed various issues, including the threat of communism, attempts at subverting the legitimate government and the free speech forum at the PDI headquarters. But Soeharto asked his generals to resolve the PDI crisis through legal means.

The second was the 25 July *Polkam* meeting chaired by Coordinating Minister for Socio-political Affairs Soesilo Soedarman and attended by ministers and officials in his compartment, including Feisal Tanjung. According to Soeyono, the meeting discussed strategies to end the free speech forum at the PDI headquarters and decided to let the police and Attorney-General's Office handle it. He concluded that this official stance must have been consulted with and approved by Soeharto. But if Soeharto, Soedarman and Tanjung had never authorized the use of force to take over the PDI headquarters, then who took the initiative to launch the 27 July raid? Based on his later "investigation", Soeyono blamed it on his colleagues, former Army Chief of Staff R. Hartono and former *Kassospol* Syarwan Hamid. "They were presumably involved in and were responsible for the 27 July raid," he concluded.<sup>179</sup>

But we must take Soeyono's account with utmost caution as his personal motives disqualify him as an impartial witness. Moreover, there are numerous published testimonies from civilian and military personnel involved in the 27 July raid that squared off with his view. Two key testimonies delivered by Alex Widya Siregar, the PDI's chief operator in the operation, and Lieutenant-General (ret'd.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then Deputy Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command, detailed how the operation was conducted.<sup>180</sup> More importantly, a recently leaked police dossier presented to Parliament's Joint Committee I and II on 17 April 2000 provided details on the chain of command of the entire 27 July operation, which was largely based on Siregar's account.<sup>181</sup> In what follows, we will examine those reports as well as personal accounts given by key military officers who were familiar with the operation and use them to draw a more objective analysis of the 27 July operation.

In his testimony, Alex Siregar disclosed that the plan to take over the PDI headquarters was decided on 25 June 1996 during a gathering to celebrate the success of the Medan congress, hosted by Syarwan Hamid and attended by Soerjadi's top lieutenants and other bureaucracy and military officials involved in the congress. The meeting concluded that control over the PDI headquarters would symbolize Soerjadi's legitimacy as the party's new chairman. The decision was then made to take it over on 23 July.<sup>182</sup>

In the next meeting held at the *Kassospol* office, Siregar presented his operational plan to take over the headquarters, in which he would use *premans* disguised as pro-Soerjadi supporters as attackers to make it appear like a clash between supporters of the two camps. On 17 July, upon approval of his plan and his appointment as the PDI's coordinator for the raid, Siregar began to recruit around 1,200 *premans* from around Jakarta and trained them at the Cibubur camping ground in East Jakarta. In addition, the BIA and the *Kodam Jaya* sent their own officers to recruit *premans* from Jakarta's numerous slums and shantytowns to help in the operation.<sup>183</sup> According to Siregar, the entire operation was conducted jointly by Soerjadi's PDI, the *Kasum* and *Kassospol* Offices, the *Kodam Jaya*, the BIA and the Department of Home Affairs (*Depdagri*).<sup>184</sup>

As preparations were underway, a political decision had to be made to set the operational D-day. On 18 July, Soeharto summoned Soesilo Soedarman and instructed him to “end free speech activities at the PDI headquarters”.<sup>185</sup> The next evening, he summoned his top generals to a meeting described earlier. Despite the controversy over the conclusion of the 19 July meeting,<sup>186</sup> it appeared to be a prelude to the 27 July raid. In his testimony on 19 May 2000, Yudhoyono stated that shortly after the Cendana audience, a few high-ranking generals held another meeting to translate Soeharto’s “green light” signal into an action plan. He stopped short at mentioning who were present at the meeting but asserted that they worked on a detailed plan to carry out the operation.<sup>187</sup>

As 23 July drew near, the *Kassopol* Syarwan Hamid sent a subtle signal aimed at justifying a subsequent takeover of the PDI headquarters. On 21 July, he issued a statement asking Megawati’s supporters to vacate the headquarters in dispute and let Soerjadi take it over. “If Soerjadi needs help, we will help,” he said.<sup>188</sup> The next evening, an urgent meeting was held at the BIA’s headquarters in the South Jakarta suburb of Kalibata. Chaired by the BIA’s Director A, Brigadier-General Zacky Makarim, the meeting was attended by Siregar and his party comrades, Brigadier-General Yudhoyono and his assistants, and Chief of Central Jakarta Police Resort (*Kapolres Jakarta Pusat*) Lieutenant-Colonel Abubakar. The meeting concluded that the operation would proceed as planned.<sup>189</sup>

On the morning of 23 July, hours before the planned raid, a briefing was held at the ABRI headquarters in Cilangkap, in which more than 500 middle- to high-ranking officers were invited. Tanjung officiated the session, while Hamid gave his assessment on the latest socio-political developments and Soeyono warned the audience of the possibility that communist elements had infiltrated the PDI, both in its central headquarters and regional offices.<sup>190</sup> Although there was no direct reference to the upcoming raid, it was clear that the briefing was aimed at preparing the regional commanders of possible security disturbances that might arise from it.

But the operation failed to proceed as planned, despite the careful planning. In his detailed testimony, Alex Siregar admitted that on the morning of 22 July, he received IDR20 million from Makarim as a down payment of the total IDR179 million prepared by the Head of BIA Syamsir Siregar for the entire operation.<sup>191</sup> He used the fund to buy mobile phones, flags and party attire, food and transportation for more than 1,000 people already recruited by his party comrades and military intelligence operatives to participate in the raid.<sup>192</sup> All was set for the raid when, a few hours before the midnight of 22 July, Siregar received information that Seno Bella, one of his own accomplices, had leaked the plan to Megawati’s side.<sup>193</sup> He called Makarim, who immediately ordered him to call off the plan and disperse the masses. The next evening, another meeting was held at Yudhoyono’s office to evaluate the failed plan. Yudhoyono concluded that BIA had failed to coordinate the operation and proposed to take the operational command under the *Kodam Jaya* supervision.<sup>194</sup>

On 25 July, a cabinet session on security was chaired directly by Soesilo Soedarman and attended by members of his compartment, including Edi Sudradjat and Feisal Tanjung. The meeting decided to end the noisy free speech forum at the PDI headquarter through “legal means with minimum military involvement to avoid further disturbances on national stability”. In the minutes of the meeting signed by Soesilo Soedarman, it was written that “these [strategies to end the free speech forum] are taken as a follow-up to the president’s instruction to the Coordinating Minister for Socio-political Affairs on 18 July”.<sup>195</sup> However, after the meeting, Tanjung called Makarim and told him that

he had approved the change of command proposed earlier by Yudhoyono. Later in the evening, another meeting was held at BIA's Headquarters, attended by Yudhoyono, Siregar and their respective operatives, in which Makarim announced Tanjung's approval. The meeting also concluded that the raid would be launched on 27 July. The date was carefully chosen to avoid public embarrassment as Jakarta was hosting the ASEAN Summit, which would end on 26 July, a Friday.<sup>196</sup>

On Friday evening, just as the ASEAN summit was concluding with delegates showering praises for Soeharto's leadership of ASEAN, the military was preparing the final stages of the operation. At the basement of the military-owned Artha Graha Bank building in Jakarta's most prestigious business district, about 400 *premans* were gathered. They were recruited by military operators from various parts of Jakarta's slums and were tricked into accepting "an easy job with big money".<sup>197</sup>

It was still dark before the dawn of 27 July when they were shaken up and ordered to put on pro-Soerjadi attire. At around 5.30 a.m., they were driven to the PDI office to join other groups dressed in similar attire, who have begun pelting stones at the building packed with Megawati's supporters and dozens of journalists from the local and international press who have been picketing its premises, in anticipation of the raid. The timing of the raid was carefully chosen, as most reporters thought that it would take place between midnight and dawn. When morning came, many red-eyed media crews had left for refreshments.

Still, a few reporters who had stayed behind witnessed the raid. Their presence made it the first of the New Order's political violence that was put under intense glare of the media. Thus, they chronicled how Sutiyoso and Yudhoyono "watched" the raid from a short distance.<sup>198</sup> The operation lasted less than two hours, during which Soeharto kept a close tab of its development through frequent calls to Yudhoyono.<sup>199</sup> Megawati's supporters were defeated, many of them were badly injured, while some others fled and the rest were rounded up and brought to police detention. There was speculation that a great number of PDI supporters was slaughtered during the raid, but no evidence appeared to support the claim.<sup>200</sup>

Thus, we can see from the presently available facts that the 27 July raid was a high-level government operation involving all relevant institutions, including Soeyono's and Syamsir Siregar's offices, and supervised directly by Soeharto. In fact, in his written testimony, Yudhoyono wrote that the [takeover] operation was not an individual work, but a collective institutional work involving all [relevant] functions". He concluded that Soeharto was politically responsible for the 27 July raid, while Feisal Tanjung held the operational command responsibility. He detailed the political chains of command as follows: President Soeharto, Minister of Home Affairs Yogie S. Memet, Director of Socio-political Affairs Sutoyo N.K., ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung, and ABRI's Chief of Socio-political Affairs Syarwan Hamid.

Similarly, the chain of operational command ran as follows: ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung and his commanding staffs, the Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command and the Jakarta Police Chief. As for his own part in it, Yudhoyono wrote that "all staffs below them [the holders of political and operational chains of command] cannot be held responsible since they only carried out orders".<sup>201</sup>

The former head of *Bakin*, Moetojib, supported Yudhoyono's assessment on the chains of command and disputed Soeyono's claim that Tanjung and Soeharto were innocent of involvement. He pointed out that according to standardized military hierarchy and procedure, only those who held command responsibility and had direct

access to the troops—the ABRI Chief and his commanders—could have launched such a large-scale military operation. Those who held staff position—the Army Chief, the *Kassopol* and the *Kasum*—could not give any order to deploy troops. In other words, it was unlikely that Hartono and Syarwan Hamid authorized the raid, as was claimed by Soeyono, without Tanjung’s knowledge and approval. More importantly, under Soeharto’s total control over the military, it was highly unlikely that such an operation proceeded without his approval.

As for Soeharto’s involvement, Moetojib added that a few days before the 27 July raid, he personally appealed to Soeharto to halt the move against Megawati. In the half-hour audience with the president, Moetojib pointed at the violent clash at the Gambir railway station that had injured dozens of supporters and warned Soeharto that a worse situation could occur if attempts at sidelining Megawati were to continue. He was later informed that Soesilo Soedarman and Edi Sudradjat had also gone personally to Soeharto with similar messages. But none of them was heard.<sup>202</sup>

The fact that Soedarman, Sudradjat and Moetojib tried to prevent a violent move against Megawati partly explained the deviation from the conclusion of the 25 July *Polkam* meeting and the raid on the PDI headquarters two days later. It was likely that, in his famed “rule of ambiguity”, Soeharto did not disclose his entire plan to the red-and-white generals, knowing that they might have been more sympathetic to Megawati. Instead, he entrusted the operation to the hands of the green officers, who shared ideological anxiety over Megawati’s leftist inclination. Thus, while Soeharto had asked Soedarman to end the noisy protests at the PDI headquarters “through legal means”, he might have kept his top security minister in the dark about the existence of another operation.

Nevertheless, the controversy will likely continue as the investigation into 27 July Affair—just like other cases of human rights abuses that involved the military—was driven more by political interests than the genuine intention to settle justice. In April 2001, President Megawati angered her supporters when she gave instructions to “drop off” charges against the former generals and even lent political backing to secure Sutiyoso’s re-nomination as Governor of Jakarta.<sup>203</sup> She was reported to have concluded that Sutiyoso and Yudhoyono, whom she appointed top security minister, only carried out Soeharto’s orders.<sup>204</sup> But three years later, when Yudhoyono became her rival in a tense presidential race, the police once again reopened the case—this time Sutiyoso was named the suspect—which raised suspicion about Megawati’s political motives.

## THE TWILIGHT OF A REGIME

The PDI debacle preceded Soeharto’s political journey downhill. Almost overnight, his oppression of Megawati turned her from a largely symbolic political leader to a uniting symbol of an increasingly hardened anti-government opposition. Cleverly, she chose non-violence and democratic means to defend her political rights. In full realization of her less-than-nil chance to win, Megawati brought her case before the court. She, of course, lost the case. But her struggle won her the support of the silent majority. Megawati’s subdued personality was a far cry from her father’s legendary flamboyant style. Yet more and more Indonesians had hoped to see in her a manifestation of the *Ratu Adil*, a messianic figure of the Queen of Justice, just as Soekarno was once seen when he helped to liberate Indonesia from the Dutch colonization. Thus, for the first time since its forced suppression after his fall, the legacy of Soekarno and his political ideas resurfaced and were set to reshape Indonesian polity.

In the second half of the 1990s, Indonesia was at economic and political crossroads. Economically, Indonesia registered an impressive average annual growth of 6.8 per cent for three decades (1966–1996), making it one of the new emerging economies of the Pacific Rim, a member of the “new Rich Asia Club” and one of the “East Asian miracles”.<sup>205</sup> A 1996 World Bank report projected an optimistic estimate that with the economy remaining stable until 2005 and gross domestic production reaching more than USD2,300, Indonesia would join the rank of the world’s 20 biggest economies. Judged from the impressive macroeconomic figures, Soeharto, who spent his childhood in poverty, had achieved a historic success in lowering the poverty level and elevating the welfare of Indonesian society. In 1996, Indonesia’s per capita income reached USD1,515, or 16 times greater than when he first came into power in the mid 1960s.<sup>206</sup>

Yet, behind the glittering success, lay the widening socio-economic gap among the populace, the widespread practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism (known in Indonesian by the acronym KKN) and monopoly by a privileged few—Soeharto’s family and cronies. Moreover, the economic miracle was built with a heavy dependence on an increasingly uncontrolled foreign debt. In the five years from 1992 to 1997, for example, Indonesia’s external debt swelled from USD83.7 billion to USD138 billion, of which more than half was made by the private sector.<sup>207</sup>

Politically, the issue of presidential succession had become a lingering fixation among Indonesia’s political elite. In the mid 1990s, Soeharto was in his late 70s. Although he remained robustly healthy, the fact that he had undergone the much-publicized kidney treatment in Germany in July 1996 deepened the perception among the political elite that a leadership succession was imminent. Moreover, Soeharto’s divide-and-rule strategy that he used to ensure his grip on power had intensified internal rivalry among his own confidants and made it more difficult for him to pick a successor. Under an increasingly assertive push for political liberalization that he had helped to set, Indonesia was awaiting to see if a democratic succession would ever take place.

There was another dimension to Soeharto’s longevity in power. On 28 April 1996, Mrs. Siti Hartinah “Tien” Soeharto died after suffering from a sudden illness. Some experts in Javanese mythology believed that Mrs. Soeharto, a member of the Mangkunegaran aristocracy, was the real holder of the mythical Javanese power (*wahyu keraton*), which gave a certain mystical legitimacy to her husband. With her passing, so they believed, the power was leaving him to seek another host (*jengkar*).

In reality, the loss of a woman who had played a central role both in his private and public life for nearly half a century certainly affected Soeharto’s personal strength. “Since Sunday, 28 April 1996, something has been lost from our family, something so priceless to us. We have lost someone who had given us so much love,” he said.<sup>208</sup>

More importantly, he lost the only authority that had brought order to his household and prevented family feuds from becoming public knowledge. After her passing, his children’s interests expanded uncontrollably in the political and economic spheres, which subsequently deepened public antipathy towards the First Family. One of the most controversial issues was the Timor national car project proposed by Tommy Soeharto, which not only incited public anger due to its obvious nepotism but also severed relations between the Cendana brothers. Bambang Trihatmodjo was upset that the lucrative project landed on his younger brother’s lap despite his better experience in the automotive sector.<sup>209</sup> Their feuds were suspected to have contributed to their mother’s deteriorating health.

Against that backdrop, the May 1997 elections were largely seen as a litmus test for Soeharto’s grip on power. The elections were held amidst fierce public protests over

the government's repression of Megawati and the PDI, which led to an unprecedented local alliance between the PDI and the PPP in Central Java known as the Mega-Bintang Phenomenon and a sharp increase in the numbers of the non-voters (*golput*).<sup>210</sup> Megawati decided to boycott the election but freed her supporters to exercise their voting rights. Thus, the government was forced to work all out to utilize party machination and military intimidation to secure a more than convincing majority of 74.51 per cent votes for Golkar.

Hence, the public was taken aback when, in early June, Harmoko was relieved as the Minister of Information by Hartono while he was still in a jubilant mood. Having served Soeharto loyally for nearly two decades, Harmoko was shocked to receive such a humiliating treatment, although he appeared to accept the decision without protest. He was made State Minister for Special Affairs with the sole task of preparing materials for the upcoming People's Consultative Assembly session slated for March 1998, despite his apparent nomination for its chairmanship. As we shall see later, Harmoko's hurt pride obviously explained his dramatic decision to leave Soeharto in his last days in power.

There was some speculation about Soeharto's drastic decision. One of them was Harmoko's alleged rivalry with Golkar's rising star, Tutut. Harmoko openly claimed credit for Golkar's victory, although some party insiders insisted that it was Tutut who performed effectively as the powerful vote-getter. Later, Army Chief Hartono confirmed many political analysts' suspicion that the military intervened heavily to secure Golkar's victory.<sup>211</sup> However, judging from the fact that Harmoko owed his entire political career to Soeharto's patronage, it was unlikely that he would take such a risk to antagonize his daughter. Another possibility was that Soeharto was preparing his trusted confidant, Hartono, for a higher office. Hartono reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 in June, hence the need to find him a political position. As Harmoko would only be inaugurated as the MPR speaker in October, it was logical to "sideline" him to make way for Hartono. Given their closeness, it was also likely that Soeharto was grooming Hartono to be one of his future successors.

Nevertheless, Soeharto was obviously aware of growing public resentment against his leadership. As he was preparing himself for his seventh consecutive term in office, he also became increasingly suspicious of possible challenges from within his own regime. Thus, he worked to ensure that his loyalists took control of Golkar, his most effective political machination. He instructed Harmoko to devise an ideological briefing for all legislative candidates, who have been selected through an extremely tight "screening" mechanism, to prevent a possible repetition of the Ibrahim Saleh incident in the upcoming assembly session slated for March 1998. But none of his anticipative measures prepared him for the worst crisis that was to happen in his long career at the top of the national leadership.

## The Sultan Subjugated

In July 1997, Thailand faced a monetary turbulence when its currency was depreciated drastically against the U.S. dollar due to an unprecedented global speculation in the foreign exchange market. It spread quickly, creating a contagion effect throughout the region. One year later, it had developed into a global monetary crisis that spread as far as Latin America, and hit Russia in 2000.

Initially, Indonesia's Central Bank, Bank Indonesia, remained confident that Indonesia's economic fundamentals were strong enough to defend the rupiah against

massive speculation. But it turned out that the assessment was flawed as the economy was founded on pseudo-stability and Indonesia was seen as a weak target for international speculators due to its combined economic and political vulnerabilities. As a result, the rupiah plummeted despite the Central Bank's attempts at combining fiscal and monetary measures to stabilize the currency. Thus, on 14 August, the Central Bank was forced to free-float the embattled currency to save the country's limited foreign exchange reserves.

However, when investors saw the safety net of fixed exchange rate disappear, they dumped the rupiah. Consequently, its value dropped drastically, virtually decapitating the national banks, bankrupting Indonesia's heavily indebted private sector and sending import prices soaring. The cost of rice increased 25 per cent in three months and cooking oil rose 97 per cent. People were forced to queue for food and other basic supplies, a pitiful sight that had never been seen since the fall of the Old Order. The collapse of the private sector also led to mass layoffs, which eventually triggered social unrest.<sup>212</sup>

Faced with such an unprecedented devastating crisis, Soeharto devoted most of his time to devise counter strategies. In the beginning of the crisis, he worked practically from dawn till dusk, including doing a routine checking on the rupiah's fluctuation at least twice a day.<sup>213</sup> Later, he relied on Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana, who had helped him build the New Order, and the technocrats under their tutelage, as well as business practitioners such as Anthony Salim, the son of Liem Sioe Liong, his long-time Chinese-born business partner, and indigenous businessman Aburizal Bakrie. In January 1998, he assembled them and a group of Indonesia's best economic and business brains to form an advisory body called the Council for the Restoration of Economics and Financial Resilience (DPK-EKU).

The question is: Why did they fail?

A politico-historical reconstruction of the decision-making process at the time reveals that Indonesia's drastic decline from the rank of a middle-income country into one of Asia's impoverished and highly-indebted economies was attributed largely to the combined factors of Soeharto's autocratic leadership and the failure of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) recovery recipes.

As a ruler with unlimited power in his hands, Soeharto can be credited with much of the blame. In his reflection over the crisis, former Central Bank Governor J. Soedradjad Djiwandono acknowledged that the government failed to recognize the severity of the crisis and when it did, it was already too late. The failure was due to Soeharto's conviction that Indonesia was merely facing a short-term monetary crisis, not the more serious crisis of confidence in his government. Like his Malaysian colleague, Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad, Soeharto was convinced that the American tycoon, George Soros, was behind the massive financial speculation aimed at discrediting his government.<sup>214</sup> Thus, from the outset his strategy had been aimed at beating the speculators, as indicated by the government's intention to use anti-subversion laws against them. The proposal was dropped due to objections from the business sector.<sup>215</sup> But, as we shall see later, Soeharto never gave up his efforts at finding a way to crush the speculators.

When the crisis deepened despite all-out efforts at stabilizing the economy, the government was forced to turn to the IMF for financial back-up and to restore international confidence in Indonesia's monetary stability. Minister of Finance Mar'ie Muhammad and Central Bank Governor Djiwandono negotiated the terms for the IMF's assistance in full consultation with Soeharto, who made the final say. On 31 October 1997, Muhammad and Djiwandono signed the first letter of intent (LoI) with the IMF. In return for its USD18 billion standby loan, the IMF required comprehensive

financial and economic reforms that included the closure of insolvent banks and the re-scheduling of some high-cost “mega-projects”, including Habibie’s pet project, the aviation industry IPTN.

The IMF’s requirement to shut down insolvent banks turned out to be a fatal policy blunder that would plunge Indonesia into its worst banking crisis, one that continues to burden its economy today. But the problem was made worse by Soeharto’s reluctance to give up part of his family’s control of the economy. In late 1996, Djwandono recommended the closure of seven insolvent banks to prevent them from burdening the financial sector. Soeharto rejected it as some of the banks were connected to his family. Djwandono repeated his recommendation in March 1997, when the banks’ condition had worsened. This time Soeharto approved it, provided that its implementation was postponed until after the general elections and MPR sessions were held to maintain political stability.<sup>216</sup> Before the decision was carried out, however, the financial crisis struck and by late August the number of insolvent banks had become 20.<sup>217</sup>

Still, Soeharto refused to close them down. Instead, on 20 August, he sent a memo to Mar’ie Muhammad, instructing him to merge two ailing banks, PT Bank Harapan Sentosa and PT Bank Utama, in an attempt to save the latter bank, whose majority shares were owned by his children, Tommy and Titiek. Despite its ineligibility, Bank Utama received a special liquidity support amounting to IDR539 billion from the Central Bank, thanks to Muhammad’s memo to Djwandono.<sup>218</sup>

Eventually, Soeharto had no more options but to close those banks when Indonesia was forced to turn to the IMF. After two weeks of intensive negotiation, the government and the IMF agreed to close down 16 illiquid banks, including the original seven that Djwandono had recommended earlier. On the evening of 31 October, Djwandono and State Secretary Moerdiono accompanied Hubert Neiss, the IMF’s Asia-Pacific Director, to pay a courtesy call to Soeharto at his Cendana private residence. After the call, Djwandono presented the president with the list of the 16 banks and read them one by one for his approval. When he read out Bank Jakarta, a private bank owned by Soeharto’s stepbrother, Probosutedjo, the president responded, “It’s all right.” But before Djwandono continued with the other banks, Moerdiono stepped on his feet, signalling that it was getting late and the ageing president had to retire. So Djwandono left the folder with the list on Soeharto’s desk.<sup>219</sup>

On the following day, assured of getting Soeharto’s approval, Djwandono, Muhammad, Moerdiono and Minister of Trade and Industry Tunky Ariwibowo announced the closure of the 16 banks. The drastic decision was met with mixed reactions. While the international business community applauded it as a signal of Jakarta’s commitment to implementing the IMF’s programmes, Indonesians were shocked that Cendana-related banks were indeed going to close and started to sow wild rumours about the “next banks on the close-down list”. It triggered massive rush against national banks and capital flight out of Indonesia, depleting the country’s scarce cash funds.

As a consequence, the Central Bank was forced to disburse liquidity support to prop up the shaken banking system, in addition to providing lender fund to the depositors of the closed banks. In his reflections over the crisis, Djwandono acknowledged that the decision to close down the 16 banks without prior provision of an adequate safety-net mechanism such as deposit insurance was a “fatal mistake”. He blamed the IMF for not advising the Indonesian government to apply a similar mechanism, although it had been implemented both in Thailand and South Korea.<sup>220</sup> Later, the government reversed its decision and, instead of closing down other insolvent banks, it “froze” them from active operations. The IMF also implemented a blanket-guarantee mechanism over the

frozen banks but the measures were too late to stop the rush.

The decision led to a massive disbursement of BLBI, which flowed uncontrollably as the crisis worsened and was prone to mismanagement and corruption. Five years later, the government has yet to settle the burden satisfactorily. According to the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), which has conducted general and investigative audits on the Central Bank in November 1999 and July 2000 under Parliament's order, BLBI disbursed from 1996 to January 1999 amounted to IDR144.5 trillion. It caused the government to face a potential loss of IDR130.4 trillion, or 95.7 per cent of the total BLBI provided, due to a number of deviations in the disbursement.<sup>221</sup>

The decision also severed the already tense relationship between Soeharto and his economic ministers, especially Muhammad and Djwandono. In a heated family meeting, Bambang Trihatmodjo and Probosutedjo protested against the decision. Instead of defending his government's decision, Soeharto permitted his son and stepbrother to sue Muhammad and Djwandono in court. Shortly after that, on 15 December 1997, he dismissed four deputies of the Central Bank Governor, which was followed by police investigation on the three of them for corruption charges.<sup>222</sup>

Djwandono was actually on that dismissal list but Soeharto deferred his replacement until February 1998, perhaps due to their family ties. He was convinced that his dismissal was due to Soeharto's assessment that he and Muhammad had failed to resolve the currency crisis, especially their decision to close down Cendana-related banks. In their last official meeting on 16 February, Djwandono enquired if Soeharto actually read the list of the 16 banks left on his desk, since he was criticized for having acted without Soeharto's approval. Soeharto replied that he did, but he also defended his decision to let his family sue his ministers in court. "I told them it was the government's decision, but if they are not happy with it, they could file a legal petition against it," Djwandono quoted Soeharto's reply.<sup>223</sup> The market reacted negatively to the news of the First Family's "rebellion", which was reflected in the drastic drop in the market indicators. It grew more confused when, a few weeks later, the government announced the continuation of some mega-projects previously re-scheduled under the IMF's agreement.

The dawn of the new year of 1998 failed to bring fresh hope to the beleaguered nation as the monetary crisis developed into a socio-political crisis, which eventually forced Soeharto to sign a new deal with the IMF. By that time, Soeharto had effectively sidelined Muhammad and Djwandono from negotiating with the IMF. He set up his own team headed by Nitisasatro and Wardhana, and requested for former IMF managing director Prabhar Narvekar to liaise with Washington for him personally. Apparently, he felt that the IMF's Jakarta resident staff were not his equal in negotiating a deal.

The defining moment came on 15 January 1998 when Soeharto personally signed the second LoI with the IMF's managing director, Michel Camdessus, in his Cendana private residence. The image of Camdessus standing with folded hands over Soeharto's bent body when he signed on the historical document immediately evoked the nation's painful collective memory of the Mataram Sultans' subjugation to the Dutch colonial power. In fact, the editorial board of World Socialist website, an Internet site run by a group of socialist-inclined analysts, described the IMF package as "nothing less than an attempt to establish a new form of quasi-colonial rule".<sup>224</sup>

## The Washington Consensus

In return for its USD43 billion bailout package, the IMF required that Soeharto sign a far-reaching deregulation agreement, which took virtually every aspect of economic

life out of his hands. The 50-point memorandum set out a detailed timetable for dismantling tariffs and other forms of trade protection, tax incentives, price control and state monopolies. It required the restructuring, merger and privatization of banks and financial institutions, and set out detailed targets for budget reduction, taxation levels and inflation.

It demanded the scrapping of 12 major infrastructure projects and an end to all subsidies and tax privileges for Tommy Soeharto's Timor national car project. It dictated the abolition of import monopolies of wheat, wheat flour, soybean and garlic, and the scrapping of all monopoly marketing organizations and controls on internal agricultural trade, including the clove monopoly controlled by Tommy Soeharto and plywood marketing cartel managed by Mohamad "Bob" Hasan. The IMF agreed to delay the timetable for ending food subsidies only if Soeharto agreed to honour his commitment to deregulate and privatize the economy.

In short, the IMF package was aimed at tearing down the web of economic privileges that protects the business empires of the Soeharto family and its cronies. The editorial board of World Socialist website commented in March 1998 that the IMF's demands were "tantamount to insisting that the entire Soeharto regime and its social base commit collective economic and political suicide".<sup>225</sup> In fact, many cabinet members were shocked to learn that Soeharto agreed to sign such an extremely stringent agreement.<sup>226</sup>

But from the start, Soeharto had never intended to fully adhere to the IMF's prescriptions, realizing that they struck at the very core of his grip on power. It was obvious that he was merely trying to buy the time while at the same time trying to find an alternative to the Bretton Wood Institution, including emulating Malaysia's decision to adopt a fixed exchange rate and foreign exchange control policies. In late January 1999, he invited Steve Hanke, a professor of political economics at the Johns Hopkins University and an expert on the foreign exchange control mechanism known as the Currency Board System (CBS), to visit him in Jakarta.<sup>227</sup>

Hanke was particularly critical of the IMF's prescriptions, which he described as "pouring gasoline on what had been a small fire".<sup>228</sup> Sharing Soeharto's conviction that financial speculators were the culprits of Indonesian crisis, Hanke offered him CBS to beat them. He proposed to hard-peg the rupiah against the American dollar, which would be controlled by a currency board, while at the same time implementing comprehensive financial and economic reforms. He argued that CBS had been successfully implemented in a number of countries where he had offered his services, such as Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria.<sup>229</sup>

Soeharto was obviously impressed with Hanke's presentation and made him a member of the newly established DPK-EKU in January 1998. He ordered a few BI directors to prepare for the implementation of the currency board, and asked Parliament to support the issuance of a regulation in lieu of the law (*Perpu*) as the legal base for the currency board. In February, he invited parliament leaders for a consultation on CBS and told them that he would announce the establishment of the currency board before the SU MPR was held in March.<sup>230</sup> He even tried to mobilize popular political support for his plan by evoking nationalist sentiment when he declared that the IMF's programmes were too liberal and that they violated the 1945 Constitution.

His plan, however, failed due to strong resistance from both within and outside Indonesia. Domestically, his government was unusually divided on the issue. A few cabinet members, including the influential B.J. Habibie, raised their doubts about the plan.<sup>231</sup> More importantly, members of the Monetary Council, including Nitisastro, Wardhana and Djiwandono, sent Soeharto a polite but firm memo, presenting him the-

almost-impossible-to-fulfil requirements for the implementation of CBS and its possible dangers. They argued that aside from the huge amount of foreign exchange reserves needed to back the currency board, the lack of transparency and accountability in state practices would impede the implementation of CBS.<sup>232</sup>

But it was American pressure that finally sealed the fate of CBS. From the start, the IMF had opposed the plan and Camdessus had openly threatened to suspend the second payment of the bailout package if Soeharto continued with it.<sup>233</sup> Having realized the danger of confronting the IMF at the time when he needed its financial lifeline, Soeharto decided to re-package Hanke's prescriptions into what he called an "IMF-Plus proposal". In a speech before the SU MPR on 1 March 1998, Soeharto outlined a four-point IMF-Plus package, including the establishment of a currency board to stabilize the rupiah, debt rescheduling and banking reform, privatization of state companies and other structural reforms. He insisted that the IMF-Plus proposal was needed as the original IMF programmes were failing to produce significant economic recovery. "The international community realized that unless the crisis is resolved properly it might eventually become a global-scale crisis," he warned.<sup>234</sup>

However, the proposal failed to impress the IMF and its prominent political patron, the White House. In a flurry of high-level diplomacy, President Bill Clinton sent former vice-president Walter Mondale as his special envoy to meet Soeharto. After a one-and-a-half-hour meeting, Mondale emerged to demand "full, demonstrable and vigorous implementation of the IMF programmes".<sup>235</sup> But after Soeharto rebuffed the elderly envoy, Clinton decided to drop the carrot and used a stick approach instead. He made a personal telephone call to Soeharto and warned him of the consequences of continuing with CBS. Other world leaders followed suit, including Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl who made a personal call to Soeharto and British Prime Minister John Major who sent his special envoy, Derek Flatchett, to Jakarta. When Soeharto still refused to heed their advice on 6 March, the IMF announced the suspension of its USD3 billion bailout package.<sup>236</sup> Under such an unprecedented and intense international pressure, Soeharto finally capitulated. On 9 March, Camdessus announced that the CBS plan had been dropped.

Having his personal pride severely dented, the self-styled Javanese Sultan refused to simply capitulate. On 16 March, Soeharto sent a clear signal of defiance to the international community when he announced his new cabinet line-up. In addition to Vice-President Habibie, whose appointment had received negative reaction from the market, he filled his cabinet with hardline economic nationalists and Cendana cronies. He appointed Ginandjar Kartasasmita, an ardent admirer of the Japanese model of "governed market", as Economic Minister and chose pro-Hanke monetarists such as Fuad Bawazier and Syahril Sabirin as Minister of Finance and Central Bank Governor respectively. But the most shocking move was his decision to pick the timber magnate and his long-time business ally Bob Hasan as Minister of Trade and Industry and Tutut as Minister of Social Affairs. Tutut, who had been offered the same post five years before, pleaded against her appointment and Probosutedjo warned Soeharto of the dangers of the blatant nepotism. But he was unmoved. And, as if adding insult to injury, Tutut's close friend R. Hartono was appointed Minister of Home Affairs.<sup>237</sup>

Soeharto's inconsistency sent an extremely negative signal that virtually wiped out what little international market confidence his government had. As a consequence, the crisis deepened. In the period between January and April 1998, the rupiah fluctuated in the range of IDR13,089 to IDR16,374 per USD1.00, or more than 70 per cent deprecia-

tion from its original value. Flight of capital out of the country reached its peak, which was estimated between USD25 billion and USD40 billion. Inflation rate rose to more than 80 per cent. And for the first time since the New Order was established, Indonesia registered a negative growth rate of 14 per cent.<sup>238</sup> Indonesia was on the brink of an economic collapse and the miracle of its development soon turned out to be a mirage.

The extent of the IMF's pressure on Soeharto sparked a theory on the use of the Washington Consensus to bring about a "regime change" in Indonesia. In March 1998, the American media were already drawing parallels between Soeharto and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and former president Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, indicating the changing perception among policymakers and observers in Washington about the Indonesian ruler. *The New York Times*' economic commentator David E. Sanger, for example, wrote, "Letting the IMF work its will in Indonesia threatens Soeharto's control over the country as surely as letting arms inspectors into Iraq threatens Saddam."<sup>239</sup>

Sanger pointed to daily White House briefings on Indonesia throughout the critical months, involving not only the financial experts but top State Department officials, CIA analysts, the Pentagon brass and national security aides as well, indicating that the fate of Soeharto was on the top of Washington's agenda. Other media also speculated about the possibility of a "Manila scenario", a reference to the U.S.-backed ouster of the Marcos leadership in 1986, against Soeharto. There appeared to be a consensus among American and European ruling circles that Soeharto had to go. However, differences existed among American policymakers and observers over how to facilitate his exit. While Republican politicians such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that the IMF's plans for Indonesia could create the conditions for a social revolution, the Democrat-dominated Clinton Administration appeared to be less hesitant in encouraging a regime change in Indonesia.<sup>240</sup>

Differences also existed between the Clinton Administration and its counterparts in Asia and Australia over the fate of the Soeharto regime. Most Asian leaders, who acknowledged Soeharto's pivotal role in preserving regional stability in Southeast Asia, preferred a gradual political change in Indonesia under his leadership while Australian Prime Minister John Howard, who had developed strong ties with the regime, was very cautious in toeing the White House line.

Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, whose country stands to lose most from the meltdowns in Indonesia and elsewhere in East Asia where its banks have lent heavily, fought to oppose the Washington-sponsored IMF austerity measures in Indonesia. In a meeting in Jakarta in October 1997, Japanese Finance Minister Eiji Sakakibara tried to persuade the head of the IMF mission to Indonesia, V. Agebri, that the economic reforms it required of Indonesia were too severe. Sakakibara was particularly critical of the IMF's requirement to shut down insolvent banks, which he correctly foresaw would destroy rather than strengthen Indonesia's financial system. However, he failed, although he had threatened that "the Japanese government would act on its own if its opinion were ignored".<sup>241</sup>

Tokyo did try to "act on its own" to save the Soeharto regime. It was initially supportive of a collective initiative to set up a Japanese-backed Asian Fund as an alternative to the IMF. Even after the CBS plan had failed, Soeharto tried to work out a Japanese-sponsored bailout package by sending Vice-President Habibie, Kartasasmita and Bawazier to meet Hashimoto. The plan failed to materialize because the U.S. vetoed it, and the ailing Japanese economy was too weak to sustain such a burden on its own.

Indonesia's closest neighbours, Singapore and Malaysia, adopted a similar stance,

albeit with some differences in their approaches. Malaysian leader Mahathir Muhammad had distrusted the IMF from the outset and advised Soeharto against turning to it for financial assistance. However, he agreed to participate in the IMF-sponsored bailout package after Singapore pledged a USD5 billion standby loan to help stabilize the rupiah in October 1997. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, whose country's prosperity depends largely on Indonesia's political stability, was more assertive in opposing America's enthusiasm in facilitating Soeharto's exit. Fearing political instability in a post-Soeharto Indonesia, Lee lobbied Washington extensively to reconsider its policy, while at the same time advising Soeharto against confronting the IMF.<sup>242</sup>

The suspicion about the IMF's role in Soeharto's fall seemed to find its justification when, in a frank interview with David Sanger in October 1999, Camdessus acknowledged for the first time that the IMF's actions in Indonesia served as a catalyst in forcing Soeharto's resignation. He said openly, "We created the conditions that obliged President Soeharto to leave his job." Camdessus added that soon after Soeharto's fall, he travelled to Moscow to warn President Boris Yeltsin that the same forces could end his control of Russia unless he acted.<sup>243</sup>

Five years later, Steve Hanke took Camdessus' statement to confirm his long-time suspicion about the IMF's real motives in blocking his CBS proposal. In an article published in *Tempo* in May 2003, in the midst of heated controversy over the American-led attack in Iraq to overthrow President Saddam Hussein, Hanke argued that a similar "regime change" attempt had been implemented to unseat Soeharto. He argued that the White House blocked CBS because it would have stabilized the rupiah, which in turn would have kept Soeharto in power. Hanke quoted a number of prominent figures, including Nobel Economics laureate Merton Miller, former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who expressed similar convictions, to support his theory.<sup>244</sup>

Aside from the "regime change through the IMF" theory, a number of comprehensive studies published in the last five years have provided critical analysis about the IMF's handling of the Indonesian crisis. One of the most authoritative of its kind is Joseph Stiglitz's recently published *Globalization and Its Discontent*, which presents convincing evidence about the fallacies of the IMF's prescriptions in Asia.<sup>245</sup> A 2001 Nobel Economics laureate, Stiglitz quit his job as the World Bank's Chief Economist after failing to persuade the IMF to change its strategy in Indonesia. Finally, in 2004, Independent Evaluation Office, an independent body commissioned by the IMF to conduct an evaluation on the IMF's handling of crises in the developing countries, delivered an official acknowledgement of the IMF's mishandling of the Indonesian crisis, especially the decision to close 16 banks. The unprecedented acknowledgement prompted President Megawati Soekarnoputri to call for the IMF to rectify its earlier mistakes by re-scheduling Indonesia's foreign debts.<sup>246</sup>

## The Struggle for the Vice-Presidential Ticket

The economic crisis gave impetus to the domestic push for a radical political change. By the end of September 1997, sporadic protests had begun to occur in several campuses in Java, calling for political reform. In the elite circles, political struggle was quietly developing in anticipation of a possible leadership change.

The struggle was prompted by two significant political events. The first was Soeharto's shocking statement before a gathering to celebrate Golkar's 33rd anniversary on 19 October 1997. Responding to Golkar's intention to re-nominate him for seventh

consecutive term in office, Soeharto raised his doubts about its sincerity and uttered his wish to “*lengser keprabon madeg pandhita*”, or giving up power to assume the role of a religious wise man.<sup>247</sup> By that statement, Soeharto referred to an episode in the Javanese version of the Barathayuda epoch where the powerful King Viyasa left the palace to lead an ascetic life, while taking the role of an adviser to his successor and subjects whenever required. Interestingly, three decades ago, it was Soeharto who suggested the Viyasa role to Soekarno when he persuaded the beleaguered president to relinquish power peacefully in 1966.<sup>248</sup>

The second was Soeharto’s decision to take an unprecedented leave of absence in late December 1997. Due to minor health problems, doctors advised Soeharto to take a ten-day rest, even though he was scheduled to attend the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Teheran and the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, spreading panic that he was incapacitated by a stroke.<sup>249</sup> Surprisingly, on both occasions, he broke state custom by asking Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas, not Vice-President Try Sutrisno, to deputize for him.

The first event generated several different interpretations. Palace insiders insisted that Soeharto’s statement was sincere, for in family meetings he had expressed his wish to retire, particularly after his wife’s death. Prior to his “*lengser keprabon*” speech, Soeharto had issued similar statements, calling for the people to consider his age. In a dialogue with students in Semarang on 20 December, Tutut stated that she and other members of the Soeharto family preferred him to retire from state duties. However, she added that if people were to ask him to become president, he would be bound by constitutional duty to accept.<sup>250</sup>

Such ambivalence led to scepticism among Jakarta’s political elite about Soeharto’s sincerity, given the fact that he had always taken similar normative Javanese appropriateness of not demonstrating political ambition in his six consecutive nominations as president. His standard reply whenever he was asked for his willingness to accept the presidential nomination was, “It all depends on the MPR as the representation of the people,” delivered in the safe knowledge that the Golkar-dominated MPR would always elect him. Golkar chairman and MPR speaker Harmoko, for example, dismissed speculation about Soeharto’s intention to step down. Instead, he was convinced that the “*lengser keprabon*” statement was merely Soeharto’s way of testing the muddy political waters, especially his subordinates’ loyalties amid growing public disillusionment towards his leadership. Thus, in response to Soeharto’s doubts, Harmoko assured him that 100 per cent of Indonesians supported his re-nomination as president.<sup>251</sup>

Other events seemed to support Harmoko’s conviction. In early October, two weeks before the “*lengser keprabon*” speech was delivered, the MPR’s Working Committee convened to prepare materials for the upcoming general session. The Ad-Hoc Committee I, where Tutut sat as member and was chaired by *Asospol Kassospol* Major-General Yudhoyono, prepared a draft decree of what was later known as TAP V/MPR/1998. Paragraph 1 of the decree gave the president “a special authority to take any necessary measures to safeguard and maintain the unity of the unitary Indonesian state, to prevent and ward off social disturbances and other subversive activities, in order to save national developments as the manifestation of *pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution”. It was obvious that through the MPR decree, Soeharto was preparing a legal base to anticipate any unexpected challenge against his leadership.

Eventually, on 20 January 1998, Harmoko announced Soeharto’s willingness to be re-nominated as president. Harmoko quoted Soeharto’s explanation that he accepted the

people's trust in him because he would never commit a cowardly act described in the Javanese words of "*tinggal glanggang colong playu*", or leaving the fray while the war is still fought. Thus, an alternative interpretation of the "*lengser keprabon*" statement is that Soeharto was initially sincere with his wish to retire, but faced with the deepening crisis that threatened the nation—and the longevity of his regime—he was bound by constitutional duty, cultural ethics and personal conviction to stay on.

Soeharto's acceptance of his re-nomination ended the quiet struggle among his subordinates, triggered by his "*lengser keprabon*" speech. Previously, a few political groups had moved to prepare for Sutrisno's elevation as Soeharto's successor. The YKPK, for example, declared him its presidential candidate with apparent backing from the active red-and-white officers. But the nomination turned out to end Sutrisno's political career as it had upset Soeharto, who regarded the group as an unacceptable opposition to his leadership. Hence, his obvious snub of Sutrisno through his decision to send Alatas to important international events in December. In a farewell speech on 19 February 1998, Sutrisno declared that he would decline any attempt at nominating him for a second term in office, citing the fact that, according to the New Order's custom, vice-presidents only served their terms once. Now that Sutrisno has fallen out of Soeharto's favour, the competition for the number two position centred around Habibie, in a clear repetition of a similar struggle five years earlier. Once again, a "war of colours" was taking place.

Habibie had emerged as the strongest candidate as Soeharto obviously had him in mind when he set forth his "criteria" for the future vice-president. Besides the standard requirements such as loyalty to the state and ability to work closely with him, Soeharto added that the candidate should be "someone with ample knowledge of science and technology", a clear reference to Habibie's reputation as an internationally recognized aviation scientist. Habibie's candidacy seemed logical too, as he was one of Soeharto's longest serving and most trusted cabinet members. Also, Soeharto had "promised" him the post five years ago.

Habibie also received support from the hardline Islamists, who were determined to prevent the repetition of the Ali Moertopo tragedy—a reference to the aforementioned roles of the Moertopo-CSIS-Chinese axis—by ensuring that a committed Muslim figure was elected vice-president, a constitutional successor to the president.

More importantly, he also won the support of key military figures such as *Pangab* Feisal Tanjung, leader of F-ABRI in the MPR Yunus Yosfiah, deputy MPR speaker Syarwan Hamid and *Kostrad* Commander Prabowo Subianto. But while the green generals threw their weight behind Habibie, other red-and-white officers, including Army Chief Wiranto and *Kassospol* Yudhoyono, expressed their concern about Habibie's track record.<sup>252</sup> In an internal meeting to discuss Soeharto's vice-presidential criteria, Wiranto raised doubts whether they really referred to Habibie, although it was finally decided that ABRI would endorse his nomination.<sup>253</sup>

Despite internal military intrigue, Wiranto's doubts were apparently driven by genuine concern over the unprecedented fierce resistance against Habibie's nomination, both from within and outside Indonesia. Having spent most of his career under Soeharto's political wing, Habibie had rarely tried to expand his political base beyond the ICMI and other Muslim-based organizations to include non-Muslim communities and to allay their fears of being politically sidelined under a Muslim-dominated regime. Ironically, he also failed to utilize his liberal Western education to project an image of a democratic civilian figure in a military-dominated regime that would have won the

hearts of the increasingly assertive pro-democracy activists. In short, he appeared to be more capable of alienating than winning potential allies. As a result, at such a crucial time in his political career, all his past conflicts threatened to impede his nomination as his political adversaries were now joining forces to block his rise to vice-presidency.

Domestically, a rainbow coalition of anti-Habibie opposition was formed, involving various groups from liberal economists and pro-democracy activists to hardline military oppositionists. Soeharto's children too, who resented Habibie's influence over their father, opposed his choice of vice-president.

Internationally, donor agencies and leaders of donor countries who fear Habibie's passion for high-cost and high-tech mega projects raised their concern about the possible impact of his "Habibienomics" on Indonesia's ailing economy. There is also another factor in the international resistance against Habibie: He had consciously cultivated his political base among Islamists, inciting fear about the emergence of a more conservative Islamic regime under his leadership. International concern over Habibie's nomination was best voiced by Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who openly called for Soeharto to reconsider his decision. Relations between the two governments soured when Habibie came to power.

Amid such heated controversy over Habibie's nomination, a number of mass organizations proposed some alternative candidates, including Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Harmoko and former cabinet minister Emil Salim. Habibie's supporters, however, were undeterred and fought to defend his candidacy. At times, they even used "tricks" to discredit his rivals, as can be seen in the controversy surrounding Kartasasmita's declaration that he was not interested in joining the vice-presidential race.

A highly ambitious bureaucrat, Kartasasmita was forced to make the decision after he was allegedly linked to an anti-Soeharto gathering known as the Radisson Hotel Affair. The affair refers to a closed-door discussion organized by University of Gadjah Mada's Centre for Strategic Policy Studies (PPSK), chaired by its head, Amien Rais, at Radisson Hotel, Jogjakarta, on 5 January. Featuring 14 Jogyakarta-based social scientists, including Rais, Syafi'i Maarif, Afan Gaffar, Sofian Effendi, Anggito Abimanyu and four observers including oil magnate Arifin Panigoro who reportedly paid the expenses, the discussion recommended comprehensive political, legal and economic reforms to resolve Indonesian crisis.

Panigoro was associated with Kartasasmita's political moves due to the fact that he owed his oil empire partly to Kartasasmita's pro-indigenous businessmen policy during his tenure as Minister of Mining and Energy. Despite Panigoro's denial, the link was enough to raise suspicion about Kartasasmita's political motives, as under the political context at the time, such an activity was categorized as "subversive".

However, none of the participants of the discussion expected Sofian Effendi—who expressed his critical assessments of the New Order during the discussion—to report it to Habibie. An assistant to Habibie, Effendi sent his boss an internal memo on 9 February in which he suggested that Panigoro was attempting to "influence Amien Rais' group to launch a people's power, including mobilizing one million people to foil the MPR Session". One day later, the memo reached Soeharto and Kartasasmita's chance was blown away.

Moreover, at the same day, some members of the Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB) alumni held a press conference at the Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM) cultural complex in Central Jakarta to reject Soeharto's re-nomination as president.<sup>254</sup> The TIM Affair was once again linked to Panigoro due to the fact that ITB activists shared

a common history of student activism with him. Panigoro and Kartasasmita attended the prestigious technical school in the 1960s. It is also interesting to note that ITB and UGM were at the forefront of students' protests against the Soeharto regime.

The next day, Kartasasmita made an awkward announcement that he would not contest the vice-presidential race since no political party has ever nominated him, saying that it would be in conflict with his new job as leader of a Golkar faction in the MPR. The elite intrigue was resolved<sup>255</sup> but Panigoro and 10 initiators of the TIM Affair had to endure police interrogation and were declared suspects with subversion charges. The charges were dropped after Amien Rais and Syafi'i Maarif met with *Kassospol* Yudhoyono and other top military officials in Jogjakarta on 27 March to clarify the matter and came to conclusion that the discussion was "purely academic".<sup>256</sup>

After Kartasasmita's fall, Harmoko emerged as the only remaining alternative candidate, as Emil Salim's candidacy was intended more to challenge the New Order's establishment than seriously winning the seat. In February, a group of highly-respected figures, including four members of the "Berkeley Mafia" (Professors Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Sadli and Subroto, and Dr. Arifin Siregar), wives of three former vice-presidents (Mrs. Rachmi Hatta, Mrs. Nelly Adam Malik and Mrs. Karlina Umar Wairahadikusumah) as well as NGO and pro-democracy activists, signed a petition rejecting Habibie's nomination. They supported the nomination of Professor Emil Salim, a highly respected former minister and a member of the Berkeley Mafia, as alternative vice-president. Despite its heavyweight supporters, the move carried little political significance as it lacked formal political endorsement.

Now all anti-Habibie groups in Golkar—including Soeharto's children, Tutut and Bambang—had little option but to support Harmoko as an alternative candidate. In a heated party meeting to pick Golkar's vice-presidential candidate on 12 February, party leaders chose Harmoko as their preferred candidate with Habibie in reserve. Preparations were being made to announce Harmoko's candidacy when, on the evening of 14 February, Soeharto summoned the leaders of the three MPR factions—Golkar, ABRI and Regional Representatives—and informed them that he had decided to pick Habibie as his vice-president.<sup>257</sup> The next day, the PPP and the PDI, followed later by ABRI, the Regional Representatives and Golkar, formally announced their support for Habibie.

The outgoing ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung then moved to secure Soeharto's wishes. On 16 February, the day he transferred his authority to his successor Wiranto, he issued a letter of order, Number Sprin/227/II/1998, to Lieutenant-General Yunus Yosfiah, head of F-ABRI in the MPR.<sup>258</sup> In anticipation of possible resistance from both the military and other political groups, Tanjung instructed Yosfiah to "create a condition, socialize and fight for the elections of H. Mohamad Soeharto as president and Professor Dr. Ing. B.J. Habibie as vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia during the 1998 MPR General Session". To achieve the goal, Yosfiah was to "take joint efforts with Golkar, Regional Representatives, United Development Party and Indonesian Democratic Party factions in the MPR". Finally, to prevent the repetition of the Ibrahim Saleh episode, a few days before the Session opened on 1 March, all members of Golkar, Regional Representatives and ABRI factions were quarantined and told to follow orders.

Under such a heavily controlled political atmosphere, on 11 March 1998, the MPR elected Habibie as Indonesia's sixth vice-president. And, in clear defiance of strong domestic and international reaction to his decision, Soeharto gave Habibie an unprecedented greater authority. Besides the traditional role as the president's "spare tire" (*ban serep*), Habibie was authorized to "help formulate policies on globalization", underlining Soeharto's unbent trust in him. But fierce resistance against Soeharto's

choice of Habibie indicated the decaying cohesion of the New Order. In its report on the controversy surrounding Habibie's vice-presidency, the magazine *Tajuk* wrote, "Habibie must prioritize his first tasks as vice-president to patch the obvious cracks in the New Order's building, otherwise the nation would move into a direction no one wishes to go."<sup>259</sup>

## CONCLUSION

We have discussed the drastic change in the interplay between the New Order's troika of power—Soeharto, the military and Islam—that has taken place since the late 1980s and the impact that it brought to the Indonesian political landscape. As a consequence of Soeharto's decision to resurrect the power of political Islam, which he had previously suppressed to the effect that it had created lasting pockets of resistance, we saw the greening of the key political institutions: the military, bureaucracy and Golkar.

We have demonstrated that the reasons for this policy reversal were far more complex than "to counterbalance the challenge from the military", as some analysts have believed. Aside from his growing interest in Islam and his determination to maintain control over the military, the move was mainly driven by Soeharto's strategic response to both domestic and international challenges at that time. Domestically, he came to the realization that co-opting Islam was arguably more effective than confronting it, hence his decision to establish the ICMI, an intellectual grouping dominated by Muhammadiyah-Masyumi activists who previously opposed his anti-Islam policies. Accordingly, he reversed his earlier reliance on what Arief Budiman called the "Ali-Moertopo-CSIS-Chinese" axis to the "Habibie-ICMI-indigeneous" axis. Internationally, he understood that the end of communism era has sparked a global wave of democratization, hence his decision to launch the openness policy, a gradual review of military politics and the establishment of the Human Rights Commission.

We note, however, that therein lies the paradox of Soeharto's reversal policy: While he might have intended to reinvent the New Order, the end goal was definitely to secure his grip on power. Thus, it led to mixed, if not conflicting, results. Our study has shown that while he might have tried to "correct" his earlier mistake of pitting the military against Islam, he did so by handpicking Muslim generals and placing them in key positions against the institution's established hierarchy. By subjugating the military to his personal rule, he not only created a deep "cleavage of colours" within the institution but also reduced it from the status of "guardian of the nation" to "president's political hitmen". We have also examined at length how Soeharto resorted to military force in dealing with his political opponents and demonstrated how it eventually helped to consolidate challenges against his regime when the economic crisis struck Indonesia in mid 1997.

## Notes

- 1 Interview, Lieutenant-General (ret'd.) Harsudiyono Hartas, 15 August 2001.
- 2 Interview, General (ret'd.) Raden Hartono, 13 November 2001.
- 3 *Santri* refers to those who adhere to formal Islamic teachings, whilst *kejawan* is attributed to practitioners of Javanese Islam. It should be noted that many members of the Javanese Islam community prefer to call themselves *kejawan* than *abangan*—used by many Western social scientists—that they regard as derogatory. For an early reference on Javanese Islam, see, Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (New York: Free Press, 1960). Critiques on Geertz's work can be found in, among others, Parsudi Suparlan's introductory note of its Indonesian edition published under the title *Santri, Abangan dan Priyayi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1972); Robert W. Hefner, *Islam, State and*

- Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class*, Indonesia, Vol. 56, October 1993 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project); and Mark Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989).
- 4 In a letter to *Asiaweek* editors published on 2 July 1991, former Army Chief-of-Staff General (retd.) GPH Djatikusumo explained that Soeharto's pilgrimage was performed in accordance with the teachings of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine Javanese apostles (*Wali Sanga*). According to the teachings, a Javanese can only perform pilgrimage after he fulfils his duties as son and father. Soeharto had observed the 1,000 days mourning of the passing of Madame Soeharto's mother, thus fulfilling his duty as a son since his own parents had already passed away. He had given his youngest daughter away in marriage, thus completing his duty as a father. In addition, he has nearly reached the age of nine *windus* (or 73 years, according to the Javanese lunar calendar). Thus the time has arrived for him to travel the path of God. Djatikusumo, a prince from the royal court of Mangkunegaran in Surakarta, was apparently irritated by cynical comments, mostly from Western observers, who called the pilgrimage a "political haji". For details of the pilgrimage, see, *Tempo*, "Bukan Haji Politik" and "Sujud Syukur, Semoga Mabur", 6 July 1991.
  - 5 *The Economist*, "The Pilgrim's Tale", 20 July 1991.
  - 6 See, among others, Donald K Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds), *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
  - 7 Soeharto called his new administration "the New Order" to symbolize its attempts to correct the wrongs of Soekarno's "Old Order".
  - 8 The actual number of people killed in the bloody massacres that took place between 1965 and 1966 is a subject of continuous controversy, but it ranged between 78,000 and half a million. For a recap on the various versions of the massacres, see, Hermawan Sulistyono, *Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu, Sejarah Pembantaian Massal Yang Terlupakan (1965–1966)* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), p. 44.
  - 9 The NU seceded from Masyumi in 1952, following both pragmatic and ideological disputes over their power sharing. For the NU "version" of the secession, see, M. Ali Haidar, *Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia, Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1998), pp. 108–109. For a Masyumi view on the same issue, see, Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 1945–1946* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers), 1987.
  - 10 The Sumatera-born Masyumi leaders became involved in the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic/People's Universal Struggle (*PRRI/Permesta*) rebellion in 1958. For an investigative analysis of the PRRI/Permesta, see, Audrey R. and George McT Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York: The New Press, 1996).
  - 11 On the NU's internal dynamics in the early years of the New Order, see, Andree Feillard, *Islam et Armee Dans L'Indonesie Contemporaine*, transl. (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1995), pp. 76–94.
  - 12 Allan A. Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia", PhD thesis (Berkeley: University of California, 1972).
  - 13 On Soeharto's biography, see, Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds* (Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1992). For details of his army inner circle, see, David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1987), pp. 20–32. It is interesting to note that all members of Soeharto's inner circle from the late 1960s to early 1970s, with the exception of Lieutenant-General Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, shared his *kejawan* background. For an analysis of the influence of Javanese thinking on the army's doctrine, see, Peter Britton, *Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer di Indonesia, Perspektif Tradisi Jawa dan Barat*, transl. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996).
  - 14 On the details of the Darul Islam revolt see, Cornelis van Dijk, *Rebellion under the*

- Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia*, transl., (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1993) and Holk H. Dengel, *Darul-Islam, Kartosuwirjos Kampf um einen Islamischen Staat in Indonesien*, transl., (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995).
- 15 Father Beek was a curious figure in the Indonesian intelligence community. Although he was said to have established an influential intelligence network, little was known about him except that he was a Dutch-born Catholic priest of the Jesuit Order. In his as-told-to autobiography, former Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Pangkopkamtib*), General (retd.) Soemitro, provided some inside information about Beek and his relationship with Ali Moertopo. According to Soemitro, Beek had come to know Moertopo since the latter served as a middle-ranking officer in the Central Java garrison, with whom he shared common resentment against communism. Their friendship later developed into political cooperation. Beek founded the Semedi Foundation (*Yayasan Semedi*) in Jogjakarta where he was reported to have trained his cadres in Orthodox Catholicism and intelligence techniques. As his political influence grew, Moertopo made use of Beek's intelligence cadres and network. He recruited some of them as Bakin operatives and helped many others with access into the bureaucracy, political parties and mass organizations. The move sparked tension in Bakin as many career officers questioned their loyalty. See, Heru Cahyono, *Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), pp. 34–38. See, also, Soemitro's interview in *Gatra*, "I Have Never Offended Pak Harto", 21 February 1998. It should be noted, however, that Soemitro and Moertopo shared very little in common politically and their rivalries led to the outbreak of the Malari Affair (the riots of 15 January 1974). Soemitro was accused to have incited the riots to overthrow Soeharto. He denied it and accused Moertopo as the real actor behind the incident to discredit him. Nonetheless, Soemitro was put under tremendous pressure to offer his resignation, which he tendered on 6 March 1974. Soeharto accepted the resignation but at the same time disbanded the *Aspri* office. Unlike Soemitro who later became a staunch government critic, Moertopo continued to serve in a number of key positions, including Minister of Information, but his importance gradually diminished. He died a disillusioned man on 15 May 1984. See, Salim Said, "Soeharto's Armed Forces: Building a Power Base in New Order Indonesia, 1966–1998", *Asian Survey* Vol. 38, No. 6, 1998 (<http://global.factiva.com/en/arch/display.asp>). Soeharto, however, refused to acknowledge Moertopo's influential roles in his administration. In a tone that truly hurt Moertopo's friends, he wrote in his memoirs: "Some people thought that Ali Murtopo was the man who decided everything. Why? Perhaps because he was a good speaker, courageous, and as my special assistant, he was supposedly close to me, and they thought that everything depended on him. That wasn't just true." See, Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds*, p. 378. In a confidential interview in August 2001, a former Moertopo operative confirmed with the author the validity of Soemitro's accounts.
- 16 During the 1970s, the CSIS became so powerful that it incited fear and hatred among the Muslims who believed that a great number, if not most, of the New Order's anti-Islam policies were produced there. In 1973, for example, the Muslims were agitated when the government proposed to enact the Marriage Law (*Undang Undang Perkawinan*), which was largely seen as a violation of Islamic law. According to Minister of Religious Affairs Dr. Mukti Ali, the CSIS staff drafted the Marriage Law. It was then delivered to the *Opsus* office, which later conveyed it to the State Secretariat and Department of Religious Affairs. See, M. Rusli Karim, *Negara dan Peminggiran Islam Politik* (Yogyakarta: PT Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999), p. 120. Although its political influence was diminishing along with the decline of Murtopo—and later Moerdani—the image apparently remained strong that in 1998, the powerful commander of *Kostrad* Lt.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto proposed to buy the entire institution. The management of CSIS declined the proposal.
- 17 Robert W. Hefner, op. cit. For details on Hurgronye's colonial policy on Aceh, see,

- Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and The Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (The Hague: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 86–129.
- 18 The Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) is central in a half-century long debate on the position of Islam in the Indonesian state. Drafted prior to Indonesian independence as a preamble of the 1945 Constitution (*Undang Undang Dasar 1945*), it acknowledged Muslims' obligation to carry out *sharia* (Islamic laws) and would have given Indonesia a more Islamic form of government without necessarily turning it into an Islamic state. The charter was dropped due to objection from Christians, a decision endorsed by Muslims for the sake of national unity. For details on the historic compromise, see, van Dijk, op. cit., pp. 35–38. In 1959, Soekarno reconstituted the UUD 1945 through a decree that acknowledged the charter as “a holistic part (*satu kesatuan*) and the soul of (*menjiwai*) the UUD 1945”. However, the latest proposal to insert the charter into the amended UUD 1945 was turned down by an overwhelming majority at the MPR annual session in August 2002.
  - 19 Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics in Indonesia*, transl. (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999), pp. 291–292. In a letter sent to Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Masyumi's former secretary-general, Soeharto personally refused to rehabilitate Masyumi, citing the reason that the party's leaders had never officially condemned the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. See, also, Cahyono, *Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974*, pp. 46–47.
  - 20 The Indonesian Nationalist Party (*PNI, Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*) and other nationalist and Christian parties were required to join a new party called the Indonesian Democratic Party (*PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*).
  - 21 Those who were arrested and later brought to trial included Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, the alleged founders of Jemaah Islamiyah, listed by the U.S. and the U.N. as a terrorist group in 2002. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be a Southeast Asian associate of Al-Qaeda, the alleged mastermind of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Eventually, all mass organizations accepted the *asas tunggal*, and a few others that insisted to reject it were disbanded. The *asas tunggal* was revoked under the pressure of the Muslim lobbyists in the MPR Special Session in November 1998.
  - 22 In a confidential interview in August 2001, a former *Opsus* operative explained to the author that his colleagues used an intelligence tactic called “fishhook and net” (*pancing dan jaring*) to frame a radical movement. Intelligence operatives penetrated clandestine radical groups and co-opted them by providing financial and political support (*pancing*, or draw them into the fishhook). When the time was deemed right, the groups would be exposed so that the security authorities could later crush them (*jaring*, or gather them under the net). For an early reference on the intelligence activities under the New Order, see, Richard Tanter, “Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966–1989”, PhD thesis (Melbourne: Monash University, 1991). See, also, Cahyono, op. cit., pp. 44–46.
  - 23 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., *Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru* (Jakarta: LIPI and Mizan Pustaka, 2001), pp. 97–103.
  - 24 Heru Cahyono, op.cit., p. 93. Hasan died mysteriously less than 24 hours after he left prison, leading to speculation that he was poisoned.
  - 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 68–72. According to Soemitro, Moertopo recruited Dodo Muhammad Darda and Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, Kartosuwiryo's sons, along with former DI/TII leaders Hispran, Adah Jaelani Tirtapraja, Danu Muhammad Hasan and Amir Fatah as *Bakin* operatives. Soemitro suspected that Moertopo acted on his own initiative, probably to create a prolonged tension between Islam and the government. But Moertopo insisted that he used the Muslim recruits to fight the communists. It was reported that Dodo Kartosuwiryo, a zealous Muslim, had agreed to join Moertopo because he was promised an opportunity to murder Dr. Soebandrio, Soekarno's former deputy Prime Minister and a communist sympathizer. Nevertheless, many *Bakin* staffers

who once fought the DI/TII rebellion were upset because their former enemies were treated very well. In an interview, Sutopo Yuwono, Moertopo's superior at the time, confirmed Soemitro's accounts. See, *Editor*, "Pisahkan Intelijen Dengan Kekuasaan", 31 July 1993. According to Yuwono, he had asked Murtopo to drop his plan to recruit former DI/TII leaders, fearing that the move would backfire. But he felt powerless, as Moertopo reported directly to the president. Soemitro, however, claimed that Soeharto was actually kept in the dark of the entire operation because he became upset when he later learned about it. In a confidential interview in 2001, a former *Bakin* operative confirmed the accuracy of Soemitro's accounts.

- 26 For a chronology of Islamic insurgencies in the 1970s and 1980s, see, *Tiras*, "Dari Hispran, Amir Biki Sampai Warsidi", 21 December 1995. For an investigative analysis on the New Order's military-backed political violence directed against Muslims, see, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., *Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru*, pp. 47–117. Later investigations found evidence of intelligence and military involvement in the aforementioned insurgencies. The Imran Movement gained public attention when its members hijacked a Garuda Indonesia airplane in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1982. Ali Moertopo and his *Bakin* operatives were suspected to have penetrated the movement. See, *Tempo*, "Seorang Imam Dalam Dua Wajah", 14 July 2002. The BCA Bombings led to arbitrary arrests of prominent civilian and military figures such as former commander of Siliwangi military garrison and former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Lieutenant-General (retd.) Hartono Reko Dharsono, former minister Ir. Haji Muhammad Sanusi and the well-known preacher, Andi Mappataheng Fatwa. A deputy speaker of Parliament after Soeharto's fall, Fatwa raised suspicion that the bombings and their subsequent arrests were the works of the intelligence apparatus. See, A.M. Fatwa, *Demi Sebuah Rezim, Demokrasi dan Keyakinan Beragama Diadili* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2000). See, also, Sanusi's interview in *Editor*, "Saya Korban Intel", 4 September 1993. The Warsidi Affair was named after the leader of a Darul Islam-linked fundamentalist sect in Talangsari, Lampung, which the government accused of attempting to set up an Islamic state. The military led by Colonel Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono, who later became head of the National Intelligence Board (BIN) under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, launched a brutal military operation. The army reported that 30 people died in the operation but human-rights groups claimed that 280 people died. See, *Kompas*, "Warga Talangsari Kembali Datangi Komnas HAM", 5 February 2003. Most important of all, perhaps, was the Tanjung Priok Incident that continues to affect today's political configuration. The incident occurred on 12 September 1984 when military troops fired on angry demonstrators demanding the release of local Muslim leaders at the Jakarta port of Tanjungpriok. The army reported that nine people died in the riots but many independent organizations estimated a much higher number, perhaps as many as 200. See, Carmel Budiardjo, Liem Soei Liong and Dorothy Perkins, *Indonesia: Muslims On Trial* (London: Tapol, 1987). Muslim leaders believe that the incident was a set-up by ABRI Chief Gen. L.B. Moerdani and the Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command and a future vice-president, Maj-Gen. Try Sutrisno. There had never been an independent investigation on the riots but under intense pressure from Muslim organizations, the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (*Komnas HAM*) established a commission to inquire into the tragedy in February 2000. After Muslim groups rejected its first report the commission submitted a second report in October 2000, which named 23 people to be brought to trial, including Murdani and Sutrisno. See, *Komisi Penyelidikan dan Pemeriksaan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Tanjung Priok (KP3T), Laporan Hasil Penyelidikan dan Pemeriksaan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Tanjung Priok* (Jakarta, Komnas HAM, October 2000). Sutrisno tried to secure a controversial out-of-court settlement with the former victims of Tanjung Priok through a religious means known as *islah* (reconciliation). He asked them to drop the charges in exchange for financial compensation. Hendropriyono was reported to follow Sutrisno's example with the former victims of the Warsidi Affair. In November

2002, the Attorney-General's Office submitted charges against civilian and military officers involved in the handling of the riots to an ad-hoc human-rights tribunal, including Major-General Sriyanto, a field commander during the incident who later became Commander of the Army's Special Forces Command (*Kopassus*). Moerdani and Sutrisno, however, were conspicuously missing from the list. In addition, former victims of the Warsidi Affair demanded similar treatment and insisted that the Komnas HAM should set up a new commission to inquire into the tragedy.

27 Hefner, op. cit.

28 *Editor*, "Bila Perlu Dengan Ikatan", 8 December 1990. On the concept of *aliran*, see, Geertz, op. cit.

29 Hefner, op. cit. Habibie had come to know Soeharto since his childhood in the South Sulawesi town of Pare-Pare when his father befriended the young general. A brilliant aeronautics scientist, he lived for more than two decades in Germany before returning to Indonesia at Soeharto's request to lead government-sponsored high tech projects. Their relationship was that of son and father, with Habibie calling Soeharto his "professor" (*mahaguru*) and SSG (Super Genius Soeharto). Habibie is one of the very few people who could engage Soeharto in hours-long discussions. Habibie had the habit of taking notes and underlined Soeharto's guidance (*petunjuk*) in red ink, which he often used to impress other ministers. For a biography on Habibie, see, A. Makmur Makka, *B.J. Habibie (Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie): His Life and Career* (Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1999).

30 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001. Hartono was the Commander of the East Java Regional Military Command (*Pangdam V/Brawijaya*) at that time. According to Hartono, he defied orders from his superiors—including Sutrisno—to block the ICMI's first-ever meeting in Malang and instead facilitated it, after learning from Habibie that Soeharto had given him the green light. According to Hartono, Soeharto later told him that he personally chose the organization's name and instructed Habibie to lead it. In separate interviews in 2001, Habibie's military adviser Lieutenant-General (retd.) Ahmad Tirtosudiro and his deputy at the Agency for Technological Research and Development (BPPT), Prof. Wardiman Djojonegoro, confirmed the military's attempts at blocking the Malang meeting. Djojonegoro said that he had to endure hours of interrogation at the office of ABRI's intelligence agency (*Bais*) for his role in preparing the ICMI's establishment. He was later appointed the ICMI's Secretary-General.

31 Interview, Hartas, 15 August 2001. Hartas was ABRI's chief of socio-political affairs (*Kassospol*) at that time.

32 Hefner, op. cit.

33 *Editor*, "Wejangan Wapres Buat ICMI", 4 September 1993.

34 When asked whether they objected to the establishment of the ICMI because of its perceived threat or because Habibie led the organization, many red-and-white generals pointed out the latter. "I dislike a *ngathok* leader," said one retired general. *Ngathok* originated from the Javanese word *kathok* (underwear), an extremely scathing term used to describe people who further their careers by sticking themselves to their superiors. But the feeling is mutual. Educated in a liberal democratic environment, Habibie hardly hid his "distaste" of the military and its involvement in politics. "He tends to look down on them," said Lt-Gen (retd.) Z.A. Maulani, one of his military advisers.

35 For an investigative report on Habibie's difficult relationship with members of military leadership over arms purchases, see, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "Techno Battles", 7 April 1994.

36 Interview, General (retd.) Edi Sudradjat, 18 February 2003.

37 Red and white are the colours of the national flag while green generally symbolizes Islam and is largely used as a background colour of the flags of Muslim parties. Both sides, however, rejected the terms as derogatory as they implied that green officers are less committed to *Sapta Marga* and, likewise, those labelled red-and-white are less Muslim. They maintained that a soldier had to uphold the principle of "*dwi warna*

- purwa cendekia wusana* “ or “a soldier’s commitment to the nation [symbolized in the red and white colours of the national flag] supersedes his intellectuality”.
- 38 Said, op. cit.
- 39 Interview, Edi Sudradjat, 18 February 2003.
- 40 See, among others, Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (London and New York: Routledge, revised edition, 1994), p. 133; and Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting, Indonesia’s Search for Stability* (St. Leonard, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1999), p. 176.
- 41 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001. One of Soeharto’s close confidants at that time, Hartono dismissed suggestion that Soeharto’s decision to mobilize Islamic support was driven by his anxiety over mounting challenge from the army. According to Hartono, Soeharto had started studying Islam seriously since the early 1980s, long before he embarked on his policy reversals. For an analysis of similar views expressed by Soeharto’s supporters, see, *Tempo*, “Bukan Haji...”, 6 July 1991.
- 42 Bhakti et al., op.cit., p. 173.
- 43 The purification of *dwifungsi* and the ABRI’s position towards Golkar were the subject of internal military debate in 1978, resulting in the publication of the *Seskoad* Paper written by military intellectual Brigadier-General (retd.) Abdul Kadir Besar. The paper argued that the ABRI should maintain an equidistant position with political parties and that it should uphold loyalty to the state, not to the government of the day. See, Jenkins, op. cit., pp. 90–101.
- 44 The Petition of Fifty was named after 50 signatories of a petition to protest Soeharto’s speeches in March and April 1980 in Pekanbaru and Jakarta, in which he insisted that the ABRI should back Golkar despite mounting calls for the military’s neutrality in politics. The signatories included two former Prime Ministers, Mohammad Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap, former head of the Revolutionary Emergency Government (PDRI) and Central Bank Governor Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former Minister of Defence General (retd.) A.H. Nasution, former governor of Jakarta Lieutenant-General (retd.) Ali Sadikin, former Police Chief General (retd.) Hoegeng Iman Santosa, as well as former cabinet ministers, retired generals and student critics. Until the late 1980s, the petition stood as the only significant alternative voice to the New Order. But it quickly lost its weight, partly due to internal rift but mostly because it was subjected to harsh treatment that forced many of its members to subdue their criticisms. The treatment included terminating the services of active military and civil servants, cutting off credit lines, barring them from overseas travel and total media blackout of their activities. In an interview, Nasution accused Moerdani of barring them from travelling overseas (*cekal*) and planned to send a few members of the Petition of Fifty to isolation in Buru Island, a notorious island-prison for communist detainees. See, *Editor*, “Intelijen Kita dan Peran Sejarah Jenderal Benny”, 31 July 1993. In an interview on 15 July 2001, Lieutenant-General (retd.) Z.A. Maulani, Moerdani’s former confidant, confirmed Nasution’s statement. According to Maulani, Attorney-General Ali Said turned down Moerdani’s proposal.
- 45 Jenkins, op.cit., pp. 22–26.
- 46 Interview, Maulani, 15 July 2001. Maulani was Jusuf’s aide-de-camp at that time. Maulani disputed some generals’ claim quoted in Jenkin’s book that Jusuf refused to express public support for Widodo’s initiative.
- 47 Interview, Harry Tjan Silalahi, 13 July 2001. Silalahi was one of the founders of the CSIS and remained as the think tank’s patron until today, a position that made him one of the trusted confidants of both Moertopo and Moerdani. See, also, an interview with Major-General (retd.) Kentot Harseno, Soeharto’s former aide-de-camp, in *Tajuk*, “*Ngantor* Di Bina Graha Mentereng, Tapi...”, 11 June 1998.
- 48 Said, op. cit.
- 49 *Tempo*, “Sebuah Pergantian Menjelang Sidang”, 20 February 1988. *Tempo* implied that Moerdani had only learned about his replacement when he met the president.
- 50 *Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite*. Indonesia, Vol. 46, October 1988,

- Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, p. 134; hereafter cited as “Current Data” with appropriate issue number in text.
- 51 Naro’s political record was as controversial as Ali Moertopo’s. Most Muslim leaders believed he was a *Bakin*-trained politician planted in the Parmusi and later the PPP. See, Cahyono, *op. cit.*, p. 46. Shortly after his “failed” candidacy, the government sought to replace him with the more accommodative Ismail Hasan Metareum in a controversial process in September 1988.
  - 52 For details on the 11-day-long political drama, see, *Editor*, “Calon Wapres Dalam Mufakat Lonjong”, 12 March 1988, and its follow-up on 19 March 1988, “Drama 10 Hari” and “Percikan Ibrahim”. On Naro’s eleventh-hour decision to withdraw his candidacy, see, Awaloeddin Djamin, *Pengalaman Seorang Perwira Polri* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), pp. 273–279. However, in an interview 14 years later, Naro denied that his vice-presidential nomination was part of Moerdani’s plot and insisted that he only carried out his party’s mandate. See, *Tajuk*, “Saya Sudah Siap Tampil Lagi”, 1–12 November 1998.
  - 53 Julius Pour, *Benny Moerdani: A Profile of Soldier Statesman* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Soedirman), 1993, p. 543. However, Moerdani denied that he blocked Sudharmono’s candidacy, arguing that he had signed a required security clearance (*surat keterangan bersih diri*) for Sudharmono before his nomination. See, Salim Said, *op. cit.*
  - 54 Sudharmono, S.H., *Pengalaman Dalam Masa Pengabdian, Sebuah Otobiografi* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia), 1997, pp. 395–408.
  - 55 Interview, Hartas, 15 August 2001. See, also, *Editor*, “Si ‘Anak Nakal’ Ibrahim Saleh”, 27 March 1993. In this interview, Saleh acknowledged that he was “helped” by a colonel but stopped short of mentioning a direct reference to Moerdani.
  - 56 *Ibid.* See, also, *Editor*, “Si Anak Nakal...”, 27 March 1993. In the interview, Saleh said that his action was motivated by concern over Sudharmono’s past communist link. But in a press conference in October 1988, Sudharmono denied the allegation.
  - 57 *FEER*, “Siege Tactics”, 29 November 1990.
  - 58 Interview, Hartas, 15 August 2001.
  - 59 *FEER*, “Siege...”, 29 November 1990.
  - 60 Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
  - 61 Said, *op. cit.*
  - 62 Interview, Harry Tjan Silalahi, 13 July 2001. Silalahi theorized that what had happened to Moerdani was not unprecedented, as it also happened to Soeharto’s former trusted allies, such as H.R. Dharsono, Soemitro, Ali Moertopo and M. Jusuf, to name a few. The “twin suns” theory, as it is called, draws largely from the leadership style of the monarchs of the ancient Mataram Kingdom who would never allow any potential challenger—another sun in the sky—to emerge. For a reference on the Javanese idea of power, see, Benedict R’OG Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture” in Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 1–69.
  - 63 Personal communication.
  - 64 Interview, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Hariyoto Pringgo Sudirjo, 12 July 2001. According to the former *Kassospol*, it was Moerdani who made Suryadi, his protégé, PDI chairman in an attempt to counter the influence of Golkar. Hariyoto’s predecessor, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Harsudiyono Hartas, confirmed it, saying: “In [the elections of] 1987, we did not support Golkar. Pak Benny forbade us from getting involved in Golkar’s activities.” Interview, Hartas, 15 August 2001. See, also, Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–78. For Moerdani’s denial, see, Said, *op. cit.*
  - 65 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001. See, also, *Editor*, “Daftar Calon Golkar Menjelang Sukses”, 14 September 1991.
  - 66 For details on the Santa Cruz Incident and Sutrisno’s account of it, see, *Editor*, “Menguji Objektivitas Tuhuz Penyidik” and “Saksi-Saksi Peristiwa 12 November”, 7 December 1991. The magazine published a series of investigative reports until mid

- 1992 and provided one of the most comprehensive analyses on the post-Santa Cruz military politics.
- 67 Interview, Sudradjat, 18 February 2003. The DKM's investigation has never been made available to the public. But according to Sudradjat, it concluded that although there were indications that the riot was premeditated by an international conspiracy to discredit Indonesia, the security apparatus in East Timor had failed to anticipate the riot and take adequate measures to deal with its aftermath. Based on the findings, he wrote a recommendation to General Try Sutrisno to dismiss the commander of the Udayana military garrison, Major-General Sintong Panjaitan, and commander of Operational Command (*Kolakops*) in East Timor, Brigadier-General Rudolf S. Warouw. He dismissed speculation that he had "watered down" the findings. In a separate interview, Z.A. Maulani, Tanjung's classmate and confidant, claimed that Tanjung recommended that Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno should be investigated too but Edi Sudradjat rejected it for fear that it would jeopardize Sutrisno's chances for the vice-presidential candidacy.
- 68 The Team of Eleven comprised 11 members of politicians and cabinet ministers appointed informally by Soeharto to nominate the vice-presidential candidate. The team was an enlargement of the Team of Nine and Team of Five tasked with a similar job in 1988 and 1983 respectively. In the Team of Eleven's election Habibie collected eight votes to Sutrisno's seven, triggering speculation that whilst Sutrisno voted for Habibie, the latter voted for himself.
- 69 Personal communication with a former member of the Team of Eleven, August 2001.
- 70 *Current Data*, Vol. 56, October 1993, p. 125.
- 71 *FEER*, "A Stir in The Rank", 5 July 1990.
- 72 Interview, Hartas, 15 August 2001.
- 73 *Editor*, "Sejumlah Kejutan Di Seputar Kabinet Baru", 27 March 1993.
- 74 Interview, Sudradjat, 18 February 2003. Sudradjat described his relationship with Soeharto as "normative", saying that he had neither requested any favours (*nyuwun*) from the president nor did he worship (*nyembah*) him loyally.
- 75 Soeharto offered Moerdani an ambassadorial post in Washington, D.C., but he turned it down. See, Said, *op.cit.*
- 76 Interview, Sudradjat, 18 February 2003.
- 77 Personal communication. Prabowo persuaded Tanjung to assemble a *Seskoad* team to produce a book on Soeharto's heroic roles in the event known as 1<sup>st</sup> March Attack (*Serangan Umum Satu Maret*) during the war of independence in 1948. (It should be noted that Soeharto's self-acclaimed role in the event was largely disputed after his fall in 1998.) Soeharto was pleased with the book. He had funds disbursed for *Seskoad*, his own alma mater, and took notice of Tanjung. In a separate interview, Maulani, Tanjung's classmate and Habibie's confidant, confirmed the story. According to Maulani, Habibie never met Tanjung in Germany and that it was Prabowo who helped to bring Tanjung into Soeharto's attention. Maulani suspected that Tanjung's unusual four-and-a-half-year tenure as the commander of *Seskoad* was due to Moerdani, who disliked his devout Muslim background.
- 78 Interview, Major-General (ret.) Kivlan Zen, 23 December 2001. Zen was Prabowo's senior and mentor in the military academy and later served as his deputy in *Kostrad*. According to Zen, Prabowo disliked and distrusted Moerdani for personal and religious reasons. Born into a secular family and educated in Western schools, Prabowo started to study Islam seriously during his years as an army cadet. As he came into contact with a number of radical Muslim figures, he came to the conclusion that Moerdani was responsible for the military's policy to sideline Islam politically. Prabowo suspected that Moerdani disliked his Islamic inclination and tried to block his career.
- 79 A field soldier (*tentara lapangan*) refers to a soldier who serves in a combat unit and is generally known for his distaste for politics, as opposed to a political soldier (*tentara politik*) who serves more in a behind-the-desk socio-political position.
- 80 Tanjung apparently felt guilty that his recommendation led to Sintong Panjaitan's

dismissal. According to Maulani, Tanjung and Panjaitan had been close friends since their academy days. In 1996, Tanjung brought Panjaitan back in as Habibie's military adviser, making him the only non-Muslim general around Habibie. In an attempt to counter resentment from the military, Habibie appointed some respected retired generals as his advisers, including Lieutenant-General (retd.) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Lieutenant-General (retd.) Hasnan Habib and Lieutenant-General (retd.) Z.A. Maulani. Panjaitan remained loyal to Habibie and served as Secretary for the Supervision of Development Operation (*Sesdalopbang*), a presidential development body, during his short term as president.

- 81 FEER, "Spies Like Us", 27 January 1994.
- 82 *Current Data*, Vol. 57, January 1994, pp. 85–87; and *Tiras*, "Sekali Mutasi 160 Perwira Diganti", 16 March 1995.
- 83 Arismunandar turned down an ambassadorial post offer and was later assigned as head of the National Sports Committee (KONI), much to his disappointment. According to widely circulated speculation, his career ended abruptly because First Lady Madame Tien Soeharto was unhappy with how Arismunandar, who is married to her youngest sister, managed his marriage. But Arismunandar's confidants cited his clashes with his nephews and nieces who tried to extract lucrative commissions from arms procurements as the real reason behind his short tenure as army chief. Moreover, Arismunandar disagreed with Soeharto's re-Islamicization policy. Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001. Hariyoto was Arismunandar's classmate and confidant.
- 84 For an analysis on Hartono's appointment, see, *Tiras*, "Mutasi Pada Bulan Suci", 2 February 1995.
- 85 Interview, Sudradjat, 18 February 2003. According to Sudradjat, Hartono's track record failed to make him an eligible candidate for the post. The army kept a comprehensive list of academy graduates and used their track records to build a database of eligible officers for key positions. The data was made available to the president, *pangab* and Army Chief-of-Staff. According to the data, the most eligible candidate to succeed Arismunandar was his deputy, Surjadi. In a separate interview, Hartono dismissed the notion that he was not qualified to become army chief. He claimed that it was a move by the red-and-white camp to block his career. He also suspected that Sudradjat and Sutrisno had deliberately prevented him from becoming the East Java Governor and sent him into "exile" in the Armed Forces' Joint Staff and Command School (*Sesko ABR*) instead.
- 86 Hartono dismissed the suggestion, arguing that he had become close to Soeharto since he was the *pangdam* in East Java when he brought some *kiais* to help the president learn more about Islam. Another version claims that it was Azwar Anas who persuaded Soeharto to appoint Hartono, just as he did with Tanjung.
- 87 Jenderal TNI Feisal Tanjung, *ABRI-Islam Mitra Sejati* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997), pp. 67–68.
- 88 In the eight-month period after taking office (February to September 1995), Hartono rotated at least 287 personnel, an amazing record compared to only 131 in the 13-month period between January 1991 and February 1993. As a result, some officers were reported to have only held their jobs less for than three months before they were rotated to another post. See, *Tiras*, "Rekor Mutasi di Jajaran ABRI", 7 September 1995.
- 89 *Current Data*, Vol. 62, October 1993, p. 105. See, also, Douglas Kammen and Siddarth Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University Press, 1999).
- 90 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001.
- 91 *Tiras*, "Mutasi Pada Bulan...", 2 February 1995.
- 92 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001. The CPDS was initially established to provide analytical support for military leaders, including Feisal Tanjung, Hartono, Syarwan Hamid and Prabowo Subianto. During its heyday, it was said to be a place

- where the military's personnel selection and mutation were decided. However, it later broke up when conflicting interests between those generals intensified. A group of intellectuals under Prabowo's patronage broke away and established the CPIS (Centre for Policy and Information Studies), while the CPDS ceased to exist.
- 93 *The Economist*, "Out with the Mafia", 27 March 1993. For a comprehensive analysis on the "technocrats" and "technologists", see, Richard Robison, "Power and Economy in Soeharto's Indonesia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, October 1991. On the role of liberal ideas in shaping Indonesia's economy, see, Rizal Mallarangeng, *Mendobrak Sentralisme Ekonomi, Indonesia 1986–1992* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, Yayasan Adikarya Ikapi and The Ford Foundation, 2002).
- 94 PII was forced to disband itself due to its refusal to adopt the *asas tunggal*. However, it continued to exist in the form of several underground cells, until Prabowo came to salvage them in the early 1990s.
- 95 In separate interviews, Harsudiyono and Hariyoto said that their replacement was due to Soeharto's displeasure with them. Harsudiyono suspected that his *fait d'accompli* in forcing Sutrisno's nomination had angered the president, who was so used to people who came to him asking for guidance. Hariyoto claimed that he was dismissed because of his criticism over Tommy Soeharto's controversial clove monopoly.
- 96 For details on YKPK, see, *Tiras*, "Merah, Kuning, Hijau, di Langit YKPK", 2 November 1995. See, also, Sudrajat's interview in the same edition, "Ini Kan Satu Kebutuhan".
- 97 In February 1994, *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Hartono announced that Samsuddin and Meliala were "recalled" from Parliament. See, *Tempo*, "Perginya Dua Vokalis", 12 February 1994. Rukmini was replaced earlier due to her deteriorating health. In a private discussion, however, Rukmini suspected that her political rivals cast "black magic" on her and caused her "strange" illness. She passed away in 1996.
- 98 For a comprehensive analysis on the ABRI's response to popular demand for political reform and democratization, see, Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
- 99 *Editor*, "Rebutan Kunci Suksesi di Golkar", 8 May 1993; *FEER*, "Party Patron", 4 November 1993.
- 100 Both Soedarman and Moerdiono were long-serving Palace confidants. Soedarman had served under Soeharto's command in Central Java. Moerdiono was known as one of the very few people who understood Soeharto's inner thoughts and body language. He acted as the unofficial spokesperson for the president.
- 101 *DeTik*, "Mayjen TNI RK Sembiring Meliala: 1000 Orang DPR/MPR Jangan Dianggap Togog", 27 October 1993. On the red-and-white camp's determination that the military should maintain its control of Golkar see, *FEER*, "Suharto's Ever-Tightening Hand", 27 October 1993, and *Editor*, "Rebutan Kunci...", 8 May 1993.
- 102 *FEER*, "Father Knows Best", 25 November 1993.
- 103 Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001. According to Hariyoto, he had suggested to Tanjung to ask for Soeharto's final say in the matter to avoid further division within Golkar. Soeharto scribbled down a written memo instructing the ABRI to support Harmoko. He also wrote down names for Golkar's new roster. As Golkar's chairman of Board of Advisors, Soeharto reserved the rights to determine the party's policy and leadership line-ups, making him the de-facto chairman of the party.
- 104 Interview, Harmoko, 20 August 2001. Harmoko denied Soeharto's interference and Habibie's manoeuvrings in his election. He insisted that his election was due to his popularity among the party's grassroots supporters and party leaders. He acknowledged, however, that Soeharto instructed him to improve Golkar's performance in the upcoming election.
- 105 *Tiras*, "Tergantung Kartu Truf Wahono", 16 February 1995. Harmoko denied the accusation.
- 106 Ma'roef later served as Indonesia's ambassador to Vietnam. During the presidential race in 2004, he joined Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's team and, when Yudhoyono

- became president, he was appointed Minister of Home Affairs.
- 107 Quoted from a personal notes made available to the author by General (ret.d.) R. Hartono.
- 108 The fact that Ma'roef's speech was delivered on behalf of the *Pangab* drew later controversy. In an interview in 20 July 2001, former *Kasum* Lieutenant-General Soeyono, Ma'roef's friend and political ally, claimed that he only expressed *Pangab's* view, not his own. Thus, he should have not been blamed for its mistake. In a separate interview, Hartono insisted that although the speech was signed by General Feisal Tanjung, it was drafted by Ma'roef.
- 109 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001.
- 110 *Kompas*, "KSAD: Setiap Anggota ABRI Kader Golkar", 14 March 1995.
- 111 Interview, Harmoko, 20 August 2001.
- 112 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 113 Interview, Lieutenant-General (ret.d.) Soeyono, 20 July 2001.
- 114 See, for example, Honna, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–35
- 115 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 26 September 2001. Hamid described many officers' resentment over Hartono's stance as follows: "It was obvious that [Hartono] wanted to gain political access to the Palace [through his statement], but it is so regrettable that he had to *ndlosor* (lower himself to such a lowest position) like that."
- 116 *Forum Keadilan*, "H. Harmoko: Bukan Golkar Yang Mengejar Mayoritas Tunggal, Tapi Rakyat", 18 November 1996.
- 117 In May 1995, Admiral (ret.d.) Sudomo, chairman of the Supreme Advisory Board (DPA), disclosed that Soeharto indicated his intention to pick a civilian vice-president. See, *Tiras*, "Menunggu Matahari Kembar Lewat Wapres Sipil", 18 May 1995. Then, in September 1996, at Soeharto's instruction, Habibie delivered a speech at the ABRI's headquarters, which was later followed by a series of speeches at a number of military garrisons. Most political observers speculated that Soeharto had begun grooming Habibie as his successor. See, *Forum Keadilan*, "Spekulasi dan Terobosan Politik Mutakhir Habibie", 21 October 1996.
- 118 *The Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ)*, "Indonesia Closes Its Era of 'Openness' by Shutting Down Three Publications", 22 June 1994.
- 119 Interview, Sudradjat, 18 February 2003. According to Sudradjat, Habibie's figure was a gross mark-up as it was four times higher than the budget proposed by the navy.
- 120 *Tempo*, "Dihadang Ombak dan Biaya Besar", 11 June 1994.
- 121 Interview, Maulani, 5 July 2001. See, also, *Tempo*, "Dihadang...", 11 June 1994.
- 122 For details on the budget controversy, see, *Tempo*, "Mar'ie Memangkas Rp 327 Miliar", 11 June 1994, and *Reuters*, "Indonesia Slashes Funds for Controversial Warships", 8 June 1994.
- 123 *Tempo*, "Pembelian Kapal Itu Memang Dirahasiakan", 18 June 1994.
- 124 Under the New Order, any publication must obtain a publication licence (SIUPP) that can be revoked by the government for a number of reasons. For details of the New Order's press regulations, see, David T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia* (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1994).
- 125 On the theories about the press banning, see, Yasuo Hanazaki, "The Indonesian Press in an Era of Keterbukaan: A Force for Democratization?", Unpublished PhD thesis (Melbourne: Monash University, 1996).
- 126 Interview, Harmoko, 20 August 2001. A seasoned journalist and editor who owns official shares in a number of publications and unofficial equity partnerships in almost every publication in Indonesia, Harmoko confessed that he could not resist Soeharto's order to ban the three publications. "Who could do it under the political context of the time?" he asked rhetorically. *Editor's* managing editor, Marah Sakti, confirmed his story, recalling that the Director of Press and Graphics Subrata was sweating with worry when he had to break the news to the three publications' editor. Subrata said that Soeharto was so incensed that he gave instructions that there was to be no delay in its execution. A number of former members of Soeharto's cabinet further confirmed

- Harmoko's account. For an investigative report on Harmoko's shares in a large number of publications, see, *Tempo*, "Menjadi Murdoch Tanpa Keringat", 19 January 2003.
- 127 While *Editor's* staffers cooperated peacefully and were allowed to republish the magazine under a new name, *Tiras*, most of *Tempo's* journalists rejected Hasan's creation of *Gatra* Magazine and took the case to court. Surprisingly, they won the case. But the magazine was not republished until after Soeharto's fall in 1998. Despite the change in its ownership, *Tiras* maintained much of *Editor's* daring political coverage until it was closed down in 1998 due to financial problems. *DeTik* tried to defy the New Order's pressure by secretly buying the licence of the defunct *Simponi* tabloid but was forced to close it down after only appearing twice. It reappeared after Soeharto's fall under the name of *DeTak*.
- 128 Duncan McCargo, "Killing the Messenger: The 1994 Press Bannings and the Demise of Indonesia's New Order", *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, pp. 29–47.
- 129 The G Group was named after a street where members of the group used to meet at the house of a veteran journalist, Said Budairy, in the South Jakarta suburb of Mampang. A former deputy chief editor of the NU's newspaper *Duta Masyarakat*, Budairy offered Wahid his family's hospitality as well as political tutelage when the latter first arrived in Jakarta. Members of the group included Fahmi Saifuddin Zuhri, Rozy Munir, Muchith Muzadi, Masdar Mas'udi, Umar Basalim, Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Ichwan Syam and many others.
- 130 Feillard, op. cit., pp. 262–271.
- 131 Interview, Ichwan Syam, 23 May 2002. Syam was a member of the G Group, who backed Wahid during the 1984 election. He was appointed the NU's Secretary-General in 1992.
- 132 Schwarz, op. cit., p. 176. Schwarz's revelation of the letter triggered controversy among NU leaders and members. Wahid's rivals used it to discredit him. See, *Tiras*, "Perseteruan Pak Lik dan Ponakan", 9 February 1995.
- 133 Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001. In a separate interview, Sudradjat confirmed that he lent both moral and financial support for Wahid.
- 134 Marzuki Wahid et al., *Dinamika NU, Perjalanan Sosial Dari Muktamar Cipasung (1994) Ke Muktamar Kediri (1999)*, (Jakarta: Kompas and Lakpesdam NU, 1999), p. 16.
- 135 Personal observation.
- 136 Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001.
- 137 Interview, Ichwan Syam, 23 May 2002. Syam is a former NU Secretary-General under Wahid's leadership. As congress organizer and Wahid's confidant, Syam was responsible for financial management. Syam was dropped off Wahid's inner circle after the Congress.
- 138 Abu Hasan is a businessman whom Wahid picked as his personal financial adviser and, later, made NU treasurer. He provided Wahid with financial backing for his political activities. Many NU staffers suspected that Wahid had promised him the chairmanship in return for his nearly unlimited financial support. Interview, Ichwan Syam, 23 May 2002.
- 139 See, Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Equinox Publishing, 2002), pp. 234–238.
- 140 *Media Indonesia*, "Istighotsah, Antara Politik dan Ibadah", 28 April 2001.
- 141 The PDI became the last party to endorse Soeharto's nomination, leading to speculation that it was preparing another candidate. See, *Tempo*, "Terakhir Bukan Terlambat", 14 November 1992.
- 142 *Tajuk*, "Bila Jenderal Menunggang Banteng", 1–23 July 1998.
- 143 Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001.
- 144 *Tajuk*, "Bila Jenderal...", 1–23 July 1998.
- 145 Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001.
- 146 For details about Soeharto's changed stance and the unprecedented meeting between

- Megawati and Tutut, see, *Tempo*, “Lakon Megawati Dalam Partai”, 25 December 1993. Megawati and Tutut were born on the same day, 23 January. They also went to the same school, *Yayasan Perguruan Cikini*. See, also, *FEER*, “Third Time Lucky”, 13 January 1994.
- 147 *Tajuk*, “Bila Jenderal...”. 1–23 July 1998.
- 148 *Tiras*, “Misteri Pembakaran Noesa Poetra”, 9 February 1995. It is interesting to note that the ICMI’s newspaper, *Republika*, carried it in a headline. The newspaper quoted military sources as saying that Kiemas was involved in a pro-PKI activity and was listed as a former PKI detainee (*tapol PKI*). But a local military spokesperson quoted by *Tiras* denied that Kiemas was on their list of former PKI detainees.
- 149 *Tiras*, “Jurus Litsus Menggantung Mega”, 9 February 1995.
- 150 *Tiras*, “Menjaring OTB dan KGB Dengan Angin Litsus”, 26 October 1995. See, also, an interesting interview with the head of *Bakin*, Lieutenant-General Soedibjo, in the same edition, “Soedibjo: Tidak Perlu Ada Program Khusus Litsus”. For a more conceptual analysis of the military’s systematic awareness against the threat of communism and other radical ideas, see, Honna, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–124.
- 151 Interview, Lieutenant-General (retd.) Moetojib, 2 January 2002. In a separate interview, former *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Hariyoto P.S. doubted Megawati’s inclination towards her father’s idea of *marhaenism*. He said that although Megawati is Soekarno’s biological daughter, his true ideological offspring is her younger sister, Rahmawati.
- 152 *Tajuk*, “Bila Jenderal...”, 1–23 July 1998.
- 153 Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati’s close friend and ally, believed that Soeharto had long prepared a political career for Tutut, thus resenting Megawati’s rise to challenge her. See, Greg Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–261. The same view was shared by a number of military officers. See, for example, Benny Butarbutar, *Bukan Puntung Rokok* (Jakarta: RIDMA Foundation, 2003), pp. 155–160.
- 154 Interview, Hariyoto, 12 July 2001.
- 155 On the Wahid-Mega alliance, see, *Tiras*, “Aliansi Politik Mbak dan Gus”, 22 June 1995.
- 156 See, an interview with K.H. Jusuf Hasyim, Wahid’s uncle and fiercest political adversary, in *Tiras*, “Dia Itu Lambang Oposisi”, 9 February 1995. Hasyim claimed that one retired general had informed him that Wahid and Megawati would plan to combine their forces to call for an Assembly Special Session to unseat Soeharto.
- 157 There were five directorates at BIA. Directorate A supervised domestic political intelligence and directorate C handled counter-intelligence.
- 158 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001. Hartono compiled written notes of his frequent audiences with the president.
- 159 Interview, Moetojib, 2 January 2002.
- 160 It turned out that the document was also leaked to other parties, including the media. NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid was apparently informed about the existence of the document. When a sectarian riot broke out in a *pesantren* in Situbondo, East Java, in September 1996, followed by a series of violence in the West Java towns of Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok, Wahid claimed that the riots were deliberately provoked to discredit him and the NU. He claimed that a military operation code-named “Green Dragon” has been launched against him, in conjunction with “Operation Red Dragon” directed at Megawati. See, *Media Indonesia*, “Istighotsah, Antara Politik...”.
- 161 The delegates comprised 16 functionaries from central party leadership (DPP) as well as leaders from 22 provincial chapters (DPD) and 182 regency chapters (DPC). Although it turned out that many of them did not represent the official local party leadership, the government was keen to demonstrate that they reflected the majority of party supporters. In order to mobilize public opinion for the Achmad-Hutapea move, officers from the ABRI’s Information Office (*Puspen ABRI*) called some publications and instructed them to carry the story.

- 162 *Tiras*, “PDI Tanpa Megawati Soekarnoputri”, 27 June 1996.
- 163 *Tajuk*, “Bila Jenderal...”, 1–23 July 1998.
- 164 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 165 *Tajuk*, “Bila Jenderal...”, 1–23 July 1998.
- 166 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 167 *Tajuk*, “Bila Jenderal...”, 1–23 July 1998.
- 168 Harmoko denied allegation that he was involved in the attempts to unseat Megawati. He insisted that Golkar had no reason to depose her. But in a confidential interview, a former Golkar official confirmed that Harmoko was present at various meetings to discuss the PDI problem.
- 169 *Tajuk*, “Bila Jenderal...”, 1–23 July 1998.
- 170 *Tajuk*, “Dan Militer Pun Merekayasa Kaum Papa”, 1–23 July 1998.
- 171 *Tiras*, “Dan Letjen Soeyono Pun Diganti”, 22 August 1996. Imelda Sari, Moriza Prananda, Untung Widyanto and the author conducted the interview. The interviewers came under tremendous pressure from army leaders who threatened to revoke the publication’s licence, but somehow managed to evade another closure. *Tiras* was the resurrection of the banned *Editor* magazine.
- 172 *Tiras*, “Ini Killing The Sitting Duck Games”, 22 August 1996.
- 173 They were: ABRI Chief General Feisal Tanjung, Police Chief General Dibyo Widodo, BIA’s Director A Brigadier-General Zacky A. Makarim, Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command Major-General Sutiyoso, Jakarta Police Chief Jaya Major-General Hamami Nata and Deputy Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command Brigadier-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The middle-ranking officers were: Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command’s Infantry Brigade Colonel Tri Tamtomo, Colonel Sudi Silalahi and Lieutenant-Colonel Budi Purnama. See, *Media Indonesia*, “Seperti Menegakkan Benang Basah”, 27 July 2003. Of all them, only Budi Purnama was finally brought to court in 2003, apparently due to the fact he was the only one who failed to climb higher in the bureaucracy and military ladder.
- 174 On June 2003, six defendants were finally brought to trial amidst protests from former victims of the 27 July raid who called it a “mock trial” as it failed to bring the generals to justice. There were two low-ranking military officers, Colonel (retd.) Budi Purnama and First Lieutenant Suharto, and four civilians, Mohammad Tanjung, Jonathan Marpaung Panahatan, Rahimi Ilyas and Joni Moniaga. See, *Kompas*, “Terdakwa ‘27 Juli’ Didakwa Pasal Perusakan”, 7 June 2003. When the first trial began, it was found out that Moniaga had already passed away. In a press interview, Lt. Suharto declared that he was deliberately “victimized” to save higher-ranking officers. See, *Media Indonesia*, “Menjadi Bumper, Saya Tidak Mau Dibuang”, 27 July 2003. However, *Media Indonesia* reported that the police was preparing prosecution dossiers.
- 175 Kevin O’Rourke, *Reformasi, The Struggle For Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia* (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2002), p. 3.
- 176 Bhakti et al., op. cit., pp. 143–148.
- 177 First published in March 2003, the book was suspiciously sold out in weeks—some suspected that a mysterious “third party” had bought up the entire stock. Undeterred, Soeyono published a second edition in April, which would be followed by other editions in the near future.
- 178 Butarbutar, op. cit., pp. 155–160.
- 179 *Ibid.*, pp. 141–167.
- 180 For details on the testimonies, see, *Tajuk*, “Alex Widya Siregar: Itu Operasi BIA dan Kodam Jaya” and “Periode Perang Bintang”, 25 May to 7 June 2000. Following his interrogation, Siregar had been held in police detention with his former party comrades, including Soerjadi, Jonathan Marpaung, Buttu Hutapea and Yorris Raweyai since February 2000. They were released when the police suspended the investigation a few months later. Siregar’s testimony provided a comprehensive picture of the 27 July raid as it detailed who was responsible for the operation and how it was conducted. As can be expected, however, all state officials named in Siregar’s testimony rejected

- his account and accused him of fabricating the story. But, in his indictment against the six defendants of the 27 July case on 30 June 2003, the state prosecutor confirmed Siregar's instrumental roles in the raid. See, *Kompas*, "Soerjadi Tunjuk Alex Widya Siregar", 1 July 2003.
- 181 For details of the police dossier, see, *Media Indonesia*, "Menyelusuri Jejak Lewat Dokumen", 27 July 2003. The article confirmed *Tajuk's* earlier report.
- 182 *Tajuk*, "Pengakuan Alex Widya Siregar...", 25 May to 7 June 2000. According to Siregar, the attendees were Suryadi and his top officials, *Depdagri's* Director of Sociopolitical Affairs Sutoyo N.K., *Kassospol* Syarwan Hamid, Intelligence Assistant Major-General Yusuf Kartanagara, head of BIA Major-General Syamsir Siregar and BIA's Director A Brigadier-General Zacky A. Makarim.
- 183 *Tajuk*, "Dan Militer Pun...", 1–23 July 1998.
- 184 *Tajuk*, "Pengakuan Alex Widya Siregar...", 25 May to 7 June 2000.
- 185 *Media Indonesia*, "Menyelusuri Jejak ...", 27 July 2003.
- 186 While Soeyono insisted that Soeharto had never ordered the raid of the PDI headquarters, Sutiyoso admitted that, in his famed indirect language, Soeharto had indicated his anger over the noisy protest at the disputed office. "Pak Harto implicitly ordered us to end all activities, including oration in front of PDI headquarters," he said. See, Butarbutar, op. cit., p. 165.
- 187 *Tajuk*, "Periode Perang...", 25 May to 7 June 2000. Yudhoyono's testimony was the most comprehensive account on the chains of political and military command in the 27 July raid. Yudhoyono was reported to have decided to spill the beans on the operations because he apparently suspected Alex Siregar's account of his involvement would be used to discredit him. At the time of his testimony, Yudhoyono was the Minister of Mining and Energy and one of President Abdurrahman Wahid's trusted confidants. We will discuss the impact of the 27 July investigation on the military's internal factionalism in Chapter 4.
- 188 *Tajuk*, "Dan Militer Pun Merekayasa..." 1–23 July 1998.
- 189 *Tajuk*, "Pengakuan Alex Widya...", 25 May to 7 June 2000.
- 190 Butarbutar, op. cit., p. 138. Soeyono was very active in warning the public against the resurgence of the communist threat. As commander of the Central Java Regional Military Command, he wrote and distributed booklets containing his analysis of the threats of communist propaganda. In late 1996, NGO and human-rights activists criticized him when he named a few respected pro-democracy activists as being infiltrated by "new-left" ideology. See, *Tiras*, "Menjaring OTB dan KGB ...", 26 October 1995.
- 191 In his testimony, Siregar estimated that the operation would cost IDR179 million. But according to the police dossier, it was concluded during the meeting between Alex Siregar and the head of BIA, Syamsir Siregar, that the total cost was IDR300 million. See, *Media Indonesia*, "Menyelusuri Jejak..." 27 July 2003.
- 192 *Tajuk*, "Pengakuan Alex Widya...", 25 May to 7 June 2000.
- 193 Personal notes. After the raid, Seno Bella went to a number of local media and detailed his role in gathering the masses for the aborted plan. He confessed that he leaked the plan because his father was a Soekarnoist.
- 194 *Tajuk*, "Pengakuan Alex Widya...", 27 May to 7 June 2000, *Media Indonesia*, "Menyelusuri Jejak...", 27 July 2003.
- 195 *Media Indonesia*, "Menyelusuri Jejak...", 27 July 2003. The document confirmed Soeyono's account that the 25 July Polkam meeting did not order the forced takeover of the PDI headquarters. In a separate interview, former head of *Bakin* Moetjib, who attended the meeting, supported Soeyono's version. But in another interview, Syarwan Hamid insisted that Soedirman's memo indicated his approval of Tanjung's plan.
- 196 *Tajuk*, "Pengakuan Alex Widya...", 27 May to 7 June 2001.
- 197 *Tajuk*, "Dan Militer Pun Merekayasa..." 1–23 July 1998.
- 198 Imelda Sari and Moriza Prananda, a reporter and photographer respectively from *Tiras* magazine saw Sutiyoso and Yudhoyono near the scene and came to greet the generals.

- In an interview eight years later, Soeyono, who lived a few houses away from the PDI office, confirmed their testimonies and added that his family driver drove Sutiyoso off after the raid since he had left his car. See, *Kompas*, “Soal Kasus 27 Juli, Berkas Sutiyoso Akhirnya Dilimpahkan”, 16 June 2004.
- 199 Personal communication with two high-ranking military officers.
- 200 The author interviewed some Megawati supporters who fled the raid but none of them claimed to have seen any deliberate murder. In a private conversation, an army general who was involved in the preparation of the operation disclosed that he had proposed that the media be allowed to witness the raid to prevent the circulation of such speculation.
- 201 *Tajuk*, “Periode Perang...”, 25 May to 7 June 2000.
- 202 Interview, Moetojib, 2 January 2002. A self-confessed red-and-white officer, Moetojib claimed that he remained loyal to Soeharto, although confessing that he was sympathetic to Megawati and her struggle to resist the New Order’s oppression.
- 203 *Kompas Cyber Media*, “Korban 27 Juli Terima Rp 10 Juta Per Orang”, 23 July 2002.
- 204 Butarbutar, op. cit., pp. 262–263.
- 205 For analyses of Indonesia’s economic development in the 1990s, see, for example, The World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Richard Robison, *The New Rich in Asia, Mobile Phone, McDonalds and Middle Class Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1996).
- 206 Sukowaluyo Mintorahardjo, *BLBI Simalakama, Pertaruhan Kekuasaan Presiden Soeharto*, (Jakarta: Riset Ekonomi Sosial Indonesia, 2001), pp. 56–58.
- 207 J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, *Bergulat Dengan Krisis dan Pemulihan Ekonomi Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001), p. 152.
- 208 James Luhulima, *Hari-Hari Terpanjang Menjelang Mundurnya Presiden Soeharto* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 59.
- 209 Interview, J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, 1 September 2002. Djiwandono was the Governor of Bank Indonesia (1993–1998). According to Djiwandono, Tommy sent him a letter requesting for a special tax reduction to produce the car. Djiwandono ignored the letter for three months until Soeharto personally instructed him to do so. But somehow he managed to axe Tommy’s ambitious plan to produce 150,000 cars per year by half.
- 210 Mega is an abbreviation of Megawati and *bintang* (star) was the symbol of the PPP. *Golput* stands for *golongan putih* or white group, who refused to exercise their voting rights due to the fact that the New Order’s elections were highly rigged.
- 211 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001. Hartono disputed Harmoko’s claim for Golkar’s victory, saying, “It was us who did that [ensuring support for Golkar]”.
- 212 For details on the 1997 monetary crisis and its implications on Indonesia, see, The World Bank, *Social Consequences of the East Asian Financial Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, September 1998). For an analytical assessment of the East Asian crisis, see, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf (eds.), *Rethinking the East Asian Miracle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, June 2001).
- 213 Former State Secretary Moerdiono’s testimony before Parliament’s special committee on Bank Indonesia’s Liquidity Supports (BLBI). See, Mintorahardjo, op. cit., p. 1.
- 214 Djiwandono, op. cit., p. 83.
- 215 Mintorahardjo, op. cit., p. 133.
- 216 Djiwandono, op. cit., p. 193.
- 217 Bank Indonesia, *Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia: Kebijakan Pemerintah Untuk Menyelamatkan Ekonomi Indonesia*, Jakarta, 2001 (<http://www.bi.go.id>).
- 218 Mintorahardjo, op. cit., pp. 1–3. However, the merger never took place because Bank Harapan Sentosa was later closed down on 1 November 1997.
- 219 Interview, Djiwandono, 1 September 2002.
- 220 Ibid.
- 221 See, Djiwandono, *Liquidity Support and Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience*, IDSS Working Paper (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, November 2002).

- 222 The three former deputies of the Central Bank Governor are Hendro Budiyo, Heru Suprpto and Paul Sutopo. In separate trials in 2002–2003, they were convicted and sentenced to various years of imprisonment. The irony, however, was that several BLBI recipients were acquitted while some others fled overseas to evade trial.
- 223 Interview, Djiwandono, 1 September 2002. Djiwandono is related to Soeharto by marriage. He is the son-in-law of the late Prof. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the father-in-law of Soeharto's second daughter, Siti Hediati or Titiek.
- 224 World Socialist website, "Behind the Suharto-IMF Confrontation...", p. 1 ([www.wsws.org/news/1998/mar1998/indo-m18.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/mar1998/indo-m18.shtml)).
- 225 Ibid. For details on the 15 January LoI, see, International Monetary Fund, Indonesia – Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, 15 January 1998 ([www.imf.org/external/np/loi/011598.HTM](http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/011598.HTM)).
- 226 Interview, Djiwandono, 1 September 2002.
- 227 Another version says that it was Soeharto's children, Tutut and Bambang Trihatmodjo, who informed their father about Hanke. On his first visit to Jakarta, Hanke stayed at a five-star hotel under the name of Simon Holland, apparently to avoid suspicion from unintended parties. See, Djiwandono, op. cit., p. 79.
- 228 Johns Hopkins Magazine, *Professor Hanke vs. the IMF*, June 1998 ([www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0698web/policy.html](http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0698web/policy.html)).
- 229 For details on CBS, see, Steve H. Hanke and Kurt Schuler, *Currency Boards for Developing Countries, A Handbook* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994).
- 230 Abdul Gafur, *Hari-Hari Terakhir Seorang Presiden* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan), p. 11.
- 231 Mintorahardjo, op. cit., p. 137.
- 232 For details on the memo and its counter arguments against CBS, see, Djiwandono, op. cit., pp. 86–91.
- 233 BBC News, "Suharto Replaces Central Bank Governor", 17 February 1998.
- 234 Peter Symonds, "Aggressive US Intervention in Indonesia", World Socialist website, 5 March 1998 ([www.wsws.org/news/1998/mar1998/Indo304.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/mar1998/Indo304.shtml)).
- 235 Ibid.
- 236 For a detailed chronology of the Indonesia-IMF negotiations, see, *Tajuk*, "RI-IMF: Mulur, Mungkret, Mulur, Mungkret", 1–2 April 1998.
- 237 Personal communications.
- 238 Djiwandono, op. cit., p. 28.
- 239 World Socialist website, "Behind the Suharto-IMF...", p. 3.
- 240 For an interesting analysis on the Clinton Administration's foreign policy on Indonesia, see, Bambang Cipto, *Tekanan Amerika Terhadap Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, January 2003).
- 241 Bruce McFarlane, "Politics of the World Bank-International Monetary Fund Nexus in Asia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, January 2001, pp. 229–230.
- 242 Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965–2000* (London and New York: Harper Collins, October 2000), pp. 98–99.
- 243 *The New York Times*, "Longtime I.M.F. Director Resigns in Midterm", 11 October 1999 (<http://graphics.nytimes.com/library/world/global/111099imf-camdessus.1.gif>). See, also, Premjith Sadasivan, *Indonesia and the Washington Consensus*, IDSS Working Paper, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, October 2002). The author is indebted to Mr. Sadasivan for alerting her to Sanger's and McFarlane's articles.
- 244 Steve H. Hanke, "Refleksi Tentang Perubahan Rezim", *Tempo*, 11 May 2003.
- 245 Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontent* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002).
- 246 C. Harinowo, "Pengakuan IMF dan Utang Kita", *Kompas*, 23 August 2004.
- 247 For the full text of Soeharto's oral speech, see, Luhulima, op. cit., pp. 63–63.
- 248 Crouch, *The Military and Politics*, p. 223.

- 249 It turned out later that Soeharto indeed suffered from a minor stroke. Palace officials, however, decided to keep it from the public for fear that it would worsen market conditions.
- 250 Luhulima, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
- 251 Interview, Harmoko, 20 August 2001.
- 252 According to a widely distributed “confidential” document that bore the signatures of CPDS staffers in late 1997, Wiranto, Yudhoyono, Major-General Agus Widjojo and Brigadier-General Agus Wirahadikusumah belonged to the red-and-white camp, while Tanjung et al. belonged to the green camp. The document claimed that the green camp was loyal to Soeharto while the red-and-white attempted to create a condition for “a national leadership change”. CPDS staffers denied that they had ever produced such a document and claimed that “another party” had fabricated it to defame the institution. In separate interview, Wiranto acknowledged that he had read the document, but dismissed it as baseless.
- 253 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 26 September 2001.
- 254 The ITB activists were members of a group known as “Ikatan Alumni ITB-234” or “Kelompok 234”, whose members had participated in a number of student protests in the 1970s. For details on the TIM Affair and Kelompok 234, see, Hermawan Sulisty, *Lawan! Jejak-Jejak Jalanan Di Balik Kejatuhan Soeharto* (Jakarta: Pensil 324, 2002), pp. 64–76 and 125–128.
- 255 Personal communications with sources in Golkar and bureaucracy. It was reported that Ginanjar went personally to Soeharto and apologized for the mistake. Soeharto decided to forgive Ginanjar, as he needed him to obtain access to Japan—his only hope for economic salvation after he was put under intense pressure from the IMF and the Western powers. It was also said that the Japanese ambassador to Indonesia, Takao Kawakami, conveyed Tokyo’s message to Soeharto to keep Ginandjar in a key cabinet position.
- 256 For details on the Radisson Hotel Affair, see, *Tajuk*, “Bingkai Politik *Goro-Goro* Panigoro”, 2 April 1998. For an analysis on the continued rivalry between Habibie and Kartasmita after Soeharto’s fall, see, *Tajuk*, “Bila Klik Ginandjar Diobok-obok”, 29 October 1999.
- 257 For details on the political manoeuvrings behind Habibie’s vice-presidential candidacy, see, *Tajuk*, “Wapres Baru, Alhamdulillah”, 1 March 1998.
- 258 A copy of the letter was made available to the author. While it does not violate the military’s internal procedure, an outgoing commander normally avoids making important decisions and leaves them to his successor.
- 259 *Tajuk*, “Wapres Baru...”, 5–18 March 1998.

## 2

## THE DEMISE OF A REGIME 1998

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Pak Harto mandated to me an extraordinary authority to save national development. But if I had to take violent and repressive measures to secure the continuity of national development, there would have been consequences to bear. Whilst at the moment, the president had been losing political supports. DPR/MPR leaders have called on him to resign, the president's plan to establish Reform Committee and to reshuffle the cabinet have failed, which meant that he had lost all political supports, except the military's. If the military continued to defend him, it would have had to confront the people, innocent casualties would have fallen. So, I said [to the president] that I could not accept the mandate. Then, Pak Harto said, "I will step down tomorrow."

– General (retd.) Wiranto, former Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces<sup>1</sup>

If I were in his [Wiranto's] position, I would have accepted the mandate. All professional soldiers would have accepted it for the sake of 200 million Indonesians. I would have emulated what Pak Harto had done when he accepted the Supersemar. We could have avoided casualties amongst the students because we could have asked them to support us just like Pak Harto had done with the Supersemar. I kept wondering why Wiranto refused to accept it.

– General (retd.) R. Hartono, former Army Chief of Staff<sup>2</sup>

There was an unusual sight in front of the posh Goro Supermarket in the busy south Jakarta suburb of Pasar Minggu on that fateful Thursday afternoon, 14 May 1998. A passenger bus stopped and dropped off a small group of casually dressed young men carrying Coca Cola crates, curiously stuffed with stones of different sizes. A few minutes later, another public transportation stopped, dropping off another group of similar curious-looking young men. Then, standing akimbo before the huge building owned by Tommy Soeharto, those young men began to pelt stones into the parking lot while shouting slogans of reform and criticism against the Cendana family, causing the remaining shoppers to flee. The packed traffic was swiftly thinning out, as news quickly spread that rioters were burning down and looting shops and supermarkets at the nearby Pasar Minggu shopping district. At the same time, residents of the numerous slums nearby were slowly gathering at the street sides, wondering what would happen to the supermarket, one of the many symbols of the wealth and despotism of the Soeharto family.<sup>3</sup> After more than an hour of agitation, with the number of people congregating

near the supermarket increasing drastically, the young men smashed the supermarket gate, burned used tires, a car and a few motorcycles. Then they called the rest of the crowd to join in. Security personnel was curiously absent as the supermarket guards called the nearest police office repeatedly and desperately, asking for protection. It was also curious that the supermarket was situated near the headquarters of two powerful military institutions: the *Bais* and *Bakin*. (Interestingly, Kalibata Mall Supermarket, located just in front of *Bais*' Headquarters, was spared from riots.)

In no time at all, men, women and children stampeded the expensive shopping mall and were instantly engaged in an orgy of looting. The deserted street was now packed with members of Jakarta's under-privileged inhabitants carrying anything their hands could lay on: computers, refrigerators, mattresses, milk and biscuits cans, and racks of clothes. "Come on, take them. They were *halal*, they belonged to Tommy," they shouted, as if to justify the actions. They broke down ATMs and took out the money. After a few hours of aggressive looting, the building was put on fire. Tongues of flames climbed the blackened sky, diffused into the darkened evening.<sup>4</sup>

That day, the ancient capital was turned into a sea of flames, literally. All over the city, almost simultaneously, bands of rioters under the "command" of groups unknown attacked, looted and burned down stores, supermarkets, police posts and offices and residential places, especially those with Chinese inhabitants. When night fell, the destruction of the normally glittering capital was painfully horrifying. Burnt vehicles were scattered on deserted streets, the sickening smell of burning flesh hung in the choking air, blackened buildings and houses stood frightfully against the dark sky. Frightened yet angry, residents gathered at street alleys, armed with any kind of weapons they could grab to deter would-be attackers. Jakarta had become a city of death and devastation.

The horror of Black Thursday climaxed in a series of riots that occurred almost simultaneously in Jakarta and four other major cities—Solo, Palembang, Lampung and Surabaya—from 13 to 15 May 1998.

There was no official figure on the casualties as The Joint Fact Finding Team (TGPF), an independent inquiry team set up by President B.J. Habibie to investigate the May 1998 riots, failed to determine the exact numbers due to the poor population register system. The TGPF cited at least four reports that gave different estimates of casualties in Jakarta.

- The Volunteer Team for Humanity (TruK) reported that 1,190 people died of burns by accident or otherwise, 27 people died of wounds caused by weapons and other violent means, and 91 people injured.
- The Jakarta Police recorded 451 deaths, but no data were available on the number injured.
- The Jakarta Regional Military Command reported 463 people dead, including security personnel, and 69 injured.
- The Local Government of Jakarta (Pemda DKI) registered 288 people dead and 101 injured.

In addition, the TGPF reported 52 cases of rape, 14 cases of rape with torture, 10 cases of sexual assault and 9 cases of sexual harassment—most of the victims being Indonesian Chinese women. In other cities, the differences in the estimated number of casualties were less glaring: the police estimated about 32 people died, 131 injured and 27 suffered from burns, while TruK reported 33 people dead and 74 injured.<sup>5</sup>

It is obvious that these were the worst riots Indonesia has ever suffered in its violence-ridden history. Unlike the abortive PKI coup of the 1965 in which the massive "red purge" occurred as a consequence of the power struggle, the riots of May 1998

preceded an elite infighting that would bring down the New Order regime. One week after the destruction of the capital that has become the symbol of his developmental success, on 21 May, President Soeharto decided to step down, starting the demise of the three-decade-old New Order's authoritarian regime. The fact that the New Order rose and fell over bloody tragedies appeared to sustain an ancient pattern of vicious cycle known since the era of the 13th century Javanese Kingdom of Singasari. Consequently, it raised concerns about the compatibility of the modern mode of governance in a society with such a violent political history.

In what follows, we will reconstruct how and why the Soeharto regime fell and the role of the military in the process. We will examine whether the military was deeply divided over its response towards popular call for Soeharto's resignation and therefore remained passive throughout the process or, as our study will argue, it played a crucial role, albeit concealed under the guise of hierarchy and command, for it would have been impossible for a transfer of power to take place peacefully without the active participation of the military. We will also investigate the truth behind the much talked-about rivalry between ABRI Chief General Wiranto and *Kostrad* Commander Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto to determine whether they contributed to Soeharto's fall.

## THE CRACKING PILLARS

Before starting with the politico-historical reconstruction of what actually happened in those historic days, we will first examine the constellation and position of key political powers that played crucial parts in the process, the roles they played and how they interacted with one another.

### The Cabinet

We have seen how Habibie's election as vice-president had deepened a "crack" in the regime's bureaucratic cohesion. Soeharto had defied both domestic and international pressures over his decision. At the same time, however, he made concessions to his children—especially his eldest daughter Tutut—who resisted his decision to let them nominate most members of the cabinet. Habibie did manage to bring a few ICMI figures into the Seventh Development Cabinet but there was no doubt that Cendana cronies dominated the new line-up. For instance, on the eve of cabinet announcement, many of the candidates attended a thanksgiving gathering at Tutut's private residence, indicating her influence in their appointment as ministers. Such was the influence of Tutut that she earned the sobriquet of "super minister", a sobriquet formerly attributed to Habibie, as meetings at her Department of Social Affairs office were considered more important than coordination meetings at the Coordinating Ministers' offices.

But the cabinet composition also reflected Soeharto's turbulent state of mind. As if losing his famous self-control and mental endurance that had helped him sail through many political challenges, Soeharto appeared to crack under pressure and developed negative attitudes of confrontation, as was demonstrated by his defiance of both domestic and international criticisms. By substituting the pro-Western "Berkeley Mafia" technocrats with the more nationalistic technologists, he had defied pressures both from the Western powers and unprecedented challenges from his own former ministers. Worse still, he defied domestic demands for a corrupt-free and competent cabinet by keeping two controversial ministers, Abdul Latief and Haryanto Dhanutirto, who were allegedly involved in the embezzlement of state funds, in their jobs.

Consequently, Soeharto reaped more public criticism, which in turn solidified opposition against his government. As popular anti-government protests intensified, the crack within the cabinet became more apparent when its members began to distance themselves from the ruling regime.

## Golkar

We have discussed Golkar's factionalism resulting from Soeharto's attempts at consolidating his control of the party and sidelining his military opponents. After setting the pace for the "greening" of Golkar in 1992, he placed Harmoko as the first civilian to chair the party and encouraged his children to sit in key party positions. While the strategy was successful in recapturing Golkar's lost votes in the 1997 election, it also intensified internal party tension, which was manifested in Harmoko's quiet "rebellion" when he led a failed attempt to block Habibie's rise to vice-presidency. Since then, Harmoko began to distance himself from Soeharto and eventually boldly called for his resignation on 18 May.

## The Military

We have examined that religious factionalism had characterized military politics in the 1990s, albeit its concealment under the tight military hierarchy. But while the green faction dominated the military stage in the Tanjung-Hartono era, there was a changing constellation resulting from the leadership change that took place in late February, a few days before the General Session of the MPR (SU MPR) was held. By that time, members of the green faction who had been instrumental in securing Habibie's vice-presidency were retiring from active service and later appointed into key posts in the cabinet and the legislatures. Tanjung was appointed Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, Yosfiah, the head of the military faction in the MPR, and Hamid, the deputy speaker of the DPR/MPR.

As expected, the ABRI's new leadership line-up comprised former aides and palace confidants: Army Chief Wiranto succeeding Tanjung and later serving concurrently as Defence Minister—a privilege last enjoyed by Edi Sudradjat; *Kostrad* Commander Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo succeeding Wiranto; *Kopassus* Commander Prabowo Subianto occupying Subagyo's vacant seat; and two non-palace officers, Fachrul Razi and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, becoming the ABRI's Chief of General Affairs and Chief of Socio-political Affairs respectively, apparently due to their proven track records.<sup>6</sup>

In the new line-up, internal factionalism seemed to materialize in a more complex form. As was mentioned in the earlier chapter, Wiranto, Subagyo and Yudhoyono were generally seen as red-and-white officers, while Prabowo and Razi belonged to the green camp. However, this simplified categorization did not reflect the real process of alliance and re-alliance among each individual, driven more by conflicting interests in winning Soeharto's favour than by religious and ideological inclinations. In the last days of Soeharto's rule, the polarization was centred on two figures: Wiranto and Prabowo.

In his as-told-to autobiography, Wiranto subtly admitted that he and Prabowo were not the best of friends, although he denied that they were "rivals". In the February reshuffle, for example, Wiranto disagreed with Prabowo over the *Wanjakti*'s decision to nominate I Nyoman Sang Suwisma as *Kopassus* Commander. Prabowo objected, stating that Suwisma was a Balinese Hindu, and nominated his close ally Muchdi Purwo Pranyono instead. Muchdi was a activist of the defunct Indonesian Student Association, a hardline student organization associated with the Masyumi party.

As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Prabowo had been diligently mobilizing support from marginalized Muslim organizations such as the DDII and its hardline associate, KISDI. With the help of his confidante, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Prabowo tried to persuade Soeharto that Suwisma was not the right candidate for such a crucial position, thus bringing the issue of religious factionalism back into the open. Despite Wiranto's objection, ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung accepted Prabowo's suggestion and swapped the posts: Muchdi becoming the *Kopassus* Commander and Suwisma, Commander of the Tanjungpura Regional Military Command in Kalimantan.<sup>7</sup>

Prabowo also exploited his close contact with Tanjung to engage in an arms spending spree. According to Wiranto, he had repeatedly rejected Prabowo's "not-too-urgent and irrational views and moves", such as his intention to equip *Kopassus* with a helicopter squadron and an armoured unit furnished with 72 ex-Russian Armed Personnel Carriers (APCs), arguing that it would cost the army dearly. After failing to persuade Tanjung to drop the plan, Wiranto went to lobby Soeharto, who eventually decreed that Prabowo's requests were "unnecessary and impossible to fulfil".<sup>8</sup>

Despite such acute internal factionalism and submission to Soeharto's personal rule, however, we note a gradual shift in the military's institutional response towards increasing demands for political reforms when the post-1945 generation of officers took over the command baton. Since the military faction in Parliament kicked off initiatives of political openness and democratization in the early 1990s, there had been a growing realization among the more "reform-minded" officers that the military had become nothing but the government's political tool. As Honna has shown in his comprehensive study, military officers were getting sick of the situation and desired a fundamental change in the implementation of *dwifungsi*, yet they were too fractured to start the process.<sup>9</sup> Fortunately, many of the officers were now occupying key military posts.

Mounting calls for reform presented those officers with an opportunity to implement a different approach. In an interview with *Tajuk* magazine in early 1998, outgoing ABRI Chief of Socio-political Affairs Yunus Yosfiah declared that "ABRI was not allergic to changes, including overall economic and political reforms as long as they proceeded gradually, not radically".<sup>10</sup> In fact, the military legislators were one step ahead of their civilian counterparts in calling for reform during the March 1998 MPR Session forum, as the latter were too scared to take such a risky position.

The policy shift was demonstrated in the ABRI's handling of widespread student protests, when it decided to refrain from repressing student protests by force, a significant departure from its previous role as the New Order's political hitmen. Initially, Wiranto tried to contain the protests within each campus' premises, arguing—quite correctly—that street demonstrations were prone to violent provocation. He feared a replay of the 1966 student protest when the death of a University of Indonesia student, Arief Rahman Hakim, at the hands of the military was used to mobilize mass support to bring down the government of President Soekarno.

When the containment strategy failed and angry mass began to join frustrated students in increasingly violent protests, Wiranto tried to calm the heated tension by sponsoring an open dialogue between students' representatives, their rectors and cabinet members. But the 18 April dialogue—and a few other similar events—failed to pacify the burning anger on the streets as the students insisted on bringing their demands directly to Soeharto. Initially, the students called for total reform, that is, the scrapping of the repressive political bills, the end of the ABRI's *dwifungsi* and an end to the corrupt practices of governance. But after Soeharto was re-elected as president in March, they demanded his resignation through an Extraordinary Session of the MPR (SI MPR),

exactly as what happened to his predecessor, Soekarno, in March 1966. The tug of war continued until the tragic shooting at Trisakti University on 12 May that killed four students, which preceded the aforementioned mass riots.

## Anti-Government Movements

Contrary to the New Order's cracking pillars, anti-government movements were strengthened and solidified by one common aim: Soeharto's exit from power. We will now discuss some key elements in the movements.

### *Students*

Students have long played the role of "agent of change" and are honoured with a respected place in Indonesian history as the true and uncorrupted moral voice of the people. Prior to Indonesia's independence, students were at the forefront of national awakening movements, and continued to play an instrumental role in delivering the birth of the new nation-state. In his excellent study on the students' roles prior to and during the struggle for independence, American historian Benedict R.O. Anderson praised the Indonesian revolution as a "students' revolt".<sup>11</sup>

Towards the end of Soekarno's rule, students played another pivotal role in the power transition process when they set up an alliance with the military to accelerate his fall in 1966. The alliance, however, did not last very long. Soon, the military-dominated New Order began to consolidate itself and in the process disregarded the democratic principles that the students had fought for. Consequently, student leaders of Generation '66 were divided—many of them decided to join the ruling regime, while a few others continued with their lost struggle. The pattern of student-military alliance was repeated in the infamous Malari Affair in January 1974, when warring generals Ali Moertopo and Soemitro exploited student protests against the government and foreign power dominance over the Indonesian economy for their own power struggle.<sup>12</sup> A rare occasion when student movements were relatively free from military interference and manipulation occurred in 1978 when widespread protests rejecting Soeharto's re-nomination as president were crushed violently. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the military under the command of *Kopkamtib* Commander Admiral Sudomo stormed the campuses and sent student activists to jail.

To put an end to such persistent student protests, the government decided to de-politicize campuses through the introduction of Normalization of Campus Life (NKK) policy. As a result, some student activists joined non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to fighting for real societal issues such as land and labour disputes. Muslim students turned to religious activities and formed the loose network of *dakwah* (propagation of Islamic teachings), while a few others joined the more radical *usroh* (which literally means "family") underground groups. Sporadic clashes between students and NGO activists and the military continued to occur, such as the violent protests against the Kedungombo Dam Project (1989) and the Badega land dispute (1991), but the period from 1980 to 1990 had been relatively free from large-scale student protests. Given such persistent military manipulation of student movements, former student leader and political scientist Arief Budiman predicted that student movements could only be successful only if they had military support.<sup>13</sup>

Against the backdrop, there were doubts that the reawakened Generation '98 after its long hibernation would be able to consolidate its forces and press for fundamental changes against the ailing-but-still-repressive regime. But a new era was obviously dawn-

ing. Learning from their predecessors' mistakes in allowing the military to manipulate them, the activists of Generation '98 resisted any attempts at co-opting their movements through the provision of facilities and financial support.

In his recollection of the 1998 street protests, historian and former student activist Hermawan Sulistyono identifies at least two distinct features that differentiate the 1998 student movements from their predecessors: the absence of structured and hierarchic formal organization and conservative form of leadership.<sup>14</sup> Although student senates and other intra-university organizations played instrumental roles in anti-government protests, most student groups consciously avoided any formal leadership and let formal student leaders act merely as figureheads. Interestingly, they decided to "borrow" some military strategies and combine them with underground tactics to form fluid yet efficient and technology-savvy networks of student organizations connecting hundreds of campuses all over the country.<sup>15</sup> Such organizational fluidity rendered it difficult for the military to penetrate and control the movements, as no actual leader could be easily identifiable.

Another interesting feature in the 1998 student movement was the blurring and even absence of "ideology" commonly identified in previous movements, which could be credited to the total de-politicization of the campus under the NKK policy. There had been a few religious-based student organizations such as the phenomenal Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI) that came to the forefront of anti-Soeharto protests,<sup>16</sup> but most student organizations consisted of cross-ideological elements encompassing a wide spectrum of primordial origins. Interestingly, they took over the initiative from more established organizations like the Association of Muslim Students (HMI) and the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement (GMNI), who stood at the forefront of anti-New Order protests in the 1970s, but now played less significant roles in anti-Soeharto movements.

### *Rainbow Coalition of Pro-Reform Movements*

The students, however, would not have succeeded without support and protection from their lecturers and rectors. Unlike their predecessors in the 1974 and 1978 failed student movements who, in general, took the side of the military, almost all rectors of major state universities threw their support behind their disciples at that time, with some even leading in vigorous street protests. The rectors and lecturers of UI, ITB, IPB, UGM, Undip and Unair—Indonesia's most prestigious universities—deserved credit for having provided guidance to their students in those historic days, which subsequently inspired their peers in other universities across the country to follow their example. Outside the campuses, a group of LIPI researchers issued a "Statement of Concern" on 20 January, demanding for Soeharto's resignation, which could be credited as one of the first bold statements of its kind.<sup>17</sup>

Another key player in the anti-Soeharto movements was the "rainbow coalition" of pro-reform activists, including NGOs, retired military officers and bureaucrats, journalists, intellectuals and other members of the middle-class intelligentsia. Some of them, such as the activists of Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), Indonesian Environmental Forum (WALHI) and the Petition of Fifty, have fought the government on a number of issues. Others such as former ministers, generals and other government officials who earned the sobriquet the "Sick-Hearted Brigade" (*Barisan Sakit Hati*), however, joined the anti-government movements only after they were sidelined by the ruling regime. While the students welcomed NGO-based activists due to their

consistency in resisting the New Order's repression, they generally eyed the bureaucrat-turned-opponent with suspicion.

The media also played a significant contribution to this middle-class revolution. Despite the setback they suffered after the 1994 media ban on press freedom, much of their critical stance of the government remained. The media were generally sympathetic to pro-reform movements and they provided extensive coverage of anti-government protests. After the outbreak of the May 1998 riots, Minister of Information Alwi Dahlan set up a media pool in a desperate attempt to control the media, especially the far-reaching private television stations, but the move failed to limit media coverage of widespread anti-Soeharto protests. In addition to the mainstream press, there were also a number of independently run students' press and underground publications, which added significant media pressure to the regime.

### *The Muslims*

Muslim leaders differed in their responses towards mounting calls for *reformasi*, although they generally agreed that reforms were inevitable and that Muslims had to play an instrumental role in the process. Many of them argued that Soeharto had to be given an opportunity to lead reforms but others insisted that genuine reforms could only take place without him. Leaders of the ICMI and DDII adopted the first view while Amien Rais of Muhammadiyah took the second view. Abdurrahman Wahid of NU was incapacitated by a stroke in mid January, leaving his followers in confusion.

The ICMI took a startling position after a national congress on 6 May when its acting chairman Lieutenant-General (ret.) Achmad Tirtosudiro and Secretary-General Adi Sasono declared that the group urge reforms as the overall solution to the current crisis. In order to carry out the reforms, any constitutional means, including cabinet reshuffle and even an SI MPR, should be considered acceptable. In other words, the ICMI took the side of the students in their demands for reforms and national leadership change. But three days later, on 9 May, Vice-President B.J. Habibie in his capacity as the ICMI's chairman corrected Tirtosudiro and Sasono's statements. Blaming the media for misquoting them, Habibie insisted that they did not represent the ICMI's official policy.<sup>18</sup>

The incident reflected an inherent tension between the "NGO wing" and the "bureaucrat wing" within the ICMI as it comprised quite a wide spectrum of *alirans* too.<sup>19</sup> The more critical NGO wing—represented by figures such as Sasono, Dawam Raharjo, Amien Rais and Sri Bintang Pamungkas—tried to democratize the organization, while the bureaucrats such as Habibie, the ICMI's first Secretary-General Wardiman Djojonegoro and other cabinet ministers secured Soeharto's agenda. From the outset, however, it was obvious that the NGO wing was in a much weaker position. In 1996, Pamungkas was imprisoned for criticizing Soeharto and calling for political reforms. A year later, Rais was dismissed from his position as chairman of the ICMI's Board of Experts for criticizing the regime's corrupt practices. Pami Hadi, chief editor of the ICMI's newspaper, *Republika*, was replaced by a Habibie loyalist for giving space in the newspaper to government critics. Nevertheless, *D&R* magazine quoted Dawam Raharjo as saying that Tirtosudiro's statements reflected "the true position of ICMI" because, despite his military background, Tirtosudiro voiced the aspirations of the ICMI's silent majority.

The DDII's position, on the other hand, reflected its rapprochement with the New Order. Established in 1967 as an alternative vehicle to channel the aspirations of former

Masyumi leaders after they were barred from participating in politics, the organization was devoted to fighting the process of Christianization through the *dakwah* and other social and religious activities. In the process, the DDII departed from Masyumi's modernist interpretation of Islam into a hardline scripturalist version of the faith.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, it became the vanguard of Muslims' resistance against what they perceived to be the New Order's anti-Islam attitude. As a consequence, most of its leaders were subjected to harsh political repression.

Thus it welcomed Soeharto's initiative to resurrect political Islam and to establish the ICMI, in which many of the "second generation" of Masyumi activists such as Sasono and Rais took active parts. Since then, the DDII had restored contacts with Soeharto and the military through Habibie and, later, Prabowo Subianto. The DDII's support for Prabowo was partly due to the fact that many of its founders were former comrades of Prabowo's father, Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, during the PRRI/Permesta struggle and he was one of the few military officers who were sympathetic to their cause.

Prior to the SU MPR of March 1998, the DDII's charismatic leader and former Masyumi spokesman, Dr. Anwar Haryono, chaired a series of meetings involving 16 Muslim organizations under the umbrella of Coordinating Board of Islamic Society (BKUI) to discuss popular call for reforms. The Muslim leaders agreed that Soeharto must lead the reform process before stepping down on his own terms. In late April 1998, Haryono sent a private message to Soeharto via Habibie, urging him to initiate and lead the reform process, to which Soeharto was said to have responded positively. Haryono rejected students' call for an SI MPR to dethrone Soeharto, arguing that it would be useless as Golkar still controlled the highest legislative body.<sup>21</sup>

Muhammadiyah, the other modernist Muslim organization, took quite an opposite position from the DDII and the ICMI, partly due to Rais' leadership. A professor of international relations at Gadjah Mada University, Rais had been calling for a presidential succession since 1993, at the time when the issue was still a political taboo. Assuming Muhammadiyah leadership in 1995, he took over the role of government critic from Wahid, when he began attacking Soeharto and his cronies for corruption, collusion and nepotism, which later became the central theme of students' protests. Due to his staunch anti-Soeharto stance, Rais was called the "Father of Reforms", and later became the central figure in a loose alliance of pro-reform activists called Assembly of People's Mandate (MARA).

The "traditionalist" NU, on the other hand, once again demonstrated its flexibility in adjusting itself to the changing power constellation. In the beginning, it kept its distance from anti-government protests, and demonstrated its loyalty to the regime. In late January 1998, Kiai Haji Ilyas Rukhyyat, chairman of the NU's Council of Shariah (*Rais Am Syuriyah*), led more than 200 *ulamas* in a mass prayer for Soeharto's health and welfare, presented him a donation of pure gold weighing 1.9 kg to help the government fight the financial crisis and urged the MPR to re-elect him as president.<sup>22</sup>

The soft stance was understandable as the NU had just enjoyed a brief rapprochement with Soeharto. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Wahid tried to save his organization from Soeharto's wrath by offering his support for Tutut, although he risked alienating his pro-democracy admirers. When he suffered a stroke and was absent from the NU's leadership, his organization was in confusion and the NU's umbrella organizations decided to stay away from anti-Soeharto protests. But true to its tradition of political flexibility, the NU swiftly jumped ship when Soeharto's grip on power was loosening after the outbreak of the May riots. On 16 May, it issued an official statement calling

for Soeharto's resignation, one of the first organizations to do so.

Aside from leaders of mainstream Muslim organizations, other Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Malik Fajar were also active in attempts to find a graceful exit for Soeharto. Despite their differences, however, Muslims had played an instrumental role in the historic process of power transition.

## THE TRIGGERS

The riots of 13–15 May 1998 clearly provided the critical impetus for the largest anti-Soeharto protests, which triggered the fall of the New Order. But the tragedy was preceded by a number of other significant events that, as we shall see, appear to intertwine in one way or the other.

### The Abduction of Political Activists

In late February 1998, several student and political activists were reported missing. The saga of the missing people began on 3 February, when a few unknown people picked up Desmon Junaidi Mahesa, a human-rights lawyer, on his way to attend a political meeting. One day later, another lawyer-cum-political activist, Pius Lustrilanang, was also reported missing.

In a concerted effort to save them, the Komnas HAM and other human-rights organizations urged security authorities to check their whereabouts, as speculation was already rife that they were detained by force. The American Bar Association, for example, offered its solidarity by calling on the Indonesian Minister of Justice to protect the missing lawyers.<sup>23</sup> But a few weeks later, on 8 March, the same fate befell on Haryanto Taslam, Deputy Secretary-General of Megawati's PDI-P, who disappeared after he left his East Jakarta home. Shortly after that, six activists of the PRD and its umbrella organization Indonesian Students' Solidarity for Democracy (SMID)—Faisol Reza, Raharjo Waluyo Jati, Aan Rusdianto, Nezar Patria, Mugiyanto and Andi Arief—were also reported missing in the period between 12 and 27 March.

Under intense pressure from both within and outside the country, Wiranto, who had just assumed responsibility as the ABRI Chief, was forced to order an internal inquiry into the mysterious disappearances on 20 March. In his as-told-to autobiography, Wiranto wrote that a quick internal investigation indicated that a *Kopassus* unit was involved in the disappearances. Upon receiving the investigation report, he summoned Prabowo—as the incident occurred when he was the *Kopassus* Commander—to his office. In the brief meeting witnessed by Yudhoyono, Razi and head of BIA Zacky A. Makarim, Prabowo orally admitted that he had initiated an intelligence operation against nine political activists to pre-empt their plans to foil the SU MPR. He acknowledged that the operation was conducted between 3 February and 27 March, and that the activists were still in *Kopassus*' custody. Wiranto promptly ordered him to set them free.<sup>24</sup>

On 3 April, Lustrilanang and Mahesa were released and arrived safely at their homes, followed by Taslam and the six PRD activists a few weeks later. Their ordeals—most of them suffered brutal torture in the hands of their abductors—shocked and angered the public. But despite widespread public speculation about *Kopassus*' involvement in the abductions and its own internal findings, the ABRI headquarters maintained an official position denying any military involvement in the criminal activities.

It took Wiranto two months before he publicly acknowledged *Kopassus*' involvement in the abductions, and another two months to move against Prabowo. Following

Prabowo's confession, he ordered further internal investigation, which later found that Prabowo had indeed ordered a *Kopassus*' *sandi yudha* intelligence unit code-named the "Rose Team" to launch the intelligence operation. On 2 May, he set up a fact-finding team led by Commander of Military Police Major-General Syamsu Djalal to investigate the case.

After two months of investigation, Wiranto announced on 29 June that "in the case of the missing activists, some ABRI personnel were presumably involved". But he stopped short of referring to a specific unit. Only after the press published investigative reports about the Rose Team's covert activities did the ABRI headquarters acknowledge *Kopassus*' involvement in the abduction.<sup>25</sup> Still, Wiranto waited until 3 August to announce that an Officer's Honorary Council (DKP), chaired by Army Chief General Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo, would examine Prabowo, his successor Muchdi Purwo Pranyono and Commander of *Kopassus*' Group IV Colonel Chairawan, for their presumed involvement in the abductions. After three weeks of DKP investigation, Wiranto announced on 24 August Prabowo's discharge from active service and Muchdi and Chairawan's suspension from active duties, since they were found guilty of involvement.<sup>26</sup> Eleven members of the Rose Team were court-martialled and sentenced from 12 to 20 months imprisonment.

Wiranto's slow and indecisive move to settle the abduction issue reflected his aversion to engage in a confrontation with Prabowo, in realization of his own precarious position vis-à-vis the president's son-in-law. "At that time, Wiranto was not sure whether Soeharto had known of Prabowo's activities. If he moved against Prabowo, but the president approved his initiative of sterilizing political situation ahead of the SU MPR, Wiranto's career would have ended just there. He was a former presidential aide, but Prabowo was the president's son-in-law," one of Wiranto's advisers explained.<sup>27</sup> So although Wiranto had known of Prabowo's covert activities since late March, he chose not to act and waited until he could use them to further weaken Prabowo's position in their open showdown after Soeharto's fall.

Whilst Wiranto's slow-but-sure move (*alon-alon waton kelakon*) was understandable in the context of power balance at the time, his decision to discharge Prabowo without martial court left a number of lingering controversies. Moreover, it turned out that his staff and even the cabinet had recommended that the issue be settled through a military tribunal. According to Syamsu Djalal, his team has collected sufficient incriminating evidence to implicate Prabowo and bring him to the military tribunal.<sup>28</sup> In an internal memo dated 9 July 1998, Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah, the ABRI Chief's expert staff, supported Djalal's recommendation and suggested that the officers involved in the abductions be held accountable through both the DKP and the martial court.<sup>29</sup> The DKP endorsed it and explicitly recommended that Prabowo, Muchdi and Chairawan face martial court and be given administrative sanctions.<sup>30</sup> A cabinet session on security chaired by Feisal Tanjung on 20 July also concluded that the abduction issue had to be resolved through the DKP and a military tribunal.<sup>31</sup> Most importantly, Prabowo himself had demanded to be court-martialled so that he could "disclose the truth".<sup>32</sup>

Wiranto gave a feeble defence of his decision, arguing that he had acted in accordance with the TNI's internal procedure to avoid "a unilateral and emotional personal decision".<sup>33</sup> Subagyo, however, disagreed. He admitted that the DKP process was "politically motivated" and that Wiranto's decision to discharge Prabowo without first determining his guilt had indeed violated the military's procedure. As a comparison, Subagyo pointed out to Soeharto's handling of the Santa Cruz Incident of 1991.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Soeharto exercised his constitutional rights as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to establish an independent inquiry team (KPN) to investigate the Santa Cruz Incident. The team concluded that local security authorities had failed to perform their duty to prevent the incident from taking place and to handle the situation when it happened. Based on the report, Soeharto ordered the establishment of the military's Honorary Council (DKM) to examine whether Sintong Panjaitan, Rudolf Warouw and the officers under their commands had violated the military's code of ethics and honours. In other words, the KPN had already declared Panjaitan and Warouw "guilty" and the DKM only examined whether they had violated the military's code of ethics and honours before recommending any disciplinary actions against them. In Prabowo's case, said Subagyo, the DKP did have the right to examine Prabowo's presumed violation of the military's code of ethics and honours, but it was in no position to determine his guilt of involvement in a criminal case. That was the reason why the DKP recommended administrative sanction for Prabowo's violation of the military's code of ethics and honours, but suggested that his alleged roles in a criminal case had to be examined in a martial court.<sup>34</sup>

More importantly, the absence of an open trial on Prabowo and the fact that the findings of the DKP investigation had never been made public left a few unsettling questions. First, did Prabowo act on his own initiative or did he carry out somebody else's order? In a press statement on 12 August 1998, Subagyo revealed that Prabowo "has misinterpreted an 'under operational command' (BKO) instruction" but insisted that ABRI Chief Feisal Tanjung and President Soeharto never issued such an instruction. But instead of clarifying the issue, Subagyo's contradictory statement triggered more controversy, as only Prabowo's superior, Feisal Tanjung, could have given a BKO order.<sup>35</sup>

Then, in a press interview a year later, on 14 October 1999, Prabowo "confirmed" Subagyo's statement, saying that he had interpreted a written order from Army Chief Hartono to "secure the situation ahead of the SU MPR as intelligence information has warned about the possibility of increased terror threats". According to Prabowo, he acted on the assumption that Soeharto must have approved the order, because the president had often bypassed Tanjung and gave his order directly to Hartono. In an interview, Syamsu Djalal confirmed that Prabowo had briefed members of the Rose Team to carry out Soeharto's order.<sup>36</sup>

On 18 January, an explosion occurred at the Tanah Tinggi apartment in Central Jakarta, during which an SMID activist was caught in the act. The military claimed that they had found documents linking the explosion to attempts at foiling the SU MPR, planned by a loose coalition of radical student organizations (PRD and SMID), Megawati's PDI-P, former ABRI Chief L.B. Moerdani and the CSIS.<sup>37</sup> As a result, the military intelligence agency summoned businessman and CSIS patron Sofyan Wanandi, who was accused of financing the subversive activities, for questioning, although he was later released without charges. Later, a number of Muslim organizations demanded the disbanding of the CSIS due to its alleged involvement in the subversion. However, CSIS founder Harry Tjan Silalahi suspected that the whole incident was Prabowo's intelligence ploy to discredit his institution by aggravating the historical animosity between the Muslims and the CSIS.<sup>38</sup>

Prabowo argued that since Hartono's order did not mention any specific action, he drew his own interpretation and issued an operational order to his men "to arrest terror suspects and interrogate them, and to deliver them to the police once evidence was collected".<sup>39</sup> Major Bambang Kristiono, Commander of Battalion 42 of the *Kopassus*'

Group-4, then formed three teams to carry out Prabowo's oral and written order. The Rose Team was tasked with detecting radical and terror groups, the Youth Guard Team to organize youth groups in a number of provinces and the Supporting Team to assist other *Kopassus* intelligence teams assigned to the regional military commands. After conducting an intelligence operation, the Rose Team suspected that the nine activists from the PRD, the SMID and Megawati's PDI-P did indeed plan to stage terror acts to foil the SU MPR and decided to arrest them. Prabowo insisted that he had never ordered his men to abduct the activists but he took full blame for their "misinterpretation" of his instruction.<sup>40</sup>

Hartono, however, denied that he had issued an instruction that could be interpreted in such a violent way.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, he retired from active service on 31 June 1997, eight months before the abduction took place. Wiranto added another blow to Prabowo's version when he revealed that during their aforementioned meeting, Prabowo admitted that he had conducted the covert operation without first securing permission from his superiors because he intended "not to involve and cause problems to the ABRI Headquarters". According to Wiranto, he checked it with Tanjung, who also confirmed that he had never known of Prabowo's covert activities.<sup>42</sup>

If we examine those facts carefully, we will see that instead of clarifying the rationale of his actions, Prabowo's explanation demonstrated his rule-breaker attitudes. Hartono's instruction was a normative order issued as a part of a regular security plan devised in conjunction with the 1997 general elections and the subsequent SU MPR before he handed over his job to Wiranto in late June 1997. Thus, even if Prabowo had received the order from Hartono, he should have reconfirmed the validity of the order to the new Army Chief of Staff, Wiranto. Most importantly, Prabowo had no authority to launch an operation without authorization from Tanjung because, as a *Kopassus* Commander, he should have taken operational orders only from the ABRI Commander, not the Army Chief of Staff. Thus, we can objectively agree with Hartono's conclusion that "Prabowo had taken personal initiative that led to the abduction of political activists to achieve personal political gain".<sup>43</sup>

The second question was what happened to the other missing people. According to *Kontras*, a human-rights organization devoted to investigating forced disappearances, the whereabouts of 13 people who were reported missing in the period between 26 April 1997 and 14 May 1998 were still unaccounted for. After seven years of *reformasi*, they were presumed to be dead.<sup>44</sup>

Since Prabowo had only acknowledged the abduction of nine activists, speculation emerged as to who had abducted the rest of the missing people. A few of the released activists claimed that they had met with some of the missing people while in detention, which indicated that their abductors might have hailed from the same institution, although Syamsu Djalal mentioned that other military institutions might have been involved too.<sup>45</sup> However, the fact that political abduction was not unprecedented<sup>46</sup> leads us to the chilling conclusion that it was part of a systematic pattern of military coercion in handling security disturbances. We can see here that Wiranto's refusal to court martial Prabowo was due to his aversion in risking a negative exposure of the ABRI's systemic culture of violence, which could snowball uncontrollably just at the time when its image nosedived to its lowest ebb.

Moreover, just like the 27 July affair, the controversy over the political abduction underlined the military's submission to Soeharto's personal rule, in which the interpretation of "state duty" was tailored to serve his political interests. As a result, we saw the

chaotic chain of command due to the president's political favouritism. More seriously, civic rights and human rights were subdued in the name of state duty, a practice that continued to hamper attempts at reforming the military long after Prabowo's debacle was left unresolved.

## The Trisakti Tragedy

On the evening of 12 May, a clash broke out between student demonstrators and security personnel near the complex of Trisakti University in West Jakarta, killing four students of the private university: Elang Mulya Lesmana, Hafidhin Royan, Heri Hertanto and Hendriawan Sic.<sup>47</sup> They were allegedly shot dead by members of the police's Mobile Brigade (*Brimob*) and became the first students to die at the hands of security personnel in the months-long protests. Their martyrdom preceded the aforementioned mass riots and elite infighting that would seal the fate of the New Order.

The tragedy occurred amidst heightened student and mass protests, which had found new impetus after the government decided to raise fuel prices in early May, in adherence to the IMF's requirement to lift fuel subsidies. Despite intense public criticism, including some from the usually subservient Parliament, over this insensitive policy, Soeharto claimed that it was well thought as the government had just raised civil servants' basic salary and the floor price for dried milled rice bought from farmers. Thus the people's burden was at least lightened. Speaking before embarking on an overseas tour on 9 May, Soeharto cited a Javanese idiom "*jer basuki mawa beya*" (no gain without sacrifice) and called for public understanding of his decision. "I do understand people's suffering as I was born into a poor family too. But if we are fighters, [and] we want to move forwards, [then] we must be willing to make a sacrifice," he said. In full confidence of people's trust of his leadership, Soeharto went on to carry out a "state duty" to attend the G-15 Summit in Cairo, Egypt.<sup>48</sup> Later, however, the government was forced to retract the policy on 15 May, after riots shook Jakarta and other cities.

Interestingly, Soeharto's trip started just at the time when widespread student and mass rallies against his decision was getting increasingly out of hand. On 2 May, student and mass protests turned ugly in Medan, resulting in the devastation of the North Sumatera capital. Dozens of houses and shops belonging to Chinese residents were looted and burnt down. Dozens of people were reported injured and more than 400 others were arrested. Three days later, a series of riots rocked the usually tranquil ancient city of Jogjakarta following a clash between angry mobs and security personnel that receded only after the charismatic Sultan Hamengkubuwono X personally intervened to calm down his subjects. Hours before Soeharto made his confident statement, a clash erupted between students and the police in the town of Bogor, just an hour's drive from Jakarta.<sup>49</sup> A policeman, Second Lieutenant Dadang Rusmana, was reported dead and one infantry officer, Captain Ali, was severely injured, allegedly after being tortured by students of Djuanda University, although the allegation was later proved groundless.<sup>50</sup>

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to examine whether Soeharto had simply committed a policy blunder due to his overconfidence in his grip on power or, as one popular conspiracy theory circulated after his fall claimed, he deliberately provided "momentum" for popular unrest to "test" his subordinates' loyalties.

In his chronological study of Soeharto's fall, Luhulima subscribed to the first theory and tried to explain the rationale behind Soeharto's policy blunder. He drew a parallel between Soeharto's May 1998 decision with similar decisions he had made in 1967 and

1968, during which he insisted on raising fuel prices despite his advisers' warning of possible popular unrest. Luhulima demonstrated that on the three occasions, Soeharto used similar language of confidence, in which he declared that he had calculated every possible risk of his decisions and was confident that "nothing would happen". In 1967 and 1968, Soeharto passed the tests, but he was not all that lucky in 1998.<sup>51</sup> Luhulima's theory was supported by the fact that Soeharto had been adopting confrontational attitudes during his last months in power, as discussed in Chapter 1, simply to demonstrate that he was in full control of the situation. The conspiracy theory, on the other hand, lacked logical coherence, as Soeharto was too experienced a politician to take such a risky plan simply to set a trap for his suspected disloyal subordinates.

Nevertheless, as widespread protests became increasingly unruly and street clashes became more and more frequent, the military was acutely aware that a student martyr would provide "the long awaited momentum to gather critical mass" to bring down the regime. Since 18 April 1998, the head of BIA, Zacky Makarim, had been sending a series of confidential telegrams to the military and police commanders throughout Indonesia. He had warned them of escalation of threats ahead of the one-million-strong "long march" slated for 20 May at National Monument (Monas) Square led by opposition leader Amien Rais. According to Makarim, his institution had even picked up information about plans to sabotage vital facilities such as electricity, water and fuel installations around the capital and other attempts at creating major disturbances—few of which had been successfully pre-empted. Due to his staunch anti-New Order and anti-military stance, the ABRI was generally very suspicious of Rais' moves and they monitored his activities closely.

On 11 May, Makarim sent a specific memo warning those commanders to prevent the fall of a student martyr, although he suspected that the martyr would be "created" in Jogjakarta, home to Rais' staunchest supporters. Therefore, he asked them to ban the use of live ammunition in handling the protests.<sup>52</sup> One high-ranking military officer, however, claimed that he had warned his colleagues that if someone indeed attempted to "create" a martyr, Trisakti University would have been a good target due to its unique historical and social background.<sup>53</sup>

Nonetheless, the security authorities took Makarim's warnings seriously. On the evening of 11 May, the Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Jakarta Police Chief Hamami Nata invited all security commanders in Jakarta to a briefing at Cilangkap Military Headquarters. They warned the commanders of plans to incite a student-security clash in order to produce the martyr, pointing to the death of Dadan Rusmana in Bogor as an example, and ordered a strict live ammunition ban.<sup>54</sup>

The fact that the security authorities had anticipated but failed to prevent the Trisakti tragedy sparked the unsettling controversy on whether it was a tragic accident or a pre-meditated action, which centred on a key question: Who actually shot the students?

The police insisted that none of their members was guilty of causing the death of the four students. The police felt that they were made a scapegoat for a crime they never committed in order to protect the real culprits, which reflected acute inter-service rivalry within the ABRI. Formally incorporated into the ABRI in 1961 after serving under a number of different departments, the police became the "most junior" service in the military, hence its perceived subordination to its "big brothers". This institutional resentment over the unfair treatment seemed to find its justification during the Trisakti controversy, which later gave an impetus for the separation of the police from the military.

The tension culminated on 24 June 1998 when Wiranto replaced Police Chief General Dibyó Widodo with General Rusmanhadi, a year before his term officially ended. Widodo had reportedly defied Wiranto's order to surrender police rifles for inspection, suspecting that the military police investigators would not act impartially, as they belonged to the army. Widodo insisted that none of his subordinates had violated the standard operating procedures (*protap*) of a strict live bullet ban and was more inclined to believe that a "third party" was responsible for the students' deaths.

In a clear defiance of Wiranto's authority, Widodo appointed a civilian defence team led by respected human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution to represent 19 low-ranking *Brimob* members who were court-martialled in relation with the Trisakti tragedy, insisting that they were innocent of involvement.<sup>55</sup> More importantly, Widodo ordered the establishment of a team to prepare for a police reform proposal, in which its separation from the ABRI topped the agenda. An internal police document prepared for the team in early June 1998 provided a detailed analysis of how the police had been mistreated as a "stepson" within the ABRI and recommended its separation from the "big brothers" to rectify the imbalances.<sup>56</sup>

The police based its argument on its internal investigation and ballistic test, which concluded that the lethal bullets were fired from M-16-A2 rifles, issued exclusively to military units including *Kopassus*.<sup>57</sup> The police's forensic examination on the bodies of the dead students also indicated that they died of precise single bullet shots, which contradicted the military's claim that they died from random shootings.<sup>58</sup> Later, during a parliamentary hearing in February 2001, a policewoman, First Lieutenant Anneke Wacano, testified that she had seen an "unknown military unit" fire indiscriminately at Trisakti students from the Grogol flyover bridge, although her testimony was later rejected due to its inconsistency with other forensic data.<sup>59</sup>

Nevertheless, these findings gave birth to a number of theories that the real culprits were either "hidden snipers", army units who were also present at the time of the tragedy, or an army unit disguised as the police. In turn, these led to a widely subscribed theory about the involvement of former *Kopassus* Commander Prabowo Subianto in the shootings—to provide a momentum for subsequent riots. Prabowo dismissed the allegation as baseless and gave an oath over the Holy Qur'an to prove that he had nothing to do with the brutal murders.<sup>60</sup>

The police version, however, was contradicted by three ballistic tests conducted both in Indonesia and abroad. Shortly after the tragic incident, Wiranto ordered a joint team comprising representatives from the military police (*Puspom*), the state-owned Army's Armament and Ammunition Industry (*Pindad*), Trisakti University and ITB's Metallurgy Laboratory to conduct the ballistic test. After examining 21 rifles suspected to have been used in the tragic shootings, the team established that the lethal bullets were likely to have been fired from Steyr or SS-1 rifles, but failed to determine which of the rifles caused those deaths.

While the ballistic test contradicted *Puslabfor*'s finding that the bullets were fired from M-16-A2 rifles, it still did not rule out possibility that the shootings were conducted by military units as SS-1 rifles were issued to both the police and military. Steyr rifles were issued exclusively to *Brimob*, but *Kopassus* soldiers were allowed to use them for special tasks under the condition that whenever a *Kopassus* soldier needed to use a Steyr rifle, he had to exchange his own SS-1 rifle with a Steyr rifle and file a report. However, on the day of the shootings, no report on the use of Steyr rifles was filed in the *Kopassus*.<sup>61</sup> Judging from troops' configuration at the time of the shootings, the *Puspom* team concluded that the *Brimob* unit was more likely to have fired the bullets.

However, due to public suspicion on the impartiality of the military-backed teams, two bullets taken from the bodies of the dead students were sent to a forensic laboratory in Montreal, Canada, for another ballistic test in May 1999. The result largely confirmed the earlier findings that the bullets were fired from Steyr rifles, yet it was similarly inconclusive on which rifles fired the lethal ammunition.

So, a year later, in an attempt to resolve the mystery, President Abdurrahman Wahid ordered the bullets to be sent and tested in the Forensic Science Agency Northern Ireland (FSANI) laboratory in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The tests concluded that the bullets found in the bodies of two Trisakti students, Hery Hartanto and Hendriawan Sie, were fired from SS-1 and Steyr rifles respectively, which largely confirmed the *Puspom-ITB-Pindad* and Montreal tests.<sup>62</sup> Accepting the investigation results, the new Police Chief General Suroyo Bimantoro surrendered 11 *Brimob* members allegedly involved in the shootings to the military court. In January 2002, they were sentenced to between three and six years' imprisonment. Thus, the presently available information indicates that the death of the four Trisakti students was a tragic incident caused by a violation of the Police Chief's strict live-bullet ban, not a premeditated action.

Despite the verdicts of the military tribunal, the relatives of the dead students remained unsatisfied as the court punished only low-ranking police officers, not their commanders. Under intense public pressure, in February 2001, Parliament set up a special committee (*Pansus*) to investigate the claims of gross human-rights violations in the Trisakti tragedy, the Semanggi I & II Incidents and the 13–15 May 1998 Riots. After summoning a number of police and military generals allegedly implicated in the tragedies, including Wiranto and Prabowo, the *Pansus* concluded that it found no gross violation of human rights in the three cases. Contrary to public expectation that the *Pansus* would recommend that the cases be brought before ad-hoc human-rights tribunals, it decided instead that the cases had to be tried through military tribunals.

The *Pansus*' disappointing conclusions were met with strong reaction from the public, including President Abdurrahman Wahid. The Komnas HAM then decided to set up a team to investigate violations of human rights in the Trisakti Tragedy and Semanggi I & II Incidents (*KPP HAM Trisakti dan Semanggi I & II*) on 31 July 2001. The team, however, failed to summon the generals in question because TNI Headquarters refused to turn in its personnel for questioning. TNI lawyers argued that such an investigation was redundant and violated Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights, which stipulated that the Komnas HAM had to drop its investigation if the case had already been tried in a martial court. Until now, the case is not resolved satisfactorily. In July 2003, the Komnas HAM tried to lobby Parliament to amend its decision so that the case could be reopened and another investigation could be carried out.<sup>63</sup>

### The 13–15 May 1998 Riots

The Trisakti tragedy was undoubtedly the determining factor that triggered the May riots, although it was definitely not a cause. Once news of the tragic deaths of the Trisakti students spread, both the security people and residents of Jakarta anticipated that riots would occur. At 10.30 a.m. the next day, while funerals for the student martyrs were prepared, a group of unknown people—none of them, however, was a student of Trisakti University—began attacking a petrol station near the location where they were shot dead. In no time, riots broke out in some parts of West and Central Jakarta, where mobs burnt and looted buildings and shops and attacked several police posts. By noon, the number of rioters had reached thousands. The military deployed troops

to the troubled areas, including parachuting two sorties of marine units, and displayed combat vehicles to disperse the rioters to prevent its spread to other parts of Jakarta. For a while, they managed to delay the destruction of the capital.<sup>64</sup>

But the next day, the rioters returned in much larger numbers and overwhelmed the security forces. The police estimated that the number of rioters reached more than a million, and they were scattered over all parts of Jakarta and its satellite towns of Bekasi, Tangerang and Bogor.<sup>65</sup> Almost at the same time, riots also shook the cities of Surabaya, Solo, Lampung and Palembang. As described in the beginning of this chapter, two distinct features of the riots were observed: the rioters appeared to be well-organized and security personnel was nowhere to be seen, especially on 14 May.

Again, the intriguing question is: Why did the military fail to prevent the destruction of the capital if it had reinforced its security forces to anticipate such a tragedy? Based on data presently available, there are at least two theories on the cause of the May riots and the military's failure to handle it.

The first is the official military version. Nearly all generals, regardless of their political inclination, claimed that the riots were spontaneous and that security forces were simply overwhelmed by the unexpectedly huge and widespread riots. In his as-told-to autobiography published in 2002, Wiranto wrote that: "The May 1998 riots were unpremeditated tragic events. Their eruptions were historical fate, a culmination of a number of national problems. The military was not involved, and the perpetrators of the riots were pillagers, plunderers and robbers, who took advantage of the political demonstrations. Most of the victims of the riots were the pillagers who were caught in accidents while performing their actions."<sup>66</sup> But as we shall see below, this statement contradicted Wiranto's own earlier accounts, which clearly pointed to the involvement of individuals from the military in provoking and instigating the riots. On the other hand, Prabowo Subianto, the man who has always been widely associated with the riots, had consistently denied any involvement in the May 1998 tragedy.

Earlier in their testimonies before the TGPF, the generals pointed out to the fact that the majority of the rioters were poor city dwellers who were lured into taking part in the riots either by provocateurs or simply by watching live reports on television.<sup>67</sup> Many social analysts had warned that the wide gap of socio-economic disparity, coupled with the mixture of political repression and injustice, could erupt into violent riots if there was a trigger for it. A number of studies have also pointed to Indonesia's delicate ethno-sociological make-up, best summed up in the acronym SARA (Ethnicity, Religion, Race and Inter-Group relations), contributing to the outbreak of riots in parts of Indonesia before, during and after the fall of the New Order.<sup>68</sup>

Against such a backdrop, the generals argued that despite massive reinforcement, security forces were still unable to quell the riots. Prior to the Trisakti tragedy, security in Jakarta was placed under the Operation Mantap Jaya (OMB) configuration, devised to safeguard the May 1997 elections and the March 1998 MPR Session, in which the Commander of the Jakarta Regional Military Command held the operational command (*koops*), assisted by the Jakarta Police Chief. The OMB configuration comprised 110 companies (SSK) or 11,000 personnel from the Polda Metro Jaya, 23 SSK (2,300 personnel) supporting units from the police headquarters and 61 SSK (6,100 personnel) from the Kodam Jaya. In a normal situation, the police was directly in charge of security (*pamsung*), assisted by the military (*pamtaksung*), but the configuration could be reversed if security deteriorated.

On 13 May, due to security deterioration, Sjamsoeddin took over command and reversed the OMB configuration with the military in full charge. He asked for troop

reinforcement to 112 SSK (11,200 personnel), which was approved and even increased to 142 SSK (14,200 personnel) on 14 May and eventually to 174 SSK (17,400 personnel) from 15 May onwards.<sup>69</sup> However, one estimate projected that to guard the capital of 13 million inhabitants (during day time) with countless number of vital political and economic objects as well as individual houses, Jakarta needed at least 225 SSK (22,500 personnel).<sup>70</sup>

Thus, even if all security personnel had been stationed on combat position, rioters would still have overwhelmed them. On many occasions, a small security unit had to face thousands of rioters without adequate equipment. Moreover, the rioters attacked non-vital objects, such as shopping malls and residential estates, which were not on the security's priority guard list. Until the evening of 14 May, there had been no shoot-on-the-spot order from the ABRI headquarters. The generals argued that more casualties at the hands of the security forces would further deteriorate the situation. In addition, most of the soldiers, who belonged to the middle to lower classes, would have found it difficult not to be sympathetic towards the poor rioters.

More critically, the police force that made up the largest part of the OMB configuration was not on hand to guard the capital during those few days. According to Jakarta Police Chief Hamami Nata, his men were demoralized due to intense public condemnation that they were responsible for the Trisakti tragedy. Since 13 May, mobs had begun to attack and burn down no less than 22 police command post and two police sector post (*polsek*) all over the city. Rumours were spreading that rioters had planned to attack the police headquarters, which prompted the police to withdraw a large part of its unit to guard its posts, barracks and headquarters on 14 May, leaving only the remaining units to squash the riots. Worse still, the troops often had to face the anger of both the mobs and their comrades from other military units.

Delivering emotional testimonies before the TGPF, Nata and his staff revealed that in some parts of Jakarta, clashes broke out between the police and soldiers from other military units because the latter also blamed the former for the Trisakti tragedy. There were a few incidents where soldiers appeared to encourage rioters to attack the police. Under such pressure, however, the police claimed to have apprehended around 2,000 rioters. Unfortunately, other military units on the ground did not follow their example.<sup>71</sup>

Sjamsoeddin and his staff, on the other hand, insisted that their 14,200-strong troops (configuration on 14 May) had to cover for the police's absence and were simply overwhelmed by the Herculean task to disperse the millions of rioters and protect hundreds of vital objects and facilities, including Nata's headquarters.<sup>72</sup> Only after reinforcement began to arrive from West, Central and East Java on the following days did they manage to bring order to the devastated capital. Prabowo's testimony, however, provided an interesting glimpse into the chaotic security coordination during the riots. While passing Jakarta's main streets on 14 May in the afternoon, he saw 16 armoured vehicles stationed to guard the offices of the Department of Defence—which was unlikely to be attacked—but no troops were available to quell the riots breaking out only a few kilometres away.<sup>73</sup> It seemed that while the limited military and police units were deployed to guard vital objects, public facilities and houses had become soft targets for rioters.

The military's official version, however, did not tally well with the TGPF's findings, which seemed to support the second and more popular theory that the riots were premeditated and the security's failure to squash them was due to the intense internal

military rivalry between Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto. According to this theory, Prabowo deliberately planned for the May riots, which was preceded by the abduction of political activists and the Trisakti shootings, to create a chaotic situation similar to that of the 1965–1966 event. In such situation, it was expected that Soeharto would issue an emergency decree and a *Supersemar*-type of authority to restore security and order through a *Kopkamtib*-like institution. In this context, the security failure in Jakarta was suspected to have been part of this “grand design” as Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Hamami Nata were known to be Prabowo’s close comrades.

Many human-rights and women activists from the TRuK, who first investigated the May riots shortly after they happened, came up with extremely graphic reports three weeks later, alleging that the riots and gang rapes were deliberately planned by elements from “the government, the military, special syndicates, hoodlums, hitmen and other groups”.<sup>74</sup> In a number of public talks they gave both in Indonesia and abroad, TRuK activists openly alleged Prabowo and his men as the masterminds of the tragedy. It was their aggressive campaigns, both in Indonesia and abroad, that eventually forced the Habibie government to establish the TGPF on 15 July 1998. Due to extensive media coverage of their reports, both domestic and international opinion had been shaped along those lines. And many, if not most, military officers mutely believed it too.<sup>75</sup>

The anti-Prabowo sentiment converged with the political need of Habibie and Wiranto’s newfound alliance in the post-Soeharto era (which we shall discuss later) to sort out the political debris of the May 1998 riots and secure legitimacy for the beleaguered transitional government. As the public at large had been convinced of Prabowo’s involvement in the violence, it was necessary to prove his guilt through a credible and independent inquiry panel, not a discreet internal military investigation. In a meeting with Army Chief Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo on 12 September 1998, for instance, a few members of the TGPF sought for evidence to implicate Prabowo and court-martial him for charges other than his involvement in the abduction of political activists.<sup>76</sup> This could well be the reason why Wiranto refused to try Prabowo for the abduction case, as there was a chance to try him for more serious crimes should there be incriminating evidence to implicate him.

The composition of the TGPF was somewhat tailored to suit the need. Half of its 18 members represented the Komnas HAM and non-governmental organizations that had helped to push for the establishment of the TGPF, including Father Sandyawan Sumardi, the priest-cum-activist who wrote some of the TRuK reports. Interestingly, one of the three military representatives was none other than Syamsu Djalal, who had investigated Prabowo’s involvement in the abduction case.<sup>77</sup> A Team of Assistance comprising nine LIPI researchers and three police officers led by activist-cum-historian Hermawan Sulistyono was attached to help the TGPF collect and verify field data. Using the TRuK reports as a starting point for its investigation, the TGPF steered its investigation towards finding a “grand design” behind the May riots and its possible link with the Trisakti tragedy and the abduction of political activists.

In this context, it is interesting to note that in an official statement delivered after a commander’s call on 21 August 1998, Wiranto admitted that some military elements had been involved in the May riots and suggested a possible link between the riots and the previous cases of violence. He said, “Realizing that some military elements had been involved in the abduction of political activists, [the] Trisakti [tragedy] and the 13–14 May 1998 riots, ABRI pledged its commitment to conduct a thorough review of the soldiership and leadership ethics so that such violation of procedures shall never happen

again.”<sup>78</sup> The statement, delivered while the TGPF investigation was underway, was widely interpreted as an official confirmation of Prabowo's involvement in the riots.

After three months of investigation, the TGPF delivered its final report on 23 October, a week before the SI MPR was held, and presented its executive summary to the press. The TGPF concluded, among others, the following.

- The 13–15 May riots were primarily caused by the dual intersection of two main processes: the process of political elite infighting, which related to the question of the longevity of national leadership; and the acceleration of the process of monetary deterioration. In this context, the meeting at the *Kostrad* headquarters on 14 May 1998 could presumably reveal the roles of the perpetrators and patterns of [elite] infighting that had triggered the riots.
- The riots occurred as the culmination of a sequence of violence, including the abduction of [political activists] and the Trisakti tragedy. The shooting of the Trisakti students had created a martyr factor that subsequently triggered the riots.
- Based on ground findings, it was concluded that while spontaneous riots did occur, there was ample evidence to support claims that some of the riots were provoked and even premeditated as part of the political elite infighting at the national level. However, there was a missing link, i.e. evidence or information that could provide a clear linkage between the elite infighting and the mass riots.
- A number of parties were identified as having taken part in the riots, either as active mass or provocateurs, in order to gain personal or collective interests. They included local hoodlums, mass and political organizations, as well as certain individuals and units from the military who acted outside the control of the institution.
- Due to the weakness in the monitoring and reporting system, the precise numbers of casualties could not be determined.
- Acts of sexual violence, including rape, occurred during the 13–15 May 1998 riots at different locations almost at the same time. They could have occurred spontaneously or were part of deliberate actions by certain groups for certain purposes.
- It could not be ascertained whether the sexual violence occurred as part of premeditated actions or an excess of riots. No evidence of religious aspects in the acts of sexual violence was found.
- The security failure in Jakarta was related to the authorities held at the hands of Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who failed to perform his duties as required.
- The causality correlation in the series of violence that culminated in the 13–15 May 1998 riots could be perceived as an attempt to create an emergency situation that would require extra-constitutional powers to restore order, whose preparations had been made at the high level of decision-making authority. The TGPF then recommended, among others, the following.
- The government should conduct further investigation into the causes and perpetrators of the 13–15 May 1998 riots. As a start, the government needed to investigate the meeting in *Kostrad* headquarters on 14 May 1998 to ascertain and reveal the roles of Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto and other parties in the entire process that led to the riots.
- The government should investigate other cases of violence that had presumably been connected to and culminated in the 13–15 May 1998 riots. In this context, Commander of Jakarta Military Command Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin had to be held responsible for security failure in Jakarta, and Lieutenant-General

Prabowo Subianto and other parties who were involved in the abduction [of political activists] had to be tried in the military tribunal. Likewise, the government had to act seriously to settle the Trisakti tragedy.

The reports that clearly implicated Prabowo received warm applause from the public, both in Indonesia and abroad. However, Prabowo, who had left for a voluntary exile in Jordan, dismissed the reports as "heavily-biased and baseless", especially the part about the meeting in *Kostrad* headquarters on 14 May 1998 and his alleged roles in the sequence of violence that culminated in the riots. The day after the TGPF delivered its reports, Prabowo's former associates held a press conference in which they insisted that there was nothing suspicious about the *Kostrad* meeting, as Prabowo was only receiving visitors who came to discuss the latest situation. They pointed to the fact that it was Adnan Buyung Nasution, an anti-Soeharto oppositionist, who made the initiative for the meeting and that TGPF's own member, lawyer Bambang Widjojanto, was also present.<sup>79</sup> Other participants of the meeting confirmed Prabowo's account and dismissed the TGPF's conclusion as speculative.<sup>80</sup>

In an attempt at a counter strike, Prabowo's associates disclosed that on 14 May, when Jakarta was besieged by riots, Wiranto had rejected Prabowo's repeated suggestions to cancel a handover ceremony for the Commander of the *Kostrad*'s Rapid Reaction and Attack Unit (PPRC) in Malang, East Java. According to Prabowo, he had urged Wiranto through his personal aide to cancel the trip due to the rapid deterioration of security in the capital. But Wiranto declined and decided to bring some of his top generals, including Prabowo, for a half-day trip to Malang. Prabowo pointed out that Wiranto chose to leave the capital under siege to attend an unimportant ceremony as an indication of his lack of sense of urgency and poor leadership quality. He even suggested that Wiranto might have had a hidden agenda.<sup>81</sup>

Once again, Wiranto gave a feeble defence, which consequently nurtured continual public suspicion over his role in the riots. First, he rejected Prabowo's accusation that he had neglected his suggestions to cancel the trip to Malang, saying that he never received the messages.<sup>82</sup> Later, he argued that, according to the ABRI's operational procedure, Indonesia's territory has been divided to the last piece (*dibagi habis*) into territorial commands. In this case, the Commander of Jakarta Regional Army Command, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, was fully responsible for security in his territory. As the ABRI Chief, he would only need to make key decisions, which he could do from aboard the well-equipped Fokker-28 airplane. Moreover, he had approved Sjamsoeddin's request for security reinforcement and ordered the ABRI's Chief of General Affairs, Fachrul Razi, who was responsible for troops' deployment, to supervise security operation in Jakarta.<sup>83</sup> Even before he left for Malang, marine units from Surabaya had begun to arrive in Jakarta.<sup>84</sup>

Based on presently available information, we can objectively say that while Wiranto's excuse was understandable and there was no evidence to support Prabowo's allegation that he had a hidden agenda, it is clear that his absence from the capital in crisis without urgent reason did suggest his questionable leadership quality. Likewise, we can accept Prabowo's rejection of the TGPF's conclusion and recommendation. A careful assessment of the entire TGPF documents reveals that while it has managed to collect valuable information that could have unravelled the mystery of the May riots, deep distrust among its members and their political bias have contributed to its failure to present a credible inquiry.

The TGPF managed to identify, for example, that on Black Thursday (14 May 1998)

in Jakarta, riots started simultaneously almost at the same time, that is, in the period between 8.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m., which suggested that there was effective coordination among the “provocateurs”. In some cases, the TGPF managed to identify some individuals and organizations that belong to this provocateur category. A few of them were known to have links one way or another with Prabowo, for example, the notorious criminal gang, Pemuda Pancasila, a forsworn criminal turned Islamic preacher, Anton Medan, and the traditional martial arts organization, Satria Muda Indonesia (SMI).<sup>85</sup> Later, a *Bakin* team identified that Prabowo’s other protégé, an East Timorese-born gang leader by the name of Hercules, had transported truckloads of *premans* from Indramayu, West Java, to Jakarta during the May riots.<sup>86</sup> But other groups and individuals with no apparent ties to Prabowo, such as soothsayer Ki Gendeng Pamungkas, were also identified, which indicate that various actors took part in the chaotic fray for their own political purposes.<sup>87</sup>

What is more interesting is that the TGPF collected evidence that some individuals from the *Kopassus*, an elite army unit previously under Prabowo’s command, were involved in, and even instigated, the riots. A number of eyewitnesses in Jakarta, Solo, Palembang and Medan testified that a few days before the riots occurred, a group of people including some military individuals mobilized the *premans* and other criminal gangs to participate in “the event of 14 May”. One forsworn rioter in Solo, for example, testified that a few individuals from the *Kopassus*, whose headquarters were situated in the nearby town of Kartasura, paid him and his fellow *premans* and gave them materials to instigate the riots.<sup>88</sup> Another eyewitness testified that he had heard a confession from a *Kopassus* soldier who admitted that he and his colleagues, as well as members of other military units, were involved in the riots in some parts of Jakarta.<sup>89</sup>

In addition, the TGPF also obtained information that Prabowo had dispatched a number of *Kostrad* units from Makassar and several *Kopassus* units from Kartasura to Jakarta during those crucial days without Wiranto and Subagyo’s authorizations, which led to suspicion that he might have had a hidden agenda.<sup>90</sup> The Medan riots preceded the 13–15 May 1998 Riots and the fact that the Regional Commander was Major-General Ismed Yuzairi, one of Prabowo’s closest confidants, had led to a suspicion that the Medan riots were designed as a “test” for the subsequent riots.<sup>91</sup>

However, despite all the “loose ends” that seem to lead to Prabowo, there is no incriminating evidence in the more-than-500-page report that indicates his direct involvement in the riots, let alone links between the riots and previous acts of violence. In fact, the TGPF admits in Point 3 of its conclusion that there is a “missing link”, i.e. evidence that links the mass riots on the ground to elite infighting in Jakarta and previous acts of violence.<sup>92</sup> Thus, its suggestion that the “missing link” could be found in the *Kostrad* headquarters meeting of 14 May 1998 without presenting adequate supporting evidence is not a logical inference, which consequently tarnishes its credibility. Interestingly, the Assistance Team’s original draft executive summary, which was used as the TGPF’s official executive summary after some minor modifications, did not mention the *Kostrad* meeting, let alone recommend its investigation.<sup>93</sup> It seemed that some TGPF members had forced some last-minute editing and addition into the original draft without prior consultation with other members.<sup>94</sup>

The controversy about the *Kostrad* meeting is not the only issue that put the TGPF’s credibility in question. It also came up with an equally controversial conclusion about the alleged “systematic mass rape” against Chinese Indonesian women that shocked and angered the whole world. As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons for the TGPF’s establishment was to investigate the TRuK’s allegation of “systematic mass rape” during

the riots. Despite the TruK's graphic accounts about the alleged mass rape, it turned out to be extremely difficult to prove that they did actually happen. Doubts about the mass rape allegation began to surface when some of the gory photos about such "systematic rape" that the TRuK activists had claimed as genuine were proven to be fakes.<sup>95</sup>

Doubts intensified when a team of policewomen assigned to investigate the case failed to find one single case of rape. Government officials began to criticize the TruK activists as the allegations of mass rape had both tarnished Indonesia's image abroad and threatened to disrupt the delicate social and inter-religious relations at home. Some Muslim figures had already voiced objections to the TruK's claims that the women were gang-raped because they were Chinese and non-Muslims and the fact that TruK's chairman, Father Sandyawan, was a Catholic priest appeared to add insult to injury.

TRuK activists, however, rejected the policewomen's findings, saying that their failure to turn up evidence was due to the victims' distrust of the police. But when the TGPF's own Assistance Team also failed to verify the TRuK's allegation of mass rape despite their attempts at tracing each of the cases mentioned in the TRuK's reports, the TGPF's credibility was also thrown into serious trouble. In its final report to the TGPF, the Assistance Team wrote that after tracing sources other than the TRuK's, they managed to verify 18 cases of rape and rape with torture, but found no evidence of a systematic mass rape.<sup>96</sup>

Surprisingly, just like the case of the *Kostrad* meeting, some TGPF members also decided to make some last-minute editing to the original report. The TGPF's executive summary reported 52 cases of rape, 14 cases of rape with torture, 10 cases of sexual assaults and 9 cases of sexual harassment. So it came as no surprise that only eight out of its 18 members approved and signed the final report, while the others declined, including Chairman Marzuki Darusman, although he agreed to read out the executive summary to the press.<sup>97</sup>

The TGPF's controversial report reflected the deep distrust between the activists and government representatives, who shared nothing in common but were forced to work together to give the team a credible face, which from the outset has plagued its investigation. In the absence of a credible inquiry into the depth of the May 1998 mystery, it is hard to conclude which of the two theories is more valid. Judging from the ground facts collected during the TGPF investigation, it is clear that the riots that occurred almost simultaneously in five cities could not have been spontaneous. However, there is no incriminating evidence to support the popular condemnation of Prabowo, as the TGPF's conclusion that the three acts of violence that preceded Soeharto's fall were causality-related is contradicted by the findings of the Trisakti investigation that has technically cleared Prabowo.

Perhaps it is this inconsistency and the TGPF's lack of credibility that prompted the Habibie government's decision to seal off the case. In a confidential reply to Komnas HAM's query about the government's response to the TGPF's report on 13 September 1999, Minister of State Secretary Muladi sent letter number B-597/M.Sesneg/09/1999, stating that further government investigation had found no evidence to implicate Prabowo in the May 1998 riots. It also said that the Commander of Jakarta Regional Army Command, Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, had performed his duty as required.<sup>98</sup>

Despite Habibie's decision, the public continued to demand for justice for the victims and thousands of their bereaved families. In an attempt to satisfy their demand, the Komnas HAM decided in March 2003 to reopen the case of the May 1998 riots and established the Committee of Inquiry for the May 1998 Human Rights Violations (KPP

Mei 1998). This time, however, they did not enjoy the full cooperation that the TGPF had with the military as the TNI Headquarters refused to turn in their officers for questioning, arguing that the investigation violated the Law on Human Rights Tribunal.<sup>99</sup>

More importantly, political currents have once again changed, which inevitably influenced the direction of the investigation. While Prabowo was the bad guy in 1998, five years later it was Wiranto who, since his forced exit from the political elite circle in 2001, had to live with similar stigmatization. Contrary to the TGPF's findings, the KPP Mei 1998 concluded that Prabowo could not be held responsible for the riots because, as the Commander of the *Kostrad* at the time, he had no direct command over the troops.

Instead, Salahuddin Wahid, head of the Komnas HAM's team and Prabowo's friend of old, said that the team concluded that Wiranto, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and the late Hamami Nata were guilty of omission, as they had failed to take the necessary measures to secure the situation during those chaotic days.<sup>100</sup> Interestingly, when Wiranto invited him to become his running mate in the 2004 presidential race, Salahuddin, the younger brother of Abdurrahman Wahid, backtracked and said that the KPP Mei 1998 had found no evidence to implicate Wiranto. Such serious political bias and questionable impartiality on the part of the investigators had led to public disillusionment, so that despite the Komnas HAM's insistence to present the investigation to the Attorney-General's Office, few people expected that it would shed much light on the May 1998 mystery.

## SOEHARTO AND HIS GENERALS: THE FINAL DAYS

The 13–15 May 1998 riots brought the military elite's internal rift and rivalry out into the open, despite attempts to conceal it amidst its tight hierarchy of command. On the evening of 15 May, amidst rumours about military's involvement in the riots, Prabowo spoke for the first time to the anxious press, assuring them that the ABRI remained solid under Wiranto's command and that it would soon bring the situation back to normal. But for the sceptical public so used to official denials and cover-ups, such an assertion about military unity at the time when it had obviously failed to prevent the destruction of the capital served only to cement the impression that the ABRI was actually divided.

Indeed, while the storm of the May riots began to subside, military factionalism was just about to culminate. Within Wiranto's "camp", there was mute suspicion that Prabowo might have had something to do with the riots.<sup>101</sup> In anticipation of the worst situation, Wiranto moved quickly to set up a special "command post" (*posko*) under the command of Fachrul Razi, tasked with monitoring the movements of Prabowo's troops in the capital.<sup>102</sup>

On paper, Prabowo had the upper hand over Wiranto. While Wiranto controlled the ABRI headquarters, Prabowo had the stronger influence over the troops as his supposed allies held most of the key positions, such as the Army Chief, Commander of the *Kopassus*, Commander of the Jakarta Regional Army Command and Commander of the Marines.<sup>103</sup> However, at that point of crisis, Wiranto made good use of his personal contacts and experience as an instructor at the army's training centre in Bandung in the 1980s, during which he supervised most of his current staff, to identify his friends and foes.

On 14 May, shortly after returning from Malang, he assembled all the key generals, including Prabowo, in an emergency meeting at the Jakarta garrison. He openly scolded Sjamsoeddin and Nata for their failures to squash the riots and challenged them to perform their duties well, or he would take over the command.<sup>104</sup> Both Sjamsoeddin

and Nata pledged their readiness to restore security and order to the capital. Privately, Wiranto sent his civilian adviser, political scientist Professor Ryaas Rasyid, to meet Sjamsoeddin and asked where his loyalty lay, to which the latter reaffirmed allegiance to his Commander-in-chief.<sup>105</sup> Wiranto also secured the loyalty of other key officers, such as the Chiefs of the Navy, the Police and the Air Force as well as most of the regional commanders, including the West Java Regional Army Commander Djamari Chaniago, who was often considered to be Prabowo's ally. He decided to bring over troops from West, Central and East Java, including the *Kostrad*'s PPRC unit under the command of Prabowo's classmate, Brigadier-General Ryamizard Ryacudu. From 15 May, 174 SSK military units and the "reawakened" 110 SSK police units patrolled the streets of Jakarta and quickly brought order to the devastated capital.

But the question was: What would Soeharto do once he returned from his overseas trip to the ruins of his developmental success of three decades?

Soeharto was attending the G-15 Summit in Cairo when he was alerted about the Trisakti shootings. On the evening of 13 May, when news about riots in Jakarta began to spread, Soeharto addressed Indonesian audiences at the Embassy complex situated by the Nile River. He spent most of the time explaining the role of the military in Indonesian politics and dismissing Western media reports about his family's wealth, which he charged had been deliberately aimed at undermining people's trust in his leadership.

About an hour before midnight (West Indonesia time), while on the subject of the people's trust, Soeharto commented, "In truth, if Indonesian people stop trusting me, never mind. I have said that if I am no longer trusted, it's all right. I would not defend it [the presidency] by force, no, it's not like that. I would become a *pandita*, getting myself closer to God." At that point, the red-eyed palace reporters jumped up wide awake and rushed to try to send the breaking news to their offices. Only one paper, however, managed to break the deadline and carried the story. On the morning of 14 May, hours before the capital was besieged by riots, *Kompas* carried the headline "If People No Longer Trust Him, the President Ready to Resign".<sup>106</sup>

Once again, the repetition of the *lengser keprabon* theme heated the already tense political situation in Jakarta. This time, however, there was a sense of finality in it, given the deteriorating situation on the ground. *Kompas*' headline had unintentionally set a "triggering factor" for all the competing groups to work on the post-Soeharto proposal and their possible roles in the new polity. We can discern at least three major proposals discussed by the four major political powers—the Muslims, the military and the students-NGO movements, discussed as follows.

## Nurcholish Madjid's Good Ending Proposal

This proposal sprang from the many discussions held since January 1998 at the Majelis Reboan (the Wednesday Forum), a forum organized by Nurcholish Madjid's Paramadina Foundation to discuss contemporary national and Islamic issues. A highly respected Muslim scholar, Madjid was acceptable to almost all political groups, including the military and Soeharto. The initial participants of the forum, however, were drawn mostly from "modernist" Muslim circles such as ICMI's Adi Sasono, Muhammadiyah's Malik Fajar and Syafi'i Maarif, Golkar's Fahmi Idris and Fadel Muhammad, and PDI's Soegeng Sarjadi, although it later included some prominent figures from other groups, including the NU and DDII.

The core argument of the proposal was that Soeharto had to be given a chance to lead a total, gradual and peaceful reform process before leaving his presidency through

a good ending (*husn-u'l khatimah*). Madjid suggested the religious term *husn-u'l khatimah* in the hope that, as he was now a devout Muslim, Soeharto would accept it as both a political and religious solution. After a series of meetings to review and reformulate the proposal due to quick changes at the political stage, it was announced to the public on 17 May.

The proposal suggested that Soeharto take over all responsibility to lead an overall reform so that he would eventually set a good end to his presidency in 20 months' time. It suggested that Soeharto "address the nation, ideally before an Extraordinary Session of MPR, and declare his commitment to lead an overall reform process, end all practices of KKN, reshuffle the cabinet and finally step down immediately through peaceful constitutional means". To demonstrate his commitment, the proposal suggested that Soeharto begin "by delivering his and his family's private wealth to the nation". After that, he should "formalize the socio-political reforms into positive laws, hold fresh elections on 10 January 2000 at the latest, followed by a General Session of MPR on March 2000 to elect new president and vice-president".<sup>107</sup> Interestingly, the proposal was presented to Soeharto, the military leaders and the head of *Bakin* who, in principle, agreed to its core points. However, the proposal has never been implemented due to drastic changes that eventually made it no longer relevant.

### The Military's Graceful Exit Proposal

Contrary to the widely shared view that the military remained unmoved by popular calls for Soeharto's resignation, the generals were quite active in seeking a peaceful solution to end the leadership stalemate. At this point, the two competing military factions shared a common goal—to provide a graceful exit for Soeharto, although they differed in the approach and implementation of their proposals.

Within Wiranto's camp, the architect for the quest to find a graceful exit for Soeharto was the ABRI's Chief of Socio-political Affairs, Yudhoyono. A well-respected officer with extensive contacts among the pro-reform movements, Yudhoyono had been absorbing their aspirations ever since he "rescued" Amien Rais and the UGM academics in the Radisson Affair (discussed in Chapter 1) from political trouble.

On the morning of 14 May, a few hours after *Kompas* hit the streets, Yudhoyono invited Madjid and a few other civilian intellectuals, including military historian Salim Said and young academics Eep Saefulloh Fatah and Yuddy Chrisnandi, for a meeting at Cilangkap. During the meeting, Madjid presented the main points of his *husn-u'l khatimah* proposal, which was received rather sceptically due to his suggestion that Soeharto should deliver the first family's wealth to the nation as a token of his commitment to reforms.<sup>108</sup> Nevertheless, the ABRI HQ followed up the meeting with a series of closed-door sessions featuring a number of civilian academics, including Ryaas Rasyid, rector of University of Indonesia (UI) Asman Budisantoso and UI's constitutional law expert Harun Al-Rasyid, to find an acceptable solution to the leadership crisis.

The ABRI's "graceful exit proposal" drew heavily from Madjid's *husn-u'l khatimah* proposal as well as the UI proposal—a summary of a symposium held in late March—that basically called for Soeharto to carry out overall reforms. The core argument of the military proposal was that Soeharto had to be allowed to lead the reforms, after which he would leave his presidency in his own terms gracefully, in full respect of his principle of never committing a cowardly act of "*tinggal glanggang colong playu*" (described in Chapter 1). The ABRI proposed for the establishment of a Board of Reforms (*Dewan Reformasi*)—which was later changed into a Committee of Reforms—to supervise the

reform process, in which key pro-reform figures would sit as members. In essence, the military was bound by its constitutional duty to remain loyal to the presidential institution and to ensure that the process proceeds constitutionally and peacefully.

However, when political tension intensified after parliamentary leaders called for Soeharto's resignation on 18 May, discussions focused on presidential succession, with the Cilangkap generals insisting that the transfer of power had to be constitutional. In addition, they also insisted that an SI MPR should be avoided, since it would be highly risky and served only to humiliate the president.

At a meeting at the Department of Defence on the evening of 20 May, most of the participants pointed to Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution as a possible constitutional avenue for Soeharto's exit. The article stipulates that "in the cases if the president dies, discontinues his service or is unable to carry out his duties during his term, he is succeeded by the vice-president until his term ends". In this context, Vice-President Habibie would become the legitimate constitutional successor to President Soeharto, should he no longer perform his duties.

Some participants, however, pointed out to the fact that Habibie's vice-presidential nomination had received strong rejection both domestically and internationally, and his rise to the presidency could trigger another political instability. They suggested another possible constitutional avenue—the MPR Decree No. VII/1973. The Decree stipulated that a triumvirate of Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence and Security would act as a collective leadership should the president and vice-president fail to carry out their duties. But the idea was turned down because it required the absence of the leadership of both the president and vice-president, which could have been done through an SI MPR that the military wished to avoid. Moreover, the public would likely reject the highly unpopular Minister of Home Affairs Hartono as a member of the triumvirate. Finally, they agreed that the only acceptable solution was Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, which meant that Soeharto had to step down voluntarily and Habibie succeed him.<sup>109</sup>

While Wiranto and Yudhoyono worked on the graceful exit proposal and at the same time maintained the ABRI's official support for Soeharto, Prabowo moved aggressively to engage opposition figures, including Rais, Sasono, Nasution, Wahid and even Vice-President Habibie, in a series of meetings to discuss a post-Soeharto scenario. According to Wiranto, he received full reports about Prabowo's political activities, which "clearly violated military ethics as the *Kostrad* Commander was supposed to concentrate on his duty to supervise his troops, not to go around meddling into political and state affairs without his superior's knowledge and approval".<sup>110</sup>

Prabowo admitted that from the outset he had openly suggested Soeharto's voluntary resignation as the only way to resolve the crises. On the afternoon of 14 May, for instance, he met Habibie and jokingly suggested that the vice-president had to prepare himself for a presidential job, as Jakarta's deteriorating situation would eventually force Soeharto to step down. According to his friends, Prabowo had proposed for a "soft-landing scenario" ever since the crisis struck in late 1997, which basically suggested that Soeharto had to carry out reforms and to prepare for a smooth transition of power to prevent a forced exit or a crash landing. As for Soeharto's successor, he pointed to Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, which clearly pointed to Habibie as the constitutional successor. Prabowo brought up the soft-landing scenario for discussion with his Cendana in-laws, who became upset and later accused him and Habibie of deliberately betraying their father.<sup>111</sup>

In retrospect, Prabowo confessed: “I was too naïve as I was not a politician. I was too honest in expressing my assessment of the situation, including suggestion for Soeharto’s resignation, without thinking that people might have misunderstood my motives.”<sup>112</sup>

### *The Students’ Impeachment Scenario*

The fluidity of student movements rendered it difficult to identify a single scenario. But unlike the Muslim groups and the military, the students and NGOs generally shared a common distrust of Soeharto and refused to believe that he would ever step down voluntarily. But while most students were generally united against the New Order and were in agreement that an SI MPR had to be held to ask for Soeharto’s accountability, they differed on his successor. Most Muslim student organizations threw their support behind Habibie but their secular and non-Muslim colleagues preferred a reformist non-New Order figure to lead the new Indonesia. Most students and pro-reform activists expected a long and possibly bloody tug-of-war with Soeharto and the military, hence their quick disarray when Soeharto decided to step down only three days after they occupied the DPR/MPR building.

## THE STRUGGLE FOR AN EMERGENCY AUTHORITY

While all the key political figures in Jakarta were busy preparing for life after his departure from power, thousands of kilometres away across the ocean, Soeharto was caught in deep confusion: Which of his generals deserved his trust and confidence? He received regular reports from Habibie and hourly security updates from Wiranto but he was also acutely aware of mounting internal tension within the military. While weighing the options that he had to make, Soeharto received a request for a private audience from Prabowo’s personal messenger, Iwan Abdurrahman, who flew directly from Jakarta to Cairo.<sup>113</sup> Abdurrahman presented Soeharto with a personal letter from his son-in-law in which he suggested the establishment of a *Kopkamtib*-like institution to restore security and order.<sup>114</sup>

According to the proposal discussed among his inner circle, Prabowo suggested to Soeharto to resurrect the old *Kopkamtib* structure, in which the Deputy of ABRI’s Commander-in-Chief (*Wapang*)—a position that had been liquidated in the early 1980s—would concurrently serve as commander of the new body. In this context, Prabowo could become the *Wapang* and the commander of the *Kopkamtib*-like body. Alternatively, Subagyo could become the *Wapang* and Prabowo succeed him as Army Chief. It was likely that Prabowo discussed the proposal with Subagyo and Sjafrie, which later led to an allegation that the two generals, along with *Kopasasus* Commander Muchdi P.R., belonged to “Prabowo’s package”. The fact that Prabowo was very quick to suggest the establishment of the *Kopkamtib*-like institution led to suspicion (as mentioned above) that he might have deliberately planned for it.

Soeharto decided to cut short his trip and left Cairo at noon. During the ten-hour flight home, he spent time reading the UI proposal, which he received from one of his private doctors, who happened to be a University of Indonesia graduate. He appeared to be interested in the proposal and decided to ask Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, who was in his entourage, to arrange a meeting with the UI team on the next day.<sup>115</sup> Soeharto arrived at the Halim Perdana Kusumah Air Force Base in the early morning of 15 May, and was swiftly ushered home through a carefully chosen route so that he would not see the ruins of his capital.

Five hours later, he held a mini cabinet session at his Cendana residence, attended by Habibie, Feisal Tanjung, Hartono, Justice Minister Muladi, Minister of Information Alwi Dahlan, State Secretary Saadillah Mursyid, Head of *Bakin* Moetojib, Wiranto and Attorney-General Soedjono C. Atmonegoro. During the meeting, Soeharto made two key points. First, he corrected public excitement about his readiness to step down, which was triggered by *Kompas*' headline. He repeated his Cairo statement and stressed that he was prepared to step down *only if* the people no longer trusted him.

Then, underlining his first point, Soeharto stated that he would exercise an emergency constitutional authority through the MPR Decree No. 5/1998 to establish a new body similar to that of the *Kopkamtib*, tasked with restoring security and order. But he stressed that Wiranto would not lead the new body as he was already carrying too many duties.<sup>116</sup>

Next, he met the UI delegates led by Professor Budisantoso, who presented him with the proposal he already read. But Budisantoso, who knew nothing about Soeharto's "correction" of his Cairo speech, still thought that Soeharto intended to step down. Thus he added that the UI team extended public calls for the president's resignation and welcomed his willingness to do so. Soeharto showed no anger towards such a "courageous" statement and replied politely that public aspirations "had to be channelled through the Parliament".<sup>117</sup>

Lastly, Soeharto received parliamentary speaker Harmoko and his deputies. The meeting was held as a response to the DPR's formal letter dated 14 May requesting for a consultation in relation with mounting public demand for reforms and the president's resignation. Departing from his infamous "waiting for president's guidance" attitude, Harmoko spoke boldly this time, presenting Soeharto with a bundle of documents received by Parliament from a number of organizations that demanded an SI MPR to be held, the cabinet to be reshuffled and the president to step down.

Responding to Harmoko's last point, Soeharto repeated his version of the Cairo speech, asserting that it was misinterpreted. Then, looking Harmoko in the eye, he asked, "What is the DPR's assessment? Is this a manifestation of a non-confidence towards the president? If this is the DPR's assessment, if this is the assessment of the DPR and its factions, and if it [the assessment] is true, I will step down."

Faced with such a direct challenge from the man to whom he had owed his entire career, Harmoko was numbed for a moment and tried to sidestep it. "Would the resignation issue better be assessed by the MPR factions?" he asked.

Soeharto was unmoved. "No need. Because the DPR is part of the MPR, the DPR and its factions would suffice." Then he continued, with a smile on his face, "I understand that people were worried, that there had been damage. I have to protect the people, to protect people's properties, national assets, to safeguard the unity of the unitary state, *pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution." Still smiling, he told them of what he would do, "First, I will take action. I will exercise the emergency authority of the MPR Decree No. V/1998 and set up a *Kopkamtib* to restore security and order. Second, reforms will continue. I expect the DPR to use its initiative rights [to come up with reform proposal]. And, third, I will reshuffle the cabinet. I have told Tutut to resign from cabinet, although she is qualified for it."

When Deputy Speaker of DPR/MPR Ismail Hasan Metareum raised objection to his intention to establish the *Kopkamtib*-like body and warned of a possible negative international reaction, Soeharto replied that he would think of a new name so that the past image of *Kopkamtib* could be softened. Indeed, he later named it the Operational

Command for National Alertness and Security (KOKKN). As for international objection, he simply said, “Don’t give it a damn (*biarin saja*). This is our own business, not an international issue.” At this point, the DPR leaders were left in confusion on how to address the press waiting outside. After conferring among themselves before the smiling Soeharto, they decided to tell the media that the president would take the necessary actions to restore the situation and to reshuffle the cabinet, and left the issue of resignation unmentioned.<sup>118</sup>

It was clear that at this stage, Soeharto had not had the slightest intention to step down. Instead, he was in full confidence of his control over the military and Parliament, and that he could restore the situation through the KOKKN. He was, however, in doubt about whom to entrust such a crucial authority. Wiranto was clearly not his first choice, perhaps for the official reasons mentioned earlier. But it was likely that Soeharto had doubted Wiranto would take repressive measures required to make the KOKKN effective. Unlike the commando-type generals of the former *Kopkamtib* commanders such as Soemitro, Sudomo and Moerdani, Wiranto projected an image of an indecisive and irresolute officer.<sup>119</sup> But it was also likely that at one point, Soeharto had his doubts of Wiranto’s loyalty and was reluctant to make him too powerful, hence his preference to have someone else to balance his power instead.

In his as-told-to autobiography, Wiranto admitted that he wondered the real reason why Soeharto did not order him to lead the KOKKN. “Was it because if the command was entrusted to me in my position as Defence Minister/ABRI Chief, I would have become too powerful, hence the fear that I could pose a challenge to Pak Harto’s position?” he wrote. In that sense, Wiranto implied that Soeharto might have exercised his “divide and rule” strategy by attempting to split the command over the military. Wiranto must have realized that the person Soeharto would choose to lead the KOKKN would have subdued his own authority as ABRI Chief.

This bitter realization might have prompted Wiranto to distance himself from the beleaguered president. Shortly after the 15 May meeting with Soeharto, Wiranto had his staff draft a policy report to the president. In the report, he warned that if the military had to take repressive measures against anti-government protesters, it would cause heavy casualties, which in turn could stoke wider public anger and intense international pressure. He also reminded the president that the protesters had included nearly all elements of the society, from religious and political leaders to retired military officers—all of them demanding his resignation. Thus Wiranto suggested that any change must proceed peacefully and constitutionally, a clear indication that the ABRI would not resort to the use of violence to quell the protests. In short, the tone of Wiranto’s report was similar to that of the DPR’s.<sup>120</sup>

Nevertheless, the preparation for the 18 May inception of the KOKKN continued. The staff at the State Secretariat office worked on the draft Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) and Department of Defence staff prepared for its structure, which resembled the old *Kopkamtib* structure, as suggested in Prabowo’s proposal.<sup>121</sup> It was possible that Soeharto had once had Prabowo on his mind since his son-in-law’s qualities met the requirement for a KOKKN commander. Bold and brash, Prabowo would have been less hesitant in using military force to handle anti-Soeharto protests. Prabowo’s confidants admitted that he would have seen a possible replay of a Tiananmen Square tragedy in the Monas Square as an inevitable risk to restore security and order.<sup>122</sup> On 20 May, for example, Prabowo assembled 43 Muslim organizations in a plan to send tens of thousands of people to evict students from the Parliament complex by force,

but the plan was dropped because of Soeharto's sudden resignation.<sup>123</sup> But Soeharto's serious candidate for the post turned out to be Army Chief Subagyo H.S., who had been known to be unquestionably loyal to the first family.

However, an incident happened on the night of 16 May that later sealed the fate of the KOKKN. It began with Wiranto's meeting with Abdurrahman Wahid, the ailing revered leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, who remained an influential national figure in spite of his physical condition. A day earlier, the NU issued a statement, signed by its Secretary-General Ahmad Bagdja, calling for Soeharto's resignation. Wahid rejected the statement and called on his NU followers to stop "undermining" Soeharto's authority. Wiranto obviously wanted to clarify the NU's position, and was relieved when Wahid told him, "NU would support ABRI's position. If Pak Wiranto moves to the right direction, we would go to the right direction. If Pak Wiranto goes to the left, we would go to the left." Wiranto then ordered the Assistant for Socio-political Affairs Mardiyanto to draft a statement about the NU's support of the ABRI. Unfortunately, Mardiyanto did so without first presenting the draft statement to Wiranto. Later, Mardiyanto apologized for his carelessness.

On Saturday evening, the ABRI's Information Chief Abdul Wahab Mokodongan held a press conference urging city inhabitants to remain vigilant as riots could still occur. But during the press briefing, some unknown people distributed Mardiyanto's draft statement under the title "ABRI Welcomes the NU's Statement Positively", which could be interpreted that the ABRI endorsed NU's call for Soeharto's resignation. Upon realizing it, Mokodongan alerted Wiranto, who promptly ordered him to contact the media and asked them not to publish the statement, although a few newspapers had already carried it in the morning edition.<sup>124</sup>

The unauthorized draft statement made its way to Prabowo through his friend, Fadli Zon, who obtained it from his media contacts. Prabowo contacted Army Chief Subagyo, who claimed to have known nothing about the statement. Together, they went to see Soeharto, accompanied by Muchdi and law expert Yusril Ihza Mahendra.<sup>125</sup> According to Wiranto, Prabowo alleged that he had betrayed the president<sup>126</sup> and suggested his and Yudhoyono's dismissals.<sup>127</sup> Prabowo had suggested Wiranto's dismissal and his own promotion to ABRI Chief several times in the past to a number of people, including Tutut and Nurcholish Madjid, but none took action to pass it on to Soeharto.<sup>128</sup>

But this time Soeharto was clearly disturbed and spent the rest of the night smoking cigars incessantly, as rumours were flying that Wiranto and the military would launch a coup.<sup>129</sup> On the other hand, rumours that some generals, including Wiranto and Yudhoyono, would be arrested to prevent them from launching a coup had forced the generals to evacuate their families.<sup>130</sup> At long last, Soeharto asked his son Bambang Trihatmodjo to find out Wiranto's true position.<sup>131</sup> Trihatmodjo called Wiranto's confidant, Indra Bambang Utoyo, son of former Army Chief Bambang Utoyo, who later urged Wiranto to clarify his position.<sup>132</sup>

Wiranto arrived at Cendana in the early morning of 17 May and offered to tender his resignation if the president had lost faith in him. To his immense relief, however, Soeharto accepted his explanation and ordered him to stay on. Shortly after leaving Soeharto, Wiranto summoned Prabowo, Subagyo and Sjamsoeddin for a meeting. He lashed out at Prabowo for his "unacceptable behaviour", to which Prabowo apologized. Strangely, Wiranto stopped short of taking decisive action against Prabowo's obvious insubordination.<sup>133</sup>

Nevertheless, Soeharto's lack of confidence in Prabowo was a turning point for

Wiranto and helped him to secure the upper hand against Prabowo. While Prabowo had clearly lost the battle to win Soeharto's favour, Wiranto also used the "ABRI statement episode" to show Subagyo and Sjamsoeddin that he was very much in charge. The Sunday morning meeting with Wiranto must have had an impact on Subagyo because, when Soeharto summoned him later for a tête-à-tête meeting and offered him the post of KOKKN commander, he politely turned it down.

According to Subagyo, he asked first if Soeharto would separate the post of Minister of Defence and ABRI Chief as a consequence of the inception of KOKKN. Soeharto replied no. At this point, Subagyo declined the offer politely, arguing that the security situation had improved and suggested that the inception of the KOKKN be postponed until 20 May to anticipate the students' plan for a long march to the Palace. In truth, Subagyo admitted that he would have accepted the offer if Soeharto separated the Defence Minister and ABRI Commander posts, which could have paved his way to become ABRI Commander.

In fact, Subagyo had cancelled a plan to install Suaidi Marasabessy as Commander of the Wirabuana Regional Military Command in Sulawesi on 18 May to prepare for his own installation ceremony as the KOKKN commander. Subagyo realized that without the separation, he would have faced a head-on collision with Wiranto as there would have been overlapping and conflicting authorities between the ABRI Chief and the KOKKN commander. Moreover, he would have risked his own credibility since the KOKKN would have been rejected domestically and internationally. Due to Subagyo's refusal, Soeharto then ordered his aide to cancel the installation ceremony, effectively killing the KOKKN even before it was born.<sup>134</sup>

Despite the cancellation, Soeharto went on to prepare for the Inpres No. 16/1998 on the inception of KOKKN, which could have become the revised versions of *Supersemar* and *Kopkamtib*, as scheduled on 18 May. Soeharto delegated extraordinary authority to the holder of the *Inpres* and the commander of the KOKKN: (a) to determine policies at national level in order to handle current as well as future crisis; (b) to take measures to swiftly prevent and eliminate the causes of or actions that cause disturbances on security and order; and (c) that all ministers and head of governmental institutions both at the centre and in the regions shall help the implementation of the duties and functions of the KOKKN. To that end, Soeharto chose Wiranto as the commander of the KOKKN with Subagyo as his deputy.<sup>135</sup> Wiranto, however, would not see the *Inpres* until the eventful evening of 20 May, when Soeharto was about to leave his presidency.

## THE CURTAIN

The failure to establish the KOKKN over the weekend had somewhat brought Soeharto the bitter realization that he could no longer rely fully on the military and therefore was no longer in control of the situation, which eventually forced him to consider an alternative solution for a graceful exit. When the new week dawned, he began to work seriously on the reform and exit proposals. On Monday, he approved Saadilah Mursyid's suggestion to meet with Nurcholish Madjid, who had announced his *husn-u'l khatimah* proposal the day before, and agreed to receive the soft-spoken scholar in the evening.

Incidentally, before meeting Madjid, Soeharto received the head of *Bakin* Moetojib, who presented him with *Bakin*'s official response towards calls for the president's resignation, which he and his staff had drafted after meeting a number of public figures, including Madjid. The *Bakin*'s proposal was similar to the Cilangkap's graceful exit scenario as it also drew heavily from Madjid's *husn-u'l khatimah* proposal. Soeharto

basically accepted Moetojib's proposal, which included the suggestion that he would announce his willingness to step down after presiding over the reforms.<sup>136</sup>

So when Madjid came with his proposal, Soeharto was fully prepared. In a relaxed and easy conversation, Madjid told the president that for the people, the word "*reformasi*" simply meant his immediate resignation. Soeharto took Madjid's words light-heartedly, and told him what he had just told Moetojib. He would reshuffle the cabinet, set up a Reform Committee to supervise the entire reform process, then hold fresh elections in 2000 at the latest, after which he would step down. He then proposed a meeting with several national figures to present his reform proposal the next day.<sup>137</sup>

But Soeharto's concessions came too late because students had begun to march into the Parliament complex from Monday afternoon and tens of thousands more joined them the following day. Over the weekend, while Soeharto was busy working on the abortive KOKKN plan, the students were also preparing their political surprise for him. Disillusioned with Soeharto's earlier statement that he would carry out reform in 2002, the students decided that the only way to force him to step down was to launch a Tiananmen-like civil disobedience protest. They threatened to occupy the building until Soeharto agreed to step down.

The question was: How did they enter the Parliament building unhindered?

The students claimed that they simply managed to outwit the security authorities. While security was stepped up in anticipation of the 20 May long march to the Palace, they failed to anticipate that the students actually planned to occupy the Parliament two days ahead of the widely published date.<sup>138</sup>

An objective assessment, however, demonstrated that such a claim lacked supporting evidence. The military could have prevented the students from entering the Parliament complex or evacuating them by force had they intended to do so. The truth was that both the parliamentary leaders and generals had decided to allow the students to enter the building, for different reasons.

The parliamentary leaders had decided that the students could play the "powerful pressure group" role to further their ends. Ever since the DPR failed to persuade Soeharto to call off his decision to raise fuel prices in early May, the five parliamentary leaders have held a series of internal meetings to discuss the DPR's response towards mounting a popular call for Soeharto's resignation. While Harmoko was initially reluctant to move bolder against Soeharto, deputy speaker Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid took the initiative to engage other deputies and faction leaders, including the head of the powerful Golkar faction, Irsyad Sudiro, and steer Parliament away from the regime. But he did so without prior consultation with Wiranto and the ABRI headquarters. The head of ABRI's faction in the DPR, Major-General Hari Sabarno, and the head of the DPR's Commission II, Brigadier-General Budi Harsono, were left entirely in the dark about Hamid's political moves.<sup>139</sup> Hamid confessed that he distrusted Wiranto and considered him too close to Soeharto to even consider a move against him.

On Monday morning, a few hours before the students began marching into the Parliament complex, Hamid received a few student representatives at Harmoko's request, who informed him that they had planned to occupy the building and demanded that the DPR support them. Harmoko was initially reluctant to comply with their demand but Hamid convinced him that the students could serve as the pressure power. Later in the afternoon, when thousands of students had already inundated the Parliament's ground, Hamid told them that they could occupy it to add to the political pressure "while we play in the Parliament". He even asked the DPR's Secretary-General Afif Ma'roef to give the students the keys that later enabled them to climb onto the building's top

roof but demanded that they should behave themselves so as not to discredit their own cause.<sup>140</sup> Ma'roef then wrote a formal request to the military, asking them to let the students enter the Parliament complex.<sup>141</sup>

Meanwhile, the five parliamentary leaders had actually agreed on a common stance over Soeharto's resignation. But since Soeharto had said that he would step down only if the DPR and faction heads agreed on his resignation, the DPR leaders needed to seek the support of the faction leaders first. On Monday morning, when the students and opposition leaders began to arrive, the DPR leaders held individual consultation with the faction heads. Through intensive lobbying, all the faction heads agreed informally to endorse the parliamentary leaders' stance, except the military faction.<sup>142</sup> Hamid then met with Hari Sabarno and members of F-ABRI to inform them of his position. "This is my personal decision. If you think it's right, follow me. If you don't, I'll take it as my personal risk," he told them.

Hamid's position reflected the classical dilemma in the relationship between the military and the president. Hamid insisted that he follow the example set by the ABRI's revered grand commander, General Sudirman, when he decided to defy President Soekarno's order to surrender to the Dutch colonial government in 1946 and chose instead to launch a guerrilla war and maintained the armed struggle for independence.<sup>143</sup> Hamid also revived the theme of the Seskoad Paper, which was derived largely from Sudirman's principle that the military's loyalty lay with the nation, not the government of the day (see Chapter 1). He even went on to argue that Soeharto took exactly the same stance when he challenged Soekarno in 1966. So Hamid concluded that it was the military's true call to side with the people, not to defend the president blindly.<sup>144</sup>

His comrades, however, disagreed. According to Budi Harsono, who recalled the debate within the F-ABRI over Hamid's individual decision, most of his colleagues regarded the move as deliberate insubordination because, as a serving officer, Hamid was duty bound to follow his superior's orders. Moreover, the F-ABRI was the political arm of the headquarters. While agreeing with Hamid's argument that the ABRI should take the side of the people, Harsono argued that it was in no position to call for the president's resignation as it could be interpreted that the military planned to subvert the legitimate government. In line with Wiranto's official position, Harsono insisted that the military should maintain a neutral stance, while at the same time ensuring that any change must proceed constitutionally.<sup>145</sup> Thus, when given the last turn for consultation by the DPR leaders, Hari Sabarno refused to endorse their position although he could "understand" it.

Despite the F-ABRI's reservation, the DPR leaders decided to call for Soeharto's resignation officially and spent hours composing the three-paragraph statement carefully. As the decision had not yet been consulted formally with the faction heads, they decided to issue it in their individual capacity. There was an emotional moment when they realized the possible political consequences of their moves that the five DPR leaders decided to perform a prayer collectively, asking for God's blessing and protection.

Then came the historic moment when Harmoko, the man who had served Soeharto faithfully for nearly two decades, called for the president's resignation, "In the light of the present situation, the DPR leadership, both the chairman and his deputies, appeal to the president, that for the sake of the unity of the unitary nation, to step down in a learned and wise manner."<sup>146</sup>

Shortly after the press conference, Hamid called Yudhoyono and Wiranto to explain his individual decision and that he would take any consequences that might arise from it. Wiranto listened to Hamid's explanation without comment.<sup>147</sup> But just as he failed to take

action against Prabowo's insubordination, Wiranto let Hamid's dissent go unpunished. However, after meeting Soeharto for consultation, he reasserted the argument made by Sabarno and members of the F-ABRI that the military affirmed its institutional loyalty to the legitimate president and endorsed his decision to reshuffle the cabinet, carry out reforms and resolve the crisis. In a press conference held four and a half hours after Harmoko's statement, Wiranto disappointed the already excited public when he said that the statement was taken on an individual basis although it was issued collectively and therefore carried no legal consequences.<sup>148</sup>

In spite of his public position to maintain institutional loyalty to the legitimate president, Wiranto moved quietly to take the side of the students. On the following day, he decided to heed Zacky Makarim's suggestion to confine the protests in the Parliament complex where the students could vent out their anger to avoid a wider security disturbance.<sup>149</sup> He then ordered Sjamsoeddin to let the students march into the Parliament complex unhindered and provided them with transportation, which the students declined.<sup>150</sup>

It appeared that a similar order was issued to the regional commanders, as there had been no major incident when students in other provinces followed the example of their Jakarta colleagues and marched into local parliaments. The Commander of the Wirabuana Regional Army Command, Suaidi Marasabessy, even let students in Makassar ride the army's armoured vehicles to enter the local parliament building, which clearly symbolized the military's support for the students' cause.<sup>151</sup> The decision angered Soeharto and his children, who later demanded that the military vacate the Parliament complex by force. One day after his resignation, Soeharto summoned Sjamsoeddin, whom his family had "adopted" as a surrogate son, and demanded for an explanation for his decision to permit the students to enter the Parliament complex. Sjamsoeddin explained that he only carried out Wiranto's order, to which Soeharto accepted without further question.<sup>152</sup>

Now that the students have occupied the "house of the people", the pressure on Soeharto reached its climax. The president, however, still fought to maintain his control of the situation. In a meeting with nine national figures he invited to the Palace on Tuesday morning, Soeharto repeated the commitment he gave to Madjid and Moetojib the previous night. But, surprisingly, he raised concerns about his vice-president. "Now if I heed the call for my resignation constitutionally, then I have to transfer power constitutionally to the vice-president. But would it really solve the problem? Would it not lead to a situation where the vice-president would be forced to step down too?" he asked. Bearing that concern in mind, Soeharto offered to stick to Madjid's *husn-u'l khatimah* and the ABRI's proposals, whereby he would exercise his constitutional rights to lead the reforms and after that step down. Soeharto also announced that he would reshuffle the cabinet and establish the Reform Committee on 21 May.<sup>153</sup>

As expected, Soeharto's belated concessions were met with cold reaction from Parliament and anger from the students. Just as Soeharto held the meeting in the Palace, Harmoko, who had just survived the wrath of his fellow party functionaries for his betrayal of Soeharto the previous night, chaired a formal consultation with the faction heads. Some of them had been wrongly tipped off that Soeharto would announce his resignation during the Palace meeting. Soeharto's determination to carry on with his reform plan made them realize that they had now reached the point of no return, in which an open confrontation with the president was imminent, hence their decision to reaffirm support for the DPR leaders' earlier statement. Surprisingly, the F-ABRI agreed now to sign the official statement, which read, "With regards to popular call for

the president's resignation, all factions are in full understanding and agreement that it should proceed constitutionally."

The DPR leaders agreed that if Soeharto failed to respond to the two DPR's formal letters requesting for another consultation by Friday, 22 May, they would, in their capacity as MPR leaders, invite MPR faction heads on 25 May to prepare for an SI MPR. But they also prepared for a parliamentary plenary session on 22 May, so if Soeharto agreed to step down, the swearing-in ceremony for the new president could be performed before Parliament, as required by MPR Decree No. VII/1973. Meanwhile, the students and pro-reform leaders concluded that Soeharto's concession was simply a tactic to buy time to save his presidency, and decided to carry on with their plan to launch a long march to the Palace.

The long-march plan presented Wiranto with a delicate security dilemma. On the one hand, the military was bound by constitutional duty to ensure the physical safety of the president, vice-president, the ministers and their families. But as the "people's army", it was bound by historical duty to defend the people, as Hamid had argued. Moreover, Wiranto and his generals were acutely aware of the possible domestic and international condemnation if they tried to foil the plan by force. Calls had been pouring in from representatives of a number of Western governments, seeking assurances that the military would not resort to the Tiananmen-type of action in handling the students' protests.<sup>154</sup> A few of his generals, including the commander of the elite presidential guard units (*Danpaspampres*), Major-General Endriartono Sutarto, had expressed their objection to use violence to disperse the students. In a private conversation with Wiranto, Sutarto offered to tender his resignation if he was asked to carry out his duty by force.<sup>155</sup>

Wiranto decided to devise a two-track strategy to resolve the dilemma. Publicly, he issued a statement calling for the cancellation of the plan, and pointed out to the fact that another security disturbance would only cause suffering to the already distressed people. He then ordered the display of fully armed troops and armoured vehicles in combat position along Jakarta's main streets and around the heavily guarded Palace and the Soeharto family's private residences. The display of the troops in combat gear was intended to force the students and pro-reform figures to cancel their plan. A contingency plan, however, was devised to allow unarmed soldiers to escort the students to the Palace peacefully should they insist on carrying out with their plan.<sup>156</sup>

At the same time, he approved Prabowo's suggestion to use his extensive contacts with opposition leaders to persuade Amien Rais to abort the plan. After meeting Prabowo and having witnessed the heavy security on display, Rais was convinced that the military would not hesitate to quell the long march by force. Moreover, he had received a stern warning from Prabowo's deputy, Kivlan Zen, who had threatened to arrest him if he continued with his plan.<sup>157</sup> A few hours before the planned march, Rais appeared on television and called it off. However, students and the mass long march continued in a number of large cities, including Jogjakarta, where Sultan Hamengkubuwono X addressed nearly half a million people and called for the Indonesian people to "support reform movement and to strengthen national leadership that takes the side of the people". The Javanese monarch quoted an ancient Javanese adage "*sing salah seleh*", or "those who wronged, would abdicate", a clear call for Soeharto's resignation.

Despite Wiranto's success in preventing a possible bloodbath, Soeharto's fall was almost unstoppable. While a violent student revolt had been avoided, another "rebellion" was quietly taking place. Since Tuesday, Mursyid and the president's legal adviser, constitutional law expert Professor Yusril Ihza Mahendra, had been working to prepare

the legal drafts of the presidential decrees, the structures of the Reform Committee and, most importantly, to get people to join the two institutions. Unfortunately, most pro-reform figures invited to join the Reform Cabinet and the Reform Committee to give the institutions credible face, including Madjid, Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Rais and other pro-reform figures around him, declined the invitation. It was reported that Rais was recommended to lead the Reform Committee, which could have paved the way for him to become the president if it was formed, but he saw it as Soeharto's trap to discredit his cause and decided to decline it.<sup>158</sup> Out of the 45 people invited to join the Reform Committee, only three accepted.<sup>159</sup>

But the "rebellion" climaxed on Wednesday evening, when all ministers under the compartment of Coordinating Minister of Economics, Finance and Industry Ginandjar Kartasasmita, except Bob Hasan and Fuad Bawazier, decided to decline the invitation to join the reshuffled cabinet. Kartasasmita called for an emergency meeting at his National Development Planning Board (*Bappenas*) office to discuss the worsening economic situation, which has forced the Central Bank to come to a near halt. Consequently, it led to a gloomy prediction that the economy would last less than one week unless a drastic political decision was quickly made.

After a heated debate, the 14 ministers agreed to draft a letter explaining their collective decision to decline the invitation to join the reshuffled cabinet. They cited two reasons for their decision: (a) the reshuffled Reform Cabinet would not resolve the crisis but create more serious problems; and (b) an unfinished political solution would lead to greater casualties and impede peaceful reforms through constitutional means.<sup>160</sup> While the economic situation was indeed very grave, just like Harmoko, Kartasasmita, who was sidelined due to his alleged involvement in the Radisson Hotel Affair discussed in Chapter I, also had a personal reason to move boldly against Soeharto.

Kartasasmita then invited the other three Coordinating Ministers, Feisal Tanjung, Hartarto and Haryono Suyono, for consultation at the *Bappenas* before finalizing the draft letter. In their previous meeting with Soeharto, the four Coordinating Ministers had suggested that the president dismiss his cabinet, not reshuffle it, arguing that a reshuffled cabinet would not resolve the crisis. But Soeharto turned down their suggestion.<sup>161</sup> Kartasasmita also called former Vice-President Sudharmono, Wiranto, Tutut and Habibie to inform them of the ministers' decision. Sudharmono expressed his objection, Wiranto said that he could "understand" it, while Tutut said that she had no options but to "accept it with profound sadness".<sup>162</sup>

But the crucial question was: Who would deliver the letter to Soeharto?

After some internal debate, the ministers agreed to ask Habibie to deliver the letter and explain its rationale to Soeharto. But here came the intriguing part about Habibie's roles in Soeharto's fall. Until the eventful day on 19 May when Soeharto openly expressed doubts about his ability to resolve the crisis if he ascended to presidency, Habibie had hardly played any active part in the entire process. He remained publicly quiet, perhaps safe in the knowledge that no matter what happened, he would, as Prabowo had told him, eventually become the constitutional successor to Soeharto.

But Soeharto's disparaging remarks about him had somewhat forced Habibie to rethink his position. According to Z.A. Maulani, Habibie's military adviser, the remarks appeared to confirm deep-seated suspicion among Habibie's supporters that despite Soeharto's decision to appoint him vice-president, the president had never actually planned to make Habibie his successor. Maulani pointed out to Soeharto's speech before the March 1998 SU MPR, during which Soeharto firmly said that "by God's

will, five years from now, I will stand before this forum to present the accountability of my leadership to the representatives of Indonesian people”<sup>163</sup>

Habibie might have had that thought in his mind when he met Soeharto on Tuesday night, a few hours after those shocking remarks were delivered. The meeting was tense as Habibie decided to belittle the significance of Soeharto's meeting with the nine public figures. He criticized it as strengthening Soeharto's perceived favouritism towards the Muslims as he had invited Muslim figures only, showing Soeharto the KAMMI's press release protesting the Muslim figures' presence in the meeting. More importantly, he protested Soeharto's remarks about his ability, which he called “an insult to the vice-presidential institution”. At last, Soeharto asked Habibie, “What do you think of [the way out]?” Habibie's reply was blunt. “I think, Pak, it would be better if you step down, but you decide when and how, rather than somebody else makes that decision for you.”<sup>164</sup> Habibie also presented his hand-written assessment of the situation, which in essence suggested the president to step down.<sup>165</sup>

It was clear that at this point that the strong bonds between the guru and his disciple who had known each other for nearly half a century broke irreparably. Habibie decided to draw a distance from the man whom he once called “Super Genius Soeharto”, which partly explained his active support for Kartasasmita's moves the following day. It was reported that not only was he in constant calls with Harmoko, Kartasasmita, Rais, Prabowo and other anti-Soeharto figures, Habibie also hosted meetings with them at his residence.<sup>166</sup> Soeharto was obviously aware of his vice-president's political activities behind his back and was convinced that Habibie, along with his son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, had worked closely with Rais and other government oppositionists to undermine his leadership.<sup>167</sup> Long after his resignation, Soeharto could not bring himself to forgive both Habibie and Prabowo and refused to meet them, despite their repeated attempts at reconciliation.<sup>168</sup>

The tension between the president and the vice-president culminated on Wednesday evening, 20 May, when Habibie agreed to bring the 14 ministers' letter for an audience with Soeharto at around 9.00 p.m. Again, the meeting went tensely. As soon as Habibie sat down, Soeharto showed him the composition of the Reform Cabinet, which he had been working on with the help of Mursyid and Mahendra. Soeharto asked for Habibie's input for some key posts, including Ministers of Finance and Education, to which he approved. Finally, Soeharto told Habibie of his plan. He would announce the line-ups for the Reform Cabinet on Thursday. On Friday, he would install the new cabinet. Then, on Saturday, he would invite the DPR leaders to the Mardeka Palace, during which he would announce his resignation.

At this point, Habibie interjected. He protested that if it were Soeharto's plan, it would only mean that as the new president, he would preside over a cabinet that he did not pick and install. In other words, he would become a “puppet Commander-in-Chief”, leading a troop he barely knew. But Soeharto's reply shocked him, “Later, you could pick your own cabinet.” Habibie was taken aback. “Pak, when would I become president then?” Soeharto's reply was a total shock. “It depends on the situation. It could be today, Monday or one week later, or even a month from now”. In other words, Soeharto agreed to step down, but on his own terms and at the time he chose, which meant that Habibie might not automatically succeed him.

The conversation lasted for nearly half an hour. The shocked Habibie then went home without delivering the 14 ministers' letter. He asked his aide to call the four Coordinating Ministers and some of the 14 ministers to meet at his Patra Kuningan

residence and briefed them of what has just happened. In a heated discussion that lasted until around 11.00 p.m., they finally agreed that Soeharto could announce the line-ups of the Reform Cabinet, but Habibie had to install the ministers, therefore they would pledge their allegiance to him. Habibie then called Mursyid to request for another audience with Soeharto but Mursyid told him calmly, "Pak, everything has changed. At around 9.50 p.m., Pak Harto called me and asked me to inform you that your presence is required tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m. at the Merdeka Palace. Pak Harto will step down".<sup>169</sup> When Habibie passed on the news, the attendees of the meeting all broke into jubilant applause.

Now, what had happened between 9.30 p.m., when Habibie left Soeharto, who still insisted on announcing his resignation on Saturday at the earliest, and 9.50 p.m., when he suddenly decided to resign on Thursday?

A significant development happened at around 9.00 p.m. when the American news station CNN carried a breaking news in which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for Soeharto to provide for reforms, a subtle demand for his immediate resignation. But given the tense atmosphere in Cendana, it was likely that only a few people paid attention to the news, shocking as it was. So, the key factor that had changed Soeharto's decision must have come from his own inner circle.

Soeharto had not yet received the 14 ministers' letter because Habibie had failed to deliver it to him. But Akbar Tanjung, who was one of the signatories of the letter, made a copy of the letter and gave it to Mahendra at around 6.00 p.m., when the latter was discussing the problems concerning the establishment of the Reform Cabinet and Reform Committee with Mursyid. Mahendra passed the letter to Mursyid, who scanned it with shaky hands. According to Mahendra, Mursyid showed the letter to Soeharto, who told him spontaneously, "Very well, I will resign".<sup>170</sup> Other version, however, claimed that Mursyid did not break the news to Soeharto because the president was preoccupied with consecutive meetings he had with three former vice-presidents and Habibie.<sup>171</sup> When he finally managed to see the president in private, Mursyid broke the news without showing the letter for fear that it would upset the already distressed president. Mursyid also told the president that they had failed to form the Reform Committee.<sup>172</sup>

However, it was likely that Soeharto had learned about the 14 ministers' refusal to join his reshuffled cabinet through Tutut, who hardly left his side during those hard days, and Sudharmono, who paid him a visit with Umar Wirahadikusumah and Try Sutrisno, before Habibie came. During the meeting, the former vice-presidents politely appealed to Soeharto to step down at his own terms.<sup>173</sup> Later, Kartasmita sent his personal aide, K. Inugroho, to deliver the letter by hand to the president's adjutant. And yet, Soeharto did not mention any intention to step down on Thursday when he met Habibie. The question is: Who and what made him change his mind?

The answer is Wiranto. There was an unregistered meeting that night at Cendana, a very crucial one. Shortly after Habibie left, Soeharto received Wiranto, Subagyo and Commander of the Presidential Guard Sutarto for an urgent meeting at Wiranto's request. Earlier, Wiranto was presiding over a discussion with a number of civilian experts at the Department of Defence office over the graceful exit scenario, when Sutarto went to see him urgently, bringing information about the 14 ministers' decision. In a quick conversation while Wiranto was nipping in the restroom, Sutarto urged his commander to take a decisive action to prevent a chaotic situation, for he predicted that the 14 ministers' refusal to join the Reform Cabinet would lead to a political and, subsequently, security crisis. Wiranto agreed and called Subagyo, asking him to join them in Cendana.<sup>174</sup>

They met the tear-stained Titiek Soeharto, who then ushered them to Soeharto's private study, a small ante-room leading up to his bedroom furnished only with one writing desk and a chair. Soeharto sat on the chair, the three generals on the carpeted floor.<sup>175</sup> Wiranto began by briefing the president over the 14 ministers' decision and its possible impact on the security situation, which he described as extremely grave. Then, with an utmost Javanese politeness, he suggested if the president would consider taking the best decision for the sake of the entire nation—to step down voluntarily. Soeharto did not reply but walked to his desk and took out two letters: the Inpres No. 16/1998 dated 18 May.

Soeharto told them that he had always been willing to step down but he was doubtful that Habibie's rise to the presidency would indeed resolve the crisis. "Pak Wiranto knew, Pak Bagyo knew and the *Danpaspampres* knew, how difficult it was to make him vice-president. But since the ABRI has asked me to step down, very well. I was only wondering if this [his resignation] would resolve the problems," he told them matter-of-factly. Then he signed the letters and gave one copy each to Wiranto and Subagyo. "Whether you will use this letter [of authority] or not is up to you."<sup>176</sup> At this point, Wiranto tried to explain the risk that the nation would face if the military had to use force, citing Soeharto's repeated statements that he would never resort to the use of violence to defend his presidency. Finally, Soeharto said, "Very well, I will step down tomorrow."<sup>177</sup> Wiranto then took out a piece of paper, in which he scribbled details of a "security guarantee" for the president and his family after his resignation, which would become the controversial part of the ABRI's official statement.

It was clear that Wiranto's tactical move of withdrawing political support while at the same time pledging the military's security guarantee played an instrumental, if not the most crucial, role in persuading Soeharto to step down immediately. Internally, however, Wiranto's decision to turn down the Inpres No. 16/1998 was met with mixed reaction from Soeharto's family and supporters, as shown by Hartono's statement quoted in the beginning of this chapter, hence Wiranto's reluctance to disclose the secret meeting until five years later.

Meanwhile, Wiranto went straight to the Department of Defence office and assembled his top generals, briefing them of what had just happened. Responding to Yudhoyono's query if he would use the extraordinary authority that he had just held, Wiranto explained his rationale (the essence of which was quoted in the beginning of this chapter) to turn it down. Throughout the night, they drafted the ABRI's five-point official statement, which included an endorsement for Vice-President B.J. Habibie as the constitutional successor and a security guarantee for former President Soeharto and his family. Earlier, Professor Al-Rasyid had suggested that the ABRI should issue a statement endorsing the transfer of power to allay public suspicion that the military was against it.<sup>178</sup>

The fourth point of the statement, which read, "In full respect of our good values, ABRI will safeguard the dignity and safety of former presidents, including Bapak Soeharto and his family", was drafted after Wiranto held an extensive consultation with former State Secretary Moerdiono and Hari Sabarno. Moerdiono suggested the words "former presidents, including Bapak Soeharto" to avoid allegation that the security guarantee was devised exclusively for Soeharto and his family.<sup>179</sup>

Meanwhile, at Cendana, Soeharto summoned Mursyid and asked him to prepare for the draft resignation statement. Shortly after midnight, Mursyid assembled his team, including Mahendra and Bambang Kesowo, to work on the draft, while at the same

time making urgent telephone calls to Harmoko and the chairman of the Supreme Court (MA), Sarwata. Soeharto, dictated some crucial points, which included his resolution that the transfer of power would take place at the Merdeka Palace, not the occupied Parliament complex.

Soeharto's requirements presented Mursyid and Mahendra with legal and constitutional problems. First, according to Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, the president is the holder of the MPR's mandate. Thus he had to return the mandate to the MPR first, should he abdicate. Second, according to MPR Decree No VII/1973, the installation of the new president must be performed before the parliament plenary session unless an emergency situation prevents it, under which the swearing-in ceremony could be held before Supreme Court judges.

After some exhausting debate as the night wore on, they agreed on the graceful exit principles: Soeharto would declare that he had decided to discontinue his service as president, a voluntary resignation. Thus, in accordance with Article 8, he could do it anytime, anywhere, and without having to declare it before the Extraordinary Session of the MPR. The installation of the new president could be performed before Supreme Court judges, since the students were occupying the Parliament building, making it impossible to hold a proper plenary session. Mursyid called Supreme Court Chairman Sarwata to seek an assurance that the process was constitutional and the latter confirmed it. When the new day dawned, the red-eyed and exhausted team finished the three-page resignation draft and presented it to Soeharto, who made some minor corrections before he finally signed the historic document that would end his presidency.<sup>180</sup>

Meanwhile, news of Soeharto's resignation spread at the speed of light to the jubilant Jakarta political community. Mahendra broke the news to Rais, who immediately told the press, indicating that "a new era" may break soon, without making clear reference to Soeharto's resignation for fear that he would change his mind at the last minute. In Habibie's camp, his advisers urged him to persuade Soeharto to perform the transfer of power before the parliamentary session to ensure the constitutionality of the process and his legitimacy as the new president. Habibie, however, turned down the suggestion for he had no wish whatsoever to humiliate Soeharto.<sup>181</sup>

On the quiet morning of 21 May, while most Indonesians were enjoying the Ascension Day public holiday at home, the country's top political leaders were in serious conferences to discuss the constitutionality of the transfer of power. While Soeharto calmly asked his tearful children to accept his decision with dignity and Habibie was preparing for the job he had not anticipated would come so soon, the DPR leaders and Supreme Court judges held separate meetings. Harmoko briefed his colleagues on what had happened and the constitutional issues regarding Soeharto's sudden decision to step down. He was concerned about the legality and constitutionality of the transfer of power but agreed to discuss it with Sarwata. At the same time, the Supreme Court judges conferred and concluded that the installation of the new president before the judges was constitutional, as it was conducted to avoid a power vacuum.<sup>182</sup>

When the DPR leaders met with Habibie and the Supreme Court judges at the Merdeka Palace, Harmoko brought up the issue to them. Sarwata explained that the judges have concluded that the process was constitutional. The DPR Chairman, the vice-president and the Supreme Court Chairman reached an agreement on the constitutionality of the transfer of power, which Mursyid then passed on to Soeharto.<sup>183</sup> Unfortunately, the public hardly learned about this agreement, hence the endless controversy about Habibie's legitimacy as president.

As the time drew near, the parliamentary leaders were ushered into the Jepara Room where Soeharto was waiting. The impassive looking president shook hands with them quietly, before extending his hands in a gesture of invitation to Harmoko to speak. In a low voice, Harmoko explained that they came to present the decision made by the DPR the day before. But before Harmoko presented the letter, Soeharto stopped him and addressed them formally, "I will exercise the Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution and I decided to discontinue my service as the president." Finally, in an expression of refined Javanese disgust and anger towards the people whom he had once trusted but now betrayed him, Soeharto stood up and stopped them from following suit, saying, "Please stay here, I will announce it to the Indonesian people."

From the quiet room, the embarrassed DPR leaders could hear Soeharto read out the statement, which included the historic words, "I declare my decision to discontinue my service as president of the Republic of Indonesia effective from the moment I read the statement on this day, Thursday, 21 May 1998." Shortly after that, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie was sworn in and gave his solemn oath as Indonesia's third president before the Supreme Court judges, "In the name of God, I give my solemn oath that I will fulfil my duty as the president of the Republic of Indonesia with the best of my ability."<sup>184</sup> A few minutes later, Wiranto seized the microphone and announced the ABRI's official statement. The entire process was broadcast live to shocked Indonesian and international audiences alike. On that historic moment, Thursday, 21 May 1998, at 09.05 a.m., the curtain fell on the New Order's stage and Soeharto's 32 years of rule came to an inglorious yet peaceful end.

## THE AFTERMATH

As the "new era" dawned, military factionalism that has so far been confined within the heavily guarded Cendana and Merdeka Palace walls began to emerge. One day after Soeharto stepped down, on Friday afternoon, Wiranto relieved Prabowo of his job as *Kostrad* Commander and replaced him with Major-General Johny Lumintang. But 17 hours later, under pressure from the Muslim lobby around Habibie, he was forced to replace Lumintang with Commander of the West Java Regional Military Command, Major-General Djamari Chaniago. The incident also served to illustrate the changing civilian-military relations after the fall of Soeharto and the rejuvenation of political Islam in Indonesian polity now that the chairman of the ICMI had risen to the helm of the nation (which will be discussed in the next chapter).

Prabowo's fall from grace came as a result of the newfound Habibie-Wiranto "marriage of convenience" struck out of mutual political needs. Prior to Soeharto's fall, Habibie and Prabowo shared common political interests and a certain ideal for political Islam. But after the fall, Habibie and Wiranto found that it was in their common interest to contain Prabowo's perceived threat and together they moved to sideline him. While Wiranto's position vis-à-vis Prabowo was understandably clear, Habibie's sudden change of attitude against his former political ally arose out of personal distrust and an exaggerated perception of threat.

It started with information received by the newly installed president that Prabowo had planned for a "military coup" against his government. Later, in a number of interviews with the foreign media, Habibie described the grave situation that he had to face only a few hours after he was sworn in due to "a suspicious concentration of Prabowo's troops" around his private Patra Kuningan residence. As a security precaution, Habibie's military adviser Lieutenant-General (retd.) Sintong Panjaitan, who was said to have

spotted the troops, evacuated the president's family to the Palace complex. Habibie, however, gave conflicting versions of his source of information. On one occasion, he mentioned that it was Panjaitan; on the other, it was Wiranto.<sup>185</sup>

But in public statements, Wiranto and Subagyo denied categorically that such an attempt at a military coup ever happened, clearly to ensure the ABRI's clean track record of allegiance to the 1945 Constitution.<sup>186</sup> A historical reconstruction of the event indicates that Prabowo had never attempted a coup but did continue to jockey for control of the military and to sideline Wiranto after Habibie had become president.

As soon as he learned of Soeharto's decision to step down on Thursday, Prabowo aborted the plan to send Muslim militias to evict the students by force from the Parliament complex. He changed tack and collected signatures of 330 *ulamas* from East Java, who had come to support Prabowo's earlier plan to take over the Parliament complex, to support Habibie instead. Early next morning, before the swearing-in ceremony, he tried to meet Habibie but failed. He tried again in the afternoon but to no avail either. He finally managed to see the new president in the evening. Before departing for Habibie's residence in Patra Kuningan, Prabowo asked his civilian and military advisers to draft a cabinet line-up, in which they proposed that the Minister of Defence and ABRI Chief posts be separated and held by Wiranto and Subagyo respectively, with Prabowo as the Army Chief.<sup>187</sup> Prabowo also sent Kivlan Zen to meet the revered General (ret.) Abdul Harris Nasution, who agreed to write a personal letter to Habibie and endorse Prabowo's proposal.

But the meeting went tensely as Habibie had already received reports about Prabowo's "attempt at a coup". Prabowo, on the other hand, seemed to have forgotten that he was now addressing the president of Republic of Indonesia, as he continued to use his usual harsh style when he presented his cabinet line-up proposal. At one point, Habibie became extremely agitated at Prabowo's attitude that his personal aide, Colonel Tubagus Hasanuddin, took an initiative to pretend making a call to Wiranto. Unwilling to encounter a confrontation with Wiranto, Prabowo left through the kitchen. At this point, it was clear that the relationship between the two former allies had been damaged. Shortly after the meeting, Habibie, in consultation with Wiranto, made his second major decision as president—to relieve Prabowo from his job.<sup>188</sup>

The incident with Prabowo seemed to have cemented the ties between Habibie and Wiranto, who previously shared very little in common. At first, Habibie accepted his advisers' suggestion to relieve Wiranto of the ABRI Chief post with more "manageable" generals such as Yunus Yosfiah and A.M. Hendropriyono, and keep him in the less powerful Minister of Defence job. A few hours after Soeharto's resignation, Habibie summoned Wiranto to his residence and told him of his intention to separate the two posts and offer the general the position of Minister of Defence. But Wiranto declined the offer, saying that he preferred the "less senior" position of ABRI Chief.<sup>189</sup> Later, in an intense negotiation with Habibie's most trusted military confidant, Feisal Tanjung, Wiranto managed to convince the president to keep him in the two posts.<sup>190</sup> There were reports about Soeharto's pressure to Habibie to keep Wiranto as ABRI Chief. But in a number of occasions, Habibie insisted that after his inauguration as president, he had never communicated with Soeharto.

Nevertheless, Habibie's decision reflected his pragmatism and good reading of his own shaky presidency. After all the difficulties in persuading Soeharto to relinquish power and his own animosity with the former president, Habibie needed someone with solid ties to Soeharto to prevent him from undermining his presidency. In the meantime, he could rely on Wiranto to contain the "threat" of Prabowo, whom some of Habibie's

advisers described as “highly unreliable and dangerous”.<sup>191</sup>

That Prabowo was considered a dangerous loose canon was apparent in the nature of his replacement a few hours after Habibie’s cabinet line-up was announced on Friday, 22 May. Wiranto signed the order to relieve Prabowo and Muchdi P.R. from their jobs at around noon and instructed Army Chief Subagyo H.S. to carry it out immediately. Prabowo was on a helicopter inspection with Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin when he was told of the news. He went to meet Fanny Habibie and asked the president’s younger brother to confirm the news.

Once again, Prabowo demonstrated his brash personality when he brought along his soldiers to the Palace and demanded to meet the president immediately, causing the security to be thrown on the highest alert. But, contrary to widely circulated reports that he insisted on carrying his gun inside, Prabowo met Commander of Presidential Guard Sutarto and handed his revolver to Habibie’s personal aide, Hasanuddin, before meeting the president for the second time in one day. Prabowo tried to persuade Habibie to rescind his decision, which he suspected had been made under Soeharto’s pressure, and reminded the president that he had always been loyal to him. But Habibie was resolute. He offered Prabowo an assignment as ambassador to Malaysia instead of Commander of the ABRI’s Joint School of Staff and Command that Wiranto had assigned him, to which Prabowo turned down.

Meanwhile, Subagyo was anxiously waiting for Prabowo at the Army headquarters, as Wiranto’s aide kept calling him every five minutes to ascertain if the handover ceremony had taken place. Subagyo had asked Wiranto for permission to talk privately with Prabowo, dismissing his assistants’ suggestion that the “fully-armed” Prabowo was too dangerous to be let in a room alone with him. When Prabowo finally arrived from the Palace, he tried to persuade Subagyo to postpone the ceremony for a month, a week, or even a day. Subagyo declined and persuaded Prabowo to carry out his job as Commander of the ABRI’s Joint School of Staff and Command well.

Finally, Prabowo agreed on the condition that he handed over his command baton and *Kostrad* flag to Subagyo, not to Lumintang. Subagyo accepted it and asked Prabowo to say the prayer together before performing a brief indoor handover ceremony at the nearby *Kostrad* headquarters. Ninety minutes later, Subagyo installed Lumintang as the new *Kostrad* Commander. In retrospect, Subagyo, who had performed a *hajj* in 1992, admitted that he was deeply concerned for his own safety during the critical moments, and decided to say the prayer so that if something went wrong and he died, he would die after fulfilling his religious duty.<sup>192</sup>

But it was a religious issue that put a sudden end to Lumintang’s brief tenure as *Kostrad* Commander. Shortly after news about Prabowo’s shocking replacement spread, a number of Muslim figures protested to Habibie that a Protestant general was chosen to hold such a crucial military post. Habibie conveyed the protest to Wiranto, who later agreed to reverse his decision. At around 1.00 a.m. on 23 May, Wiranto called Subagyo and ordered him to carry out a handover ceremony from Lumintang to Djamari Chaniago the first thing in the morning. Wiranto’s choice of Chaniago clearly indicated his concession to the Muslim lobby as Chaniago hailed from a devout Muslim family. But it was also a sound tactical move as Wiranto placed Chaniago, who once belonged to Prabowo’s colonel groups (see Chapter 1) but had turned against his former ally, to restore order in Prabowo’s stronghold.

Later, in an awkward statement to the curious media, Wiranto explained that Lumintang was appointed merely as caretaker *Kostrad* Commander to “consolidate the

numerous *Kostrad* units” before he was replaced by Chaniago as the definitive *Kostrad* Commander.<sup>193</sup> This time, Subagyo objected and returned the letter of order, suggesting that both Lumintang and Chaniago should be made definitive *Kostrad* Commanders as it carried administrative consequences, to which Wiranto finally agreed.<sup>194</sup> The brief episode, however, reflected the turbulent relationship between the military and Islam that continued to cast a shadow over the Habibie presidency.

As Prabowo had been “kicked up” to a position without direct access to the troops and was later discharged from active service, his “package” followed suit. On Saturday, Muchdi was relieved as *Kopassus* Commander, with Major-General Syahrir M.S. replacing him. A few weeks later, Sjamsoeddin was made a Territorial Assistant and, after intense public pressure, to a less significant post as the ABRI Chief’s expert staff. In June, Prabowo’s Chief of Staff, Kivlan Zen, was removed to a non-job position at the Army’s General Staff (SUAD).

Interestingly, it turned out that Subagyo was also on the removal list. On Saturday noon, before Subagyo installed Chaniago as *Kostrad* Commander, Sintong Panjaitan came and asked him the shocking question, “Why have you not been replaced yet?” In a frank conversation, Panjaitan explained that Subagyo was suspected to have belonged to “Prabowo’s package”, which included Muchdi, Zen and Sjamsoeddin, and so was on the replacement list. Subagyo explained that he had never harboured any political ambition and was content with his job as Army Chief that he had held for only two months, which apparently convinced Panjaitan of his “innocence”. Subagyo continued to serve as Army Chief until early 2000, a few months after Admiral Widodo succeeded Wiranto as TNI Chief.

Despite the fact that key members of “Prabowo’s package” had been sidelined, the residue of the internal factionalism continued to haunt the military, which was now facing an immense task to redefine its roles and position in the changing Indonesian polity.

## CONCLUSION

Years after the fall of Soeharto, academic debate about the determining factors that had brought an end to one of the world’s most resilient regimes continued. Apart from the fascinating saga about loyalty and betrayal, heroes and traitors as well as crude Machiavellian politics that had always characterized the enigmatic New Order and its founder, we learn from our study that a number of overlapping factors have contributed to his fall.

The economic crisis of 1997 was definitely the key factor that subsequently led to the crisis of confidence in Soeharto’s leadership both within and outside Indonesia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the crisis provided new impetus for a domestic push for democratization, which materialized in the more assertive student and mass movements demanding for Soeharto’s resignation. But while the 1998 generation of student movements, which featured a totally different character from its predecessors, played crucial role in setting the end of the New Order, our study shows that students were not the primary actors in the entire process.

Instead, it was the interplay between the New Order’s troika of power—Soeharto, Islam and the military—that finally set the curtain on its stage. The crises and the subsequent domestic pressure for leadership change helped to aggravate the bureaucratic crack, which in spite of Soeharto’s superficial control, led to internal disillusionment and even rebellion. The crack led to the fall of the New Order’s bureaucratic pillar when Harmoko unexpectedly called for Soeharto’s resignation and the 14 ministers withdrew their support for him at the eleventh hour. In addition, we can discern the pattern of

“personal politics” that had always characterized the New Order, judging from the fact that Harmoko and Kartasasmita, who led the rebellion, had their own personal motives in moving against Soeharto.

Most importantly, our study discovered that, contrary to some analysts' suggestion that the military remained unmoved to the popular call for Soeharto's resignation, it was the military, the regime's primary and strongest pillar, that delivered the final nail in the New Order's coffin. Confronted by intense public pressure, the military was torn into a dilemma between upholding constitutional loyalty to the presidential institution and heeding its historical duty as the people's army to take the side of the people. In the end, in spite of deep internal divisions, the military opted for the latter. When the generals withdrew their support for the regime and declined Soeharto's "request" for the implementation of an emergency law, Soeharto had no other option but to step down.

But apart from the military's adherence to the principles of constitutionalism, our study shows that internal military factionalism has indeed hastened Soeharto's exit from power. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the military was deeply fractured by Soeharto's personal intervention that reduced the institution from self-styled guardian of the nation into a president's "political hitmen". When the president's authority was loosening, the hitmen fought each other for control of the military institution. While our study found no incriminating evidence to support popular claims that a military faction under Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto had planned for the Trisakti tragedy and the 13–15 May 1998 riots, we demonstrated that the security failure to handle the situation was due to the military's internal factionalism. We have described in great detail how Generals Wiranto and Prabowo had fought a quiet power struggle that eventually accelerated Soeharto's departure, which ended with the latter's discharge from active service.

However, our study demonstrated that the ideological factionalism blurred both within the military and the society when it came to Soeharto's exit from power. As Soeharto had become a liability to the nation, attempts at removing him from power became a rare rallying factor that brought together almost all Indonesians irrespective of their ideological inclinations. Despite their differences, the Muslims eventually supported calls for Soeharto's resignation, including ICMI, the organization he founded to woo Muslim supports. There was also nothing "ideological" about the conflict between Wiranto and Prabowo; it was clearly driven by their intersecting interests. While the green Prabowo tried to mobilize his Muslim base, he failed to win the support of his fellow green generals, who rallied behind the red-and-white Wiranto instead. In the end, Prabowo's loose alliance with Habibie broke up as the latter decided to strike a deal with Wiranto due to personal and pragmatic reasons.

We need to add another factor that also contributed to Soeharto's fall: the waning international confidence in his leadership. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the Clinton Administration in the United States played the most crucial part when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for Soeharto to conduct "a historic act of statesmanship by providing for a democratic transition" on 20 May.<sup>195</sup> Many studies have indicated that the Clinton's agenda on democracy might have influenced its dealings with Indonesia and Soeharto, in the sense that Washington appeared to encourage the ruler's exit, or at least, did nothing to stop it. Nevertheless, more thorough research needs to be conducted to determine the level of American "influence" in the historic change in Indonesia, which certainly goes beyond the scope of this study.

Last but certainly not the least, the final determining factor was Soeharto, the man who could have gone down in history as one of the world's greatest leaders for his success—according to Albright—in raising Indonesia's standing in the world and hastening

its economic growth and integration into the global economy. Despite his last attempts at maintaining a grip on power, in the end Soeharto chose to follow the footsteps of his predecessor, Soekarno, when he was presented with a similar dilemma. In a striking replay of history, Soeharto might have remembered that he had once tried to persuade Soekarno to adopt the Vijaya Scenario, an early version of his own “*lengser keprabon madeg pandita*” statement. Thus, on that eventful evening of 20 May 1998, at the critical junction of history, Soeharto decided to make his wisest decision ever and saved Indonesia from the possible peril of a civil war: to step down voluntarily.

## Notes

- 1 Interview, General (ret'd.) Wiranto, 21 August 2001.
- 2 Interview, General (ret'd.) R. Hartono, 13 November 2001.
- 3 The Goro grocery supermarket was acquired through an illegal business swap mechanism involving Tommy Soeharto, his business partner Ricardo Gelael and the head of the Agency for Logistical Procurements (*Bulog*) Beddu Amang. After Soeharto's fall, the three were brought before the court on corruption charges and were sentenced to a few years imprisonment. While Gelael and Amang dutifully served their sentences, Tommy fled and became the country's most sought-after fugitive after he was accused of having ordered the murder of a Supreme Court judge. He was captured in November 2001, tried and convicted in July 2002. He is currently serving 15 years imprisonment at the island prison of Nusakambangan, alongside his father's trusted business ally, former Minister of Trade and Industry, Bob Hasan. For details on Tommy Soeharto's saga, see, *Tempo*, “Jika Pangeran Cendana Pelesir ke Cipinang”, 12 May 2002, and *Tempo*, “Tommy, Sang Pangeran Terpidana”, 11 August 2002.
- 4 Personal observation. See, also, Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF), *Laporan Akhir Peristiwa Kerusuhan Tanggal 13–15 Mei, Jakarta, Solo, Palembang, Lampung, Surabaya dan Medan, Seri 6 Verifikasi* (Jakarta, October 1998), pp. 360–362. The author testified before the TGPF investigators.
- 5 Komnas Perempuan, *Temuan Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Kerusuhan Mei 1998* (Jakarta: Publikasi Komnas Perempuan and New Zealand Official Development Assistance, November 1999), pp. 22–23. For a recap on the many different versions of the casualties of the riots in Jakarta and five other cities, see, *Tempo*, “Peta Amuk Di Kota Hantu”, 25 May 2003.
- 6 The best graduate of the 1973 class and one of the few holders of the *Adhi Makayasa* decoration, Yudhoyono was the first among his equals to obtain the general rank, while Razi was the most senior officer for the post.
- 7 Interview, Wiranto, 21 August 2001. According to Wiranto, he went personally to Soeharto to defend the *Wanjakti*'s recommendation and was assured of the president's approval. But without consulting him, Tanjung decided to heed Prabowo's objection, arguing that Soeharto had approved it. Wiranto went to Tanjung and warned him of the mistake although, in the end, he had to accept his superior's decision. See, also, Aidul Fitrijadi Azhari, *Bersaksi Di Tengah Badai, Dari Catatan Jenderal Purnawirawan Wiranto* (Jakarta: Institute for Democracy of Indonesia, 1st edition, April 2003). For Prabowo's version of the event, see, Fadli Zon, *Politik Huru Hara Mei 1998*, (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Studies, 2004), pp. 27–28. Nevertheless, the fact that Tanjung, Wiranto and Prabowo all claimed that they have secured Soeharto's approval served only to underline the military's submission to Soeharto's personal control.
- 8 Azhari, *Bersaksi*, op. cit., pp. 29–30.
- 9 Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 131–157.
- 10 *Tajuk*, “Letjen TNI M. Yunus Yosfiah: ABRI Tidak Alergi Perubahan”, 1 March 1998.
- 11 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).
- 12 For an account of how the students were caught in the “star wars” between the two

- generals during the Malari Affair, see, Hariman Siregar, *Gerakan Mahasiswa: Pilar Kelima Demokrasi* (Jakarta: Teplok Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, March 2003), pp. 61–66. Siregar was the chairman of University of Indonesia's student senate.
- 13 For a concise analysis on the relation between the military and the student movements, see, *Tajuk*, "ABRI-Mahasiswa, Dari Masa Ke Masa", 13 January 1999.
- 14 Sulisty, op. cit., pp. 105–123.
- 15 See, *Tajuk*, "Tarik Ulur ABRI-Mahasiswa", 30 April 1998.
- 16 On the origin of KAMMI, see, Andi Rahmat and Mukhammad Najib, *Gerakan Perlawanan Dari Masjid Kampus* (Jakarta: Purimedia, March 2001). For an analysis on a possible link between KAMMI, ICMI, KISDI and Prabowo Subianto, see, *Tajuk*, "Anatomi Aksi Mahasiswa Islam", 1–14 May 1998.
- 17 Sulisty, op. cit., p. 31.
- 18 *D&R*, "Habibie Meralat ICMI", 16 May 1998.
- 19 For details on the tension between the bureaucrats and the NGO activists in the ICMI, see, Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 235–266.
- 20 For details on DDII, see, Hefner, *Civil Islam...*, pp. 183–202.
- 21 *Tajuk*, "Anwar Haryono: Yang Tak Menjalankan Reformasi, Ganti!", 14 May 1998.
- 22 *Media Indonesia*, "Istighotsah, antara Politik...", 28 April 2001.
- 23 *Tajuk*, "Hilangnya Orang-Orang Mega", 2 April 1998. The magazine was one of the first publications to report the abduction of political activists.
- 24 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., pp. 21–22.
- 25 *Tajuk*, "Kopassus Terlibat Penculikan?", 9 July 1998. The magazine was the first to publish details about the Rose Team's involvement in the abduction. A few days after the report was published, on 13 July, the ABRI's Chief of Information Officer Major-General Syamsul Mu'arif acknowledged *Kopassus*' involvement.
- 26 Prabowo was found guilty of initiating the entire operation. Muchdi was blamed for causing the disappearance of abduction evidence when, as Prabowo's successor, he ordered the detaining chamber at the *Kopassus* Headquarters used to torture the activists to be turned into a flower garden. Chairawan, who was Prabowo's right-hand man in the 1996 operation to free a group of foreign scientists kidnapped in Irian Jaya, was found guilty of supervising the operation. See, *Tajuk*, "Prabowo Buka Kartu Di Mahmil?", 20 August 1998.
- 27 Personal communication.
- 28 Interview, Major-General (ret'd.) Syamsu Djalal, 2 August 2001.
- 29 A copy of memo No. R/ND-13/VII/1998/Polkam was made available to the author.
- 30 Interview, General (ret'd.) Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo, 16 August 2002.
- 31 *Tajuk*, "Kisah Sebuah Bintang Jatuh", 23 July 1998.
- 32 *Tajuk*, "Prabowo Buka Kartu ...", 20 August 1998.
- 33 Interview, Wiranto, 21 August 2001.
- 34 Interview, Subagyo, 16 August 2002.
- 35 For a detailed analysis on the contradiction, see, *Tajuk*, "Prabowo Buka Kartu...", 20 August 1998.
- 36 Interview, Syamsu Djalal, 2 August 2001.
- 37 Zon, op. cit., pp. 30–34.
- 38 Interview, Harry Tjan Silalahi, 13 July 2001.
- 39 Luhulima, op. cit., p. 97.
- 40 For details on the Rose Team's activities, see, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Berbagai Peristiwa Dan Penanganannya 1998–1999*, (Jakarta: Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, August 1999), pp. 9–13.
- 41 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001.
- 42 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., p. 22.
- 43 Interview, Hartono, 13 November 2001.
- 44 Quoting military sources, the magazine *Tajuk* reported that eight out of the 13 missing people were dead: four bodies were buried inland, the other four were drowned at sea. See, *Tajuk*, "Korban Penculikan Dibuang Ke Laut?", 6 January 1999.

- 45 *Tajuk*, “Prabowo Buka Kartu...”, 20 August 1998.
- 46 The Komnas HAM reported that 16 people were missing in the aftermath of the 27 July 1996 raid, including award-winning poet Wiji Thukul. Twelve PRD activists in Java claimed that they were abducted and tortured by intelligence officers from the Brawijaya army regional command in July 1996, although they were released safely. See, *Tajuk*, “Dari Lexy Sampai Deddy”, 2 April 1998, and *Tajuk*, “Memilah-Milah Komando Penculikan”, 3 September 1998.
- 47 For a detailed chronology of the tragic 12 May protest, see, Soekisno Hadikoemoro and Pers Mahasiswa Trisakti, *Tragedi Trisakti 12 Mei 1998*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Trisakti, 1999), pp. 85–102, and *Gatra*, “They Lay Prostrated Inside Their Campus”, 13 June 1998 ([www.gatranews.net/\\_english/IV/30/lpt4-30.html](http://www.gatranews.net/_english/IV/30/lpt4-30.html)).
- 48 Luhulima, op. cit., p. 110.
- 49 *Tajuk*, “Jaket Mahasiswa Sudah Berdarah”, 14 May 1998.
- 50 Dr. Yuli Budiningsih, a forensic doctor who conducted the autopsy of the body of Dadang Rusmana, the dead policeman, disputed police allegation. In her 2 June 1998 testimony before two members of Komnas HAM who investigated the case, Dr. Budiningsih asserted that Rusmana died of a coronary heart problem. See, Luhulima, op. cit., p. 111.
- 51 *Ibid.*, pp. 108–110.
- 52 Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim’s testimony before the TGPF on 2 September 1998. See, TGPF, op. cit., Seri 5, Testimony, Appendix VI.D, pp. 229–234.
- 53 Personal communication.
- 54 Hamami Nata’s testimony before the TGPF on 28 August 1998, TGPF, op. cit., Seri 5, Testimony, Appendix VI.E., p. 252.
- 55 *Forum Keadilan*, “Persidangan Sembilan Belas Tumbal”, 29 June 1998, and “Merindukan Polisi Yang Mandiri”, 13 July 1998.
- 56 For details on the police internal document, see, *Tajuk*, “Derita Polri, Si ‘Anak Tiri’”, 1 October 1998.
- 57 Sulisty, op. cit., p. 216.
- 58 *Forum Keadilan*, “Mengadu Fakta Kasus Trisakti”, 29 June 1998. See, also, Hermawan Sulisty, “Siapa Yang Menembak Mereka?”, in *Kompas*, 26 June 2001.
- 59 *Media Indonesia*, “Saksi Penembakan Trisakti Bicara”, 21 February 2001.
- 60 *The Washington Post*, “Indonesia’s Unintentional Martyrs”, 8 June 1998.
- 61 Luhulima, op. cit., p. 118.
- 62 Zon, op. cit., pp. 66–67.
- 63 *Tempo Interaktif*, “DPR, Komisi Hak Asasi, Kejaksaan Akan Bahas Kasus Trisakti dan Semanggi”, 9 July 2003.
- 64 Brigadier-General Sudi Silalahi’s testimony before the TGPF on 24 September 1998. Silalahi was the deputy commander of the Jakarta Army Regional Command. Two marine soldiers died accidentally in the parachuting and a commander of the army district command (*Danramil*) died at the hands of rioters on 13 May. See, TGPF, op. cit., Seri 5, Testimony, Appendix VI.G, p. 277.
- 65 See, TGPF, op. cit., Seri 5, Testimony, Appendix VI.E., pp. 242–263.
- 66 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., pp. 57–58.
- 67 Both security and government officials complained about the media coverage, especially live television broadcast of the riots, which they blamed for exacerbating the riots. In order to reduce the “television effect”, starting from 13 May, the government pooled all television stations under state television and applied tight censorship over the coverage for one full week.
- 68 See, for example, Riza Sihbudi and Moch. Nurchasim, *Kerusuhan Sosial di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2002). There is a large body of literature on conflict and violence with a special reference to Indonesia prepared by Glenn Smith and Helene Bouvier-Smith, which can be accessed through [www.communalconflict.com/ref/conflict.htm](http://www.communalconflict.com/ref/conflict.htm).
- 69 Sudi Silalahi’s testimony, op. cit.
- 70 Prabowo Subianto’s testimony before the TGPF on 7 September 1998, op. cit., Seri V,

Testimony, Appendix VI.C, pp. 221–228.

- 71 Nata's testimony, *op. cit.*
- 72 Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsjoeddin's testimony on 26 September 1998, TGPF, *op. cit.*, Seri 5, Testimony, Appendix VI.A; and Silalahi's testimony, *op. cit.*
- 73 Prabowo Subianto's testimony before the TGPF on 7 September 1998.
- 74 For full reports, see, Komnas Perempuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–107. An English version of the reports can be accessed through [www.hsph.harvard.edu/organizations/](http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/organizations/). The U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, C. Komaraswamy, went to investigate a series of violence against women in Indonesia and East Timor in 2000 and used TRuK's data extensively.
- 75 Personal communications.
- 76 Minutes of meeting between Army Chief General Subagyo H.S. and TGPF delegates on 12 October 1998. A copy was made available to the author.
- 77 Six government officials—Ministers of Defence and Security, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Women Affairs and Attorney-General—signed a joint statement on the establishment of the TGPF on 23 July 1998. Members of the TGPF are: Marzuki Darusman (chairman, *Komnas HAM*), Major-General Marwan Paris (ABRI HQ), K.H. Said Aqiel Siradj (NU), Dr. Rosita Noer (Bakom-PKB), Zulkarnain Yunus (Department of Justice), Asmara Nababan (*Komnas HAM*), Sri Hardjo (Ministry of Women's Affairs), Bambang W. Soeharto (*Komnas HAM*), Prof. Sparinah Sadli (*Komnas HAM*), Major-General Syamsu Djalal (ABRI HQ), Major-General Da'i Bachtiar (ABRI HQ), Abdul Ghani (Department of Foreign Affairs), I Made Gelgel (Attorney-General's Office), Major-General (retd.) Dunidja D. (Department of Home Affairs), Father I. Sandyawan Sumardi (TRuK), Nursyahbani Katjasungkana (LBH-APIK), Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara (Elsam) and Bambang Wijoyanto (YLBHI). Initially, Ita Fatia Nadia, the activist who wrote the TruK reports along with Father Sandyawan, was included in the TGPF, but she declined at the last minute. While some NGO and women activists took active parts in the TGPF, other activists accused of an attempt by the Habibie government to coopt the NGOs.
- 78 *Tajuk*, "Teka-Teki Jenderal...", 3 September 1998.
- 79 For Prabowo's side of the story, see, *Majalah Berita Populer Totalitas*, "*Buku Putih Prabowo: Kesaksian Tragedi Mei 1998* (August 2000). The widely circulated leaflet was an Indonesian version of what was said to be a forthcoming book on Prabowo written by *Asiaweek's* correspondent Jose Manuel Tesoro and taken from his lengthy investigative story, in which he disputed numerous allegations on Prabowo and presented the general's version. See, *Asiaweek*, "The Scapegoat?", 3 March 2000. Interestingly, *Asiaweek* was one of the first foreign publications that declared Prabowo guilty of involvement in May riots in 1998. For a comparison, see, *Asiaweek*, "Ten Days That Shook Indonesia", 24 July 1998.
- 80 In fact, the TGPF summoned Fahmi Idris, a Muslim figure and leader of Golkar who attended the Kostrad meeting and inquired about its extent. Idris said there was nothing unusual about the meeting. See, TGPF, *op. cit.*, Seri 6, Testimony, pp. 284–295. The author interviewed three other attendees who also confirmed Prabowo's version. For a full account of the meeting, see, Zon, *op. cit.*, pp. 125–131.
- 81 Prabowo Subianto's testimony, *op. cit.* See, also, Luhulima, *op. cit.*, p. 122, and Zon, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–122.
- 82 Azhari, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Prabowo's personal aide, Lieutenant-Colonel Fuad Basya, insisted that he had passed on his boss' messages to Wiranto's aide, Lieutenant-Colonel Muktiyanto, and received Wiranto's instructions to carry on with the trip to Malang. See, Zon, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
- 83 Interview, Wiranto, 21 August 2001.
- 84 *Kompas*, "Mantan KSAL Ungkap Kerusakan Mei 1998", 20 June 2003.
- 85 On the TGPF's conclusion about Pemuda Pancasila's involvement in the riots, see, TGPF, *op. cit.*, *Ringkasan Eksekutif*. On Anton Medan's alleged roles in the riots, see, *Bernas*, "Anton Medan Jadi Tersangka", 11 July 1998. The police summoned Medan for questioning, but he was later released without being charged. For the allegation on

- Satria Muda Indonesia, see, for example, *SiaR*, “Kelompok Pesilat Bantah Tuduhan Rosihan Anwar”, 31 July 1998. SMI dismissed the allegation as baseless. For an analysis on the roles of Pemuda Pancasila, SMI and other mass organizations in Indonesia’s violent conflicts before and after Soeharto’s fall and their relations with the former president’s family and the military, see, George J. Aditjondro, *Financing Human Rights Violations in Indonesia*, Indonesia Alert, December 2001(www.indonesiaalert.org/).
- 86 Interview, Maulani, 15 July 2001.
- 87 The TGPF obtained video footage showing a figure that resembled Pamungkas encouraging rioters in a South Jakarta suburb. Pamungkas was known to have set up an anti-Chinese organization and was quite open about his activities. He was summoned for questioning by the police but was later released without being charged. He denied allegations of his involvement in the May riots. See, *Tajuk*, “Ketika Itu Saya Di Australia”, 3 September 1998, and *Bernas*, “Ki Gendeng Diperiksa Polisi”, 25 September 1998.
- 88 The unnamed rioter testified before a TGPF team in Solo on 2 October 1998. A copy of his transcript was made available to the author. In fact, the police in Solo arrested one rioter who also confessed to have received a large sum of money from “certain individuals” to instigate riots. See, also, *Tajuk*, “Dari Medan Rusuh Bermula”, 15 October 1998, and *Balipost*, “Organisasi Makar Manfaatkan Tukang Becak”, 14 January 1999.
- 89 *Tajuk*, “Teka-Teki Jenderal Syafrie” and “Saksi-Saksi Setelah Seratus Hari”, 3 September 1998. The magazine published the testimony in full, prompting the Jakarta Regional Military Command to sue it for slander. But after the police summoned three *Tajuk* staffers—chief editor M. Cholid, business director Hendrix Hidayat and reporter Imelda Sari—the case was dropped for lack of incriminating evidence to implicate the magazine. The TGPF, however, received and verified the same testimony. See, TGPF, op. cit., Seri 6, Verifikasi, Appendix VI.5.1, pp. 322–327.
- 90 Minutes of meeting between TGPF and General Subagyo, op. cit. In an interview with the author, Subagyo confirmed information about Prabowo’s unauthorized moves.
- 91 *Tajuk*, “Dari Medan Kerusuhan Bermula”, 17 September 1998.
- 92 TGPF, op. cit., *Ringkasan Eksekutif, Bab VI, Kesimpulan*.
- 93 TGPF, *Laporan Akhir...., Seri 1, Laporan Eksekutif*, pp. 6–8.
- 94 Sulisty, op. cit., p. 248.
- 95 *AWSJ*, “Some Indonesian Rape Photos on the Internet are Frauds”, 20 August 1998.
- 96 TGPF, op. cit., *Seri 1, Laporan Eksekutif*, p. 8. However, according to Hermawan Sulisty, who wrote the Team of Assistance’s report to the TGPF, his team only verified 13 rape cases. See, Sulisty, op. cit., p. 242.
- 97 Sulisty, op. cit., Ch. 11, footnote 9, p. 248.
- 98 *Bernas*, “Habibie Akan Layani Prabowo”, 9 October 1999. Prabowo’s brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, and his lawyer disclosed the letter to the press on 7 October 1999. Muladi confirmed its validity, but complained that such a confidential letter was not supposed to fall into the hands of an unintended party.
- 99 For the TNI’s legal argument, see, *Puspen TNI*, “Pendapat Dan Sikap Tim Advokasi Personel TNI Terhadap Pembentukan Tim Ad Hoc Penyelidikan Peristiwa Kerusuhan Mei 1998”, 25 July 2003 (www.tni.mil.id/).
- 100 Zon, op. cit., pp. 133–134. Responding to suspicion of his close ties to Prabowo, Salahuddin insisted that he remained impartial throughout the investigation and expressed confidence that Prabowo had nothing to do with the May 1998 riots.
- 101 Personal communication.
- 102 Marcus Mietzner, “From Soeharto to Habibie: ABRI and the Power of Political Islam in the Transition Era” in Geoff Forrester (ed.), *Post-Soeharto: Renewal or Chaos?* (Singapore: KITLV Press, The Netherlands and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
- 103 Zon, op. cit., p. 29.
- 104 Azhari, op. cit., p. 55.
- 105 Personal communication.

- 106 For details on *Kompas*' decision to carry the story, see, Luhulima, op. cit., p. 123–126.
- 107 For the full text of Madjid's proposal, see, *ibid.*, p. 161–165.
- 108 *Ibid.*, p. 156.
- 109 Personal communications with Prof. Ryaas Rasyid and Prof. Harun Al-Rasyid, members of the discussion group.
- 110 Azhari, op. cit., p. 80.
- 111 Personal communication. See, also, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000), pp. 428–429.
- 112 Luhulima, op. cit., p. 134.
- 113 Iwan Abdurrahman was a celebrated composer and environmental activist. An accomplished martial arts expert, he helped to found the Satria Muda Indonesia (SMI) martial organization along with Prabowo and stayed by the latter's side through the ups and downs of his military career.
- 114 Personal communications.
- 115 Gafur, op. cit., p. 76.
- 116 Interview, Wiranto, 21 August 2001. See, also, Azhari, op. cit., p. 77–78.
- 117 Gafur, op. cit., p. 77.
- 118 Harmoko was accompanied by Abdul Gafur (Golkar), Ismail Hasan Metereum (PPP), Fatimah Ahmad (PDI), Syarwan Hamid (F-ABRI) and DPR's Secretary-General Afif Ma'roef. For a full account of the meeting, see, Gafur, op. cit., pp. 77–81. The author also interviewed Harmoko and Syarwan Hamid who confirmed Gafur's accounts. See, also, Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, *DPR RI Dalam Menyikapi Proses Reformasi dan Berhentinya Presiden Soeharto* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, October 1998), pp. 14–22.
- 119 Personal communication.
- 120 Azhari, op. cit., p. 79.
- 121 Interview, Soeyono, 20 July 2001. Soeyono was at that time Secretary-General of Dephankam. According to Soeyono, he and his staff worked over the weekend to prepare the structure of the KOKKN.
- 122 Personal communication with a former member of Prabowo's inner circle.
- 123 *Tajuk*, "Habibie, Prabowo dan Hari-Hari Dramatis Itu", 4 March 1999.
- 124 *Tajuk*, "Orde Baru, 1996–1998", 28 May 1998, and "Tajuk, Habibie, Prabowo dan Hari-Hari Dramatis Itu", 4 March 1999.
- 125 For Zon's account of the event, see, Zon, op. cit., pp. 139–140.
- 126 Azhari, op. cit., p. 89.
- 127 "Habibie, Prabowo...", 4 March 1999.
- 128 Luhulima, op. cit., p. 135, 166.
- 129 *Tajuk*, "Habibie, Prabowo..."
- 130 *Kompas*, "Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono", 24 June 2004. See, also, Yudhoyono's account of the event in Usamah Hisyam, *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Sang Demokrat* (Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, 2004).
- 131 "Habibie, Prabowo...", 4 March 1999.
- 132 Interview, Indra Bambang Utoyo, 9 August 2001.
- 133 Azhari, op. cit., p. 82.
- 134 Interview, Subagyo, 16 August 2002.
- 135 For the full text of the Inpres No. 16/1998 see, Azhari, op. cit., Appendix 5, pp. 294–297.
- 136 Interview, Moetojib, 2 January 2002.
- 137 For Madjid's full account of the meeting, see, *Tajuk*, "Wawancara Nurcholish Madjid: Saya Khawatir, Nasib Habibie Seperti Pak Harto", 28 May 1998, and *Forum Keadilan*, "Nurcholish Madjid: Habibie Hanya Pemimpin Kabinet Transisi", 15 June 1998.
- 138 See, Sulisty, op. cit., p. 256.
- 139 Interview, Lieutenant-General Budi Harsono, 1 November 2001. At the time, Harsono was head of the DPR's Commission II on Home Politics. He was in charge of formulating Commission II's recommendation on political issues to the DPR

- leadership.
- 140 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 141 Interview, Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, 17 August 2004.
- 142 Interview, Harmoko, 20 August 2001. In a separate interview, Syarwan Hamid confirmed it.
- 143 For a comprehensive analysis of Sudirman's position vis-à-vis the civilian government of President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta, see, Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945–1949* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991).
- 144 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 145 Interview, Budi Harsono, 1 November 2001.
- 146 For the full text of the DPR leaders' statement, see, Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 23–25.
- 147 Hamid insisted that he did inform Wiranto about his decision and remembered their brief conversation word by word. In a separate interview, Wiranto claimed that he had never received any call from Hamid.
- 148 For the full text of Wiranto's statement, see, Luhulima, op. cit., p. 151.
- 149 Makarim's testimony, op. cit.
- 150 Interview, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, 17 August 2004. According to Sjamsoeddin, two of Wiranto's assistants, Assistant of Operation Major-General Johny Lumintang and Assistant of Socio-political Affairs Major-General Mardiyanto came to his office and were received by Commander of Jakarta Garrison Brigadier-General M. Yahya. They conveyed Wiranto's order that he was to provide transportation for the students who wished to go to the parliament building. He also received the DPR Secretary-General's letter, requesting the military to let the students into the parliament building. In a separate interview, Wiranto denied that he had ever given such an order and insisted that Sjamsoeddin had full authority to take the necessary measures to ensure security in Jakarta. See, also, Luhulima, op. cit., p. 137.
- 151 Sulisty, op. cit., p. 272.
- 152 Interview, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, 17 August 2004.
- 153 For the full transcript of Soeharto's oral speech during the meeting, see, Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 76–89.
- 154 Interview, Moetojib, 2 January 2002.
- 155 *Tempo*, "Kartu Kuning Tentara", 11 March 2001.
- 156 Personal communication.
- 157 "Habibie, Prabowo dan Hari-Hari...", 4 March 1999.
- 158 *Tempo*, "Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Jika Saya Jaksa Agung Saya Akan Menyatakan Soeharto Sebagai Tersangka", 9 November 1998.
- 159 *Forum Keadilan*, "Malam Itu Semua Tank Sudah Siap...", 15 June 1998.
- 160 For the full text of the letter of the 14 ministers, see, Luhulima, op. cit., pp. 18–19.
- 161 Sulisty, op. cit., p. 277.
- 162 Gafur, op. cit., pp. 143–144.
- 163 Interview, Maulani, 15 July 2001.
- 164 Gafur, op. cit., p. 131. Shortly after the meeting, Gafur and Minister of Public Housing Akbar Tanjung met Habibie, who related his version of the events to them.
- 165 Interview, Maulani, 21 July 2001.
- 166 Personal communication.
- 167 Personal communication. Prabowo admitted that his in-laws have called him "a traitor" for having deliberately undermined his father-in-law's presidency. See, Luhulima, op. cit., pp. 133–137; and Djojohadikusumo, op. cit., pp. 428–429.
- 168 Interview, K.H. Yusuf Hasyim, 15 April 2002. A respected *kiai* from the Tebuireng Pesantren in Jombang, East Java, Hasyim knew Soeharto, Habibie and Prabowo well. At one point, he was asked by Habibie to convey his request for a meeting with Soeharto. When Hasyim passed him Habibie's message, Soeharto's reply was curt: "Never. I will never forgive him."
- 169 Gafur, op. cit., pp. 141–142.
- 170 *Forum Keadilan*, "Malam Itu Semua...", 15 June 1998.

- 171 *Luhulima*, op. cit., p. 228.
- 172 Personal communication. See, also, Sulistyono, op. cit., p. 279.
- 173 Personal communication.
- 174 Interviews, Wiranto, 21 August 2001, and Subagyo H.S., 16 August 2002. For a long time, the crucial meeting at Cendana was kept out of public knowledge. Even in his as-told-to autobiography, Wiranto stopped short of describing about the meeting. Instead, he gave a rather vague account about how Soeharto delegated him the Inpres No. 16/1998 without mentioning *when* exactly it happened. See, Azhari, op. cit., pp. 82–87. But in separate interviews, Wiranto and Subagyo did mention that the meeting took place on the evening of 20 May.
- 175 Interview, Subagyo, 16 August 2002.
- 176 Azhari, op. cit., p. 83. Although the generals had different recollection of the precise words that Soeharto uttered when he gave the *Inpres*, they agreed on the interpretation that Soeharto had left it to Wiranto's judgement whether to use the authority or not.
- 177 Interview, Wiranto, 21 August 2001.
- 178 Interview, Harun Al-Rasid, 20 December 2001.
- 179 Interview, Wiranto, 21 August 2001. For the full text of the ABRI's official statement on Soeharto's resignation, see, *Luhulima*, op. cit., pp. 5–6.
- 180 *Forum Keadilan*, "Malam Itu Semua...", 15 June 1998.
- 181 Interview, Maulani, 15 July 2001.
- 182 For the full text of the Supreme Court's ruling on Soeharto's resignation and Habibie's installation as the new president, see, Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 94–101.
- 183 Gafur, op. cit., p. 152.
- 184 For the full text of Soeharto's resignation statement and Habibie's oath, see, *Luhulima*, op. cit., pp. 2–4.
- 185 *Asiaweek*, "The Coup", 3 March 2000. In an interview, an army general confirmed that it was Panjaitan who first alerted Habibie to Prabowo's alleged attempts at a coup.
- 186 "Habibie, Prabowo...", 4 March 1999.
- 187 Interview, Din Syamsuddin, 9 March 1999. A professor of Islamic theology, Syamsuddin was the executive director of the CPDS, Prabowo's think tank. Syamsuddin dictated Prabowo's proposal for the cabinet line-up to Kivlan Zen who typed it down.
- 188 Habibie's first decision as president was to revoke Soeharto's Inpres No. 16/1998.
- 189 Azhari, op. cit., p. 94.
- 190 Personal communication.
- 191 Personal communication.
- 192 Interview, Subagyo, 16 August 2002.
- 193 *Tajuk*, "Dan Letjen Prabowo Pun Diganti", 28 May 1998, and *Forum Keadilan*, "Kisah Mutasi Panglima Yang Unik", 15 June 1998.
- 194 Interview, Subagyo, 16 August 2002.
- 195 *Reuters*, "US Pressures Suharto on Democratic Transition", 20 May 1998.

## THE SIAMESE-TWIN POWER SHARING 1998–1999

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**Wiranto was nothing more than a hot potato for Habibie. Habibie had to accommodate him to appease Soeharto. He felt that he owed a lot to the Old Man and decided to pay him back.**

– *Lieutenant-General (retd.) Z.A. Maulani, former head of Bakin*<sup>1</sup>

**Habibie, Wiranto, and at one point in time, Prabowo, too, belonged to one club. They were all alumni of the Cendana University, all groomed under the tutelage of Soeharto.**

– *Lieutenant-General (retd.) Agus Widjojo, former TNI Chief of Territorial Affairs*<sup>2</sup>

There was nothing extraordinary about the seminar. Held in a seminar room at the University of Indonesia’s Department of Social and Political Sciences on 25 May 1999, it looked just like any regular discussions on internal military reforms that some campuses all over the country had been organizing to commemorate the anniversary of the fall of the New Order. The only difference was that it featured Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah, the Assistant of General Planning to the TNI Commander, widely lauded as a military “reformer”, and two civilian military observers. Formerly the Commander of the *Seskoad*, Wirahadikusumah had been advocating “fast-paced” internal military reforms in an “extraordinary” fashion, judging against the military’s standard of discreet attitude. Addressing around an audience of a hundred, Wirahadikusumah received loud applause when he admitted that the military shared the blame for the New Order’s failures and subsequent fall, saying that it had “committed” at least 60 “sins”.<sup>3</sup>

Later in an interview, Wirahadikusumah explained that the “60 military’s sins” statement was derived from an academic analysis of the New Order’s mistakes, including the military’s, devised by an ABRI Special Team on Opinion Shaping and Counter Opinion, in which he, in his capacity as an expert staff to the ABRI Chief at that time, sat as deputy chairman. Drawing a matrix on the New Order’s structural failures, the team concluded that there were at least 60 “policy mistakes” it had committed, including the twisted implementation of *dwifungsi*, weak law enforcement, flawed economic and development policy and the resurgence of neo-feudalism.<sup>4</sup>

A year ago, such a frank self-criticism about the military’s mistakes and failures was unimaginable. More interestingly, the team was formed in late August 1998 under Wiranto’s order and comprised nine generals and 10 middle-ranking officers from the staff, operational and intelligence units, including Fachrul Razi, Yudhoyono and Agus Widjojo. The team was assigned to “devise plans and actions to counter rumours and propaganda and to prevent the formation of public opinion that could destabilize national

development”, which reflected the generals’ concerns about the military’s deteriorating public image.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, in the one-year period after Soeharto’s fall, the military had been facing almost a daily litany of public criticism over its support of the New Order, its involvement in massive human-rights abuses in some conflict-torn areas and its continuing influence over Indonesian politics. Hardly a day passed without students swarming the streets and calling for the abolition of *dwifungsi* and an immediate end to military’s involvement in politics.

The generals, however, differed in their response towards public demand for military reforms. In the beginning, there appeared to be a unanimous and genuine consensus among the military’s rank and file that reforms were indeed unavoidable and that they had to carry them out in a managed fashion. But later, Wirahadikusumah became disillusioned with what he saw as half-hearted reforms and called for their expedition to save the military from becoming a “political dinosaur” that could face extinction if it failed to adapt to the changing times.<sup>6</sup>

But while Wirahadikusumah’s progressive stance had won him public praise, it raised many eyebrows and ruffled more than a few feathers within the military. He was criticized, for example, for having breached the military’s code of ethics as he brought up political issues, which fell outside his operational jurisdiction, to the public. As a serving officer, he was duty bound to settle internal issues internally. The controversy over Wirahadikusumah’s “internal rebellion” continued until he was relieved as *Kostrad* Commander in August 2000 (which will be discussed in the following chapter).

Nevertheless, such internal dynamics illustrate the drastic change in the military’s political role in the first years of *reformasi*, as it was now forced to accept an unprecedented “power sharing” with a civilian president. Given its continuing dominance over the political stage, however, the question most often asked during the short rule of President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie was: Wouldn’t the military be tempted to take over the power?

In this chapter, we discuss how the military learned to grapple with the drastic change in the post-Soeharto polity and the reduction of its previous privileges. We will also examine the factors that, in spite of the difficult transition and adjustment it had to face, had impeded the much-feared scenario of a military takeover.

## THE FIRST PHASE OF MILITARY REFORMS

In early May 1998, a few weeks before Soeharto’s fall, the ABRI’s Chief of Socio-political Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had assembled a number of civilian academics and military intellectuals to help him draft the military’s concept of reforms. In the context of that time, the concept was relatively progressive as it accommodated public demands for overall reforms, including political, economic, legal and even constitutional reforms, a previously taboo issue as it advocated a review of the “sacred” 1945 Constitution. Shortly after Soeharto’s fall, the concept was modified to include the post-Soeharto realities, which included the need to establish a corrupt-free government, a total review of political laws, repeal of the draconian anti-Subversion Law and ratification of all international conventions on human rights. The concept was then presented to President Habibie as the military’s contribution to the discourse on the post-New Order reforms in April 1999.<sup>7</sup>

But the military’s concept of reforms did not include its internal political reforms; apparently Yudhoyono had worked on the issue separately. In September 1998, he hosted a seminar at the ABRI’s Joint School of Staff and Command in Bandung to discuss the

concept of military reforms. Dominated by frank self-criticism over the military's past mistakes, which were later reformulated into the "60 military's sins assessment", the seminar agreed to adopt a "new paradigm", which redefined the military's new position and roles in the new era, including a drastic reduction in its political involvement. On Military Day (5 October 1998), Wiranto formally announced the ABRI's New Paradigm, which contained the following four principles.

- The military did not need to be at the forefront of politics,
- It would shift from "occupying" (*menduduki*) key positions to "influencing" (*mempengaruhi*) the political process.
- It would exercise its influence indirectly rather than directly.
- It would be prepared for "political and role sharing" with non-military partners.<sup>8</sup>

The New Paradigm proposal, however, failed to address the question of *dwifungsi* which the reform movements have called for its abolition. In fact, the proposal maintained a position that *dwifungsi* "is the military's pledge of loyalty, service and alignment to the people of Indonesia".<sup>9</sup> The position was somewhat understandable in the context that the concept was drafted before Soeharto's fall and there had not yet been any consensus within the military on how to "treat" the sacred *dwifungsi*. In truth, Yudhoyono had proposed for the "power sharing" idea in a paper about the future of *dwifungsi* he wrote in the Army's School of Staff and Command in the mid 1990s. The New Paradigm proposal was basically a reformulation and modification of his old concept.<sup>10</sup> In that sense, the New Paradigm reflected more of a commitment and direction for a change than a comprehensive proposal for an overhaul of the military.

However, Wiranto announced 14 strategic action plans to implement the New Paradigm concept in March 1999. These included:

- formulation of the ABRI's New Paradigm for the 21st century;
- a change in the ABRI's socio-political roles;
- separation of the Police Force from the ABRI;
- liquidation of the ABRI's Central Council of Socio-political Affairs (*Wansospolsus*) and Regional Council of Socio-political Affairs (*Wansospolda*);
- a change of the ABRI's socio-political staff into its territorial staff;
- the restructuring of TNI's Corps of Civil Servants unit into its original administrative function and liquidation of other socio-political offices at the ABRI headquarters;
- liquidation of socio-political offices at the regional military commands;
- termination of the secondment policy, whereby active servicemen can only occupy non-military positions after retiring from service;
- reduction of military seats in Parliament;
- termination of the ABRI's involvement in day-to-day politics;
- severance of ties with Golkar and the adoption of equidistance position with all political parties policy;
- adoption of the neutrality principle in elections;
- severance of the ABRI's structural ties with a number of military-related mass organizations formally grouped under the umbrella of the ABRI's Greater Family (KBA); and
- a review of the ABRI's doctrines in accordance with its internal reforms and its roles in the 21st century.<sup>11</sup>

Starting from the following month, the ABRI began to implement the action programmes. On 1 April, it formally separated the Police Force from the military, which was recommended during the seminar at the ABRI's Joint School of Staff and Command in

October the year before. Then it announced the termination of the secondment of military officers to civilian posts (*kekaryaan*) by requiring them to resign from the military if they opted to retain or accept positions in the government and the bureaucracy. In May, it severed formal ties with Golkar and pledged its political neutrality ahead of the June 1999 elections. Then, on 9 November, on the eve of the SI MPR 1998, the office of the ABRI's Chief of Socio-political Affairs was abolished and was replaced by a Chief of Staff of Territorial Affairs (*Kaster*). Under intense mass pressure during the SI MPR that led to the outbreak of the bloody Semanggi I Incident, the military agreed to slash its seats in the legislatures. In addition, the military took an unprecedented move in August 1998 to apologize to the people of Aceh for the atrocities that occurred during the decade-long military operation (DOM) there and decided to revoke the DOM status in the conflict-torn province.

In other words, the ABRI had begun to disengage itself from politics while at the same time maintaining the doctrine of *dwifungsi*. Such ambivalence reflected strong internal resistance as structural changes brought about by the reforms affected the military organization, which explained why Wiranto preferred gradual rather than radical reforms in order to minimize organizational shock and the aggravation of deep division within. The end of officers' secondment to civilian posts, for example, affected more than 6,000 jobs within the military structure, which could have led to an "internal rebellion" if it had not been handled carefully.<sup>12</sup> But contrary to some analysts' assessments that most of the reform initiatives came up only as a reaction to strong public pressure,<sup>13</sup> the fact that the reform proposals had been discussed internally long before Soeharto's fall indicated that they were largely formulated within the institution itself. However, the military's slow and seemingly hesitant attitude in carrying out fundamental changes within the institution led to waning public confidence in its genuine commitment to reforms.

Thus, it is obvious that the military's initiatives lagged far behind public demand and even the government's reform programmes, which made it constantly appear on the defensive when it came to its own reforms. Despite its formal pledge to reduce its political involvement, the first year of *reformasi* saw how the military still playing a slightly reduced yet highly influential role in the political stage.

## THE CHALLENGE OF OLD SOLDIERS...

The first test of the ABRI's pledge of political neutrality came when Golkar held an Extraordinary National Congress (*Munashub*) in July 1998, during which it would elect a new chairman to replace the disgraced Harmoko. Despite public condemnation of its role as the New Order's main political vehicle, Golkar maintained its political importance as it controlled the majority of legislative seats. Earlier, President B.J. Habibie and the parliamentary leaders had agreed to hold an SI MPR in November 1998 to amend political legislation that would pave way for a general election to be held in June 1999, in an attempt to end public controversy over the legitimacy of the government. In this context, Golkar's Extraordinary Congress could determine Habibie's political future in the upcoming SI MPR, as its new chairman could steer the party into endorsing his rule or ending it for good.

Interestingly, the Extraordinary Congress turned out to be a process of political re-alliance within Golkar, for it was the first open "showdown" between Habibie and Soeharto after the latter's resignation. As discussed in Chapter 1, Soeharto antagonized the red-and-white generals when he installed Harmoko as the first civilian to chair the

party in Golkar's Congress of 1993. But when Harmoko "betrayed" him in his last days of power, Soeharto sought a deal with his former military adversaries to regain control over his former powerful political vehicle.

Thus, while Habibie threw his weight behind Muslim politician Akbar Tanjung, Soeharto quietly endorsed former Army Chief Edi Sudradjat and his fellow red-and-white generals such as Try Sutrisno, Rudini and Kemal Idris to contest the Golkar leadership. The non-political Sudradjat, who had been sidelined by Soeharto, decided to enter the Golkar race to "rescue" it from Habibie, with whom he had been on a head-on collision course over a number of issues and whom he saw as a "danger" to the nation's pluralism.<sup>14</sup> In a striking replay of the 1993 Congress, the green generals around Habibie and Harmoko, such as Feisal Tanjung and Syarwan Hamid, confronted their red-and-white counterparts. Only this time, Soeharto was at their adversary's side.

The intriguing question is: How would the military under Wiranto position itself in Golkar's internal conflict?

From the very beginning, Wiranto had been sending mixed signals to the two contending parties, which indicated his ambivalence in carrying out his own pledge of political neutrality. In public statements, Yudhoyono announced the ABRI's withdrawal from Golkar and Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid asserted that Golkar's Three Tracks had ceased to exist.<sup>15</sup> In a meeting with Yudhoyono, Sudradjat's team requested for the headquarters' support, saying that since political relations between the headquarters and the ABRI's Big Family (KBA) had not been formally severed, it was ethically bound to support Sudradjat as he was the KBA's official candidate. Yudhoyono declined the request politely, saying that the military had pledged its political neutrality.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, Sudradjat's side was confident of winning the race, even without help from the headquarters, since retired military officers controlled 21 out of 27 of Golkar's provincial chapters. More importantly, as the KBA's candidate, he had been assured of their support.<sup>17</sup>

But in contradiction to Yudhoyono's statements, Wiranto gave the green light to Habibie's side to hold a "consolidation" meeting between Golkar's Three Tracks in the ABRI headquarters in Cilangkap in late June, which was later called off due to protest from Sudradjat's side. Eventually, under pressure from Habibie and Tanjung, Wiranto decided to intervene at the eleventh hour and "saved" Habibie's presidency. In a move known as "strike at dawn" (*serangan fajar*), he ordered Mardiyanto, the Socio-political Assistant to the Chief of Socio-political Affairs, perhaps without Yudhoyono's knowledge, to call all regional military commanders and instructed them to order all Golkar's regional leaders to support Akbar Tanjung.<sup>18</sup>

So in the final round of the election, Tanjung was elected Golkar's new chairman in a convincing victory. At this point, relations between the ABRI headquarters and the retired generals reached an unprecedented nadir, with Sudradjat and his supporters of old soldiers refusing to accept the humiliating defeat and deciding to leave Golkar. They later formed a breakaway faction called the Justice and Unity Party (PKP).

Wiranto's decision further strengthened his ties with Habibie and made him an indispensable ally to the beleaguered president. But, their political alliance was both unprecedented and unique. Habibie was not simply "a very frightened president", as political scientist Arief Budiman described him, implying that Wiranto and the military had the upper hand over the civilian president. Instead, it was a symbiosis,<sup>19</sup> an unprecedented civilian-military Siamese-Twin type of power sharing<sup>20</sup> in which each gained mutual benefit out of his dependence on the other. For his part, Wiranto had a more strategic purpose than just a "conspiratorial" motive, as suggested by one analysis, "he

could wait to become president in a legitimate and constitutional way if only he could keep the military under his control".<sup>21</sup> Wiranto was by no means a born-again democrat but he did believe in the principle of constitutionalism, which he had demonstrated in a number of occasions. That he gave full support to the initiative of internal military reforms drafted by the "more" reform-minded officers such as Yudhoyono, Widjojo and even Wirahadikusumah can be seen as an indication of his commitment to reforms, in spite of his own political ambition.

On the other hand, Wiranto's position was far weaker than some analysts have thought. The fact that he had to lobby hard to persuade Habibie, who had his own stock of generals, to keep him both as Minister of Defence and the ABRI Chief indicated his precarious position as the president could constitutionally relieve him of his job at any time. In fact, as we shall see later, most of Habibie's military advisers had repeatedly suggested to Habibie to relieve Wiranto of the ABRI Chief's job, although the president had consistently turned them down.<sup>22</sup> At the same time, Wiranto had to sort out the political fallout left by Prabowo's debacle, which had sparked both public condemnation of a persistent culture of military impunity and internal frustration due to his own indecisiveness to move boldly against Prabowo. Later, he had to face the challenge of the disillusioned "old soldiers" who, after their defeat in Golkar's Extraordinary Congress of June 1998, called him a "traitor" to the military corps.

For his part, Habibie had made a savvy political calculation. For a civilian who had more than a decade-long animosity with most of the generals, especially the old soldiers of Sudradjat's generation, he needed Wiranto to provide him with a military umbrella. In return, Habibie offered Wiranto a few concessions, including a free hand in managing his military house and support for his internal reform programmes, which fell in line with his own belief in the concept of civilian supremacy, thanks to his upbringing in a Western democracy. But he held all the cards on the table. In addition to his constitutional right as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he also surrounded himself with his own generals who, as it turned out later, managed to keep Wiranto in check.

Nevertheless, there was one issue that truly cemented the ties between Wiranto and Habibie: their past connection to Soeharto. As Soeharto's longest serving minister, Habibie faced both public scepticism of his commitment to reform and continued attempts at undermining his presidency, hence his need of the military's support. But given his animosity with Soeharto, especially during his last days in power, he needed Wiranto to bridge the gap between them.

In turn, their past ties to Soeharto presented a dilemma for the Habibie-Wiranto team, which partly explained the many paradoxes of Habibie's transitional presidency. While they basically agreed to revamp Soeharto's political legacies, both Wiranto and Habibie resisted calls for Soeharto's trial, which was seen by the public as a token of their commitment to break from the past. In a leaked telephone conversation in February 1999, Habibie was reported to have "pressed" Attorney-General Lieutenant-General Andi M. Ghalib, whose appointment was suggested by Wiranto, to halt investigations on Soeharto.

Later, in his as-told-to autobiography, Ghalib disclosed that in a meeting on 9 March 1999, Habibie initially agreed to support his suggestion to bring Soeharto to court but changed his mind after Wiranto objected to it. Ghalib claimed that he had repeatedly asked Habibie to let him try Soeharto, arguing that prosecutors had already possessed sufficient incriminating evidence to implicate the former ruler for corruption and abuse of power, but Habibie consistently turned him down.<sup>23</sup> On June 1999, Ghalib was

replaced as Attorney-General by Feisal Tanjung and later by State Secretary Muladi, after an independent anti-corruption organization accused him of corruption. Soeharto was eventually brought to trial, but he failed to show up in the courtroom due to poor health. The case was later closed pending Soeharto's recovery after an independent medical team declared him unfit for trial.

### ...AND POLITICAL ISLAM

The challenge from the old soldiers and the controversy over Soeharto's trial continued to haunt Habibie's presidency as it geared up for the SI MPR slated for 10–13 November 1998. The SI MPR's main agenda was to amend the GBHN and election laws to pave the way for the June 1999 elections as well as accommodate some agenda on political reform. But anti-Habibie student groups such as the City Forum (*Forkot*) and mass organizations such as the National Front and the National Movement of the People (GRN) rejected the agenda and instead called the MPR to prepare for a leadership change during the SI MPR.<sup>24</sup>

Security authorities suspected that certain groups, which involved a number of retired generals, had attempted to replay the students' success in May 1998 to bring down the government of President Habibie and replace it with a triumvirate or a presidium consisting of pro-reform figures.<sup>25</sup> They claimed that the groups had planned to occupy the Parliament complex on 9 November and if that failed, they would try to occupy the State Palace on 10 November to force Habibie to step down.<sup>26</sup>

But in a stark contrast to their unity in bringing down the New Order regime, the students were now deeply divided over how to respond to the call for Habibie's resignation. Most Muslim student groups rejected the call but their secular and non-Muslim counterparts were generally supportive of the idea or at least took a neutral stance. In early October, Wiranto accused the *Forkot*, a loose grouping of campus-based student organizations that stood at the forefront of anti-Habibie protests, of being corrupted by communist and leftist ideas. His suspicion was echoed by a number of Muslim organizations, who called for public awareness against attempts at resurrecting the defunct PKI, which was accused of having been infiltrated the anti-government elements. That several student organizations chose to set up base at the Atmajaya Catholic University led to a widely-shared perception among pro-Habibie supporters that it was a non-Muslim alliance that intended to subvert his government.

Against such a backdrop, the Habibie government approved a controversial proposal to form a civilian militia and used it to confront the student and mass protesters. Called the *Pam Swakarsa* or Self-Initiative Security Group, its members were recruited from a number of Muslim-based mass organizations. Other organizations, including the military-linked *Pemuda Pancasila* (PP), *Pemuda Panca Marga* (PPM) and FKPPI, as well as Muslim groups such as the NU's All-Purpose Front (*Banser NU*) and the Muslims' Forum for Justice and Constitution (*Furkon*), also participated in the civilian militia. The *Furkon* was formed by certain figures from the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) and was allowed to share office with the government-sponsored body at the state mosque Istiqlal in Central Jakarta. The *Furkon* and the *Pam Swakarsa* used religious symbols of *jihād* in its activities, prompting strong criticisms from a number of Muslim leaders who expressed concern that it represented a cruel manipulation of religion for political purposes.<sup>27</sup>

In an investigative report on the *Pam Swakarsa*, *Tajuk* magazine reported that the idea was proposed by Feisal Tanjung and other Muslim generals but Wiranto, whose

precarious position gave him no other option but to comply, supervised its implementation on the ground. Publicly, he issued an official instruction to prevent clashes between pro- and anti-Habibie groups.<sup>28</sup> Secretly, however, he gave an order to Kivlan Zen and Adityawarman Thaha, two of Prabowo's former confidants who had extensive contacts with the Muslim groups, to recruit, supervise and train *Pam Swakarsa* members. Zen and Thaha, who had been sidelined to non-job positions due to their links with Prabowo, accepted the "dirty job" as a means to regain their positions. In a relatively short time, as they only received the order from Wiranto on 4 November, the two generals managed to recruit and coordinate the arrival of thousands of Muslim masses from several areas in Java and Madura. Meanwhile, Jakarta Police Chief Nugroho Djajusman and the Commander of the Jakarta Regional Military Command, Djadja Suparman, coordinated other militia groups.<sup>29</sup>

The job of the *Pam Swakarsa* and other militias was to prevent anti-Habibie groups from occupying the Parliament complex and emulating the students' success in bringing down the Soeharto regime. In a dossier presented to the media shortly after the breakout of the Semanggi Incident I, the government accused a loose coalition of anti-Habibie groups of planning to use students to occupy the Parliament complex to force Habibie's resignation.<sup>30</sup> Realizing that there would be public condemnation if security forces had to quell protesters by force, the initial plan of the *Pam Swakarsa* was to position militia members at the forefront of security line-ups so that they would face the protesters.

Financial support to fund the *Pam Swakarsa* operation came from several Muslim businessmen and politicians as well as members of the Cendana family, including Tutut. Tutut even sent her own civilian militia, *Satgas Tebas*, to participate in the *Pam Swakarsa* along with *Pemuda Pancasila*, *Pemuda Panca Marga* and FKPPi, all of whom were known to have had close links with her brother, Bambang Trihatmodjo.<sup>31</sup> The fact that the Cendana family joined the fray indicated a temporary rapprochement between the Soeharto family and the Wiranto-Habibie alliance as they came to face one common adversary: anti-government protesters that demanded the trial of Soeharto, the end of military representation in the legislatures and the end of Habibie's presidency.

The SI MPR opened on Heroes Day, 10 November, with a bloody clash between student protesters and the *Pam Swakarsa*, which sparked public outcry against them. The intensity of public pressure forced nearly all the militia groups to withdraw from the *Pam Swakarsa*, except the *Furkon*. However, another clash between the *Furkon* and mass protesters occurred two days later in the East Jakarta suburb of Cawang, which led to tragic deaths of three *Pam Swakarsa* members. The incident forced security authorities to withdraw the aggressive *Furkon* militia and abandoned the plan to use them to quell the student and mass protests.<sup>32</sup>

Another tragedy, which was to remain unresolved in the next five years, occurred a few days after the clash of 10 November. At around 6.00 p.m. on Friday, 13 November, soldiers opened fire on unarmed mass protestors as they tried to break the security barricade near the Semanggi flyover bridge, killing 15 people and injured at least 240 others, known later as the Semanggi I Incident. As usual, the military only admitted that its soldiers violated standard operating procedures but refused to explain the extent of the violations to the public. However, a leaked police investigation indicated that the lethal bullets were fired from M-16-A1 rifles at the hands of the *Kostrad* soldiers, but no information was given for the motive of the shootings.<sup>33</sup>

In the end, the new alliance of Cendana-Habibie-Wiranto suffered heavy defeat. Under intense public pressure after the bloody tragedy, the legislators had no options but

to pass MPR Decree No. XI/1998. Under the Decree, the government was mandated to investigate the wealth of Soeharto, his family and his cronies. Habibie reportedly made repeated telephone calls to his people at Golkar in a desperate attempt to prevent the passing of the decree but to no avail.<sup>34</sup> Similarly, the military legislators under Yudhoyono's command only succeeded in blocking the decision to end the military's representation in the legislatures immediately but they had to accept a drastic slash to the number of their seats. In a clear indication of the return to power of political Islam, the Muslim lobby managed to pass an MPR decree repealing the *asas tunggal* principle, which paved way for the mushrooming of Muslim political parties in the 1999 elections.

Internally, the Semanggi I Incident provided a fresh impetus for the anti-Wiranto circles around Habibie to put fresh pressure for his dismissal. A number of ministers took up the students' demand for Wiranto's dismissal, accusing him of failing to carry out his job, which in turn undermined Habibie's legitimacy. Wiranto made an emotional defence before a cabinet session on the morning after the incident, arguing that had he failed to prevent the students from entering the Parliament complex, Habibie's presidency would have become history, and "challenged" the president to give his final verdict. To his advisers' disappointment, Habibie accepted Wiranto's defence and empowered him to move against the National Front figures suspected to have orchestrated the subversive plan.<sup>35</sup> A number of National Front-linked figures such as retired generals Kemal Idris, Roch Basoeki Mangoenpoerojo and Ali Sadikin were summoned for questioning, but later released without charges.

Nevertheless, the return of political Islam and Habibie's blunder in unleashing its "negative" forces through the formation of Muslim militias as well as the passing of a constitutional mandate to bring Soeharto to court all contributed to the weakening of Habibie's grip on power in the second half of his rule. On 22 November, a clash broke out in the Central Jakarta suburb of Ketapang, which resulted in 13 people dead, several injuries, and seven churches, some schools and a few other buildings destroyed. More seriously, what began as a brawl between two criminal gangs who happened to hail from Maluku but belonged to different religions, Islam and Christian, deteriorated into what is believed to be a series of the worst sectarian and communal conflicts that Indonesia has ever seen.

One week after the Ketapang Incident, another sectarian conflict broke out in Kupang, West Timor, where Catholic rioters attacked the Muslims, destroyed 15 mosques, dozens of Islamic schools and residences and sent at least 3,000 Muslims fleeing the predominantly Catholic area. According to a document of an independent investigation obtained by *Tajuk* magazine, the riots were premeditated and groups with links to the Cendana family were allegedly involved. The document also quoted an oral testimony by one Muslim activist who claimed to have attended a meeting with a few Cendana-linked minions where they planned to start other riots in a number of places, including Alor in West Timor and Ambon in Maluku.<sup>36</sup>

Coincidentally, a few days after the article was published, riots actually broke out in the Maluku capital of Ambon when a brawl between two Muslim and Christian youngsters triggered a Christian attack on Muslims just as they were celebrating the end of the holy month of Ramadan with a feast on 19 January 1999. In no time at all, bloody sectarian conflict tore down the centuries-long religious and cultural harmony in Ambon and spread to the other Maluku islands. The conflict lasted for nearly three years, during which at least 5,000 people (perhaps as many as 10,000) were killed and close to 700,000 people (about one-third of the population of 2.1 million) became

internal refugees, before the warring parties were persuaded to sign a peace agreement in February 2002.<sup>37</sup>

Suspicion that some criminal elements with ties to the Cendana family were involved in a number of riots was widely shared among the public, the government and security officials alike. Shortly after the outbreak of riots, Jakarta sent an intelligence team to Maluku to investigate its origins. The team came up with a detailed report about the complex web of local, national and international actors, who were allegedly involved in provoking the riots, including groups and individuals with alleged ties to the Cendana family.<sup>38</sup> In fact, top security officials, including top security minister Feisal Tanjung and head of *Bakin* Z.A. Maulani presented similar reports to Habibie and used them for yet another desperate attempt to get Wiranto dismissed, arguing that he was the biggest stumbling block in investigating the Cendana family. As usual, Habibie turned them down.<sup>39</sup>

Wiranto, on the other hand, insisted that he lacked any incriminating evidence to implicate the Cendana family despite the fact that his people had arrested more than 500 provocateurs suspected to have incited 98 incidences of riots in 1998 alone.<sup>40</sup> Wiranto complained that since the draconian Anti-Subversion Law was repealed in June 1998, the security apparatus faced significant legal loopholes, as existing laws had failed to provide an adequate legal umbrella to deal with such clandestine operations.<sup>41</sup> But a year later, Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono reiterated Tanjung and Maulani's claims, saying that he had read the reports of *Bakin*, *Bais* and other intelligence agencies, and concluded that Soeharto's cronies were indeed involved in a series of riots throughout the country to destabilize the government. However, just like Wiranto, Sudarsono admitted that there had been no incriminating evidence to implicate the Cendana family.<sup>42</sup>

Nonetheless, the sectarian and communal conflicts that pitted Muslims against Christians in the world's most populous Muslim country have given impetus to the rise of Islamic extremism and the mushrooming of militant Muslim militias, whose early existence was brought about by a presidential approval. The widely-shared perception that secular and non-Muslim forces had been trying to undermine a Muslim president continued to nurture suspicion among Muslims that non-Muslim forces—both local and international—have been trying to undermine Islam in Indonesia. Most Muslim militias felt compelled to join the complex fray of sectarian conflicts to fulfil a self-appointed task to defend their Muslim brethren and so were able to draw recruits from the former *Pam Swakarsa* militia and obtain financial and logistical support from a wide segment of the Muslim community easily. Their activities presented Indonesia with a serious security challenge when some of the militias became entangled with international terrorist networks, long after Habibie's fall.

## THE EAST TIMOR DEBACLE

Just after surviving a major political test, Habibie embarked on a much riskier endeavour: to settle the more-than-two-decades-old issue of East Timor once and for all. On 27 January 1999, the tired-looking Foreign Minister Ali Alatas announced a shocking government decision: If the people of East Timor rejected the offer of extended autonomy proposed by the Indonesian government, they could choose Option II, that is, to secede peacefully from Indonesia.<sup>43</sup> Earlier in a heated cabinet debate, Alatas had failed to convince his colleagues and President Habibie that the proposal was too premature.<sup>44</sup> The decision shocked Indonesians, East Timorese and the world alike as it contradicted the government's earlier proposal to grant an extended autonomy, known as Option I,

to the restive province, which was delivered in June 1998 as a fresh Indonesian initiative to break the long stalemate. More shockingly, the proposal was announced while Indonesian diplomats in New York were trying to convince their sceptical Portuguese counterparts and the United Nation's Secretary-General Kofi Annan of their government's sincerity to grant genuine autonomy to East Timor.

The question is: What prompted Habibie to make such a risky decision?

There are a number of theories about Habibie's political motives, from the rational to the bizarre. But a careful examination of a number of events that preceded his drastic decision indicates that he was driven by both pragmatic and tactical calculations, in spite of their failed implementations on the ground.

The decision was prompted by Australian Prime Minister John Howard's letter dated 19 December 1998, sent in response to Habibie's Option I proposal, in which he urged Jakarta to hold a vote in East Timor that included an option to separate from Indonesia after a period of extended autonomy. Later, in a meeting with Habibie in Bali on 27 April 1999, Howard reasserted his position, and even went on to say that Australia would withdraw its official recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor. Soon, the U.S., the European Union and the U.N., which basically insisted that the people of East Timor must be given the rights of self-determination and eventually their independence, followed Australia's new position.

Howard's letter angered Habibie, who interpreted the drastic policy change as an indication of Canberra's lack of goodwill in maintaining warm ties between the two countries and a denial of its earlier policies. From the outset, as recent declassified documents now show, Australia, along with the U.S. and its West European allies as well as other ASEAN countries, had quietly approved Soeharto's annexation of East Timor under the guise of preventing the emergence of a communist regime in its backyard.<sup>45</sup> While the U.N. officially considered East Timor a "non-governing territory", Australia was one of the few countries that recognized it as the 27th province of Indonesia, and even signed a mutual treaty with Jakarta to exploit mineral resources at the Timor Gap in 1989.

So, at 3.00 a.m. on 25 January 1999, the workaholic Habibie wrote a disposition to his ministers, asking them to study Howard's letter and to consider that if after 22 years of integration the issue of East Timor continued to be a burden, perhaps it would be wiser to let it secede gracefully from Indonesia.<sup>46</sup> A few hours later, a special politics and security meeting chaired by Tanjung discussed Habibie's disposition, which concluded with an endorsement of the idea to hold an immediate vote on East Timor's future status, but with a suggestion to discuss its possible consequences thoroughly.<sup>47</sup> Two days later, Habibie chaired a limited cabinet session on security with the East Timor issue as the sole item on the agenda.

As he later explained in a series of public statements, Habibie insisted that the Option II proposal was a win-win solution for Indonesia. While Alatas described the East Timor problem as "a pebble in the shoe", Habibie made a more blunt analogy: East Timor was an appendix infection in the sick Indonesian body, hence its immediate removal would help to heal the country's multiple illnesses. Thus he argued that the sooner Indonesia removed the "infection", the sooner its "diplomatic shoes" would be freed from "the pebble" as all international pressure would be lifted, if Option I was won. But even if it had lost, Indonesia would still win, as it would still be freed from domestic and international pressures and its losses would be minimal compared to the political and economic costs of keeping East Timor in Indonesia.<sup>48</sup>

Politically, Habibie pointed out that despite Jakarta's all-out efforts at convincing

the world of its success in developing East Timor, the U.N. had never recognized its sovereignty over the tiny former Portuguese colony. Despite their initial support, the Western countries quickly turned their backs on Jakarta when gross human-rights violations resulting from massive military operations in East Timor triggered international condemnation of the Soeharto regime. Since then, the East Timor issue had always been attached as an unofficial string of conditionality for Western aid, which eventually prompted Soeharto to disband the donor consortium IGGI (Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia) in 1992, after its chairman, Dutch Minister J.P. Pronk, threatened to cut off aid following the outbreak of the Santa Cruz incident.

Economically, Habibie argued that despite developmental aid of millions of dollars that Jakarta had pumped into East Timor over two decades—more than it gave to any other province—it still failed to win the hearts and minds of the East Timorese. Against such a backdrop, he rejected Howard's proposal that Indonesia should grant an extended autonomy status to the province for another 10 to 15 years before holding a vote, arguing that the ailing Indonesian economy could not sustain the political and economic burden of East Timor much longer. And if the East Timorese would eventually opt for independence, as the world seemed to have made it clear, then it would be better to do it sooner than later.<sup>49</sup>

From the outset, Habibie had made a once-and-for-all solution for East Timor the top priority of his administration's foreign policy, just as the settlement of the confrontation with Malaysia was the top of Soeharto's priority lists in his first days in power. This explains his decision to come up with the Option I proposal in June, only a few weeks after he assumed power. Earlier, in 1994, Alatas proposed a special autonomy for East Timor to Soeharto, but it was turned down.

However, Habibie was too shrewd a politician to simply act out of democratic conviction. Despite the rhetoric rationale, it was obvious that his political future was the primary consideration of his decision as under intense domestic pressure, Habibie needed to score major international points to compensate for his political weaknesses at the home front. Habibie had liberated Indonesian politics more than anyone could have expected. He freed political prisoners, liberated the media, repealed the much-detested Anti-Subversion Law, revised the New Order's repressive political bills and drafted new legislation, including laws on elections and regional autonomy. In the economic sector, his team fared even better. In six months, they managed to prevent a total collapse of the economy by stabilizing the currency at nearly half of its pre-crisis value and brought down the inflation rate from over 80 per cent a year to a manageable 10–15 per cent. Yet public controversy over his legitimacy lingered on.

With the initiative to settle the issue of East Timor democratically and the promise to turn Indonesia into the world's third largest democracy, Habibie managed to regain a little of the international support for his beleaguered government. On 12 July, after a meeting with American President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Howard said that they both welcomed Habibie's breakthrough proposal and that "Indonesia deserved from the world a little more credit and praise and understanding for its democratic transition".<sup>50</sup> Earlier in February, a few weeks after the announcement of the Option II proposal, the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB, along with other donor countries, injected millions of dollars to help alleviate Indonesia's budget deficit.

In this sense, Habibie's move was indeed a daring political gambit. If he could win an international acknowledgement for Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor in a U.N.-supervised free and fair ballot, Indonesia's appendix infection would indeed

be removed once and for all, and he would take full credit it. But contrary to many analysts' belief that he intended to free East Timor, Habibie realized that he was bound by a constitutional duty to defend Indonesia's territorial integrity. He knew very well that if he failed, his political career would simply end there.

So from the outset, Habibie's policy had been to win international recognition for an extended autonomy status for East Timor. For that, he needed assurances that Jakarta would win it convincingly. He had that guarantee from his closest military confidant, Feisal Tanjung. Contrary to many conspiracy theories claiming that the military objected, and later sabotaged, Habibie's proposal, most of the key generals in the cabinet—all of whom had fought the war in East Timor—endorsed his stand. Also, contrary to a popular claim that it was Habibie's political adviser, Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, who influenced his decision, recent information suggests that it was Tanjung's guarantee that Indonesia could win Option I easily that eventually convinced Habibie to carry on with the idea.<sup>51</sup>

Tanjung based his assessment partly on the fact that during the 1997 elections, voter turnout in East Timor was about 90 per cent—the highest in Indonesia—and more than 90 per cent of them voted for Golkar. In that sense, Tanjung believed that anti-integration supporters were a minority and pro-Jakarta groups could easily outnumber them. Moreover, the military had recruited and armed a number of indigenous groups to help them fight anti-Indonesia guerrillas ever since they began to occupy East Timor. Presumably, Tanjung hoped to emulate the success of the New Order's intelligence chief Ali Moertopo in winning the U.N.-supervised "act of free choice" (*Pepera*) in Irian Jaya in 1969, during which he, then an army captain, had played a significant role in cultivating pro-Indonesia support through intelligence operations.<sup>52</sup>

So when Habibie asked him about Jakarta's chance of winning the East Timor vote, Tanjung reportedly said quite confidently that it stood at 80:20 for pro-integration forces. In fact, Tanjung wrote in his as-told-to autobiography that his main job at the time of the East Timor ballot was to guarantee that pro-integration forces would win. He wrote frankly that when he was asked to make a success of the East Timor ballot, he felt as if he had to do it the second time around, as if he had been born for it. A success, Tanjung said, meant that the ballot "would proceed free, fair and secure as the president had instructed and that the pro-integration forces would win it".<sup>53</sup> Given Tanjung's optimistic assessment, Alatas, who later said that he and Minister of State Secretary Akbar Tanjung were the only ones to disagree with the Option II proposal, recalled that "we were then very convinced that we would win the referendum".<sup>54</sup>

In truth, other generals were far less optimistic than Tanjung. Some of them warned of the poor timing of such a drastic proposal and suggested its postponement until after the June 1999 elections, when it would be clear if the government had the popular mandate. Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid and Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah, who came from the restive provinces of Riau and South Sulawesi respectively, warned that under a situation where the central government's control over the regions was weakening, any province with a troubled relation with Jakarta would interpret an offer of referendum as a chance to break away from Indonesia.<sup>55</sup> In turn, a free East Timor could start a domino effect of disintegration. Indeed, the fear that Indonesia would undergo a balkanization scenario was imminent at that time.

As the military chief, Wiranto warned of the high security risks that might arise from the referendum process, arguing that East Timorese society had been divided and was on the brink of a civil war even before Jakarta annexed the area. He even predicted

a gloomy security scenario if Option I was rejected, knowing that pro-integration East Timorese would never accept it, and suggested that if that happened, security control be handed over to a U.N.-sponsored multinational force, in which Indonesian security would take part. His proposal, however, was overturned when Alatas highlighted the legal complexities that could arise. He eventually gave his cautious endorsement on the condition that, in tribute to the 3,500 soldiers who died in the war, their widows and more than 2,000 handicapped veterans, there should never be any condemnation of the New Order's policy to integrate East Timor.<sup>56</sup> It was likely that Wiranto decided to support the proposal to demonstrate the military's commitment to internal reforms under his leadership, which in turn could boost his political future.

Nevertheless, after a five-hour cabinet session where all arguments were made and debated in a process that Alatas described as "very democratic", Habibie remained resolute. The Option II proposal was announced. In retrospect, Syarwan Hamid admitted that "if he [Tanjung] came up with a less optimistic assessment, I suspect that even though President Habibie had those political and economic calculations, he would have reconsidered the option".<sup>57</sup> It is interesting to note that throughout the process, the Habibie government never consulted the local government and parliament of East Timor, which later triggered a deep sense of betrayal among the East Timorese who chose to stay in Indonesia after East Timor's independence.

The East Timor debate provides an example of how, under *reformasi*, the previously overbearing military had to learn to subject itself to a civilian authority, disillusioned as they were. Later, in their memoirs, Wiranto, Makarim and other officers who had to face domestic and international condemnation for their alleged involvement in the post-ballot human-rights abuses hardly hid their dissatisfaction with Habibie's decision. Wiranto called Habibie's rationale in offering Option II "simplistic", Makarim said it was "impulsive" and Tono Suratman, the commander of Dili military resort, likened it to a lightning in a bright, cloudless sky, that is, simply incomprehensible.<sup>58</sup>

Nevertheless, once the Option II proposal was adopted as a state policy, Wiranto and his generals, just like the disappointed Indonesian diplomats under Alatas, had no other options but to comply. Alatas began the process of tripartite negotiation with his counterpart, Portugal's Jaime Gama, under the auspices of the U.N. On 5 May 1999, they signed an "agreement" that set modalities for the popular consultation—Indonesia rejected the term "referendum"—in East Timor on 8 August.<sup>59</sup> Under the agreement, the Indonesian government was bound to ensure that the vote would proceed in a free, fair and peaceful way. According to Annex 2 of the agreement, the Indonesian police, who was only separated from the military in April, was required to secure the situation in the province in the run up to, during and after the vote, clearly due to the deep suspicion of the TNI and its poor track record.<sup>60</sup>

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan then set up the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee the vote. Accordingly, Habibie formed the Task Force for the Implementation of Popular Consultation in East Timor (*Satgas P3TT*) to act as its counterpart. Formerly called the Security Team for the Implementation of Popular Consultation on Special Autonomy for East Timor (P4OKTT), the Task Force was led by a senior diplomat, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi, and comprised representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security and the military headquarters.<sup>61</sup> It turned out that the team was part of government operations—both overt and covert—that included almost all state institutions both in Jakarta and East Timor to ensure Indonesia's victory in the ballot.

According to Presidential Decree No. 43/1999 dated 18 May 1999, the inter-departmental team was coordinated by and answerable to Feisal Tanjung.

Tanjung's pivotal roles in the Habibie government's operations in East Timor had been generally overlooked by most analysts and human rights activists alike, as attention was focused on Wiranto. But if we examine the structures of the P4OKTT and the Task Force P3TT as well as the presently available military documents, we can discern two separate yet intertwined chains of command of political and military intelligence operations dedicated to secure Habibie's policy in East Timor. Wiranto was in charge of security throughout the popular consultation process but Tanjung was responsible for ensuring that Jakarta would win it.

While Wiranto carried a high-profile overt operation to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table in order to project an impression that Indonesia was committed to a free ballot, Tanjung launched covert operation to secure Jakarta's victory. As the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Tanjung had the authority to devise the policy and coordinate its implementation, while as Defence Minister and TNI Chief under his coordination, Wiranto provided the expertise needed to implement it. At Tanjung's request, Wiranto sent top intelligence officers, Zacky Makarim, Glennly Kairupan and Andreas Sugianto, as security advisers to the team—all known for their expertise in East Timor matters. Interestingly, Major-General (retd.) H.R. Garnadi, one of Tanjung's confidants, who later triggered controversy due to a "scorched-earth" document that he allegedly authored, sat as the deputy chairman of the task force. As numerous documents and confessions from former militia leaders indicated, the team was tasked with recruiting, training and financing pro-integration militias, which it did so in close cooperation with local military and police commanders as well as other government institutions both in Jakarta and Dili.<sup>62</sup> In short, it was a coordinated and all-out government's effort to ensure its victory in the ballot.

In this context, as a former military adviser to Habibie explained, human-rights activists were after the wrong guy when they called for Wiranto's prosecution for his involvement in the post-ballot atrocities and left out Tanjung. "Wiranto had hot ash fallen on him," he said.<sup>63</sup> Australian veteran journalist Hamish McDonald gave rather similar assessment and named Wiranto "a fall guy" in terms of political, if not legal, responsibility over the post-ballot atrocities. Quoting classified Australian intelligence data obtained from intercepted communications between Indonesian military officers and militia leaders during the East Timor crisis, McDonald concluded that Wiranto was somewhat "out of the loop" of the entire militia campaign. Instead, the intelligence data gave fresh details about Tanjung's pivotal role in "instigating, planning and executing the militia campaign".<sup>64</sup> However, judging from the fact that most of the officers involved in the militia campaign were in active service and that it was Wiranto who handpicked them, it was more likely that he knew about the operation, although he was not in charge of it.

Nevertheless, the policy of providing tacit support for the pro-integration militias stood at the centre of the government's flawed strategy in East Timor, which eventually placed Indonesia in a head-on collision with the world. For its part, Jakarta alleged that instead of overseeing an impartial popular vote process, UNAMET carried an "East Timor liberation" agenda and deliberately took the side of the anti-integration groups. It also suspected that foreign powers, especially Australia, had launched covert intelligence activities in the area long before the ballot was held to provide support for the anti-integration groups. The TNI managed to detect a number of "black flights", which

allegedly came from Australian territory, carrying logistical and arm supplies for the anti-integration groups but failed to repel them due to lack of adequate armaments.<sup>65</sup> This, in turn, led to a near-universal suspicion in Indonesia about the existence of an international conspiracy to liberate East Timor to serve the big powers' geopolitical interests.<sup>66</sup>

The rest of the world, however, accused the Indonesian military of trying to sabotage the ballot, pointing to the fact that most of the perpetrators of the violence were pro-Jakarta militias. As the incidence of violence increased, so was the international pressure on Habibie. In late July, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth, met with Habibie and warned that if the ballot were derailed by security problems, it would have consequences and affect Indonesia's relations with a number of countries around the world, including the U.S. Washington has reportedly considered a plan to send 15,000 marines to East Timor before or after the popular vote, under the pretext of protecting the East Timorese people from the Indonesian people.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, the World Bank threatened to cut off aid to Indonesia if the ballot were disrupted.<sup>68</sup> However, the World Bank denied that some of its loan to Indonesia in the form of the Social Security Net (JPS) had been misused to finance the militias in East Timor, as some NGOs had accused.

Indeed the ballot was postponed twice due to security and administrative considerations. Finally, on 30 August, 451,792 East Timorese all over the globe went to polling booths and voted for their future. On 4 September, three days ahead of the agreed schedule, the results were announced: 78.5 per cent of the voters rejected the autonomy offer and only 21.5 per cent accepted it. In other words, Indonesia suffered a humiliating defeat and lost East Timor for good.

A few hours after the shocking results were announced, pro-integration militias as well as some military and police elements, began to destroy Dili and other cities in East Timor, and in their "scorched earth" (*bumi hangus*) actions, razed nearly 70 per cent of civilian buildings to the ground and set them on fire. In turn, it prompted the mass exodus of at least 250,000 people to West Timor in what was alleged to be a forced expulsion in order to create a partition for East Timor. However, contrary to Western media reports that thousands of people died in the destruction, the government-sanctioned Commission of Inquiry on the Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP HAM Timor Timur) recorded that 142 people died in September 1999, most of them killed before the poll results were announced.<sup>69</sup>

Habibie blamed the atrocities on U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's unilateral decision to advance the date of announcement of the poll results three days ahead of the agreed schedule. Habibie complained that Annan called him only one hour before the announcement, so he was pressed to accept it.<sup>70</sup> The decision prompted speculation among pro-integration militias that UNAMET had rigged the polls, hence their anger when they had to face such a humiliating defeat.

More importantly, the security in East Timor was put under the command of the police, as required by the New York Agreement, who was incapable of handling such large-scale destruction. Shortly after the destruction began, Wiranto reversed the command back to the military, but the fresh security reinforcements that he sent in anticipation of post-ballot riots were still on their way to Dili and failed to reach the capital on time because UNAMET approved the reinforcements only two days before. That left the area under the control of mostly indigenous troops who had worked closely with the pro-Jakarta groups, which contributed to their reluctance to stop the destruction.

However, unlike his generals, Habibie acknowledged defeat gracefully, saying that the shocking results indicated that East Timorese had never felt to be part of Indonesia.<sup>71</sup>

A few hours after the announcement, Habibie addressed his countrymen and the world, announcing his government's acceptance of the unprecedented loss of an Indonesian territory, "even though I also realize how bitter this must be for the wide segment of the East Timorese people as well as for the people of Indonesia". He also ordered the TNI and the Police Chiefs to take firm action against all parties "which seek to dishonour the nation, undermine the authority of the government and the foundations of security and public order in East Timor".<sup>72</sup>

But the destruction of East Timor culminated the total failure of the Habibie government's strategy to settle the issue of East Timor peacefully. Instead of removing the pebble from its diplomatic shoes, Indonesia was now forced to face virtual international isolation when a U.N. Assembly Session in September unanimously condemned Jakarta for the atrocities in Dili. Jakarta implemented a military emergency status in the province to prevent further atrocities on 7 September but was compelled to accept an Australian-led multinational force (Interfet) to secure the area. When the first Australian soldiers set foot on the shores of Dili on 20 September, Indonesia's presence in East Timor came to an unofficial and inglorious end.

In the end, Habibie, Wiranto and the military had to pay the highest price for East Timor debacle. Although there was some international sympathy for Habibie due to a widely shared perception that his genuine intention to free East Timor had been sabotaged by the military, he failed to survive the domestic wrath for his failure. On 19 November, the SU MPR voted in overwhelming majority to reject his "accountability" speech, citing his failure to defend Indonesia's territorial integrity as one of the reasons, and sealed off his chance of a re-election as president. Wiranto managed to avoid the political consequences of the East Timor failure for a while, but on 31 January 2000, the KPP HAM Timor Timur, whose inception was intended to avoid the formation of an international tribunal on human rights and approved by Habibie, implicated him in its report.

The KPP HAM Timor Timur concluded that "gross violations of human rights had been carried out in a planned, systematic and large-scale way in the form of mass murder, torture and assault, forced disappearances, violence against women and children (including rape and sexual slavery), forced migration, a scorched-earth policy and the destruction of property". It identified five specific cases of serious human-rights violations and recommended that the Attorney-General commence formal investigation of direct involvement of 33 people in the crimes against humanity. They included the Governor of East Timor Abilio Soares, the Commander of the Udayana Army Regional Command Major-General Adam Damiri, five district heads, 14 army officers, one non-commissioned officer, one police officer and 10 militia leaders. It also recommended the investigation of Wiranto, Zacky Makarim, Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Johny Lumintang and H.R. Garnadi for failing to prevent the occurrence of and/or indirect involvement in the aforementioned crimes.<sup>73</sup>

Wiranto and his generals rejected the report, which since its initiation had fuelled wild speculations in Jakarta and abroad about attempts at a military coup.<sup>74</sup> In their public defence, and later through their memoirs, the generals insisted they only carried out a "state duty" to win the vote in East Timor. As for the Dili atrocities, they pointed out that there had been no evidence that the scorched-earth actions were directed from Jakarta.

According to Wiranto, the KPP HAM had misinterpreted a “contingency plan” signed by Lumintang in anticipation of post-ballot security disturbances and the so-called Garnadi Document as plans to carry out the scorched-earth and forced-evacuation policies. In truth, he said, the contingency plan, including evacuation of Indonesian residents and pro-integration supporters to West Nusa Tenggara, was part of the military’s standard operating procedure to anticipate the worst scenario. And that the so-called forced evacuation turned out to be a voluntary action as a large number of the evacuees refused to be repatriated when East Timor became independent.<sup>75</sup> As for the Garnadi Document, Makarim gave a rather feeble defence, claiming that it was a fabrication by an “anti-integration sympathizer” who worked for the Indonesian government. However, he insisted that its content was part of the standard operating procedure to save national assets and Indonesian personnel, although he stopped short of explaining the controversial words “planning and securing the withdrawal route, if possible destroying vital facilities or objects”.<sup>76</sup> In short, Wiranto and Makarim charged that the KPP HAM report was heavily biased and that it had obviously carried an international agenda to discredit the TNI.

But in response to the report, Habibie’s successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, suspended Wiranto in February 2000 and played a zigzag game with him that eventually forced him to submit his resignation from the cabinet.<sup>77</sup> Wiranto, however, managed to elude trial. After a long and tedious process of passing the Laws on Human Rights and Human Rights Court in Parliament and the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal on human-rights violations in East Timor, the Attorney-General’s Office decided to process only the five cases recommended by the KPP HAM Timor Timur. In other words, instead of investigating the state policy that led to gross human-rights violations, it chose to narrow its focus on the ordinary criminal cases of murder, which effectively omitted Wiranto and the other generals from the prosecution list.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, the East Timor issue kept haunting Wiranto and contributed to his failure in the presidential race in 2004.

In March 2002, the ad hoc tribunal on Human Rights Violations in East Timor began to try 18 military and police officers, civilian officials and militia members. A few months later, the court began to deliver its verdict. It acquitted most low- to middle-ranking military officers but sentenced the highest holders of authority and security in the East Timor region, Adam Damiri and Abilio Soares, to prison, to the disappointment of the military and human-rights activists alike.

The two cases drew public controversy. In Damiri’s case, the prosecutor had asked the court to acquit him but the judges decided to sentence him to 10 years of imprisonment. As for Soares, he managed to earn a signed letter from East Timor President Xanana Gusmao, who testified to his innocence of involvement. Yet the court sentenced him to three years of imprisonment.<sup>79</sup> All the convicted petitioned to the High Court and eventually the Supreme Court, which since December 2003 has acquitted 12 out of the 18, excluding Soares who became the first of the accused to serve his sentence in July 2004.<sup>80</sup> The incapacity of the ad hoc tribunal as well as the lack of political will on the part of both the government and the military to get to the bottom of the issue have contributed to their failure to serve justice for the East Timorese.<sup>81</sup>

Despite its success in evading the demand of justice, the military still suffered the heaviest blow. Shortly after the Dili atrocities, the American Congress passed the Leahy Amendment, banning military-to-military cooperation between the two countries, which was followed by the European Union. Indonesia severed military ties with Australia and revoked a treaty of military cooperation signed under the Soeharto regime. Since

then, the once warm relationship between the two big countries across the Pacific Ocean nose-dived to its lowest ebb. The severance of ties with the major powers led to virtual international isolation of the Indonesian military, which eventually took its toll on the institution as it was highly dependent on Western countries for logistic supplies and maintenance of its ageing equipment. More importantly, the military's commitment to carry out internal reforms, including the termination of its deeply-entrenched culture of impunity, will always be judged against its compliance with the legal settlements of the East Timor issue.

## THE FALL OF HABIBIE

With his attempts at settling the East Timor issue ending in chaotic and humiliating defeat, Habibie's days were numbered. In reality, his chance of re-election actually diminished when his party, Golkar, failed to win the June 1999 elections, the first free and fair elections since 1955. Stripped of its military and bureaucratic support, Golkar was still successful in maintaining a runner-up position behind the rejuvenated PDI, now called the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), under the leadership of Megawati Soekarnoputri. PDI-P collected 34 per cent of total votes, Golkar 22 per cent, Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB) 12.4 per cent, the PPP, 10 per cent, and Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN), 7 per cent. However, as the president and vice-president were elected by the MPR, Megawati's victory did not automatically lead to her election as president. So the period between June and October 1999, when the SU MPR was to be held, was tense as all political leaders tried to grapple with this unprecedented situation where there was no single majority and that they had to learn to form a coalition to win the presidential election.

As the "winner" of the elections, Megawati Soekarnoputri, had the best chance to form a ruling coalition to ensure her victory in the October 1999 presidential election as she had yet to secure the simple majority needed to smoothly claim the seat. All political leaders tried to knock at her door, offering their support for her leadership. The first to do so was her long-time friend and ally, Abdurrahman Wahid—affectionately known as Gus Dur—whose party failed to perform as expected but from the outset had indicated his support for Megawati. During its leadership meeting in July, the PKB announced Megawati as its presidential candidate, cementing ties between the two parties that had been formed even before the elections began. Prior to the June elections, pro-reform activists had tried to bring together Wahid, Megawati and Rais in a coalition to block Golkar's chance of winning it. While Wahid and Rais—whose personal relationship had improved significantly—appeared to support the idea and agreed to work together, Megawati turned it down as she had always distrusted Rais.

However, in early July, a few days after the results of the June polls were announced, Wahid and Rais tried to engage Megawati in what was intended to be the Ciganjur Declaration II.<sup>82</sup> But once again, Megawati sent a lukewarm response. Perhaps she now felt more confident of her own victory and needed no ally to sail through the SU MPR. Megawati's reluctance paved way for the formation of the Central Axis under the leadership of Rais. After meeting Wahid in mid July, Rais announced the birth of the Central Axis comprising the Muslim-based parties, the PKB, PPP, PAN, Crescent and Star Party (PBB) and Justice Party (PK), which would stand as an alternative between Megawati and Habibie.<sup>83</sup> Rais announced that the Central Axis would nominate Wahid as its presidential candidate.

The alternative candidate was needed, said Rais, because there was strong public

rejection against both Habibie and Megawati. Pro-reform groups had always rejected Habibie but Megawati's chance of rising to presidency raised concerns among some Muslim groups who had always distrusted her commitment to Islam. Contrary to a widely shared perception that rejection over Megawati's nomination was mostly due to her gender, most Muslim leaders actually objected to her perceived anti-Islam attitudes. They feared that the secular-nationalist Megawati would emulate Soeharto's policy of sidelining the newly resurrected political Islam, so they decided to play up the gender issue.<sup>84</sup> In this context, Wahid possessed the least public disapproval as he was acceptable to almost every segment of society, in addition to his unblemished international image. But in his typically confusing attitude, Wahid accepted the nomination, while at the same time maintaining his support for Megawati.

In the beginning, few political observers considered the Central Axis a serious political contender to Megawati and Habibie. In truth, until the very last minute, its own leaders had not been convinced that it could really take off due to deep ideological and personal distrust among them, especially between Wahid and Rais. Only after an intensive lobby between Rais' party and the respected NU *kiais*, whose political and supposedly divine-guided blessings were instrumental in convincing the PKB and NU's constituencies to support Wahid's candidacy, did it stand as a real political alternative to the two competing camps. For his part, Wahid believed that his rise to presidency was somewhat pre-ordained, and he actively sought both worldly and "divine" support for it.<sup>85</sup>

But Wahid's decision to maintain ties with Megawati turned out to be an excellent strategy as, almost at the same time, Golkar's chairman Akbar Tanjung, who was fighting an internal battle within his own party, also tried to engage Megawati in a coalition. Tanjung, tried to strengthen his position by striking an alliance with Megawati, in his efforts to revitalize a Golkar that had been badly tarnished by the shocking revelation of the alleged involvement of "Habibie's success team" in the embezzlement of state funds amounting to USD73 million in the Bank Bali scandal that began to unravel in July.<sup>86</sup>

In spite of his failure in East Timor, Habibie was determined to run for the October presidential election, and his "success team" had been working overtime to ensure his victory. But resistance against Habibie's re-election was also mounting inside the party. Due to its alleged involvement in the Bank Bali financial scam that led to the suspension of IMF-World Bank-IDB programmes until the government conducted a thorough investigation on it, the pro-Habibie faction earned a sobriquet "Black Golkar", while the anti-Habibie camp, widely perceived as trying to offer an alternative candidate, was called the "White Golkar".

However, Megawati's lack of political experience and rather unusual combination of political naivety and arrogance contributed to her passive response towards coalition initiatives. Her cold response towards Wahid was understandable. Despite their close personal friendship, she was often hurt by his lack of appreciation for her qualities. Moreover, she had always distrusted Rais and his Muslim-based alliance. But an offer of coalition with Tanjung's Golkar was seen by many analysts as a sound political strategy to ensure her smooth election as president. If it materialized, she could contain Habibie's challenge. However, in response to Tanjung's offer in early August, she indirectly turned it down, saying that at present her mind was so preoccupied by the plight of the East Timorese, whom she had just visited, that she could not think of anything else.<sup>87</sup> Megawati's cold shoulder forced Tanjung to turn to Rais and his Central Axis for political coalition, which eventually dashed her chance of becoming president. As a

former chairman of the HMI, Tanjung, and the “greener” Golkar under his leadership, found it easier to form an alliance with the Muslim-based Central Axis.

As the General Session of the MPR drew near, tension was rising at the grassroots level between Megawati’s followers and Habibie’s supporters, inciting fear of a bloody horizontal conflict within the already-divided society. In some parts of East Java, PDI-P’s stronghold, Megawati’s supporters launched a “blood fingerprint” campaign and vowed to fight for her election as president until the last drop of their blood. PDI-P’s Task Force (*Satgas PDI-P*) was reported to have prepared and trained tens of thousands of personnel to perform “street parliament” pressure to ensure her election at the SU MPR.<sup>88</sup> But Habibie’s supporters, who had been prepared since their participation in the November 1998 SI MPR, were undeterred. Gathered under the umbrella of the United Muslim Front (FUIB), which comprised 32 Muslim organizations and boasted nearly one million followers, they were determined to face Megawati’s supporters if they moved to force her election as president.<sup>89</sup>

How did the military respond to the question of another presidential succession in just one year?

Despite his damaged international image, domestically Wiranto maintained much of his political clout, as all political parties acknowledged the military’s political significance. As mentioned earlier, Habibie had repeatedly turned down his advisers’ recommendation to sideline Wiranto. Moreover, after having gone through a number of political perils together, their “political marriage of convenience” appeared to have blossomed into genuine camaraderie.

In late September, a few days before the SU MPR, Habibie asked Wiranto to become his running mate in the upcoming presidential election. Habibie offered Wiranto a similar position before the SI MPR 1998 but Wiranto turned it down for strategic reasons as it would strip him of control of the military.<sup>90</sup> This time, however, Habibie had to make concessions to Tanjung, whose formal leadership of Golkar was equally pivotal in ensuring his victory, too. So Habibie came up with a strange proposal: both Tanjung and Wiranto would be vice-presidents if he were elected president.<sup>91</sup> Finally, in a heated leadership meeting only a few days ahead of the SU MPR, Golkar decided to nominate Habibie as its single presidential candidate, and chose four figures to be his running mate: Wiranto, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Akbar Tanjung and Sultan Heman-gkubuwono X. On the following day, Habibie announced that he had chosen Wiranto as his vice-presidential candidate.

In fact, both Wiranto and Tanjung were reluctant to accept the offer as they—separately—had been making contact with the “more legitimate” presidential candidate, Megawati. Wiranto’s contacts with Megawati were made with the help of two civilian figures, academic Dr. Roosita Noor and businessman Indra Bambang Utoyo. A personal friend of Wiranto, Dr. Noor was a well-known figure among the military generals as some of them had been her students at the National Defence Institute. As a chairman of the FKPPi and a close friend of Soeharto’s middle son Bambang Trihatmodjo, Utoyo had known Wiranto since his days as the president’s aide. As mentioned earlier, Utoyo represented the aspirations of Edi Sudradjat’s red-and-white generals who had been kicked out of Golkar by Habibie and his green generals. So they saw Megawati as a natural ally. Utoyo also hailed from Palembang, where Megawati’s husband, Taufik Kiemas, came from.

Thus, through a network of personal and primordial connections, Dr. Noor and Utoyo worked to bring Wiranto and Megawati into a political alliance. After several

meetings, the two leaders reached a common understanding, although stopping short of striking a formal agreement as Wiranto had to maintain the military's political neutrality.<sup>92</sup> Interestingly, Wiranto's name was also on the Central Axis' vice-presidential list. A few days before the SU MPR was held, Wahid called Wiranto and asked him to become his running mate in the presidential election, saying that the request came from the respected NU *kiais*. According to Wiranto, he turned it down politely.<sup>93</sup> Subsequently, Wiranto had the best chance of becoming vice-president, as all sides tried to woo the support of the military.

Internally, however, the military was divided over the issue of Wiranto's political ambition. The generals in the "conservative" camp—both retired and active—endorsed his possible rise to a higher political office, arguing that Indonesia needed a decisive hand to steer it through the rocky path of reform. They believed in the self-appointed praetorian duty to save the nation from collapsing, just as their predecessors claimed to have done in 1965. In fact, a number of "intervention" proposals have been discussed internally, although none of them had been implemented due to the drastic changes going on at the political stage.

In November 1998, several prominent retired generals urged Wiranto to emulate the Turkish Scenario, a reference to the Turkish military's "tradition" of benevolent intervention by taking over from a weak civilian government to pave way for the rise of a more capable administration. In a meeting shortly after the outbreak of the Semanggi I Incident, some retired generals were reported to have urged Wiranto to take over from Habibie and then hold free and fair elections to pave way for the rise of a more legitimate government. Wiranto turned down the proposal, arguing that throughout its history the military had never been tempted to take over power, even during the days of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s when governments rose and fell within months. He had no intention to break the clean track record.<sup>94</sup>

Another proposal that came to the table at Cilangkap was the so-called Fidel Ramos Scenario, a reference to General (retd.) Fidel Ramos, who was credited for having brought stability and economic growth to the Philippines after a turbulent period under civilian President Corazon Aquino. Interestingly, it was Marzuki Darusman, a respected human-rights activist, who brought the idea to the public's attention in May. He argued that Wiranto could become the strongest presidential candidate because the military remained the *de facto* determinant power in Indonesia and that he could help settle the thorny issue of Soeharto's trial. Despite suspicions about Darusman's political motives, Wiranto's circles were said to have seriously discussed the possibility to elevating him to be Indonesia's Ramos.<sup>95</sup> Unlike the Turkish Scenario, which could invite rejection from both inside and outside Indonesia, the Ramos Scenario was far more democratic, as Wiranto could constitutionally participate in a presidential election once he relinquished his active service.

But the younger and arguably more "progressive" officers opposed the proposal, arguing that the time has come for the military to disengage itself fully from politics and limit its role only to ensure that the presidential election proceeded safely. They argued that the military's alleged roles in the East Timor tragedy, followed by another bloody clash with demonstrators protesting Parliament's decision to pass the State Emergency Law—known as the Semanggi II Incident—on 23 September had sent its image to its lowest ebb. Therefore, they insisted that rather than playing politics, Wiranto must instead focus his attention to expedite internal military reforms. Moreover, as the nation was facing a possible horizontal conflict pitting the seculars against the Muslims

that could easily plunge it into another political chaos, the military should reaffirm its neutrality.<sup>96</sup> Aside from the “progressive-conservative” polarization, the military was also divided along religious lines, as the green generals around Habibie once again fought to defend his presidency while their red-and-white counterparts joined the anti-Habibie camp to support Megawati.

All those internal dynamics eventually forced Wiranto to announce his withdrawal from the vice-presidential race as Habibie’s running mate on the eve of the MPR plenary session when it would vote to accept or reject Habibie’s “accountability speech”, to reduce the tension within his institution. It did not mean, however, that Wiranto relinquished his political ambition, as the “one step backward, two steps forward” move was intended to increase his political bargain; with a “free” status, he could become the running mate of other candidates while at the same time maintaining the military’s neutrality.<sup>97</sup>

The strategy, however, failed to be implemented on the ground as the SU MPR began and ended with surprises. From the very beginning, it was obvious that the newfound Central Axis-Golkar alliance, cemented by both pragmatic calculations and ideological concern over the future of political Islam, easily outmanoeuvred the poorly-skilled PDI-P of Megawati. On 16 November, Rais was elected MPR Speaker, beating the PKB’s Matori Abdul Jalil, who defied Wahid’s order to break his alliance with Megawati. The next day, Akbar Tanjung was elected DPR speaker, beating PDI-P’s Sutjipto. PDI-P appeared to strike back when an “internal rebellion” within Golkar and the military’s decision to “vote for security” helped them to force the 20 October plenary session to reject Habibie’s “accountability speech” by an overwhelming majority.<sup>98</sup> In a desperate last attempt to block Megawati’s rise to presidency, Habibie tried to persuade Wiranto, Akbar Tanjung, Amien Rais, Hamzah Haz and Yusril Mahendra to stand as a presidential candidate with Golkar’s support. All of them declined but Tanjung was eventually persuaded to run. A few hours later, Habibie announced his withdrawal from presidential candidacy.

With Habibie out of the way, Megawati’s camp was thrown into a premature euphoria as they seemed to have struck a deal with Tanjung, who promised to bring Golkar to support her. But they were shocked to find out much too late that an eleventh-hour deal between Rais-Wahid and Tanjung would change the delicate balance: Tanjung would agree to support Wahid in exchange for a vice-presidential seat. Moreover, the widely-believed scenario among PDI-P leaders was that at the last minute Wahid would withdraw his candidacy and turn his support for Megawati. It turned out to be one of Wahid’s most infamous political tricks. However, the concern over Wahid’s erratic behaviour had prompted some Axis Force leaders to ask him to take an oath under God’s name that he would stick to his candidacy. Finally, at 2.00 p.m. on 20 October, in the first free and fair presidential election in Indonesia’s history, the MPR voted in favour of Wahid, who beat Megawati by a very narrow margin: 373 against 313 votes.<sup>99</sup>

As the news of Megawati’s tragic defeat spread, her militant red supporters, who had been facing off pro-Habibie green militias in their attempts at encircling the Parliament complex, were thrown into deep shock. A few hours later, small-scale explosions rocked Jakarta, followed by bigger riots in Solo, Rais’s hometown where hundreds of PDI-P supporters razed his mother’s house, and Bali, home to Megawati’s most loyal supporters. The riots and the concern that the country would face prolonged instability forced the political leaders to reconsider earlier political deals, which eventually sealed off both Wiranto and Tanjung’s chance of ever ascending to vice-presidency.

Both Wiranto and Tanjung had entered the vice-presidential race. Wiranto was nominated by the tiny Association of the Muslim Community's Sovereignty faction (FPDU) and Tanjung won Golkar's support. Wiranto was reportedly angered by Tanjung's decision to run for vice-presidency, which violated Golkar's earlier decision to nominate him. Although he had sealed a deal with Tanjung, Wahid had actually preferred Wiranto as his vice-president, giving the reason that Wiranto's loyalty to both Soeharto and Habibie made him a reliable political partner. In contrast, Tanjung was too slick a politician and he had successfully "betrayed" his mentors twice: Soeharto and Habibie. The jokes-loving Wahid likened Wiranto with a dog that never bites his master's hand and Tanjung "an electric eel in oil", too slippery to catch.<sup>100</sup> However, the anger and destruction on the streets forced the Central Axis leaders to accommodate Megawati to prevent further chaos.

In a flurry of negotiations, the newly-elected president Wahid offered an olive branch to Megawati and asked her to become his vice-president. After a long moment of hesitation and indecision, Megawati accepted it on the condition that she would be elected unanimously. When Megawati's requirement was passed on to Central Axis leaders, Hamzah Haz of the PPP, whose party formed the largest of the Central Axis' components but who ended up with no position, objected to it. Moreover, his party had officially rejected Megawati's candidacy. After some tough internal negotiations, Rais came up with a solution. Haz would run as the Central Axis's vice-presidential candidate to prevent any internal disarray but Megawati's victory would be ensured through arrangements with other parties.

At the same time, Wahid contacted Wiranto and Tanjung and asked them to accept the new political deal for the sake of national unity, which they both reluctantly agreed. On the morning of 21 October, Wiranto drafted his withdrawal from the vice-presidential race but he asked the head of F-TNI/Polri Lieutenant-General Hari Sabarno to hold it until further notice. Earlier, his staff had made brief projections and concluded that he only had a very slim chance of winning the race. In addition, a number of veteran generals, including former vice-president Umar Wirahadikusumah met Wiranto and persuaded him to withdraw from the race.<sup>101</sup> Eventually, after consultation with Habibie, Wiranto called Sabarno and instructed him to announce his withdrawal from the race. At the same time, Tanjung, who was facing internal rebellion within his party, including physical attempts on his life, eventually gave up his chase for vice-presidency.

Thus, on 21 October at noon, Megawati Soekarnoputri was sworn in as Indonesia's eighth vice-president after she beat Haz in a convincing victory. The 10 days of political drama in the country's highest legislative body, imperfect as it was, eventually elevated two pro-reform leaders who represented the mainstream powers of Islam and nationalism to the helm of the nation. More importantly, it saved Indonesia from yet another period of political anarchy.

## CONCLUSION

We have discussed the civilian-military relations in the first year of *reformasi*, during which the military was put under the heaviest pressure to carry out internal reform and adapt itself to the changing post-Soeharto polity. In spite of the pressure, we see that some of the reform proposals were produced internally as a result of internal discourse that had taken place even before Soeharto stepped down. The military's first significant concept of reform, known as the ABRI's New Paradigm, indicated its willingness to reformulate its position: from the dominant actor on the political stage to a mere partner

in a role- and power-sharing with civilians. Although the concept did not outline a major overhaul of the military, and some analysts call it “a half-hearted reform” concept, it did set a direction for change and was arguably realistic enough under the context of the political turbulence of the time.

As a number of theorists on civilian-military relations point out, a genuine transition from a military-dominated authoritarian regime to a democratically-elected civilian administration requires a military disengagement from politics and a capable and responsible civilian regime to fill in the vacuum it leaves.<sup>102</sup> In the case of Indonesia, it was clear that while the beleaguered military was forced to redefine its political role, the civilian government under Habibie was too weak to seize the opportunity to consolidate what Samuel Huntington calls an objective civilian control over the military.

Under such circumstances, what we saw instead was a subjective civilian control in the form of symbiotic alliance between Wiranto and Habibie, which largely fitted the “role and political sharing” envisaged by the military’s New Paradigm. Subjected to endless public controversy over his legitimacy, Habibie needed a military umbrella to provide him a defence against repeated attempts at removing him from power. On the other hand, the much weakened military needed a civilian partner in the power sharing, which could provide it with political umbrella against public demands for an immediate end to its previous privileges.

Against such a backdrop, we can understand why Habibie resisted his own advisers’ repeated suggestions to sideline Wiranto and Wiranto resisted repeated internal suggestions—mostly from retired officers—to take over from Habibie. In addition, the two weak leaders were bound by their past ties to Soeharto, who, in spite of his official resignation, was believed—and feared—to be still wielding some influence over the political scene. Under such an unprecedented civilian-military power sharing, it was obvious that the military’s pledge to leave day-to-day politics turned out to be an empty promise, as it continued to play an instrumental, if not a crucial, role in almost every major political decision.

It is worth noting here, however, that in spite of the flaws of their power sharing, the Habibie-Wiranto team had succeeded somewhat in preventing the break-up of Indonesia, which, given the unprecedented strong centrifugal force of disintegration, could arguably be credited as a major achievement. In addition, Habibie laid the foundations for democratization, imperfect as they were, that helped to prevent Indonesia from collapsing back into the authoritarian regime.

## Notes

- 1 Interview, Maulani, 15 July 2001.
- 2 Interview, Agus Widjojo, 12 October 2001.
- 3 *Kompas*, “TNI Akui Turut Bertanggung Jawab Atas Dosa Dosa Orba”, 26 May 1999.
- 4 Interview, Lieutenant-General Agus Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001. For details on the “60 sins”, see, *Tajuk*, “Menghitung Dosa Tentara”, 10 June 1999.
- 5 A copy of the Letter of Order (*Surat Perintah*) Number Sprin/1557/P/VIII/1998 dated 28 August 1998 was made available to the author.
- 6 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001.
- 7 *Tajuk*, “Letjen Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: Saya Ajak Rakyat Mendukung Presiden Habibie”, 25 June 1998.
- 8 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *TNI Abad XXI, Redefinisi, Reposisi, Dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI Dalam Kehidupan Bangsa*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition (Jakarta: CV Jasa Bumi, June 1999).
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 27–28.

- 10 Personal communication with Brigadier-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, April 1996.
- 11 The official publication of the Sesko ABRI, *Widya Dharma*, devoted a special edition in 1999 to discuss the 14 strategic plans. For a concise analysis of the 14 plans and the military's internal reforms, see, A. Malik Haramain, "Gus Dur Dan Reposisi Militer" in Khamami Zada (ed.), *Neraca Gus Dur Di Panggung Kekuasaan* (Jakarta: Lakpesdam, August 2002), pp. 69–118.
- 12 *Tajuk*, "Menghitung Dosa Tentara...", 10 June 1999. For an analysis of the impact of the end of the *kekaryaan* policy, see, *Current Data*, Vol. 67, April 1999, pp. 145–147.
- 13 International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Keeping The Military Under Control*, ICG Asia Report No. 9 (Jakarta/Brussels: 5 September 2000), p. 5.
- 14 Interview, Sudradjat, 18 February 2003.
- 15 *Tajuk*, "Berebut Awu Di Pohon Beringin", 11 June 1998.
- 16 Interview, Indra Bambang Utoyo, 9 August 2001. A deputy chairman of Communication Forum for Retired Military Officers' Children (FKPPI), Utoyo was present at the meeting with Yudhoyono. Soeharto's middle son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, chaired the FKPPI.
- 17 *Tajuk*, "Battle Ground Di Golkar", 9 July 1998.
- 18 Interview, Indra Utoyo, 9 August 2001. See, also, Edi Sudradjat's interview in *Tempo*, "Edi Sudradjat: Golkar Itu Rumah Bobrok", 5 November 2000. Wiranto denied that he had ever ordered the "strike at dawn" move and insisted that he remained neutral throughout the process. See, Azhari, *Bersaksi Di Tengah...*, p. 163.
- 19 Harold Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations since May 1998" in A. Budiman, B. Hatley and D. Kingsbury (eds), *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia* (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp. 127–148.
- 20 For the term, the author was indebted to a Western diplomat in Jakarta who wished to remain anonymous.
- 21 *Current Data*, Vol. 71, April 2001, p. 140.
- 22 Interview, Maulani, 21 July 2001.
- 23 Usamah Hisyam et al., *HA Muhammad Ghalib, Menepis Badai, Menegakkan Supremasi Hukum* (Jakarta: Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara, 2000), pp. 337–352. In his book, Wiranto insisted that he endorsed Soeharto's investigation as long as it was legal. See, Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., p. 71. However, in an interview, Z.A. Maulani, Habibie's adviser, confirmed Ghalib's account. According to Maulani, Ghalib had even gone down on his knees before Habibie, asking his permission to bring Soeharto to court, but Habibie turned him down.
- 24 *Forum Keadilan*, "Gerakan Para Mantan Melawan Habibie", 17 August 1998. See, also, *FEER*, "Secular Soldiers", 29 October 1998.
- 25 *Tajuk*, "Cendana Diadili, Cendana Bereaksi", 26 November 1998.
- 26 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., Appendix 9, p. 305. See, also, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Berbagai Peristiwa Dan Penanganannya 1998–1999*, (Jakarta: Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, August 1999), p. 23.
- 27 For an investigation into the background and anatomy of the *Pam Swakarsa* militia, see, *Tajuk*, "Furkon, Sang Peredam Kapal Selam" and "Tokoh, Dana Dan Jaringan Furkon", 26 November 1998. The *Pam Swakarsa* was apparently used as a pilot project for the official formation of the Trained Citizens (*Ratih*) units in late November 1998. While the formation of the *Ratih* was legally based on Law No. 20/1982 on the doctrine of *Sishankamrata*, it drew public criticism as it was aimed at handling student and mass protests. See, *Tajuk*, "Politik Di Balik Pasukan Rakyat", 10 December 1998. On 4 October 1999, Parliament passed Law No 56/1999 On Trained Citizens. For an interesting description on the ordeals of *Ratih* recruits, see, *Tempo*, "Agar Ojat Tetap Bisa Berobat", 5 November 2000.
- 28 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., Appendix 9, 10, 11, 12, pp. 304–314.
- 29 Interview, Kivlan Zen, 23 December 2001. According to Zen, at a private meeting on 4 November, Wiranto instructed him to coordinate the non-military activities to secure the SI MPR. Before accepting the order, Zen complained about his dismissal

- as *Kostrad* Chief of Staff. Wiranto promised to restore Zen's military career if he succeeded in carrying out his duty. In his as-told-to autobiography, Wiranto denied any involvement in the inception of the *Pam Swakarsa* and insisted that it was a spontaneous reaction from Habibie's supporters to defend his presidency. See, Azhari, op. cit., pp. 145–147. Zen was obviously disappointed with Wiranto's denial that he had published a book in which he had decided to reveal the story to the public, perhaps to tarnish the latter's image as Wiranto was running for presidency in June 2004. Zen claimed that Wiranto had failed to settle the bill for the *Pam Swakarsa* expenses, despite his repeated attempts at pressing for the payment of the debt both to Habibie and Wiranto. See, Mayjen TNI (purn.) Kivlan Zen, MSi, *Konflik Dan Integrasi TNI-AD* (Jakarta: Institute For Policy Studies, June 2004), pp. 92–98. Once again, Wiranto dismissed Zen's accusation as baseless and had his team of lawyers bring the case to court. See, *Kompas*, "Pengerahan Pam Swakarsa Perintah Wiranto", 1 June 2004. It is worth noting, however, that Zen's credibility was in question as he had been allegedly involved in a number of riots. Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, had once accused a "Major-General K" of inciting riots in Maluku, which many believed to be Kivlan Zen. However, after meeting Zen, Wahid retracted his accusation.
- 30 *Tajuk*, "Cendana Diadili, Cendana...", 26 November 1998.
- 31 For an investigative report on Tutut's alleged involvement in the *Pam Swakarsa*, see, *Tajuk*, "Perlawanan Tiada Akhir Laskar Cendana", 26 November 1998. In a subsequent edition, the magazine claimed that former Army Chief General (ret.) R. Hartono was allegedly involved in the Cendana-linked militia too. See, *Tajuk*, "Harum Cendana di Pesantren", 10 December 1998. Tutut and Hartono denied the allegations. For Tutut and Hartono's denials, see, *Tajuk*, "Wawancara Mbak Tutut: Kami *Dehem* Pun Dianggap Berpolitik", 10 December 1998, and *Tajuk*, "Apa Saya Terlalu Mengerikan", 6 January 1999. But in an interview, Kivlan Zen confirmed the Cendana family's involvement in the *Pam Swakarsa*. The author also had communications with Syarifuddin Harahap, a former official at the *Setneg* who later formed the miniscule Republic Party, who admitted that he had also participated in providing funds for the *Pam Swakarsa* to defend the Cendana family's interest. See, also, *Tajuk*, "Bila Saja Habibie Dan Cendana 'Beli' Papol", 4 February 1999.
- 32 Interview, Zen, 21 December 2001.
- 33 *Tajuk*, "Menguji Proyektil Peluru", 26 November 1998, and "Tewas Di Tangan Penembak Mahir?", 14 October 1999. Almost a year later, the military headquarters announced that 164 soldiers have been given disciplinary and administrative sanctions due to violations of procedures in the Semanggi I Incident. See, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Berbagai Peristiwa Dan Penanganannya 1998–1999*, (Jakarta: Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, August 1999), p. 29.
- 34 *Tajuk*, "Cendana Diadili Cendana...", 26 November 1998.
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *Tajuk*, "Tangan Cendana di Kupang?", 13 January 1999.
- 37 International Crisis Group, *The Search for Peace in Maluku* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 2002).
- 38 *Tajuk*, "Jaringan Provokator Kerusuhan Ambon", 1 April 1999.
- 39 Interview, Maulani, 21 July 2001. In a series of concerted efforts at turning public opinion against Wiranto, ICMI-linked media—the newspaper *Republika* and the tabloid *Adil*—published a series of articles calling for the separation of the *Menhankam* and *Pangab* posts in February 1999, arguing that Wiranto's loyalty was questionable. See, *Tajuk*, "Pisah, Tidak, Pisah...", 18 February 1999. Tanjung, however, denied that he ever suggested Wiranto's dismissal.
- 40 *Tajuk*, "Mencekal Provokator Kerusuhan", 27 January 1999.
- 41 *Tajuk*, "Antara Intervensi Dan Cerita Komik", 18 February 1999.
- 42 *Tempo*, "Juwono Sudarsono: Kroni Cendana Mendanai Kerusuhan", 9 July 2000.
- 43 For the full text of Alatas's statement, see, Z.A. Makarim, G. Kairupan, A. Sriyanto and I. Fatah, *Hari-Hari Terakhir Timor Timur, Sebuah Kesaksian* (Jakarta: PT Sportif Media Informasindo, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 2003), p. 30.

- 44 Ibid., p. 40.
- 45 World Socialist website, “Secret Timor Documents Implicate Former Whitlam Government in Australia”, 25 August 1998.
- 46 Aidul Fitriadi Azhari, *Selamat Jalan Timor Timur, Pergulatan Menguak Kebenaran, Pengakuan Apa Adanya Seorang Wiranto* (Jakarta: Institute of Democracy for Indonesia, April 2002), p. 88.
- 47 *The Jakarta Post*, “Habibie Wants To Be Remembered For East Timor”, 16 February 1999.
- 48 Makarim et al., op. cit., p. 56–57.
- 49 Ibid., p. 58–59.
- 50 Ibid., p. 62.
- 51 Interviews, Maulani, 21 July 2001, and Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001. In fact, Anwar, whose position as Habibie’s spokesperson had enabled her to often “overshadow” Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, denied that she was the one who proposed the idea to Habibie and insisted that it was Habibie’s own genuine idea.
- 52 Usamah Hisyam et al., *Feisal Tanjung: Terbaik Untuk Rakyat, Terbaik Untuk ABRI* (Jakarta: Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara, 1999), p. 222. Interestingly, a set of newly declassified U.S. foreign policy files indicated that the government of President Richard Nixon secretly endorsed Indonesia’s rigging of the Papuan Act of Free Choice. See, *Kompas*, “Bukan Pasar Malam (2)”, 17 July 2004.
- 53 Hisyam, *Feisal...*, op. cit., pp. 722–724.
- 54 *The Jakarta Post*, “East Timor Move Not An Instruction: Alatas”, 6 February 1999.
- 55 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 56 Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., pp. 88–91.
- 57 Interview, Syarwan Hamid, 16 September 2001.
- 58 Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., p. 86; Makarim et al., op. cit., p. 57; and Tono Suratman, *Untuk Negaraku, Sebuah Potret Perjuangan Timor Timur* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, March 2002), p. 68.
- 59 The fact that the accord was called an “agreement” and not a “treaty”, although it amounted to a treaty between two countries, was presumably a deliberate move on the part of Habibie’s government to avoid the obligation to consult Parliament as required by the 1945 Constitution. Habibie was reported to have held a private consultation with parliamentary speaker Harmoko, who approved the proposal without prior consultation with parliamentary members. Later, Habibie’s political opponents used this “legal defect” to hold him accountable for the policy blunder after the ballot ended up in the loss of East Timor. See, Makarim, op. cit., p. 196, and Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., p. 93.
- 60 Hisyam, *Feisal...*, op. cit., pp. 715–746.
- 61 For details on the Task Force, see, Hisyam, op. cit., pp. 715–746, and Makarim, op. cit., pp. 85–88.
- 62 See, Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Akhir Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur (KPP HAM)* (Jakarta: Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, 31 January 2000), pp. 10–16. Copies of the thousands-page report were made available to the author. For more graphic accounts of the pro-integration militias’ activities, see, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (CIET) to the Secretary-General*, January 2000 (A/54/726, S/2000/59). The KPP HAM and CIET announced their respective reports simultaneously in Jakarta and New York on 31 January 2000. The Indonesian military insisted that what the Western reports called “armed militias” were none other than the *Pam Swakarsa*, legally acknowledged under the defence doctrine of *Sishankamrata* as outlined in Law No. 20/1982 on the Basic Principles of National Defence. Moreover, they pointed out that pro-integration groups had already existed as part of the territory’s integration to Indonesia, which spontaneously rose to the challenge of the anti-integration movements throughout the vote process. The military felt a moral obligation to take their side as they have helped them during the integration process. See, Makarim, op. cit., pp. 74–79. For a personal account from a former militia leader, see, Khairul Jismi,

- Eurico Guterres Melintas Badai Politik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2002).
- 63 Personal communication.
- 64 *Sydney Morning Herald*, “Silence Over A Crime Against Humanity”, 14 March 2002. See, also, David Bouchier (with Hamish McDonald, Desmond Ball, James Dunn, Gerry van Klinken, Douglas Kammen and Richard Tanter), “Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999”, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 145 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002).
- 65 *Tajuk*, “East Timor Is Enough”, 22 December 1999. For details on the alleged Australian intelligence activities in East Timor, see, Makarim, op. cit., pp. 234–243. In fact, the Australian media carried reports on their government’s intelligence activities, including the deployment of the elite Special Air Services and the Navy’s Clearance Diving Team units in East Timor territory in April. See, *World Socialist website*, “Australian Special Forces Operating In East Timor Months Before UN Ballot”, 12 October 1999 ([www.wsws.org/articles/1999/oct1999/tim-o12\\_prn.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/oct1999/tim-o12_prn.shtml)).
- 66 See, Suhardi Somomoeljono, *Analisis Yuridis Menganai Konspirasi Internasional Atas Wilayah Timor Timur* (Jakarta: DPP HAPI and LS ADIPI, 1997). Wiranto did not rule out such an international conspiracy, saying that there was evidence to support the claim. See, Azhari, op. cit., p. 180.
- 67 *World Socialist website*, “Leaked Documents Show Plan To Send 1,500 U.S. Marines to East Timor”, 12 August 1999.
- 68 *World Socialist website*, “U.S. and World Bank Threaten Indonesia over Timor”, 23 July 1999.
- 69 Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Akhir...*, op. cit., pp. 18–21.
- 70 *Pikiran Rakyat*, “Dalam Kasus Timor Timur BJ Habibie Bersaksi”, 21 March 2003.
- 71 *Sydney Morning Herald*, “To Stop the Dogs of War”, 27 August 2001. See, also, Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., pp. 196–197.
- 72 For the full text of Habibie’s speech, see, “Statement By The President of The Republic of Indonesia On The Result of The Popular Consultation in East Timor, 4 September 1999” ([www3.itu.int/MISSIONS/Indonesia/etppresdsept.htm](http://www3.itu.int/MISSIONS/Indonesia/etppresdsept.htm)).
- 73 Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Akhir...*, op. cit., pp. 43–45.
- 74 *Tajuk*, “Agar Tak Ada Kudeta Militer”, 3 January 2000.
- 75 Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., pp. 192–217. In an interview, General (retd.) Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo, Lumintang’s superior at that time, dismissed the KPP HAM’s recommendation as baseless. Lumintang’s telegram, which was written with his full knowledge, was part of the army’s SOP. If Lumintang was blamed for having devised a “forced evacuation” plan, as his superior he should have been held accountable too. But the KPP HAM Timor Timur had never summoned him and asked for an explanation. In another interview, General Endriartono Sutarto, who was the military’s Assistant of Operation (*Asops*) at that time and the author of the TNI’s Contingency Plan, disclosed that he had decided to give voluntary testimony to the KPP HAM Timor Timur to explain the true extent of the Contingency Plan. However, he complained that the KPP HAM did not include his explanation in their analysis. Both Subagyo and Sutarto concluded that the KPP HAM Timor Timur lacked adequate knowledge to commence such a crucial investigation, in addition to their biased political motivation.
- 76 Makarim, op. cit., pp. 327–329. For the full text of the English translation of the Garnadi Document, see, “The Report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili To Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security” (<http://etan.org/news/news99b/secret2.htm>). In his testimony before the KPP HAM Timor Timur, Garnadi admitted that the signature in the copy of the document resembled his signature but denied that he wrote it. See, Colonel Cavalier (retd.) H.R. Garnadi’s testimony before the KPP HAM on 24 December 1999. A copy of the document was made available to the author.
- 77 We will discuss Wiranto’s fall from grace in the next chapter. See, also, *Tajuk*, “Gus Dur, Wiranto Dan Drama Kejatuhan Itu”, 17 February 2000.

- 78 For a comprehensive assessment on the East Timor tribunal, see, International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the East Timor Trials* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 May 2002).
- 79 For an assessment on the weaknesses of the East Timor tribunal and persistent military impunity, see, International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability For Gross Human Rights Violations* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2 February 2001). For details on the verdicts, see, *Kompas*, “Kasus Pelanggaran HAM Berat, Pengadilan Sandiwara atau Sungguhan?”, 16 June 2004.
- 80 *Kompas*, “Abilio Akhirnya Jalani Hukuman Di LP Cipinang”, 18 July 2004. Soares submitted a request for a review of his case to the Supreme Court. After serving 111 days of his sentence, the Supreme Court decided to acquit him in November 2004, to the disappointment of Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda who complained that his acquittal would further tarnish Indonesia's image abroad. See, *Kompas*, “Abilio Bebas”, 5 November 2004. Damiri appealed to the High Court, which eventually acquitted him in July 2004.
- 81 For a comprehensive legal analysis of the East Timor ad-hoc court, see, David Cohen, *Intended To Fail, The Trials Before the Ad Human Rights Court in Jakarta* (International Center for Transitional Justice, August 2003); and Lembaga Studi Dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Elsam), *Progress Report V, Putusan Bebas Pengadilan HAM ad hoc Timtim: Peluang Pembelajaran Yang Gagal*, (Jakarta: Elsam, 2003).
- 82 Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta: PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia, 2002), p. 342. Ciganjur is the name of a south Jakarta suburb where Wahid and his family reside. Ciganjur Declaration I was signed during the SI MPR 1998 by pro-reform leaders—Wahid, Rais, Megawati and the Sultan Hamengkubuwono X—to push for the adoption of reform agendas during the controversial session.
- 83 *Tajuk*, “Poros Tengah Di Antara Dua Gajah”, 22 July 1999.
- 84 The Muslims were agitated when, during a visit to Bali in mid 1999, Megawati was seen saying a prayer before a Hindu temple. During the election campaign, they criticized her party's provisional legislative candidate lists, which were dominated by non-Muslim candidates. Of all the Muslim-based parties that formed the Central Axis, only the PPP formally issued a statement rejecting a woman leader, using a dubious religious ruling barring women from assuming leadership as its religious justification.
- 85 For Wahid's mystical inclination, see, Barton, op. cit., pp. 132–134.
- 86 For details on the Bank Bali scandal, see, *Tempo*, “Taruhannya Bukan Cuma Kursi Presiden”, 30 August 1999.
- 87 Personal notes.
- 88 *Tajuk*, “Lakon Bharatayudha Yang Gagal”, 28 October 1999.
- 89 *Tajuk*, “Ancaman Jihad Laskar Hijau”, 28 October 1999.
- 90 Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., p. 210.
- 91 *Tajuk*, “Skenario Fidel Ramos Dari Cilangkap”, 30 September 1999. Habibie's proposal of two vice-presidents, which essentially violated the 1945 Constitution, was confirmed when after his “accountability speech” was rejected during the MPR session. His ardent supporter, Dr. Marwah Daud Ibrahim, proposed the “two vice-presidents” scenario to accommodate the aspirations of people from the eastern part of Indonesia.
- 92 Interview, Indra Bambang Utoyo, 9 August 2001. See, also, *Tempo*, “Derap Sang Jenderal Ke Istana”, 3 October 1999.
- 93 Azhari, *Selamat...*, op. cit., pp. 214–215.
- 94 Personal communications with a number of retired generals who were present at the meeting.
- 95 *Tajuk*, “Presiden Wiranto?”, 12 May 1999.
- 96 Interview, Agus Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001. The categorization of “conservative” and “progressive” was used simply for convenience purpose, taking into account that it was insufficient to illustrate internal military dynamics. For an analytical framework for such categorization, see, Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al, *Gus Dur*

vs *Militer, Studi Tentang Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Era Transisi* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Widiasarana and P2P-LIPI, 2002), pp. 33–37.

- 97 Personal communication. Wiranto was said to have reported the strategy to Habibie, who approved it.
- 98 In a closed voting, 355 members voted against Habibie’s speech, 322 voted for it, nine abstained and four votes were invalid. The “White Golkar” faction obviously defected from the party’s official policy to accept the speech, leading to the accusation that Akbar Tanjung had betrayed Habibie. The military, on the other hand, decided to vote against Habibie due to security considerations, fearing a bloody protest would erupt on the streets if he were to enter the presidential race.
- 99 For details on the historic election, see, *Tajuk*, “Segi Banyak Menuju Puncak”, 28 October 1999.
- 100 Personal communication.
- 101 Interview, Agus Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001.
- 102 See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civilian-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Bilveer Singh, *Civil-Military Relations Revisited: The Future of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in Indonesian Politics* (Singapore: Crescent Design Associate, 1999).

## ONE OF THE STRANGEST PERIODS IN INDONESIAN HISTORY 1999–2001

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**Gus Dur has promised that if he became president, he would serve one term only to help turn Indonesia into a fully-fledged democracy. But he knew nothing about the military, no, nothing at all.**

*– Bondan Gunawan, former Minister of State Secretary<sup>1</sup>*

**The public, the students, the president, they needed a military reformer figure, that was me. Some people might have had an agenda and manipulated my popular image, but I was not their Trojan horse. I struggled to carry out genuine reforms, because I always wished to make a change, small change.<sup>2</sup>**

*– Lieutenant-General Agus Wirahadikusumah, former Commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve*

**G**us Dur is the fourth divine mystery—after birth, destiny and death. So goes a popular joke about Indonesia's fourth and the first democratically elected president. The joke illustrates public puzzlement over President Abdurrahman Wahid's infamous erratic behaviour, which was amusing in the beginning but as time went by, it began to create more confusion and controversy than amusement.

In the beginning, the rise of an internationally acclaimed democratic figure to presidency in the country's first free and fair presidential elections was wildly welcomed both at home and abroad, which silenced criticisms over how he was elected. His first few days in power appeared promising. Despite the controversial political manoeuvring that had brought him to power, Wahid managed to secure support from both his allies and adversaries—Rais, Wiranto, Tanjung, Haz and even Megawati—who agreed to “guarantee” their people in the cabinet. It resulted in an unprecedented political make-up since the parliamentary era of the 1950s, in which almost all political streams were represented in the cabinet. Although this “rainbow-coalition” cabinet failed to meet public expectation of a professional line-up, it was largely welcomed as the best political compromise possible, given Wahid's minor support in Parliament. Moreover, compared to Habibie's technocratic but New Order-heavy cabinet, Wahid's cabinet in general, though lacking in technical expertise, was staffed with a number of fresh and respected pro-reform figures.

Shortly after taking office, Wahid made the shocking but popular decision to liquidate the Department of Information and Department of Social Affairs. In addition to the fact that the department was notoriously corrupt, he argued that in a free society, the free flow of information is a must, hence there was no need for a state institution to regulate it. Moreover, in a democracy, society is responsible for managing its own

social affairs, thus there was no need for the state to meddle in. Although the employees of the two departments staged noisy protests and took the matter to court, their disappointment was subdued by public praise for Wahid's farsighted faith in press freedom and a streamlined and efficient government.

In December 1999, Wahid gave more hope that he was committed to fight corruption in his administration. During an overseas tour, he announced that he would "dismiss" any cabinet member who was involved in corruption. Although he did not mention any name, speculation back home was rife that one of the ministers was Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare Hamzah Haz. The public applauded Wahid's "remote control politics", a reference to his tactic of controlling home politics from abroad. Shortly after his return, Haz "tendered" his resignation and was promptly replaced by a relatively unknown academic, Professor Basri Hasanuddin. Haz denied that he was involved in any corruption case and claimed that his resignation was purely a matter of misunderstanding on the part of the president.<sup>3</sup> His early departure from the cabinet began to spark tension between Wahid and his Muslim allies of the Central Axis, although none of its leaders voiced open protest, as they were still grappling with Wahid's style of leadership.

However, the first real test on Wahid's control of his rainbow cabinet came when, during another whirlwind international tour in late January, he tried to emulate his earlier tactic in dismissing Haz to sideline Wiranto. The opportunity came when the KPP HAM Timor Timur implicated Wiranto in the post-referendum atrocities of East Timor. Responding to the report, Wahid called for Wiranto's immediate resignation so that he would not impede further investigation. Unlike Haz, however, Wiranto refused to capitulate. Defying Wahid's repeated demands from overseas, Wiranto insisted that he would wait until the president returned home to settle the issue.

So for two weeks, the nation was entertained in witnessing a high-level political suspense as Wahid made a number of conflicting statements to confuse Wiranto and to force his voluntary resignation. After praising Wiranto for having saved him from attempts at his life, Wahid accused him of having clandestinely mobilized a number of army generals to challenge his leadership, which fuelled the already intense rumour about a military coup. The rumour intensified when a number of American officials issued a series of warnings about a possible military coup and pledged Washington's support for Wahid. Such intense rumour eventually forced TNI Commander Widodo Adi Sucipto and the three Chiefs of Staff to meet Wahid and pledge their commitment that the TNI would never harbour the slightest intention of toppling the legitimate president.<sup>4</sup>

When Wahid arrived home a week later, the public had anticipated that the first thing he would do was to dismiss Wiranto. Wahid summoned Vice-President Megawati, Wiranto and Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman for a meeting at the Merdeka Palace. But he did not sack Wiranto. Instead, Cabinet Secretary Marsillam Simanjuntak announced that Wahid had decided to keep Wiranto in his job, pending further investigation into his case. Yet, a few hours later, while the public was still debating his disappointing decision, Wahid abruptly changed his mind and replaced Wiranto with an interim official, Lieutenant-General (retd.) Surjadi Soedirdja, who would serve concurrently as Minister of Home Affairs.<sup>5</sup> Wiranto only learned of the shocking news from the morning newspaper, but somehow managed to keep his composure and handed over his authority to Sudirdja a few hours later. He eventually tendered his resignation from the cabinet in July as an expression of moral responsibility.

Wahid's success in sidelining Wiranto, the military's strongman and the last significant tie to the New Order, without significant resistance from the military was widely

applauded as his major achievement in taming the TNI. However, the strange nature of Wiranto's forced exit from the cabinet began to spark concerns about Wahid's style of leadership, more so because he had never explained the rationale for his decision to the public. It turned out that Wahid only used the East Timor issue as a pretext to sideline Wiranto politically, as he believed that the general had been plotting to undermine his rule and even planned to stage a coup. So he deliberately mobilized domestic and international opinion against Wiranto by "leaking" classified information about a "planned military coup" to the press and diplomatic circles, including private briefings to American Ambassador Robert Gelbard.

According to his biographer, Greg Barton, Wahid changed his mind after Simanjuntak, his trusted adviser, reported that reliable sources had confirmed that "Wiranto had met Habibie, senior generals and other power brokers to plot against Gus Dur".<sup>6</sup> Earlier, Wahid had dispatched a few "intelligence operatives" to keep track of Wiranto and held a private consultation with former ABRI Commander and intelligence guru L.B. Moerdani, all reportedly confirmed his suspicions.<sup>7</sup> So shortly before midnight, he summoned Megawati, TNI Commander Widodo and Army Chief of Staff Sudarto. In their presence, he signed the decree to suspend Wiranto.

The wildly rumoured military coup, of course, never took place and there had been no convincing evidence to sustain claims that Wiranto had ever contemplated such an unconstitutional move. However, from the outset, deep mutual distrust had characterized and continued to shape the troubled pattern of civilian-military relations under President Wahid. At first, Wahid's celebrated track record as a democratic campaigner had sparked hopes that he would eventually manage to carry out what Habibie had failed to do: to subject the military to civilian control. As time passed, however, such high hopes quickly waned. It turned out that instead of consolidating an objective civilian control of the military, Wahid had failed to resist the temptation to manipulate the military for his own political purposes.

In this chapter, we will examine what went wrong with Wahid's much-applauded commitment to reform the military. It is interesting to ask the question: did Wahid really consolidate civilian control of the military or did his politicization of the institution help to resurrect its political assertiveness?

## THE SECOND PHASE OF MILITARY REFORMS

As was mentioned earlier, Abdurrahman Wahid's initial moves to consolidate civilian control of the military appeared promising. Unlike Habibie, he decided to separate the portfolios of Minister of Defence and TNI Commander and set the widely applauded historical records and precedence. He appointed Professor Juwono Sudarsono, a well-respected academic, as the second civilian to be the Defence Minister and Admiral Widodo Adi Sucipto, Wiranto's former deputy, as the first navy general to sit at the helm of the TNI. Hopes were high then that such moves would precede concrete steps towards the adoption of a civilian supremacy and the reduction of the army's dominance of the TNI.

In reality, however, those symbolic moves hardly made any practical difference. There was no resistance against Sudarsono's appointment because, as Deputy Governor of the National Resilience Institute (*Lemhannas*), he was acceptable to the TNI due to his long contact with and relatively mild stance on the institution. In fact, it was Wiranto who nominated Sudarsono as Defence Minister. Wiranto also handpicked Widodo as his deputy and had nominated him as his future successor even during Habibie's presidency.<sup>8</sup>

More importantly, Wiranto had made sure that his influence both in the TNI headquarters and the Department of Defence would not wane despite his “promotion” to a civilian job as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs. On the morning of 4 November, one-and-a-half hour before transferring his authority to Widodo, Wiranto signed his last order for an internal reshuffle, reportedly without consulting Sudarsono and deliberately bypassing the *Wanjakti* process. Through the “blitzkrieg”, Wiranto bequeathed an army-dominated headquarters to Widodo and a ministry staffed with his handpicked army generals to Sudarsono.<sup>9</sup>

In December, Wahid came up with more significant initiatives for democratic consolidation when he continued Habibie’s policy of freeing all political prisoners and, a month later, allowed ex-PKI exiles to return home. In February 2000, he disbanded all ad hoc bodies established under Habibie, including the Council for the Enforcement of Security and Legal System (DPKSH), and liquidated the post of Directorate-General of Socio-political Affairs at the Ministry of Home Affairs. Most significantly, in March, he disbanded the much-detested Coordinating Agency for National Stability (*Bakorstanas*) and abolished the implementation of “ideological screenings” (*litsus*), a security mechanism used to filter left- and right-wing extremists from entering government-controlled bodies.<sup>10</sup>

However, apart from the abovementioned Palace initiatives, most reform programmes were largely conceptualized within the TNI headquarters as a response to increased public pressures. Thus, Widodo, who had unexpectedly demonstrated a collegial leadership to lead a league of army generals without significant resistance, deserved a significant part of the credit. Significantly, he let Agus Widjojo, Yudhoyono’s successor as the TNI’s Chief of Territorial Affairs, expedite the TNI’s internal reforms. In turn, Widjojo benefited from Widodo’s non-political leadership, which enabled him to steer the reforms, particularly the crucial agenda of the termination of its socio-political roles, away from the *dwifungsi* jargon of Yudhoyono’s New Paradigm.

At a leadership meeting on 20 April 2000, the TNI took the historical decisions to abolish *dwifungsi*, reformulate its roles and duties and subject itself to civilian supremacy.<sup>11</sup> In a press statement delivered at the end of the meeting, Widodo announced:

As a primary state tool of national defence, TNI’s main duties are to deter any aggression over the nation’s sovereignty as well as its territorial integrity and to secure national interests both at domestic and international levels. In line with those duties, TNI will carry out the following functions. First, to deter and take action against any enemy’s aggression. Second, to train people for national defence duty. Third, to enforce law in the air and the sea. Fourth, if requested, to assist the police in the anti-terror areas. Fifth, to assist other government elements in raising national resilience and unity, to handle the impacts of natural disaster, and to prepare non-TNI elements in national defence and other social duties. Sixth, to carry out international duties to secure global peace.<sup>12</sup>

The historic decisions marked fundamental shifts not just in the TNI’s roles and duties but also its worldview. By officially defining its role as “a state tool of national defence”, the TNI abandoned its decades-long praetorian mindset as “the guardian of the nation”. By focusing its duty on defending the nation against aggression, which would consequently leave the task of maintaining internal security to the police, the TNI had positioned itself as an externally oriented defence force. Interestingly, this decision was a step ahead of Minister Sudarsono’s earlier proposal to let the TNI and the Polri share the responsibility.<sup>13</sup> Most important of all, by officially abandoning *dwifungsi*, the TNI

has removed the stumbling block in its pledge to become a professional military and delivered its biggest contribution to Indonesia's transition to democracy.

Despite its commitment to uphold civilian supremacy, however, the TNI continued to resist attempts to place its headquarters under the Department of Defence's control. In July, Sudarsono proposed to adopt the American model of Joint Chiefs of Staff to replace the current TNI Commander structure and placed it under the Minister of Defence but the generals gave him the cold shoulder. Sudarsono's successor, constitutional law expert Professor Mahfud MD, tried to include the plan in the draft Defence Law that he was overseeing but he, too, failed. However, an encouraging development occurred in 2004 with the passing of TNI Law, which stipulated a gradual repositioning of the TNI headquarters under the Department of Defence (which we shall discuss in the concluding chapter).

In August, the TNI's historic decisions received their formal constitutional bindings when the MPR's annual session passed two decrees: MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 on the Separation of the TNI and the Polri and MPR Decree No VII/MPR/2000 on the Roles of the Polri. Article 2 of MPR Decree No. VII/2000 defined the TNI's new roles as "a tool of national defence whose main duties are to uphold national sovereignty, safeguard territorial integrity and protect the nation and its territory from threats and disturbances against its sovereignty and integrity". Article 6 defined the role of the Polri as "a state tool in the maintenance of security and community order, law enforcement, and protection and service to the society". However, Article 4 made a provision for the TNI's involvement in maintaining internal security provided that "its assistance is requested by the National Police Force and is in accordance with the existing laws". Moreover, to prevent the politicization of the TNI Commander and Police Chief positions, Articles 3 and 7 stipulated that "the President appoints and terminates the service of the TNI Commander and the Police Chief upon approval from the Parliament".

As for the political roles of the two institutions, the decree stipulated that the TNI and the Polri would not participate in day-to-day politics, but they would retain their representation in the DPR until 2004 and the MPR until 2009.<sup>14</sup> The decision to extend the TNI/Polri representation in the MPR until 2009 and not 2004, as was decided earlier, received strong public reaction. Many suspected some dirty connivance between the military and the co-opted civilian politicians to retain military politics. The suspicion was unfounded, however, when during the 2002 annual session of the MPR, Widodo's successor, General Endriartono Sutarto, decided to terminate the service of the F-TNI/Polri both in the DPR and MPR in 2004.

On 5 October 2001, in conjunction with its 56th anniversary, the TNI headquarters issued the TNI's New Paradigm, Second Phase—a sequel to the ABRI's New Paradigm of 1998 which was now called the TNI's New Paradigm, First Phase. While the TNI's New Paradigm, First Phase outlined a concept of civilian-military power sharing under *dwifungsi*, the Second Phase envisaged the TNI's post-*dwifungsi* roles and authorities under a civilian supremacy. The New Paradigm, Second Phase stated that the TNI would perform:

- state duties only, which during the transition period is aimed at empowering institutional functions;
- its duties only after a national agreement is reached;
- its duties along with other national components;
- its duties as a part of the national system; and
- its duties through constitutional arrangements, in which the state's decisions are

taken constitutionally.

The TNI's New Paradigm, Second Phase was further fleshed out into internal reform programmes, which included:

- the gradual abandonment of its socio-political roles;
- focus on its primary duty of national defence;
- the transfer of duty and authority to maintain internal security to the Police Force;
- the implementation of the Joint Services doctrine; and
- improvement of its internal management performance.<sup>15</sup>

As of the end of 2001, the TNI had registered the implementation of its internal reform programmes, which, in addition to the 14 action programmes announced in 1999, also included:

- the restructuring of the TNI's Corps of Civil Servants into its original administrative function;
- the restructuring of the army's territorial structure;
- the implementation of principles of transparency, professional management and public audit on the various military-related business enterprises;
- the implementation of the principles of protection and preservation of human rights in all military actions;
- the abandonment of "the guardian of the nation" mindset and attitude; and
- the removal of socio-political materials from the Military Academy's curriculae.<sup>16</sup>

Of all the reform programmes mentioned above, two came into effect only after intense internal deliberation and public controversy: the separation of the Polri from the TNI and the proposal to review the army's territorial structure.

The proposal to separate the police from the military was put forward as early as 1995 but the Trisakti tragedy provided a new impetus for its implementation. Under pressure from both the police and the public, ABRI Commander Wiranto decided to set up a special team chaired by Wirahadikusumah to work on the separation proposal. In early October 1998, the team came up with a recommendation to place the Polri under the responsibility of the Department of Defence, as a transitional step towards its full civilianization.<sup>17</sup> The organizational separation took place on 1 April 1999 but since Wiranto served concurrently as ABRI Commander and Minister of Defence, the decision was criticized as being the ABRI's half-hearted willingness to separate the Polri. Moreover, the two institutions remained inseparable in operational terms as they both continued to handle internal security.

As military reforms moved beyond the *dwifungsi* jargons, there was a growing realization among both the military and police conceptors to separate the two institutions operationally. Widjojo, the chief architect of the TNI's New Paradigm, Second Phase concept, proposed to position the military as an externally oriented defence force and the police as a legal enforcement force. Consequently, the TNI would be responsible for defending national sovereignty against external threats while the police would assume responsibility over maintaining internal security. Widjojo argued that the original 1945 Constitution did differentiate between "defence" and "security". According to Widjojo, the 1945 Constitution defined defence as an operational military function to defend national sovereignty against external threats, which, consequently, fell under the TNI's jurisdiction. The constitution also stipulated that the TNI could participate in maintaining internal security only if the president decided to impose overall or partial martial law. During peace time, the TNI's duty is limited only to assist the police in

maintaining security.<sup>18</sup>

Some “security-first” officers, however, raised objection to such a rigid segregation, arguing that it would be impractical as Indonesia’s main security threats originated from within its own territory. They also questioned the readiness of the police’s institutional capability to assume such a great burden, pointing out to the fact that its resources were limited.<sup>19</sup> Widjojo, however, insisted that the separation was not meant to curtail the TNI’s authority as it would still be responsible for deterring threats that could undermine national sovereignty regardless of their origins if a political decision was made. He convinced his fellow generals that it was in the interests of the TNI to have this political and constitutional umbrella to legitimize its operations to prevent the recurrence of past military abuse by the ruler.<sup>20</sup> Widjojo obviously won the argument, hence the military leadership meeting’s historic decision on 20 April 2000 and the subsequent passing of the MPR decrees.

Consequently, the police moved out of the Department of Defence to assume new roles under the president’s direct supervision. The entire process was scheduled to be completed by 1 January 2001 but President Wahid advanced the date by six months to 1 July 2000. The MPR Decree Number VII/MPR/2000 stipulated that a commission, the National Police Commission, should be formed to advise the president on the appointment of the police chief and policy matters and to oversee police management and performance.

Moreover, the implementation of the TNI-Polri separation turned out to be far more complex than initially envisaged. Long considered as the TNI’s most junior service, the police generally lacked institutional capability to handle persistent internal security disturbances in conflict-torn areas such as Maluku, Aceh and Papua, which eventually led to military involvement. However, the sudden change in the power balance and the absence of clear-cut guidelines to regulate the “grey areas” between the two institutions’ overlapping authorities contributed to the many police-military clashes on the ground in the past few years.

Nevertheless, unlike the full civilianization of the police that was eventually accepted and implemented, the proposal to review the army’s territorial structure was accepted but had never been implemented. Devised during the independence struggle against the Dutch as part of the army’s *Sishankamrata* doctrine, the territorial structure expanded in the 1950s and 1960s when Indonesia was facing a series of separatist movements and the threat of communism. Under the New Order, it was misused as the regime’s most effective political means to ensure its longevity in power, including ensuring Golkar’s victories in elections and to maintain an effective control over opposition movements through domestic intelligence and repression.<sup>21</sup> Shortly after Soeharto’s fall, some NGO activists called for the reduction, even abolition, of the territorial structure, considered by many as one of the main stumbling blocks towards total abandonment of *dwifungsi*. Instead of heeding their calls, however, TNI decided to expand the territorial structure and established two new regional military commands in the conflict-torn Aceh and Maluku.

Interestingly, similar calls also came from within the TNI. Speaking before a parliamentary commission in mid December 1999 in his official capacity as a representative of the TNI headquarters, Wirahadikusumah called the army’s territorial structure “an instrument of power”. He proposed for its gradual reduction beginning at the lowest level at the provinces where security had been firmly established. His idea, however, was met with strong reaction from other army generals, including Army Chief of Staff General Tyasno Sudarto. They argued that the army’s territorial structure remained relevant in

the present situation as it was an effective mechanism to deter communal and separatist conflicts as well as providing an early warning system to prevent and pre-empt external aggression.<sup>22</sup> A few military hardliners even voiced accusation that the idea reflected foreign-sponsored subversions aimed at weakening the TNI systematically.<sup>23</sup>

The controversy occurred because Wirahadikusumah, in his haste to expedite reforms, disclosed an unfinished concept on the army's territorial restructuring that the TNI headquarters was working on, a move that many of his colleagues deplored.<sup>24</sup> Responding to such controversy, Chief of Territorial Affairs Widjojo, who proposed the concept at the ABRI's New Paradigm seminar in October 1998, decided to hold a series of internal seminars to further discuss the issue in January. The seminars concluded that in the short term, the current territorial structure had to be retained to maintain stability, but it would be stripped of political and other non-defence authorities.

Nine months later, in October 1999, Widjojo came up with a more comprehensive concept, which separated the administrative function of the territorial structure from the defence function of the territorial command. In line with the TNI's focus on its defence duty and the government's decentralization programme, he proposed to place the territorial structure under the responsibility of the local government, while maintaining the territorial command under the central government's control. The restructuring would start with the disbanding of the bottom three rungs of the territorial structure, namely, the village non-commissioned officer (*babinsa*), and sub-district and district regional commands (*koramil* and *kodim*).

However, to prepare for a substitute system and avoid drastic shock due to personnel reduction, Widjojo proposed a phased contraction over the period of 12 to 19 years, depending on the specific condition of each region. In the generally stable Java, for example, the territorial restructuring could take place in the near future, but it may take much longer for restive provinces such as Papua and Aceh.<sup>25</sup> Widjono emphasized that the restructuring does not necessarily lead to the dismantling of the territorial structure, obviously to pre-empt internal resistance against the proposal. Widjojo recalled that when he released his final concept in August 2001, Army Chief of Staff Endriartono Sutarto accepted it, although hardliners such as *Kostrad* Commander Ryamizard Ryacudu and the Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command, Bibit Waluyo, raised their objections.<sup>26</sup> Interestingly, the DPR and the academics rejected the concept, for different reasons. While legislators insisted that the army's territorial structure remained a vital instrument to maintain national stability,<sup>27</sup> the academics suspected that the concept was a militarization of civilian bureaucracy.<sup>28</sup>

In the end, Widjojo's proposal was officially adopted as part of the TNI's New Paradigm, Second Phase programmes.<sup>29</sup> However, three years later, there had been no concrete action taken towards its full implementation. Persistent threats of separatism and mounting challenges of international terrorism resulting from the drastic change in the post-September 11 World Order had led to a unanimous agreement among the TNI leaders to retain the current territorial structure. After the terrorist attacks in Bali on 12 September 2002, which many blamed on weak intelligence, there were calls to strengthen the territorial structure to provide a reliable early warning system, but no concrete steps had been taken to implement it.<sup>30</sup> However, a significant development occurred in September 2004 when Parliament passed law on the TNI, which included an obligation for the TNI to start a gradual territorial restructuring process, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

In spite of those shortcomings and several residual practices of *dwifungsi*, it was clear that the TNI had taken and completed several of the concrete steps towards the

abolishment of its socio-political roles.<sup>31</sup> By the end of 2001, the military was no longer a powerful actor in the Indonesian political stage and, more importantly, it had begun a transformation process into a professional institution.

That said, a critical question remained: Did the formal termination of military politics really mean the end of the generals' involvement in day-to-day politics?

Interestingly, the Wahid period demonstrated that the end of *dwifungsi* did not go well with the end of the politicization of the military. In fact, under Wahid's subjective control of the military, the internal factionalism in the TNI reached its most intense since the time of the Wiranto-Prabowo conflict, which in turn contributed to the resurrection of the military's political assertiveness.

## THE BULAKRANTAI GROUP AND THE RISE OF THE SECURITY-FIRST OFFICERS

The nature of civilian-military relations under Wahid's short rule was partly shaped by the so-called Bulakrantai Group, which rose to political prominence shortly after the fall of Wiranto. The name referred to a loose gathering of several reform-minded TNI officers, civilian politicians and non-governmental organization (NGO) activists who had reportedly played critical roles in influencing Wahid's policy on military reforms. Bulakrantai is an East Jakarta suburb where a housing complex for the army's high-ranking officers was situated and the venue where the group was said to have held their meetings. The media and analysts often called them—rather wrongly—the BTA Group, a name taken from the first names of Minister of State Secretary Bondan (Gunawan), Army Chief General Tyasno (Sudarto), and *Kostrad* Commander Lieutenant-General Agus (Wirahadikusumah).

The saga began in early June 2000 when a "Bulakrantai document" made its way to the media and ignited intense public controversy. The document contained minutes of three meetings allegedly attended by several TNI officers, including Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi, as well as some NGO and student activists held at Wirahadikusumah's house in Bulakrantai Complex on 12, 16 and 25 April 2000. It contained, among others, plans to promote Wirahadikusumah to Army Chief of Staff, sideline "Wiranto-contaminated" officers, investigate Wiranto and Suparman's alleged misuse of the army's funds and "kick up" Army Chief of Staff Tyasno Sudarto to become TNI Commander.<sup>32</sup> Interestingly, a few weeks before the alleged meetings took place, Wirahadikusumah was appointed *Kostrad* Commander in a major reshuffle that some military observers saw as a process of "de-Wiranto-ization".<sup>33</sup>

Circulated amidst brewing tension between the president and the TNI following Wiranto's forced exit from the cabinet, the document seemed to confirm public speculation of a persistent military factionalism. As the document indicated, the Bulakrantai Group supported Wahid's attempts at consolidating civilian control of the TNI by ridding the institution of its "pro-status quo" elements and replacing them with more reform-minded officers. Due to their popular public image, many military analysts praised the Bulakrantai Group as true reformers and anticipated that their rise to the military helm would expedite its reforms, although most TNI generals regarded them simply as "power seekers". Strangely, the Bulakrantai officers themselves insisted that the group had never existed and the Bulakrantai document was merely a crude intelligence fabrication aimed at discrediting them.<sup>34</sup>

The question is: Did the Bulakrantai Group ever really exist?

An examination of presently available information indicates that the Bulakrantai Group affair was comparable to the controversy over the red-and-white army and the

green army of the 1990s. They did not exist as real entities but their influence was undeniable.

Indeed, a closer look into the individual backgrounds of Gunawan, Wirahadikusumah, Sudarto and Kadi indicates that they shared a few things in common politically. While Gunawan had been known as a pro-democracy activist ever since he helped found the Forum of Democracy, one of the few remaining critical voices under the New Order, the three generals were very much part of the regime's establishment. Wirahadikusumah, a nephew of former vice-president Umar Wirahadikusumah, was regarded as an accomplished field officer who earned most of his decorations in combat assignments. Kadi was one of the beneficiaries of the *dwifungsi* doctrine as he had spent most of his career in socio-political posts, including two terms in Parliament, although he later turned into one of its staunchest critics. Sudarto was a seasoned intelligence officer, a job that often put him in conflict with pro-democracy activists.

They hardly shared any common platform on military reforms either. While Gunawan, like his *Fordem* comrades, had suggested for an immediate abolition of *dwifungsi*, Wirahadikusumah and Kadi—at least in their early writings—proposed to redefine it.<sup>35</sup> Sudarto had hardly expressed any public statement on the issue but, as mentioned earlier, he rejected Wirahadikusumah's proposal for the restructuring of the army's territorial structure. In fact, Sudarto's intelligence background had made him an awkward "partner" in the loose grouping. Later, he would turn his back on them.

Yet they did share mutual political interests—at least in the beginning. In the first days of his presidency, Wahid was determined to seize the historic opportunity to implement his ideas of reform, including the demilitarization of Indonesian politics. To that end, he brought Gunawan and Marsillam Simanjuntak, his *Fordem* friends of old, into his inner circle. He appointed Gunawan Secretary for Governmental and Development Matters (*Sesdalprin*), and later Minister of State Secretary, and Marsillam, Cabinet Secretary. In turn, Gunawan, with the help of Simanjuntak, took advantage of their powerful positions to identify "reform-minded officers" within the TNI to help secure Wahid's control of the TNI.

With his popular reformer image, Wirahadikusumah was indeed the Palace's first choice. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, Wirahadikusumah had been member of the TNI's team tasked with drafting the concept of military reforms. However, he soon felt disillusioned with what he saw as half-hearted implementation and become its staunchest critic. Due to his open criticism of the TNI's internal reforms, he was "demoted" to regional army commander in South Sulawesi.<sup>36</sup> Yet it enhanced his popularity as a military reformer. In December, Wahid stopped by in Makassar and at a closed session attended by a number of military officials, including Widodo, he praised Wirahadikusumah as a progressive. Later, Wahid ignored a recommendation from the TNI's High Advisory Council (*Wantimti*) to reprimand Wirahadikusumah for his transgression of the code of conduct<sup>37</sup> and quietly asked Widodo to promote him.

For his part, Wirahadikusumah had always had deep respect for Wahid's inclusive Islam and democratic credentials. Now that they shared common goals, Wahid's inner circle hoped that if Wirahadikusumah made it into the army's helm, he would be able to accelerate the process of internal reforms. However, as a two-star general who hailed from the 1973 Class, he was too junior for the post, and his forced promotion to the top job would ruffle more than a few feathers in the army. A more senior general who could stand up to Wiranto and his conservative allies was needed to play the leading role, and that was how Sudarto came into the picture.

Unlike Wirahadikusumah and Kadi, who had been recognized—at least from their

later writings and public statements—as reform-minded officers, Sudarto's background was somewhat questionable. A graduate of the 1971 Class, little was known about his political inclination until he served as Commander of the prestigious Central Java Regional Military Command at the height of the anti-Soeharto protests. Unlike most of his colleagues, Sudarto appeared to adopt a pro-reform stance. On one occasion, he invited a number of academics and student activists for talks on reforms in his office.<sup>38</sup> It was his pro-reform attitudes during the crucial period that won him the trust of many pro-democracy activists, in spite of his close ties with the Soeharto family.<sup>39</sup>

In January, Wiranto appointed Sudarto head of the BIA, a decision that roused suspicion that Soeharto had maintained control of the TNI.<sup>40</sup> Five months later, Sudarto was promoted to the rank of a three-star-general when Wiranto decided to expand the BIA and revert it to its old name, *Bais*, to counter-balance the influence of *Bakin*.<sup>41</sup> However, their alliance turned sour after Wiranto lost the 1999 vice-presidential bid, which he reportedly blamed on Sudarto for “betraying” him at the last minute.<sup>42</sup>

Sudarto's decision to leave Wiranto had obviously convinced Wahid's inner circle that he was the general they had been looking for in spite of his hazy intelligence background. As Gunawan explained, “He was the only one among his peers who seemed to be genuinely committed to military reforms. Who else?”<sup>43</sup> Even Wirahadikusumah admitted that he once believed that Sudarto was committed to reforming the military.<sup>44</sup> In November, Wahid appointed Sudarto the Army's Chief of Staff, a decision that angered Wiranto. In his as-told-to autobiography, Wiranto disclosed that Wahid had bypassed the normal *Wanjakti* process, as the TNI's official candidate for the post was Yudhoyono. Wahid turned down Wiranto's suggestion to appoint Yudhoyono, saying that he was “too political” for the job.<sup>45</sup> Later, however, Wahid appointed Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister for Security and Socio-political Affairs, after his brief spell as Minister of Mining and Energy.

During his confrontation with Wiranto, both Sudarto and Wirahadikusumah proved to be Wahid's useful allies. Unlike Widodo, who maintained a normative position in the conflict, Wirahadikusumah and Sudarto clearly took Wahid's side. In November, Wirahadikusumah was engaged in an infamous war of words with his superior, *Kostrad* Commander Djadja Suparman. A Wiranto protégé, Suparman had warned that the soldiers would take revenge if their superiors continued to be subjected to humiliating treatment over the investigation of the East Timor human-rights violations, a statement that sparked rumours of a military coup. In an unusual disrespect of hierarchy, Wirahadikusumah lashed out at Suparman, asserting that the soldiers' loyalty lay with the nation and the TNI institution, not the generals.<sup>46</sup> Later, he was quoted as urging Wiranto to comply with Wahid's demand for his resignation,<sup>47</sup> an attitude that offended not just Wiranto, but most of his own colleagues who saw it as a breach of an officer's code of conduct. The public, however, applauded Wirahadikusumah's bravery as more evidence of his courage to challenge his discredited superior, which further cemented his reformer image.

Sudarto took a far less controversial stance than Wirahadikusumah, yet he personally assured Wahid of the army's support in his confrontation with Wiranto.<sup>48</sup> Later in May, amidst mounting tension between the president and Parliament, Sudarto declared that the TNI would face any party that planned to unseat the legitimate government through unconstitutional means. The statement drew strong reaction as it could lead to an interpretation that the army had pledge its official support for Wahid, which breached the TNI leadership's earlier decision to quit day-to-day politics.<sup>49</sup>

Shortly after Wiranto's fall, the Bulakrantai Group began to exert its influence. Two

weeks after Wiranto's suspension, the TNI headquarters announced a major reshuffle, widely seen as a process of de-Wiranto-nization as it swept away most of Wiranto's men and brought in "members" of the Bulakrantai Group. The initial draft for the reshuffle had reportedly been prepared in Gunawan's Minister of State Secretary Office, but was altered due to fierce resistance from the TNI headquarters.<sup>50</sup> However, Wirahadikusumah took over the *Kostrad* Commander baton from Suparman, who was sidelined into the less significant post as Commander of the TNI's Joint Staff and Command School.<sup>51</sup>

While the move was generally applauded as a sign of Wahid's success in consolidating his control over the military as the reformers were now occupying key posts, it began what would become an open conflict between the president and the TNI. In an emotional public statement, Suparman protested Wirahadikusumah's appointment and threatened to return his decorations, although he later relented. However, his anger was widely shared among the generals. Commander of the TNI's School of Staff and Commander Lieutenant-General Endriartono Sutarto quietly offered to tender his resignation in protest of Wirahadikusumah's promotion, citing that his breach of officer's code of conduct made him unfit for high-ranking jobs.<sup>52</sup> Although Widodo persuaded him to stay, the tension fuelled speculation that some generals planned to tender their resignation en masse. The tension receded—for a while at least—when Suparman and Wirahadikusumah were persuaded to uphold the corps' solidity and displayed a united front during the handover ceremony.

Nonetheless, deep disillusionment with Wahid was swiftly developing, as the generals felt that he had intervened too deeply into the military's internal affairs and exercised a subjective control over the TNI that contradicted his own commitment to de-politicize the military.

## Theatres of Power Struggle

Another dimension that aggravated Wahid's tension with the military was his unconventional policies in handling the threats of separatism that threatened to jeopardize territorial integrity, a non-negotiable issue that stood at very core of the TNI's existence.

As a well-known campaigner of the non-violence movement, Wahid had consistently striven to avoid the use of military force to deal with separatist threats in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Instead, he tried to win the hearts and minds of the people in the restive provinces through some populist but controversial moves. Wahid rightfully claimed success when, through his frequent visits overseas, he secured international recognition for Indonesia's sovereignty over Aceh, thus preventing a possible replay of the East Timor scenario that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been trying to emulate.

Aceh, the westernmost and Indonesia's most Muslim province, had presented Jakarta with the most serious security challenge. Aceh's disillusionment with Jakarta stemmed from the Central Government's repeated failure to grant a genuine special status to the province, as Soekarno had promised in appreciation of Aceh's heroic contribution to the new republic. Under the special status, Aceh could run its internal affairs, including managing its rich resources and implementing the *sharia* law. Soekarno, however, backtracked on his promise, which eventually triggered Aceh's first rebellion under its charismatic leader, Teungku Daud di Beureueh, who joined Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam Movement. The rebellion ended peacefully when Beureueh surrendered, but erupted again when Jakarta backtracked on its promise, which left in the Acehnese a deep-seated sense of betrayal and provided impetus for persistent armed rebellion movement.

In response to the secessionist threats, Soeharto authorized a decade-long military

operation that resulted in gross human-rights abuses and deepened the Acehese anger of Jakarta. Soeharto's successor, Habibie, tried to rectify the mistake by lifting the "military operation area" status, draft a new Law on the Special Autonomy Status for Aceh and step up development in the poverty-stricken province. However, poor implementation of the programmes, rampant corruptions and persistent human-rights abuses eroded the Acehese's thin trust of Jakarta and contributed to their tacit support for the GAM.

As a democratic campaigner, Wahid tried to offer a peaceful approach to settle the issue but his inconsistency made its implementation impractical. In December 1999, he endorsed the NGO activists and Acehese students' demand for a referendum of self-determination in the province. He even tried to co-opt pro-independence groups in Aceh and bought them off, which later triggered controversy over the so-called Bruneigate scandal. The public, however, reacted strongly against such an approach as it violated his presidential oath to defend the nation's territorial integrity. Interestingly, it contradicted his own rejection of Habibie's failed policy to offer a referendum in East Timor. Eventually, he backtracked and "corrected" his statement, saying that a vote for self-determination in Aceh could only be held upon approval from the MPR, Parliament and the TNI.<sup>53</sup>

In March 2000, Wahid came up with another peace initiative for Aceh. He allowed Minister of State Secretary Gunawan to use his extensive contacts among the NGOs and other unofficial leaders of Aceh to engage GAM leader Teungku Abdullah Syafii for an informal discussion. Despite the TNI's reluctance to support the initiative, the informal talk resulted in an agreement to settle the conflict peacefully, which later led to a "humanitarian pause" accord mediated by the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre. Its implementation, however, was futile as both the GAM and the Indonesian security refused to adhere to the agreement. In April, when security in Aceh deteriorated despite the agreement for the cessation of hostilities, Wahid had no option but to authorize a "limited" military operation in the province.<sup>54</sup>

Wahid's policies in Papua were even more confounding. The easternmost and predominantly Christian province, Papua shared Aceh's grievances of Jakarta's exploitation of its rich resources and excessive military operations that had resulted in gross human-rights violations. Emulating his policy in Aceh, Wahid tried to offer a peaceful cultural approach to settle the issue. In a speech in Jayapura in January 2000, he spontaneously changed the name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua, an indigenous name, signifying his government's gesture of goodwill. However, when Parliament protested that he had breached official procedure, he denied that he had ever done so, which raised questions about his consistency and even mental condition.<sup>55</sup> More shockingly, Wahid endorsed and financed a pro-independence gathering<sup>56</sup> and allowed the raising of the Flag of the Morning Star, a symbol of Free Papua, which triggered public protest as they sent a wrong signal that he endorsed a free Papua.

While Wahid's supporters defended his policies in Aceh and Irian Jaya as signifying his commitment to democracy,<sup>57</sup> they intensified the president's conflict with the military and Parliament, who saw them as jeopardizing the country's territorial integrity. In December, Wahid faced a quiet "insubordination" from his own cabinet when Yudhoyono supported the Jayapura Police Chief's decision to arrest Theys Hiyo Eluay and other Papuan pro-independence leaders for holding an anti-Jakarta meeting despite the president's order for their immediate release.

However, it was the sectarian conflict in Maluku that severed relations between Wahid and the TNI as well as the Central Axis. Wahid announced that he had delegated the task of resolving the issues of communal conflict in Maluku and separatism in Papua

to Megawati but in reality he had made most of the decisions concerning the two areas without consulting her.<sup>58</sup> The problem began when Muslim leaders had already perceived Wahid's position on the Maluku conflict as heavily biased towards the Christians. Shortly after the conflict erupted in mid December 1999, Wahid blamed the Muslims in Maluku for provoking the conflict, claiming that Governor Saleh Latuconsina's "Islamization" of the local bureaucracy had exacerbated social and religious enmity in the heterogeneous society. He also blamed the *Kostrad* squads for favouring Muslims and demanded their immediate withdrawal from Maluku.<sup>59</sup>

The perception that Wahid had favoured Christians intensified when he consistently protected the rights of the minority and refused to bow to the Muslims' demand to take their side instead. In December 1999, 400–500 Muslims were reportedly murdered in a violent clash in northern Maluku. The incident sparked Muslim anger and prompted Muslim politicians, including Rais and Haz, to stage a gathering of hundreds of thousands of Muslims and criticized Wahid's policy in Maluku, the first open rift between the president and his Central Axis allies. Wahid decided to belittle the protest, saying that only 25,000 people attended the gathering and that his political rivals had exaggerated the number of Muslim casualties—which he claimed was only five—to discredit and even topple his government.<sup>60</sup>

The president's statement, delivered at a time when calls for *jihad* to defend the threatened Muslims in Maluku were shouted out from almost every mosque in the country, seemed to have poured fuel over the flaming fire. Claiming that Wahid had failed to protect the Muslims in Maluku, some hardline Muslim militias, such as Front of the Defenders of Islam (FPI) and the Jihad Fighters (Laskar Jihad) began to recruit volunteers and send them to Maluku.<sup>61</sup>

Of all the many radical vigilante groups—both Muslim and Christian—that operated in Maluku, the Laskar Jihad drew most attention due to its militancy and well-structured organization. It first captured public attention in April 2000 when thousands of its members staged a noisy protest before Parliament and the Palace, criticizing Wahid's controversial proposal to lift the ban on communism and his perceived anti-Muslim policy in Maluku. Although its activities had rarely been heard before, a few months after its inception, the Laskar Jihad had already boasted thousands of members and volunteers from all over the country.<sup>62</sup> Such phenomenal growth sparked suspicion that the Laskar Jihad had received political backing, financial support and even military training from some anti-Wahid politicians and TNI individuals. According to his biographer, Wahid suspected that Fuad Bawazier, Wiranto and Suparman had used the Laskar Jihad to undermine his leadership, although he provided no evidence to support his claims.<sup>63</sup> In April, Wahid ordered TNI Chief Admiral Widodo to prevent the shipment of Laskar Jihad fighters to Maluku but a month later, hundreds of them landed in the troubled province.<sup>64</sup>

Wahid also suspected the involvement of some rogue TNI elements in a series of terror attacks that had rocked the country since 2000. On 1 August, just as the MPR started its annual session, a powerful explosion tore down the official residence of the Ambassador of the Philippines in Jakarta. It killed two people and injured 22 others, including Ambassador Leonidas Caday. Four months later, on Christmas Eve of 2000, a series of explosions ripped apart 16 churches and residences that belonged to Christian communities in eight cities in six provinces, including Jakarta, which claimed 19 lives and injured at least 120 others.<sup>65</sup>

In private conversation, Wahid accused Wiranto and the ring of Cendana cronies of being the mastermind of the attacks and other clandestine activities aimed at destabilizing

his government, a theme that he consistently repeated in his biography.<sup>66</sup> Given the fact that such unprecedented brutal attacks occurred amidst heightened tension between the president and his military adversaries, such an allegation appeared logical. It seemed more convincing when Tommy Soeharto became the country's most famous fugitive after he fled to evade a court sentence and was allegedly involved in the assassination of a Supreme Court judge. An independent investigation into the Christmas Eve bombings and other explosions conducted by a group of academics and NGO activists indicated that some rogue elements within the TNI might have masterminded the terror attacks to undermine the civilian government.<sup>67</sup>

However, later police investigations contradicted those allegations as it turned out that the perpetrators of the terror attacks were neither the military nor Tommy Soeharto but a group of largely unknown radical Islamists called the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Despite persistent controversy about the existence of the JI, the police claimed that it had unravelled its terror network in Indonesia after terror attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002 that killed nearly 200 people. In an internationally assisted investigation, the police claimed to have found that the same ring of perpetrators had staged the Christmas Eve bombings and other terror attacks against Christians throughout the country. The police believed that the JI was an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist network that had masterminded terror attacks and attempted to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate in the region.<sup>68</sup> In a separate investigation, the Philippines Police claimed that two JI operatives, Fathurrahman Al-Ghozi and Agus Dwikarna, had masterminded the explosion at Ambassador Caday's residence in Jakarta.<sup>69</sup>

Nevertheless, allegation that some rogue elements within the TNI had masterminded the terror attacks further deteriorated Wahid's relation with the military, but in a curious way. While Wahid had suspected Wiranto, other fingers pointed to Wirahadikusumah. In a parliamentary hearing on 13 June, Abdul Qadir Jaelani, a Muslim legislator, alleged that Wirahadikusumah and his Bulakrantai Group had masterminded a series of terror attacks to destabilize Wahid's government.<sup>70</sup> Curiously, a few weeks later, on 1 August, Wirahadikusumah was relieved as *Kostrad* Commander and replaced by his classmate, Ryamizard Ryacudu, who held the job for four months. He was sidelined to a non-job position at the Army headquarters along with his friend, Romulo Simbolon. Earlier, in July, the Army's *Wanjakti* decided to transfer Kadi to an insignificant position in the Army-owned Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation.<sup>71</sup>

In private conversation, Wahid told Wirahadikusumah that Widodo and Sudarto had come to him with similar allegations to those of Jaelani's, thus he had no option but to approve their recommendation for his replacement. Wahid, however, promised Wirahadikusumah that it was only temporary and he would find a way to bring him back in. Wirahadikusumah dismissed the allegation as baseless, and both Widodo and Sudarto denied that they had ever given the president such unreliable information.<sup>72</sup> However, given Wahid's infamous proclivity for rumour mongering, it was likely that he wanted to secure Wirahadikusumah's loyalty by putting the blame for his dismissal on his superiors.

Wirahadikusumah, however, was not the only casualty of such intense elite intrigue that occurred during Wahid's rule. In May, a document containing police investigation into the 27 July 1996 affair that implicated Yudhoyono found its way to the media but he survived after convincing Megawati of his loyalty. Similarly, Bondan Gunawan's alleged involvement in the embezzlement of the *Bulog* fund became media headline, which, in addition to his political manoeuvring within PDI-P that had displeased Megawati,

eventually forced his exit from the cabinet.<sup>73</sup> In July, a suspect in a counterfeit money case implicated Army Chief of Staff Sudarto in the crime.<sup>74</sup>

Yet, a close examination into the facts relating to Wirahadikusumah's fall indicates that he was actually a casualty of Wahid's conflict with Parliament and the military. Wirahadikusumah's downhill journey began when he ordered a thorough audit on the *Kostrad*-linked business enterprises shortly after he took over command from Suparman. As *Tempo* magazine reported in late July 2000, the audit found irregularities that might involve Suparman in the embezzlement of the Dharma Putera Foundation and Mandala Airlines funds amounting to IDR173 billion (around USD9.2 million).<sup>75</sup>

Wirahadikusumah's exposure of the scandal was greeted with mixed reactions. The public in general applauded Wirahadikusumah's downfall as it had been an open secret that large-scale corruption had been rampant in both the military institution and the many business enterprises it controlled. Indeed, military business was one of the many dark legacies of the *dwifungsi* practices that had continued unabated in spite of reforms.<sup>76</sup> In early 2000, an IMF-sponsored LoI stipulated that the TNI, Polri and Department of Defence had to allow their businesses to be scrutinized by authorized public auditors. Despite the introduction of new measures, their actual implementation remained problematic. In November, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) conducted an audit of the Army's business enterprise, the Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation. It found irregularities in its balance sheet amounted to IDR59 billion (USD 6.6 million) but no concrete action was taken to punish the guilty parties.<sup>77</sup>

Wirahadikusumah's colleagues, however, were furious. Apart from their criticism that he had launched a personal vendetta against Suparman, they feared that such an exposure would snowball uncontrollably and further damage the beleaguered military institution. Sudarto and his deputy, Sutarto, who initially approved Wirahadikusumah's move to audit the *Kostrad*, turned their backs on him when they realized that the results would be made available to the public.<sup>78</sup> Evidently, Sudarto began to distance himself from Wirahadikusumah and the Bulakrantai Group. Wirahadikusumah, however, insisted that he had never regretted his decision because he had done it out of conscience.<sup>79</sup>

Coincidentally, Wirahadikusumah's exposure of the *Kostrad* scandal took place at the time when Wahid was facing a serious challenge from Parliament. After less than a year in office, Wahid had been more successful in creating adversaries than maintaining political allies, mainly due to his decision to sideline the coalition that had brought him into power. In April, he fired two ministers, Jusuf Kalla of Golkar and Laksamana Sukardi of PDI-P. It drew strong public reaction because Wahid appointed his cronies, Rozy Munir, an obscure economist and a member of the NU's central executive board, and Luhut Panjaitan, a retired general with no track record in trade matters, as State Minister to oversee state-owned companies and Minister of Trade and Industry respectively.

More importantly, it turned out that Wahid had committed a serious political blunder, which later set Parliament's move to impeach him. Unlike the relatively controlled reaction from the TNI and the Central Axis when he sacked Haz and Wiranto, he had now upset the leaders of Golkar and PDI-P, who together controlled more than half of the seats in Parliament. Megawati was reportedly upset when she only learnt about the dismissal of Sukardi, her close confidant, aboard a navy ship bound for Papua.<sup>80</sup> More seriously, he gave conflicting reasons for their dismissals. First, he said they failed to work in harmony with other ministers. However, at a closed-door DPR session, which was later leaked to the media, he accused them of corruption and nepotism.

His allegation backfired when Ahmad Kalla, a younger brother of Jusuf Kalla, whom

Wahid had accused of having taken advantage of his brother's position to win lucrative business contracts, decided to strike back. In media interviews, he disclosed that Wahid authorized the disbursement of the Logistical Procurement Agency's (*Bulog*) off-budgetary fund amounting to IDR35 billion (USD3.5 million). Ahmad Kalla accused Wahid of corruption and suspected that his elder brother was sacked because he had declined Wahid's order to disburse the fund, which was later known as the Buloggate scandal.

Seeing an opportunity to discredit him politically, Wahid's adversaries exercised the DPR's rights to enquire about the true reason for the ministers' dismissals and investigate his alleged corruption. Unsurprisingly, PDI-P and Golkar initiated the moves, which heated up the political temperature ahead of the MPR's annual session, as speculation was rife that his opponents would turn the forum into an impeachment session.

Against that backdrop, Wahid had no choice but to appease the TNI, which still maintained much political influence despite its reduced presence in the legislature. A master of the political game, Wahid decided to approve Widodo and Sudarto's recommendation to sideline Wirahadikusumah and replace him with the non-political and more internally accepted Commander of the Jakarta Regional Army Command, Ryamizard Ryacudu. As we shall see later, however, Wahid only took a strategic retreat, as he had planned to bring Wirahadikusumah back in when he could restore his control of the situation.

Indeed, the TNI-Polri decided to stay away from the power struggle that coloured the August annual session. As soon as the session began, Wahid's opponents wasted no time in attacking his chaotic leadership and his government's abysmal achievement in resolving Indonesia's multi-dimensional crises. Led by the Central Axis, they proposed to curtail Wahid's executive power through the so-called "golden cage" power-sharing scenario. Under this scenario, Wahid would be "caged" in a largely ceremonial role as "head of state", while Megawati would take over executive duties as "head of government" to oversee day-to-day state affairs. The proponents of the scenario realized that this parliamentary-styled proposal would violate the presidential-system based on the 1945 Constitution but they argued that it was the best possible solution to resolve the leadership stalemate without having to force Wahid to step down.

The move would have been successful had it not been for Megawati, whose party controlled the largest number of seats in the DPR and the MPR. She turned down the proposal and chose to renew her partnership with Wahid instead. Despite their occasional disillusionment with Wahid, Megawati and her PDI-P advisers had not yet forgotten the Central Axis' blockade of her rise to presidency, and so refused to dance to their tune.

Taking advantage of Megawati's distrust of Amien Rais and his Central Axis, Wahid persuaded her to accept an alternate version of power sharing with a larger role. According to the 1945 Constitution, the vice-president holds no executive power and acts mostly as a "spare tire". Under the deal, however, Wahid agreed to delegate a greater responsibility of supervising day-to-day state activities to Megawati, including the authority to select high-ranking state officials. Shocked by Wahid's brilliant move, his adversaries tried to persuade Megawati to formalize the new deal through a binding MPR decree. She turned it down and, after intense negotiations with Wahid, agreed to formalize the deal through a presidential decree (*Keppres*) No. 121/2000 on the President's Instruction to the Vice-President to Carry Out Day-to-Day Technical State Duties.

It is interesting to note that Wahid's biographer Greg Barton claimed that the *Keppres* was "legally defect" and it was not meant to empower Megawati with sub-

stantial executive powers.<sup>81</sup> However, an examination into the content of the *Keppres* and a historical reconstruction of its issuance contradicts Barton's claim. The *Keppres* was legally sound and it covered a wide range of authorities that Wahid had agreed to delegate to Megawati. State Minister for Regional Autonomy Ryaas Rasyid, who helped draft the *Keppres*, testified that Wahid and Megawati struck the deal to save their partnership.<sup>82</sup>

Greg Barton's account could only indicate that for his part, Wahid never intended to honour the deal. Indeed, shortly after his miraculous victory over Parliament, Wahid decided to reshuffle his cabinet. Hope was high that he would use the opportunity to strengthen his renewed partnership with Megawati and put an end to the president-Parliament conflict that had begun to take its toll on the ailing economy. Unfortunately, Wahid decided to ignore the chance and handpicked cabinet ministers without the full consent of Megawati. He even went to announce the cabinet line-up in her absence, saying that she was "taking a shower", an incident that sparked wild speculation about a fresh rift between the newly reconciled leaders.<sup>83</sup> The suspicion was confirmed three months later when Wahid sent a confidential memo No. 01/2000 to cabinet members that, in essence, retracted the contents of the *Keppres* No 121/2000.<sup>84</sup> The incident obviously taught Megawati a very bitter lesson, which obviously influenced her later decision to move boldly against Wahid.

For the time being, however, Wahid was holding all the cards. Now that he had secured a fresh political legitimacy, he decided to strike back and work on a plan to "re-order" the TNI leadership. In mid September, Wahid reportedly disclosed his intention to replace Widodo, Sudarto and head of *Bakin* Arie J. Kumaat, arguing that they had failed to prevent terror attacks and widespread sectarian conflicts.<sup>85</sup> He intended to replace Widodo with Air Force Chief Hanafie Asnan, Sudarto with Wirahadikusumah and Kumaat with Rahman Tolleng, a civilian intellectual and his old *Fordem* friend.<sup>86</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the prospect of Wirahadikusumah's return was met with strong reaction from the military and, for the first time since the fall of Soeharto, there was a single issue that made the generals close ranks. Even Wahid's military friends, including retired generals Edi Sudradjat and Hariyoto Pringgo Sudirjo, felt that he had gone too far. Apart from their anger at Wirahadikusumah's controversial ideas of military reform, the old conservative generals saw that he had breached the universal military's principle of adherence to the unity of command.<sup>87</sup> Sudarto seized this unprecedented solidarity to block Wirahadikusumah's possible return.

In early October, Sudarto assembled all the regional army commanders in Bandung to issue a statement calling for Wirahadikusumah's and Kadi's appearance before an Officer's Honorary Council (DKP) for a disciplinary hearing.<sup>88</sup> Interestingly, the statement did not mention the *Kostrad* scandal. Instead, it alleged that Wirahadikusumah had breached the officer's code of conduct for failing to secure his superior's approval to send a relief team to earthquake-shaken Bengkulu and leaving for a personal trip to the United States.

Wirahadikusumah's American trip was clearly played up to depict him as an "American lackey", an issue that easily roused nationalistic sentiment among military officers. Earlier, US Defence Secretary William Cohen had said that the TNI's subjection to civilian supremacy was a pre-requisite for the resumption of military ties and implied that Washington would be keen to see "military reformers" sit at the helm of the TNI.<sup>89</sup> Sudarto hosted two other consolidation meetings to further isolate Wirahadikusumah and prevent him from becoming the Army Commander. The generals also reportedly

threatened to tender their resignations en masse should the president insist on continuing with his plan. Undeterred, Wahid responded to their threats calmly, saying, “Let them all resign, [that would make] it easier for me to handle the TNI”.<sup>90</sup>

Wahid’s confidence was short-lived, however, partly because the disillusioned generals now found a strong ally and “defender” in the very figure of Megawati. As the holder of the aforementioned *Keppres*, Megawati had the authority to approve or disapprove high-ranking government officials’ appointment and discharge. So Wahid was left with no option but to come up with a compromise proposal. Shortly after returning home, Wahid told Megawati of his intention to replace Widodo with Air Force Chief Marshall Hanafie Asnan and Sudarto with his deputy, Sutarto.

By nominating Asnan, Wahid wished to implement a fair rotation among the services, and give each a turn to lead the TNI. The obscure yet non-political Sutarto, on the other hand, was a compromise candidate since Wahid and Megawati reportedly had some personal reservations against the other two candidates, Agus Widjojo and Djamari Chaniago.<sup>91</sup> Wahid sent Yudhoyono to negotiate a “compromise proposal” with Sutarto, where the latter would become Army Chief only if he agreed to accept Wirahadikusumah as his deputy. Sutarto turned down the proposal and offered to tender his resignation if Wahid insisted on bringing Wirahadikusumah back.

Apart from his principled position, Sutarto had obviously made a sound decision, knowing that he could rely on his fellow generals and, more importantly, Megawati, for support. In the end, Wahid had to admit defeat. In a meeting with Widodo and his generals on 6 October, he failed to persuade them to accept Wirahadikusumah as Deputy Army Chief of Staff. The generals insisted on leaving the disputed post vacant until the TNI’s *Wanjakti* could come up with a nominee. Realizing that an open confrontation with the TNI and Megawati would only provide his political adversaries fresh ammunition to launch a new strike, Wahid backed off.

On 9 October, he signed a presidential decree appointing Sutarto and Indroko Sastrowiyono Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff respectively. Later, the *Wanjakti* nominated Kiki Syahnakri, former Commander of the Martial Law in East Timor and Sutarto’s classmate, as Deputy Army Chief of Staff. In return, Sutarto decided to “freeze” the DKP process, realizing that they had now won the game and there was no need to prolong the internal conflict. In an interview with *Tajuk* magazine a few hours after his installation, Sutarto indicated his intention to bury the hatchet and maintain the internal army’s solidarity, saying that there had been insufficient evidence to bring Wirahadikusumah and Kadi before the DKP.<sup>92</sup> Regrettably, he also froze the release of the *Kostrad*’s audit results and kept them within the army headquarters.

Wirahadikusumah’s fall put an end to the Bulakrantai Group episode. The brief period when the Bulakrantai Group managed to exert its influence and the internal intrigues that eventually led to its downfall clearly indicates that it never existed as a solid entity. More importantly, it was caught up in and became part of a power struggle, which hardly left it time to implement its proposed agenda of military reform and prove that it was more “progressive” than its “conservative” rivals.

On the other hand, Sutarto’s rise to the army’s helm signified the strengthened influence of the praetorian, conservative “security-first” officers, who were characterized by their preoccupation with security, distaste of politics and distrust of civilian politicians. With slight differences in their views, most of the army’s elite under Sutarto’s command, including his deputy Syahnakri and *Kostrad* Commander Ryacudu, represents this kind of officers. They generally saw Wahid’s politicization of the military and his power struggle with Parliament as a confirmation of “civilian failure”, a replay of civil-

ian power struggle during the problematic implementation of liberal parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Unsurprisingly, these were the officers who later helped to expedite Wahid's forced exit from power.

## THE FALL OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID

Wahid's political journey downhill began with the exposure of the Buloggate and the Bruneigate scandals. As mentioned earlier, Buloggate allegedly involved Wahid and his inner circle in the embezzlement of *Bulog's* Yanatera Foundation fund amounting IDR35 billion (USD3.5 million). The saga began when Suwondo, a Chinese-Indonesian businessman who claimed to be Wahid's informal aide and personal masseur, approached Sapuan, the Deputy Head of *Bulog*, and asked him to disburse the Yanatera Foundation's off-budget fund. Later, Suwondo claimed that it was a pure business deal in which he would use the fund to finance his business activities. In return, he would use his connections with the Palace to help Sapuan's promotion. However, Sapuan, a career bureaucrat, insisted that he agreed to disburse the fund in the belief that the president needed emergency funds to finance the government's humanitarian operations in Aceh. Sapuan disclosed that Suwondo had arranged an audience with Wahid for him, during which the president indicated his interest in using *Bulog's* off-budget fund. After the meeting, Sapuan decided to disburse the fund to Suwondo without notifying his superior, Jusuf Kalla.

Interestingly, the controversy over the exact use of the embezzled fund led to the unintentional revelation of another scandal, Bruneigate. In an interview with *Kompas'* Myrna Ratna, Wahid denied that he had ordered the disbursement of the *Bulog* fund to finance the government's operations in Aceh, saying he used the Sultan of Brunei's personal donation for that purpose. The interview, however, sparked another controversy because Wahid never reported the existence of the Sultan of Brunei's USD2 million donation and the accountability of its use, as was required by law.

In late August, Parliament voted in an overwhelming majority to pass a motion authorizing the inception of two Special Committees (*Pansus*) to investigate Buloggate and Bruneigate. Despite the PKB's insistence that there was insufficient legal cause to investigate the two cases, the *Pansus* commenced an unprecedented parliamentary investigation on the president. Earlier, the PKB had conducted its own investigation into Buloggate, which cleared Wahid as it found that Suwondo had abused his connections with the president to obtain the *Bulog* fund. As for Bruneigate, the PKB insisted that the Sultan of Brunei had given the personal donation to Wahid, so there was no obligation for him to report its existence or use.

While facing mounting challenges from a hostile Parliament, Wahid failed to refrain himself from engaging in another round of conflict. In September, he suddenly replaced Police Chief General Rusdihardjo with General Suroyo Bimantoro, saying that the former was responsible for the release of six suspects in the murder of three members of a U.N. relief mission in Atambua, West Timor. The incident had once again tarnished Indonesia's credibility and threatened to trigger international isolation and embargo.<sup>93</sup> Another version, however, claimed that Rusdihardjo's dismissal was due to his reluctance to arrest the elusive Tommy Soeharto.<sup>94</sup>

Wahid's decision drew strong protest from the DPR and MPR leaders as he made it without prior consultation with the Parliament, as required by the MPR Decree No. VII/2000. Wahid claimed that he had informed parliamentary speaker Akbar Tanjung personally but most legislators insisted that Tanjung alone did not represent Parliament.

Nevertheless, after a round of legal arguments, Wahid went ahead to install Bimantoro as the definitive Police Chief, without Parliament's approval.

More importantly, it turned out that Wahid had committed another blunder in antagonizing the Police, who had so far maintained a distance from the theatre of power struggle, which eventually forced them to join the fray. Angered by his sudden dismissal, Rusdihardjo decided to strike back. On 28 November, a few weeks after his forced departure, Rusdihardjo agreed to deliver crucial testimony before the *Pansus*, which implicated Wahid in the scandal.

According to *Tempo* magazine, Rusdihardjo disclosed the content of a confidential meeting he had with Wahid in May, during which Wahid admitted that he had given a few cheques to Siti Farika, one of his business associates. Wahid claimed that due to his poor eyesight, he was not aware that those were the disputed *Bulog* cheques. The president asked Rusdihardjo to "secure his position", to which the Police Chief complied and ordered his investigators to "handle the case with care". Police investigators questioned Wahid as a witness in the Buloggate case in June but concluded that he was innocent of involvement.<sup>95</sup> However, Rusdihardjo took a precautionary move and presented a written summary of his conversation with Wahid to Megawati, who then ordered her party people to further investigate the case discreetly.<sup>96</sup>

Rusdihardjo's leaked testimony was indeed a heavy blow to Wahid, which further eroded his credibility. In addition to Rusdihardjo's testimony, the *Pansus* also managed to track down recipients of the *Bulog* fund who were Wahid's close confidants, including Farika and his private financier, Aris Junaedi. The fund was used to finance their business activities, including a business expansion for AWAIR, a private airline company that Wahid had helped found. More seriously, the *Pansus* found evidence that Wahid's inner circle had tried to turn the issue of power abuse into an ordinary case of business fraud and shift the blame to Sapuan and Suwondo in order to protect the president.<sup>97</sup>

Thus, on 26 January, after examining more than 40 witnesses, the *Pansus* voted to conclude that Wahid was presumably involved in Buloggate and he had violated state procedure in public assets management related to Bruneigate.<sup>98</sup> On 1 February 2001, despite the PKB's fruitless attempts at blocking it, Parliament's plenary session voted in overwhelming majority to issue its first memorandum to the president. The memorandum asserted that "the President has violated state's basic guidelines (*haluan negara*), Article 9 of 1945 Constitution on Presidential solemn oath, and MPR Decree No XI/MPR/1998 on Good Governance".

The 1945 Constitution stipulated that upon receiving Parliament's first memorandum, which opened the first constitutional door towards the MPR's impeachment of the president, Wahid had three months to clarify his position regarding the issues presented in the memorandum. If Parliament was not satisfied with the president's reply, it could issue a second memorandum, after which the president would be given one more month to reply. If Parliament was still unsatisfied with the president's second reply, it could then invite the MPR to hold an Extraordinary Session to impeach the president. Since DPR members made up two-thirds of the MPR members, the MPR would be bound to accept the DPR's recommendation. The only time Indonesia witnessed the implementation of this constitutional mechanism was when the Extraordinary Session of the Interim MPR rejected President Soekarno's accountability speech in 1966 and consequently impeached him.

Surprisingly, in the voting session to determine the issuance of the memorandum, members of the F-TNI/Polri voted against Wahid, a significant departure from a standard neutral stance that they adopted when faced with such a divisive issue. More shockingly,

in an open voting session broadcast live nationwide, the 38 members of the F-TNI/Polri all stood in support for the issuance of Parliament's first memorandum. The TNI and Polri leaders made the decision after their representatives at the *Pansus* reported that there was sufficient evidence to implicate Wahid in Buloggate and Bruneigate.<sup>99</sup> The surprising decision sparked the question: What prompted the TNI to risk a confrontation with its Supreme Commander?

## The Controversy over the President's Emergency Decree

Apart from the aforementioned issues that had strained relations between Wahid and the TNI, the culminating factor in their confrontation was the president's intention to declare a state of emergency in his desperate attempt to prevent his impeachment.

As parliamentary pressure intensified, Wahid began to lose his puzzling yet creative manoeuvres that his friends and foes alike had come to admire, and resorted to the use of threats and political intimidation. On the evening of 27 January, while addressing a gathering at Bina Graha presidential office, Wahid criticized Parliament's unconstitutional attempts to unseat him and threatened to issue a state-of-emergency decree to freeze the DPR and the MPR.<sup>100</sup> Wahid had not declared the session off-the-record, but realizing the impact of such a shocking statement, Defence Minister Mahfud, who was present at the meeting, asked journalists not to report it. However, a few reporters had already left the vicinity and rushed to file their reports.<sup>101</sup> Thanks to technology, the statement sparked instant controversy, which later triggered accusation from Palace insiders that the media had conspired against Wahid.<sup>102</sup>

The Bina Graha incident further strained Wahid's already tense relations with the press. To mend ties, Wahid decided to hire competent spokespersons, including political commentator Wimar Witoelar and senior journalist Adhi Massardi.<sup>103</sup> Despite their efforts, however, Wahid's popularity continued to plummet, as the problem indeed lay with the king, not the messenger. While it was true that the Indonesian media had been facing many problems that impeded its professionalism since the fall of Soeharto, it had been recognized as one of Asia's freest press. Moreover, the Palace's allegation that the local media had conspired to destroy Wahid's image and later helped to facilitate his fall was easily contradicted by the fact that it was the foreign media that delivered the harsher criticisms against his presidency. *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, for example, wrote that under Wahid's chaotic leadership, Indonesia was one sad example of "failed states". After Wahid's fall, the same newspaper called his term in office as "one of the strangest periods in Indonesian history".<sup>104</sup>

Moreover, later events demonstrated that Wahid and his Palace confidants did not tell the entire truth regarding his intention to issue an emergency decree. After six months of denials, on 23 July 2001, Wahid issued an emergency decree to dissolve the DPR and the MPR, which in turn, prompted the MPR's decision to hold an Extraordinary Session to impeach him. A historical reconstruction, however, demonstrated that Wahid had been working on the emergency decree plan as early as late January, in his attempts to block the impeachment process.

On Saturday morning, hours before addressing the aforementioned gathering at Bina Graha, Wahid summoned Army Chief of Staff Sutarto for a private conversation at the Palace. He explained that the country was in danger of disintegration due to the DPR's unconstitutional moves to unseat him, which could trigger secessionist moves in some provinces, including East Java, Aceh, Riau, Maluku and Papua. To prevent the chaos that might arise, he would impose a martial law, dissolve the DPR and the MPR, and

then hold fresh elections some time in June 2001. To pave way for the fresh elections, he would appoint his legal adviser, Professor Harun Al-Rasid, the new chairman of the Election Committee. Wahid implicitly asked the army to support his plan and subtly indicated Sutarto's dismissal if he declined. Later, he approached other TNI and Polri leaders individually and tried to secure their respective support.

Sutarto recalled that he was so shocked to hear such a far-fetched yet controversial plan that he was not prepared to give a reply. He had never expected that Wahid, an internationally recognized campaigner of democracy, would ever contemplate a plan that would jeopardize Indonesia's nascent democracy. But when he heard that Wahid had announced his plan at Bina Graha in the evening, he made up his mind. Concluding that Wahid's emergency plan was unconstitutional and would endanger the nation, he made a personal decision to decline the president's request.<sup>105</sup>

Meanwhile, Wahid was obviously serious with his emergency decree plan and moved swiftly to mobilize support for its execution so that he could prevent the issuance of the DPR's first memorandum. The following morning, he assembled a mini cabinet session over breakfast at the Palace, attended by Megawati and all top security officials including Yudhoyono, Widodo, Sutarto, Navy Chief Indroko, Air Force Chief Asnan, Police Chief Bimantoro, Minister of Home Affairs Surjadi Soedirdja, Defence Minister Mahfud and head of National Intelligence Agency Arie Kumaat. Cabinet Secretary Simanjuntak and Wahid's spokesperson Witoelar joined in later.

Wahid repeated what he had told Sutarto and the gathering at the Bina Graha. Most of the officials had obviously heard about Wahid's plan since the electronic media turned it into public controversy, yet they appeared too shocked to offer their comments. Sutarto, however, decided to express his decision, saying that while pledging the army's support for the president's determination to prevent the disintegration of the country, he questioned the constitutionality of the plan and raised concerns about its impact on national stability.

Wahid replied that his plan was neither unconstitutional nor unprecedented. He pointed to Soekarno's decision to issue a presidential decree on 5 July 1959 to disband the Constitutional Assembly, a legislative body tasked with devising a permanent constitution to replace the interim 1945 Constitution, on the grounds that he had to prevent a constitutional vacuum due to its inability to complete the job.<sup>106</sup> Drawing the parallel, Wahid argued that since the DPR had violated the 1945 Constitution and endangered the nation, he, like Soekarno, could declare an emergency situation and dissolve the DPR and the MPR. In short, Wahid indicated his intention to issue the emergency decree to dissolve Parliament if it insisted on issuing the first memorandum. The meeting, however, ended inconclusively as, apart from Sutarto's subtle rejection, other attendees of the meeting decided to express their disagreement with the president in silence.<sup>107</sup>

Interestingly, Wahid's biographer claimed that the breakfast meeting at the Palace did not discuss the emergency decree and alleged that the issue was blown out of proportion to discredit the president.<sup>108</sup> Barton's claim, however, was contradicted by Mahfud, Wahid's hand-picked Defence Minister who remained loyal to him to this day. In his autobiography, Mahfud confirmed Sutarto's account of the event, adding that he, like most attendees of the meeting, quietly supported the Army Chief of Staff's stance and recommended against Wahid's plan. According to Mahfud, he informed Yudhoyono about Wahid's controversial speech at the Bina Graha and suggested that he assemble all ministers and officials under his politics and security compartment for an emergency meeting to deliberate the issue.<sup>109</sup>

In the next three days, Yudhoyono hosted a series of marathon meetings, during which pro-Wahid ministers defended the president's plan while TNI-Polri leaders and other officials voiced their objection. Wahid's ministers argued that the president was being treated unfairly, pointing out that his alleged corruption was nothing compared to Golkar's alleged embezzlement of *Bulog*, Habibie's alleged misuse of the Bank Bali fund and the New Order's three decades of systematic corruption. Mahfud, for example, argued that there was no constitutional basis for the issuance of the DPR memorandum since the *Pansus* only concluded that "Wahid was presumably involved" in the Bulog-gate scandal, an allegation that had to be determined through a legal process, not a parliamentary trial.<sup>110</sup> Other officials, however, pointed that the root of the problems was Wahid's betrayal of the rainbow coalition agreement and his political adversaries merely used his alleged corruption as a constitutional justification for his impeachment. So what was happening was a power struggle that needed a political solution, not legal and constitutional arguments. In the end, the meetings recommended against Wahid's plan and decided to find a win-win solution to end the political crisis.

On Wednesday, a day before Parliament held its plenary session, Wahid held another breakfast session at Megawati's place and tried to persuade them to support his emergency decree but failed. Yudhoyono conveyed his compartment's recommendation, while Widodo and Bimantoro politely expressed the TNI and the Polri's objection to the president's plan.<sup>111</sup> Yudhoyono, however, made a last attempt to find a compromise and invited ministers who represented political parties, including those who sponsored the *Pansus*, for another talk at his office's crisis centre. Yet, the meeting failed to reach an agreement, hence the issuance of the DPR's first memorandum.<sup>112</sup>

The intriguing question is: Who gave Wahid such a controversial idea? According to Mahfud, Wahid received input from his legal advisers, Professor Al-Rasid and Minister of Justice Professor Baharuddin Lopa, both of whom were known to be credible legal figures. Al-Rasyid based his argument on the fact that in a presidential system, Parliament could not unseat the president and vice versa, hence the DPR's move to undermine Wahid through the *Pansus* was unconstitutional. To prevent violation of the constitution, the president could exercise his subjective judgement to issue a state-of-emergency decree to dissolve Parliament. Similarly, Lopa argued that since the DPR had used the logic of a parliamentary system to unseat the president, Wahid could "retaliate" by using the same logic, that is, to dissolve Parliament.<sup>113</sup> He even asked Mahfud not to prevent Wahid's militant supporters from foiling the impeachment process by force, arguing that they were only retaliating to Parliament's unfair and unconstitutional move to unseat the president.<sup>114</sup> Cabinet Secretary Simanjuntak, who earned his doctorate in constitutional law, shared a similar view and was known to have helped Wahid with some legal advice.

Wahid's legal advisers, however, were a minority as most legal and constitutional law experts as well as political historians contradicted their views. Mahfud, who was also a professor of constitutional law, offered a different interpretation of the 1945 Constitution. While agreeing with his colleagues' argument that, based on the principle of *salus populi suprema lex* (the people's safety is the supreme law), which stipulated that the president could impose martial law should he determine that the people and the constitution were in danger, Mahfud argued that the constitutionality of such unconstitutional decision would depend on whether it was supported by real political powers—most importantly, the military.<sup>115</sup> Minister of Justice Yusril Ihza Mahendra, also a constitutional law expert, delivered a similar argument, pointing to the historical

precedence that Soekarno's decree was successful only because the army under General Nasution threw its weight behind him.<sup>116</sup> This constitutional debate later provided the impetus for the birth of the Constitutional Court, the supreme judiciary body that would deliver the final verdict for any constitutional dispute. Nevertheless, both Mahfud and Mahendra emphasized one crucial point: that Wahid's plan to issue a state of emergency decree was executable if and only if the security apparatus, that is, the TNI and the Polri, pledged their support.

Here lies the biggest flaw in Wahid's plan. The TNI insisted that there was no evidence to support Wahid's claim that five provinces would secede if he were ousted. In fact, such claim roused suspicion that Wahid's supporters had planned to instigate riots in those provinces to justify the issuance of the emergency decree. Some generals pointed out that Wahid had refused point-blank to impose martial law in Aceh, the province that faced the greatest threat of disintegration. So his intention to issue a state-of-emergency decree at the time when he faced a possible impeachment was indeed suspicious.<sup>117</sup>

Wahid, however, was confident that if he dismissed the generals who opposed his plan, particularly the Army Chief of Staff, the coast would be clear for the execution of his plan. He actually managed to secure the support of a few TNI and Polri generals.<sup>118</sup> He intended to replace Sutarto and *Kostrad* Commander Ryacudu with Wirahadikusumah and Prabowo's former deputy, Kivlan Zen, respectively.<sup>119</sup> Interestingly, instead of exercising his right to dismiss the Army Chief of Staff, Wahid reportedly asked Megawati to persuade Sutarto to tender his resignation, but she declined his request.<sup>120</sup>

As a result, the following months witnessed a tug of war between the president and his Army Chief of Staff. Refusing to bow to the president's demand, Sutarto moved quickly to mobilize internal support. First, he sought approval from senior generals, including Wahid's personal friends such as Sudradjat, Try Sutrisno, Hartas and former Speaker of MPR Kharis Suhud, for his action. In February, the retired generals issued a statement endorsing the Army Chief of Staff's stance vis-à-vis the president.<sup>121</sup>

Next, he consolidated his own house. On 1 March, Sutarto hosted a six-hour "heart-to-heart" talk to discuss the latest situation at the Army headquarters, attended by most army generals, including Wirahadikusumah and Kadi. He called them to put aside their differences and uphold institutional solidity. Despite a few generals suggesting that the Army should take a firm stance against the president, in the end they all agreed to maintain the TNI's unbroken record of adherence to the 1945 Constitution. In a press statement afterwards, Sutarto dismissed speculation of a military coup as baseless and pledged the Army's commitment that it would support a presidential impeachment if only the process was constitutional. However, he sent a stern warning, "If the president insisted on issuing it [the emergency decree], we would no longer assist him."<sup>122</sup>

It is clear that Sutarto also used the meeting to prevent Wahid's further intervention into the army. Now that the army had taken an official position, as a serving officer, Wirahadikusumah was duty-bound to comply. Consequently, even if Wahid insisted on appointing him the Army Chief of Staff, Wirahadikusumah would face fierce and widespread internal resistance. In mid May, Sutarto hosted another consolidation meeting in Bandung, after which all regional army commanders issued a statement that they rejected the rise of a "political general" (*jenderal politik*), a clear reference to Wirahadikusumah, to the army's helm.<sup>123</sup> Wirahadikusumah, however, denied widespread speculation that he had accepted Wahid's offer and insisted that he would never degrade himself into becoming an institutional traitor. Despite his personal disapproval of Sutarto's open challenge to the president, Wirahadikusumah met Sutarto in private and pledged his

loyalty to the army institution.<sup>124</sup> Later, when Wahid repeatedly threatened to sack Widodo, Sutarto and a few other commanders in his desperation to secure support for his emergency decree plan, most army generals who were eligible to succeed them pledged their commitment to decline Wahid's offer to maintain institutional solidity.<sup>125</sup>

Indeed, Sutarto's aggressive moves sparked internal controversy. While there was an unprecedented unity among the TNI's rank and file to reject Wahid's controversial plan, a few generals disapproved of his open confrontation with the president. Some of them criticized him for having overstepped Widodo's authority, as until then the TNI Commander had yet to issue the TNI's official statement on the matter.<sup>126</sup> Others, like Agus Widjojo, expressed concern that the army's open challenge to the president would be seen as an act of insubordination, which once again revived the debate on the problematic relations between the TNI and its Supreme Commander (as discussed in Chapter 2). It could lead to an interpretation that instead of disengaging itself from politics, the army was taking part in the political game.<sup>127</sup> Unsurprisingly, Wahid's supporters suspected that Sutarto's challenge signalled the TNI's intention to subvert the legitimate civilian government.<sup>128</sup> Ambassador Gelbard, Wahid's personal friend whose briefing to his superiors during the Wahid-Wiranto confrontation had triggered Washington's warning of a possible military coup, now warned the TNI to obey its civilian leader.<sup>129</sup>

Responding to the criticism, Sutarto wrote a column in *Kompas*, asserting that based on universal military principle and the TNI's rules, a soldier must obey his superior's order if and only if it is right, but he reserves the right to disobey an order if it is unlawful.<sup>130</sup> As for allegation that he had bypassed his superior, Sutarto insisted that he had always been in constant communication with Widodo, who assured him that all TNI leaders would tender their resignation in protest if Wahid dismissed him.<sup>131</sup> In the end, in an obvious attempt to end the internal controversy, Widodo issued the TNI's official statement—read out by Widjojo—which basically endorsed Sutarto's stance, while at the same time calling for all political elites to strike a compromise.<sup>132</sup>

Despite his public challenge of the president, however, Sutarto, along with Widodo and other TNI and Polri leaders, discreetly took an active part in Yudhoyono-led efforts at lobbying the political elites to accept a political compromise.<sup>133</sup> One of the compromise proposals that most political leaders seemed to agree upon was the modification of the "golden cage" scenario. This time, however, they proposed to seal the power sharing through a binding MPR decree to prevent the recurrence of the ill-fated *Keppres* No. 121/2000. In early February, the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) proposed the power-sharing concept to Wahid but received no response from the president. However, a month later, Yudhoyono and his team met the DPA and sounded out the possibility of reviving the proposal to prevent the issuance of the DPR's second memorandum.<sup>134</sup> Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung indicated his support, although MPR speaker and Wahid's nemesis Amien Rais voiced his open scepticism.<sup>135</sup>

The compromise proposal, however, failed to take off mainly because Wahid turned it down, arguing that it was unconstitutional.<sup>136</sup> However, at a closed-door meeting with some MPR members, he unintentionally disclosed the true reason for his objection, saying that he doubted Megawati's ability to assume greater responsibility should he agree to delegate executive power to her.<sup>137</sup> This and other disparaging remarks that he made about Megawati—publicly and discreetly—soured their once warm friendship and contributed to her assertiveness in moving against him.<sup>138</sup>

In the following months, Wahid became increasingly confrontational. In late March, he ordered Attorney-General Darusman to arrest three New Order cronies, believed to

be head of Golkar faction Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Megawati's confidant Arifin Panigoro and Amien Rais's financier, Fuad Bawazier, on charges of corruption.<sup>139</sup> While the three businessmen-turned-politicians were widely regarded as corrupt, Wahid's belated order to arrest them just as he faced mounting parliamentary pressure raised suspicion that he was launching a counter attack against his political adversaries.

More seriously, Wahid appeared to have deliberately played the "NU card" and manipulated public fear of a grassroots conflict pitting his militant NU supporters against Muhammadiyah and PDI-P members to deter an impeachment.<sup>140</sup> Ever since the DPR issued its first memorandum, some of his loyalists in East Java and other provinces began to mobilize what they called "dare-to die-squads" and vowed to defend him to the last drop of their blood. Such militancy raised deep concern about a possible NU-Muhammadiyah clash at the grassroots level, as many NU leaders blamed Muhammadiyah's Rais for having betrayed Wahid and led Parliament's move to oust him.<sup>141</sup> A clash with Megawati's equally militant supporters was also imminent, which partly contributed to her reluctance to take an active part in Wahid's ousting.

Some of his NU loyalists even called for the issuance of a *fatwa* to condemn attempts at ousting him as an act of *bughat* (subversion against the divinely legitimate ruler), which could justify a *jihād* against its perpetrators.<sup>142</sup> Fortunately, moderate voices within the NU prevailed. While most NU leaders pledged their commitment to defend Wahid's leadership, most senior and respected clerics resisted attempts to manipulate religion for political purposes. At a meeting in the town of Cilegon in mid April, the NU officially issued a neutral statement, appealing to all political elites to uphold the interest of the people above their own and put an end to the power struggle.<sup>143</sup> Later, NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi persuaded the militant leaders to drop their plan to foil the MPR's Extraordinary Session by force, a decision that soured his relationship with Wahid.<sup>144</sup>

In the end, despite his multi-layered strategies, Wahid failed to halt the impeachment process. On 30 April, the DPR voted in an overwhelming majority to issue a second memorandum to the president, which further widened the constitutional door towards his impeachment. Interestingly, this time the TNI-Polri faction abstained from voting, citing that "as a state tool, the TNI and Polri must remain politically neutral".<sup>145</sup> A few days before the voting session, Megawati tried to persuade Sutarto, who represented the TNI-Polri to convey the decision, to support the issuance of the second memorandum. Sutarto, however, convinced her that the TNI and Polri would be in a better position to handle security disturbances that might occur during the impeachment process if they abstained from the power struggle.<sup>146</sup> In response to Wahid's militant supporters' threats to foil the impeachment process by force, the Police headquarters issued a shoot-on-the-spot order and authorized the use of live bullets to disperse rioters.<sup>147</sup>

## The Impeachment

The DPR's second memorandum put more pressure on Wahid as he had only one month to come up with an official reply or strike another political compromise to save his presidency. Realizing that his options were narrowing, Wahid agreed to offer Megawati another power-sharing proposal, which he had previously rejected, in exchange for her willingness to halt the impeachment process. In early May, he ordered Yudhoyono to chair a team of seven ministers known as the Team of Seven to work on the power-sharing proposal.<sup>148</sup>

The team's proposal consisted of three main points: a power sharing between the

president and vice-president, a cabinet reshuffle, and a pause in the power struggle between the president and Parliament. Under the power sharing, Wahid would assume responsibility of managing state affairs while Megawati would run day-to-day government activities as head of government. To ensure that the new power sharing worked, the team proposed that cabinet composition be reverted to its original form, the one of October 1999, which reflected the rainbow coalition that brought the Wahid-Megawati ticket to power. If political compromise had to be reached, the team recommended that all political and state institutions hold a “political moratorium” until 2004 to ensure that the “new” government could carry on its work effectively.<sup>149</sup>

Despite the apparent inevitability of presidential impeachment, the door for political compromise actually remained narrowly open until mid May. One day after the DPR issued the second memorandum, Megawati took the initiative to invite the chairmen of all political parties for talks on the latest situation. The meeting was slated for 11 May but she called it off at the last minute to give time for the Team of Seven to work on their compromise proposal.<sup>150</sup> Although she had encouraged her party to move forward with the impeachment process, Megawati remained doubtful about the future of her presidency should she agree to take over from Wahid, given the bitter experience of her failed presidential bid in 1999. The fact that Rais had enthusiastically propelled Wahid to power but was now aggressively working to facilitate his exit increased her doubts.

In March, with active lobbying from Taufik Kiemas, her husband cum political mentor, she held separate meetings with Rais, Tanjung, Haz and other political leaders to glean their genuine commitment to support her rise to presidency. She presented them with four conditions for her consent to take over from Wahid, which reflected her distrust of her new potential allies. They were:

- unanimous support for her rise to presidency;
- a guarantee that she would serve Wahid’s remaining term until 2004;
- the abolition of the MPR’s annual session; and
- the vacating of the vice-president position.<sup>151</sup>

Her conditions almost halted the impeachment process as most political leaders were reluctant to write “a blank cheque” to guarantee her undisturbed rule until 2004. Her last requirement presented them with a problem in power sharing. By mid April, only Rais’ PAN agreed to pledge its official support for her rise to presidency.

Indeed, apart from Rais, who had from the outset declared that Wahid had only two options—either step down or face an impeachment—other leaders seemed to be willing to give Wahid a second chance. Tanjung, who had preferred a new power sharing due to his party’s own precarious position against Wahid’s threat to disband it, reiterated his position.<sup>152</sup> Retired general Edi Sudradjat, whose voice was heard and heeded by TNI leaders, urged Wahid to delegate executive power to Megawati, arguing that it presented the minimum security risk to the nation.<sup>153</sup> In line with the Team of Seven’s recommendation, both Tanjung and Sudradjat insisted that if Wahid accepted the power-sharing proposal, the MPR could still hold an Extraordinary Session to constitutionalize the new deal, and not impeach him.

However, the biggest stumbling block for a compromise solution remained none other than Wahid himself. Under such heavy pressure, the ailing president seemed to have developed some sort of paranoia, perhaps due to a combination of physical limitations and wrong advice from his inner circle. He voiced suspicion, which was later echoed by members of the PKB, that Yudhoyono and the Team of Seven were plotting against him and planned to emulate what Kartasasmita did to Soeharto in 1998.<sup>154</sup> Against such a backdrop, he discreetly set up the Team of Three to work on a separate power sharing

proposal and intensify lobby to the Megawati's side.<sup>155</sup>

In the end, however, he seemed to crack under pressure. On 11 May, while the two teams were lobbying Megawati, Wahid issued a shocking statement that effectively killed the compromise proposal. Responding to reporters' questions if he would delegate more power to his vice-president, Wahid blurted out, "What kind of more power for Megawati? I ask you, what kind of power sharing? I have given her everything. I have asked her to chair cabinet session and handle day-to-day technical state affairs, except for two things, that is, selection of cabinet [members] and [the making of] state basic policies."<sup>156</sup>

At this point, the bond between the two leaders, who once called each other "brother and sister" and whom many Indonesians hoped would emulate the duumvirate (*dwi-tunggal*) of Soekarno-Hatta, seemed to have irreparably broken. From that moment on, Megawati seemed to have stiffened her resolve to take over from Wahid. Three days later, at a meeting with a youth organization, she was quoted as saying that the impeachment session cannot be stopped.<sup>157</sup> The next day, addressing tens of thousands of her PDI-P supporters in the Riau capital of Pekanbaru, she signalled her readiness to take over from Wahid as long as the process was constitutional.<sup>158</sup>

Facing Megawati's change of heart, Wahid refused to back down. One day after Megawati's assertion about the inevitability of the impeachment process, he invited key ministers and TNI-Polri leaders for another breakfast, interestingly, at Megawati's place although she had left for a medical check-up in Singapore. During the tense meal, Wahid repeated his familiar threat that if the impeachment process continued, he would issue a state-of-emergency decree to dissolve the DPR and the MPR on 25 May. This time, however, he gave some justification to the threat, claiming that Megawati was holding a "clandestine" political meeting in Singapore and planned to announce her own cabinet line-up. He issued them an "either with me or I will sack you" ultimatum and set the deadline at midnight. Rumours were flying that Wahid had prepared a presidential decree to dissolve the DPR and the MPR slated for 18 May, which the president's spokespersons denied.<sup>159</sup> More seriously, he had reportedly signed a presidential decree to replace the TNI's top leaders with more "cooperative" generals to ensure smooth execution of his emergency decree plan.<sup>160</sup>

Wahid's ultimatum forced Megawati to hastily return home and hold urgent talks with her party leaders as well as TNI-Polri generals to anticipate Wahid's next move. Meanwhile, DPR and MPR leaders held an emergency meeting and concluded that if Wahid made either of the moves—dissolve the DPR or dismiss the army leaders—they would speed up the impeachment process. The TNI, however, decided to send Wahid a stronger signal of defiance. On Saturday evening, 20 armoured vehicles were suddenly deployed at the *Kostrad* headquarters, some 300 metres away from the Palace. The next morning, hundreds of the green-bereted *Kostrad* soldiers gathered at the National Monument Square for a "readiness call". Standing over a Stormer tank, Ryacudu reminded his soldiers of the principle set by the grand Commander Sudirman, "A soldier's politics is the nation's politics. Let there be not a single *Kostrad* soldier who betrays this or becomes a traitor to the Republic and people of Indonesia."<sup>161</sup>

Since the nation's politics clearly mandated an adherence to the Constitution, the message of such a bold military parade was unmistakably clear: the TNI would not support the president if he carried out his unconstitutional emergency-decree plan. Drawing inspiration from their Philippine counterparts who left embattled President Joseph Estrada and took the side of the mass during the People Power II movement in

January,<sup>162</sup> the TNI indicated that it might leave Wahid too.

Interestingly, American Ambassador Gelbard now praised the TNI's open challenge of the president, which indicated that Washington was reconsidering its position on the Indonesian political crisis.<sup>163</sup> Significantly, the U.S. Navy and its Indonesian counterpart held a joint Combined Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) operation from 5 May to 26 May. Given that the U.S. had severed military ties with the TNI, such a joint operation indicated that Washington had worked on security measures to anticipate the impeachment process.<sup>164</sup>

More importantly, President George W. Bush might have emulated his predecessor's strategy in using the Washington Consensus (discussed in Chapter 1) to put financial pressure on Wahid. In April, the IMF and the World Bank decided to postpone the disbursement of loans to Jakarta, citing that the government had failed to meet the necessary requirements. Wahid had been constantly engaged in a tug of war with the IMF, which virtually wiped out what little confidence the market had in his government. The dire economic situation led to the Paris Club's gloomy prediction of an Indonesian default if both sides failed to reach an amicable agreement by the end of May.<sup>165</sup> While the domestic power struggle was still under way, the IMF had signalled its commitment to work with Wahid's successor.<sup>166</sup> Bush's change of heart might have been due to Kiemas, who went to meet Washington's power brokers in May and convinced them of his wife's readiness to take over from Wahid.<sup>167</sup> Indeed, Wahid claimed that he had received intelligence reports about the presence of six American submarines in Indonesian territory during his impeachment and accused Washington of facilitating his fall.<sup>168</sup>

Nevertheless, the next few days witnessed one of the country's tensest political situations as the whole nation anticipated Wahid's 25 May emergency decree. On the day in question, Wahid assembled a cabinet session and repeated his ultimatum to Megawati: Either accept the power sharing proposal or let him issue the state-of-emergency decree. He gave her time until midnight to reply. If she declined, he would issue the state-of-emergency decree the following day, order the arrest of several corruptors, and hold fresh elections. Megawati delivered her boldest reply by leaving the cabinet meeting. She gathered her party leaders and, by midnight, Jakarta's political circle was buzzed with the wildly anticipated news: She had turned down the proposal, citing Wahid's earlier argument, that it was unconstitutional.<sup>169</sup>

The next day, however, passed without Wahid issuing the emergency decree. Yet, two days later, he issued the "President's Declaration" and ordered Yudhoyono "to take specific and necessary measures and coordinate all security apparatus, in order to handle the crisis and enforce order, security and law in the shortest of time". As Yudhoyono later disclosed to the media, Wahid intended to impose a state-of-emergency decree on 28 May but was eventually persuaded by Yudhoyono, Simanjuntak and other members of his inner circle to sign the softer version instead.<sup>170</sup> Indeed, the President's Declaration did not include any of Wahid's threats to impose martial law, dissolve the DPR and the MPR and hold fresh elections.

Realizing the danger of being associated with the embattled president, Yudhoyono moved quickly to calm the anxious public that he would never take any of those measures. Instead, he met parliamentary leaders and assured them that he would use his new authority to secure the constitutional process, whatever the outcome.<sup>171</sup> Despite fierce protest from Wahid's militant supporters, the DPR voted on 30 May in an overwhelming majority to invite the MPR to hold the impeachment session, which, according to the existing laws, would commence on 1 August. The PKB walked out from the session

while the TNI-Polri faction once again abstained from voting.<sup>172</sup>

## Ungraceful Exit

Wahid was obviously upset that Yudhoyono chose to let the impeachment process go unhindered instead of using his new authority to quell his opponents. On 1 June, he made a series of bizarre but desperate moves. He relieved Yudhoyono from his job and replaced him with Minister of Transportation Agum Gumelar, dismissed two ministers and rotated four others. He sacked Attorney-General Darusman, who had only a week earlier announced that Wahid was innocent of involvement in the Buloggate scandal, and replaced him with Lopa. He also ordered Police Chief Bimantoro, who had angered him for taking action against his supporters in Pasuruan, East Java, to tender his resignation. When Bimantoro declined, knowing that Wahid needed the DPR's approval to replace him, the president decided to risk a confrontation with Parliament and suspended him.

Despite his apparent desperation, Wahid's moves were logical, if only they were not too late in coming. By substituting Yudhoyono with Gumelar, he hoped that the former *Kopassus* Commander who had helped Megawati to rise to the PDI's helm (see in Chapter 1) would manage to soften her opposition.<sup>173</sup> By replacing Darusman with Lopa, he hoped to restore public trust in his commitment to fight corruption, while at the same time using it to force his opponents to strike a compromise. Indeed, shortly after taking office, Lopa announced that he would do what Darusman had failed to carry out—investigate Akbar Tanjung and Arifin Panigoro of PDI-P for corruption.<sup>174</sup> Two weeks later, Wahid did another cabinet shake-up and replaced top economics minister Rizal Ramli, who had been on loggerheads with the IMF, with the more accommodating banker, Burhanuddin Abdullah, to ease international financial pressure. In early July, Lopa suddenly died of a heart attack, forcing Wahid to make another reshuffle, which brought to total the number of cabinet changes he had made during his 20-month rule to 28.

Yet, his decision to open a fresh front with the Polri at a time when he was already facing open opposition from Parliament and the TNI had sparked some suspicion. Did he try to take control of the Polri to pave the way for his emergency decree without the TNI's support? Or, as human-rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution suspected, did he try to “provoke” the TNI into launching a coup so that he would be justified to issue a state-of-emergency decree?<sup>175</sup>

A post-factum analysis indicated that Wahid's decision to control the Polri was a crude and desperate, though logical, step in his attempts to halt the impeachment process. Since Bimantoro had publicly voiced the Polri's rejection of his emergency-decree plan, Wahid needed to find a more cooperative ally inside. He was lucky as, under Bimantoro, the Polri was facing severe internal factionalism due to inter-class and inter-unit rivalries as well as rampant corruption.<sup>176</sup> He found Inspector-General Chaeruddin Ismail, a relatively competent and clean officer who was sidelined into oblivion due to inter-class rivalry, to be a willing candidate and appointed him Deputy Police Chief in spite of the DPR's rejection.<sup>177</sup> When Bimantoro still refused to delegate his authority to Ismail after his suspension, Wahid dismissed him during a ceremony to commemorate Police Day on 1 July.<sup>178</sup>

More importantly, unlike the army, the Polri lacked political sophistication due to its decades-long subordination within the TNI, which contributed to its awkward and slow response to outside political interference.<sup>179</sup> With active encouragement from his TNI colleagues and parliamentary leaders, Bimantoro defied Wahid's order to surrender his

command baton, a symbol of the Police Chief's authority, and emulated Sutarto's strategy in mobilizing internal support. The Polri officially took Wahid's decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that Wahid had violated MPR Decree No VII/2000 and contradicted his earlier action, in which he liquidated the position of Deputy Police Chief. The Supreme Court eventually overturned Wahid's decision. While the legal battle was being fought, Ismail managed to secure the support of some of his classmates and around 150 young officers, who worked aggressively to expand their support base.<sup>180</sup>

Nonetheless, Wahid had undoubtedly played his biggest and most dangerous political gambit. While he managed to restore his bargaining power and forced his opponents to recalculate the risk of an impeachment, the leadership dualism in Polri presented the country with an unprecedented danger of an open clash between the Polri and TNI institutions. There had been no convincing evidence to sustain Nasution's suspicion that Wahid, the man who spent half of his life fighting for democracy—whatever his interpretation of the concept was—would degrade himself into betraying his own commitment. However, there were serious indications that he had planned to foil the SI MPR at all cost, by force if necessary.

On 12 July, Wahid's spokesman Yahya Staquf announced that the president had instructed Gumelar and Deputy Police Chief Ismail to arrest Bimantoro and Jakarta Police Chief Sofjan Jacobeb for committing acts of insubordination.<sup>181</sup> Two days earlier, Gumelar tried to dissuade Wahid from making such a reckless move. When Wahid carried on with his plan, Gumelar decided to decline it publicly, saying that the only person who had the authority to arrest the Police Chief was the president himself.<sup>182</sup> Wahid's credibility was further eroded when Ismail publicly expressed his "confusion" over the order.<sup>183</sup>

Wahid tried to save the situation, as usual, by blaming the press for twisting his spokesman's statement. However, later evidence indicated that some of his supporters in the Polri and the Attorney-General's Office had gone as far as to prepare a plan to arrest DPR and MPR leaders to foil the impeachment session.<sup>184</sup> Police and military intelligence had even intercepted attempts at repeating the success of the 1998 student's occupation of the DPR-MPR complex to foil the impeachment process. In fact, a few hours before the impeachment session began on 23 July, Wahid called TNI leaders and threatened to arrest them if they prevented his supporters from occupying the Parliament complex. He also ordered the Commander of the Presidential Guards and the Chief of Staff of the Jakarta Military Garrison to arrest the Chairman of the Supreme Court and Vice-President Megawati, but the two generals ignored the order.<sup>185</sup>

Despite Wahid's denial, Staquf's statement had prompted the MPR to prepare for the advancement of the impeachment session should he arrest or replace Bimantoro.<sup>186</sup> More seriously, it alerted the TNI to a worst-case scenario if Wahid took over control of the Polri and use it to pave the way for his emergency-decree plan, which might force them to confront the Polri. While encouraging Bimantoro to "fight" the president and pledging security guarantees to the MPR leaders, the TNI decided to devise a contingency plan if the worst came. In an unprecedented display of unity, the TNI generals pledged both material and moral support for their police counterparts. To prevent the replay of the street protests and riots in the capital, *Kostrad* donated its anti-riot equipment and military transportation to the Jakarta police.<sup>187</sup> On 5 June, 7,000 police and TNI soldiers paraded at the National Monument Square, right in front of the Palace, in a display of unity. Yet, if Bimantoro had failed and Ismail had taken control of the Polri, the TNI was prepared to take over security, by force if necessary.<sup>188</sup> All TNI units throughout the country were called on the highest alert and military transportation was readied to

fly troops to any trouble spot.<sup>189</sup>

Indeed, the worst scenario of a clash between the Polri and the TNI seemed inevitable. When he realized that all the doors to a political compromise had been closed, Wahid decided to play his final gambit. On 21 July, ignoring Rais's warning of the advancement of the impeachment session, he appointed Ismail as the acting Police Chief, a clever move aimed at evading an obligation to seek the DPR's approval. Earlier, Ismail had ignored an appeal from Gumelar, Widodo and the three Chiefs of Staff to decline Wahid's offer to avoid a clash between the TNI and the Polri.

Shortly after returning to his office, Ismail sent telegrams to all regional police chiefs, instructing them to follow his order as he was now in charge of the Polri. Bimantoro and his loyalists moved quickly to retract the order but they faced fierce resistance within the headquarters as more than 150 middle-ranking officers and a few generals who supported Ismail struggled to assert their control. Jakarta Police Chief Jacob proposed to arrest Ismail to end the leadership dualism but other generals turned him down.<sup>190</sup>

Although Ismail's appointment as acting Police Chief did not directly violate the MPR decree, the MPR leaders realized that Wahid was manipulating legal loopholes and decided to take no risk. One day after Ismail's appointment, Rais invited all MPR members who had gathered in the capital a week before to hold a plenary session, during which they agreed to proceed with the impeachment session on Monday, 23 July. The PKB decided to boycott the session but its chairman, Matori Abdul Jalil, who had quietly left Wahid's sinking ship for some time, pledged his support, which prompted Wahid to dismiss him from the party.

Responding to the MPR's decision, Wahid reiterated earlier threats that he would never leave the Palace and warned of a "twin presidents" scenario if the MPR impeached him by force. The political elites, however, ignored his threat and, on Sunday, they, including chairman of F-TNI/Polri Lieutenant-General Hari Sabarno and Jalil, met at Megawati's place. Coming out from the meeting and looking jubilant, Rais told the press, "By God's will, soon we will witness a new national leadership. We have pledged our support for Ibu Megawati Soekarnoputri, in the hope that her future leadership will be more effective, more productive and that it will restore public confidence and trust that have been lost from the present government."<sup>191</sup>

Wahid called Rais' premature statement concerning Megawati's presidency while he was still the legitimate president a "legislative coup", and it stiffened his resolve to issue the emergency decree despite the diminishing political and security support. He ordered Widodo to tender his resignation for failing to restrain the F-TNI/Polri from endorsing the advancement of the impeachment session. When Widodo refused, Wahid decided to use the "Ismail strategy" at the TNI. On Sunday night, he summoned the Secretary-General of the Department of Defence Lieutenant-General Johny Lumintang and, in Widodo's presence, offered him the job of Deputy TNI Commander. In his desperation, Wahid had forgotten that Lumintang was facing an in-absentia trial at a U.S. court for his alleged involvement in the East Timor human-rights violations, a serious issue that could spark an international uproar to his appointment. Lumintang was reportedly bitter about the stagnation of his career due to what he alleged was the fundamentalist Muslim lobby (discussed in Chapter 2) and replied that as a soldier, he would carry out the Supreme Commander's order. His appointment was scheduled to take place on Monday morning but he changed his mind after Gumelar, Widodo and the three Chiefs of Staff persuaded him to decline the offer for the sake of the TNI

institution.<sup>192</sup>

Wahid moved further and approached Wirahadikusumah, his long-time candidate for Army Chief of Staff. *Bais* had reportedly assigned an intelligence team to “pre-empt” such a possibility but, unlike Lumintang, Wirahadikusumah was upset as Wahid had turned him into a pawn in his prolonged power play with the TNI. Insisting that he had never had any intention to become “a traitor to the TNI institution”, Wirahadikusumah reported Wahid’s offer to Sutarto who, in turn, asked him to listen to his conscience. In the end, Wirahadikusumah decided to ignore repeated calls from the president’s aide throughout Sunday night, pretending that he was in religious meditation and was not to be disturbed.<sup>193</sup>

Despite the generals’ pledge of loyalty, the TNI decided to take no risk. On Sunday, Widodo approved Ryacudu’s suggestion to hold another roll call of 2,000 TNI soldiers, along with their armoured vehicles, at the National Monument Square and ordered them to stay there until the MPR session was over. Responding to Wahid’s curious query, Ryacudu followed Sutarto’s instruction and assured him that the roll call was aimed at “safeguarding the president”. Wahid mistook it as a sign of the TNI’s support and happily gave his approval but later accused Ryacudu of “betraying” him.<sup>194</sup> Meanwhile, the TNI continued with its preparation for a contingency plan.

If Bimantoro had failed to sideline Ismail and reassert control of the Polri headquarters, the TNI would be prepared to take over security. At a meeting with Jakarta Police Chief Jacob on Sunday night, Ryacudu told him bluntly that if the worst-case scenario happened, he would take over security in the capital and a TNI-Polri clash might be unavoidable. Jacob, however, dissuaded his army colleagues from contemplating such a scenario and promised them that Bimantoro and his loyal generals would fight to secure the situation, as long as the TNI remained firmly behind them.<sup>195</sup> The police in East and Central Java had applied a security filter mechanism to prevent pro-Wahid militants from coming into the capital, and the police deployed no less than 5,000 personnel to secure the Parliament complex. Helicopters and other military transportations were stationed to evacuate MPR members should pro-Wahid dare-to-die squads attempt to occupy the complex by force.

The night of 22 July seemed to be one of the longest and tensest nights in the nation’s history as Indonesians were holding their breath while waiting for the end of the high political suspense from their living rooms. Unlike the behind-the-scene political intrigues that preceded the fall of two earlier presidents—Soeharto and Habibie—Indonesians could now follow the development instantly on television, thanks to round-the-clock live reports. Shortly before midnight, Gumelar and Widodo went to the Palace, which was now full of Wahid’s loyal friends and supporters, to convey Lumintang’s decision. However, unlike Soeharto and Habibie, who chose graceful exits and avoided the use of violence, Wahid decided to take the inglorious path. When Gumelar and Widodo, like Wiranto three years before, implored him to rescind his emergency-decree plan for the sake of the nation, Wahid snapped at them and sent them away.<sup>196</sup>

Shortly after midnight, after much hesitation and a tense period of postponement, Wahid tearfully signed the President’s Declaration (*Maklumat Presiden*). Simanjuntak composed the Declaration draft with the help of some NGO activists and NU *kiais*, who had come to offer their support for the embattled president.<sup>197</sup> The declaration consisted of three of the president’s decisions:

- to freeze the MPR and the DPR;
- to hold fresh elections in one year’s time; and

- to freeze the Golkar party pending the Supreme Court's decision.

The president instructed the TNI and the Polri to secure his decisions and called for the people to remain calm. As his supporters later explained, Wahid insisted on issuing the emergency decree despite its futility, in order to defend his constitutional position as the legitimate president against the MPR's constitutional coup.<sup>198</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the decree sealed the end of Wahid's presidency. Minutes after its live announcement, DPR speaker Akbar Tanjung sent an official letter requesting the Supreme Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the decree. It turned out that the Supreme Court had anticipated such a request ever since Wahid threatened to issue the emergency decree and drafted the counter legal and constitutional arguments. After one and a half hours of deliberation, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan, personally delivered the official ruling, which stated that the president's decree was unconstitutional.<sup>199</sup> More importantly, Bimantoro and his loyal generals moved decisively to contain Ismail's threats and, a few hours later, issued the Polri's official statement rejecting the president's decree. Similarly, Widodo asserted the TNI's consistent position to reject the decree and reconfirm its commitment to secure the constitutional process of impeachment.

So came the end of Abdurrahman Wahid's 21-month-old presidency. On Monday morning, Amien Rais, the man who had helped bring down Soeharto and facilitated the fall of Habibie, chaired a historic session that would witness the fall of the incumbent president and the rise of another. Unlike Habibie, who had bravely attended the MPR session that rejected his accountability speech, Wahid refused to attend the impeachment session, insisting that it was illegal. Despite the tightest security and lingering controversy about its constitutionality, the impeachment session went smoothly, as all MPR members present unanimously voted Wahid out of office and, a few hours later, at 5.15 p.m., appointed Megawati Soekarnoputri as his successor.

In the next two days, the MPR voted to elect a vice-president, after Megawati agreed to drop her condition of keeping the position vacant. In the two-round session, five well-known leaders—Haz, Tanjung, Yudhoyono, Gumelar and nationalist figure Siswono Yudhohusodo—contested the race. In a surprising but well-calculated move, Megawati ordered her party members to vote for the Central Axis-backed Haz as her vice-president to ensure support from both Parliament and the Muslims. The MPR finally elected Haz vice-president, repeating the earlier pattern of nationalist Muslim figures at the helm of the nation. More importantly, the much-feared scenario of pro-Wahid backlash and the TNI-Polri clash did not happen. Though Wahid and his loyal friends and supporters rejected the impeachment as unconstitutional, they accepted it as an inevitable political reality.

One serious problem remained. Wahid had vowed that he would very much rather "die than leave the Palace", which incited fear that President Megawati might have to use force to effectively assert her authority. However, after much persuasion from family and friends, including U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, the former American Ambassador to Indonesia and Wahid's personal friend, he agreed to leave for a medical check-up at a navy hospital in Virginia. On a very emotional afternoon, three days after tenaciously holding out at the Palace, Wahid left amidst warm applause from thousands of his supporters and friends who gathered at the National Monument Square. Later, Widodo and his Chiefs of Staff joined hundreds of well-wishers to see him off at the airport. With his graceful decision, despite his ungraceful exit, Abdurrahman Wahid remained one of Indonesia's most celebrated leaders for his ceaseless fight

for democracy and unwavering commitment to pluralism. Most importantly, Indonesia was once again spared from the peril of political anarchy.

## CONCLUSION

Under the rule of President Abdurrahman Wahid, the TNI expedited its internal reforms beyond the three-decade-old jargon of *dwifungsi*. It decided to relinquish its political roles, focus its primary duties and authorities as the state's tool for national defence, subjected itself to civilian supremacy and scrapped the "guardian of the nation" mindset. It also pledged a commitment to gradually dismantle the army's territorial structure, reorder its business activities, and put an end to the deeply entrenched culture of impunity. In short, after three years of *reformasi*, the TNI has demonstrated a strong commitment to transform itself into a professional military.

Many military observers applauded Wahid for his success in consolidating civilian control of the military and credited him for having initiated those historic changes.<sup>200</sup> This chapter, however, demonstrates—in great detail—that such claims are hard to sustain as Wahid spent most of his presidency trying to exert a crude form of subjective control over the military. Instead of de-politicizing the military, Wahid dragged the TNI along in his protracted power struggle with Parliament, which prompted the rise of non-political yet conservative and security-oriented officers within the military. Ironically, Wahid's ungraceful exit through a presidential impeachment has helped to restore some of the TNI's lost credibility and reassert its political assertiveness, which despite its commitment to leave day-to-day politics, will continue to influence Indonesian politics for a long time to come.

## Notes

- 1 Interview, Bondan Gunawan, 1 October 2001.
- 2 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001.
- 3 *Tajuk*, "Hamzah Haz: Ada Rekayasa Menjauhkan Gus Dur Dari Poros Tengah", 20 January 2000.
- 4 Usamah Hisyam et al., *Widodo A.S., Nakhoda Di Antara Tiga Presiden* (Jakarta: Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara, 2003), p. 202.
- 5 *Tajuk*, "Gus Dur, Wiranto Dan Drama Kejatuhan Itu", 17 February 2000, and *Forum Keadilan*, "Saat Wiranto Tergilas Buldoser Zig Zag", 27 February, 2000. Another version, however, claimed that Wahid did indeed intend to sack Wiranto, but he was approached by the latter and Megawati who asked him to soften his position. Wahid then decided to call Darusman, who later suggested a two-week assessment of the KPP HAM report, but Wiranto would not be charged. I am indebted to Dr. Harold Crouch for alerting me to this information.
- 6 Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Equinox Publishing, 2002), pp. 365–382. For Wiranto's version of the event, see, Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., pp. 235–245.
- 7 *Tajuk*, "Gus Dur, Wiranto dan Drama...".
- 8 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., p. 225.
- 9 *Tajuk*, "Blitzkrieg Terakhir Jenderal Wiranto", 11 November 1999.
- 10 *Tajuk*, "Melikuidasi Lembaga Hantu", 15 March 2000.
- 11 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *TNI Abad XXI, Redefinisi, Reposisi, Dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI Dalam Kehidupan Bangsa*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition (Jakarta: CV Jasa Bumi, June 1999), p.7. On the origin and rationale of *dwifungsi*, see, Jenderal TNI Dr. A.H. Nasution, *Kekayaan ABRI* (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971). For a comprehensive historical analysis of the origin and end of *dwifungsi*, see, Salim Said, *Tumbuh dan Tumbuhnya Dwifungsi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2002). For an analytical

- assessment of the TNI's internal reforms, see, International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Keeping The Military Under Control*, ICG Asia Report No. 9 (Jakarta/Brussels: 5 September 2000), p. 5.
- 12 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Keterangan Pers Panglima TNI Setelah Penutupan Rapat Pimpinan TNI Tahun 2000* (Jakarta, 20 April 2000).
  - 13 *Current Data*, 1 January 1999 – 1 January 2001, p. 149.
  - 14 For the full text of the two decrees, see, Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, Putusan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, *Sidang Tahunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 7–18 Agustus 2000* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2000), pp. 75–87.
  - 15 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *TNI Abad XXI, Redefinisi, Reposisi, Dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI Dalam Kehidupan Bangsa*, pp. 7–9.
  - 16 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Implementasi Paradigma Baru TNI Dalam Berbagai Keadaan Mutakhir* (Jakarta: Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2001), pp. 22–25. See, also, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *TNI Abad XXI, Redefinisi, Reposisi, Dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI Dalam Kehidupan Bangsa*, pp. 14–15.
  - 17 Santhy M. Sibarani et al., *Antara Kekuasaan dan Profesionalisme* (Jakarta: PT Dharmapena Multimedia, November 2001), pp. 25–27. The book was meant as an as-told-to autobiography of former Police Chief General (retd.) Suroyo Bimantoro and was slated for publication in November 2001. However, Bimantoro decided to call off the launch of the book at the last minute for personal reasons. A copy of the book was made available to the author.
  - 18 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Implementasi Paradigma Baru TNI Dalam Berbagai Keadaan Mutakhir*, pp. 16–25.
  - 19 Personal communications.
  - 20 Interview, Widjojo, 12 October 2001. See, also, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Implementasi Paradigma Baru TNI Dalam Berbagai Keadaan Mutakhir*, pp. 8–9.
  - 21 See, Nasution, op. cit., pp. 31–33.
  - 22 *Tajuk*, “Kalau TNI Jadi Superman, Negara Ini Ambruk”, 22 December 1999.
  - 23 Personal communications.
  - 24 Interview, Widjojo, 12 October 2001.
  - 25 For details on Widjojo's concept of the re-functioning of the territorial command structure, see, Lieutenant-General Agus Widjojo, “Refungsionalisasi Binter Sesuai Paradigma Baru Peran TNI”, a paper presented at the military resort commanders' roll call in Jakarta, 1–2 October 2001.
  - 26 Interview, Widjojo, 12 October 2001.
  - 27 *Kompas*, “Pengalihan Fungsi Teritorial ke Pemda, Komisi I DPR Akan Lakukan Klarifikasi ke Panglima TNI”, 23 August 2001.
  - 28 *Kompas*, “Fungsi Teritorial Dialihkan Jadi Fungsi Pemerintahan, Bentul Militerisasi Birokrasi Sipil”, 21 August 2001.
  - 29 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Implementasi Paradigma Baru TNI Dalam Berbagai Keadaan Mutakhir*, pp. 14–18.
  - 30 *Kompas*, “KSAD: Tak Ada Lagi Kodam Bubar”, 17 October 2002.
  - 31 For a concise analysis of the residual practices of *dwifungsi* and the necessary steps to take to abolish them, see, International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reforms* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 11 October 2001).
  - 32 A copy of the Bulakrantai Document was made available to the author. See, also, *Forum Keadilan*, “Menebak Mutasi Lewat Dokumen Bulak Rantai”, 28 May 2000.
  - 33 *Tajuk*, “Dua Kubu Jenderal AD”, 2 March 2000.
  - 34 Interviews, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001, Saurip Kadi, 14 September 2001, and Bondan Gunawan, 1 October 2001.
  - 35 Kadi and Wirahadikusumah have produced several writings and delivered public talks in which they outlined their ideas of military reform. In January 1999, while serving as Commander of the Army's Staff and Command School, Wirahadikusumah hosted a seminar on reforms in which a number of military officers and civilian intellectuals

contributed their papers. Most military contributors called for the ABRI to redefine its socio-political roles, yet their proposal of reform had hardly moved beyond the official concept of the ABRI's New Paradigm. Kadi, for example, insisted that in order to carry out its main duty as the national defence force, the ABRI should maintain a supervisory role that would enable it to "remind, scold and punish any party that breached *pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution". As for the army's territorial structure, he underlined the need for the limitation of the army's socio-political roles but insisted that one army's regional command had to be maintained in each province. See, Saurip Kadi, "ABRI Di Masa Depan" in Forum Pengkajian Seskoad (eds.), *ABRI Dan Agenda Perubahan, Bunga Rampai Seskoad* (Jakarta: Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat, 1999), pp. 159–176. Interestingly, in a later writing, he criticized the TNI's praetorian mindset and superior attitude as the ultimate factor that hampered the genuine implementation of its reforms. He also called for a quick dismantling of the army's territorial structure. See, Saurip Kadi, *TNI-AD, Dahulu, Sekarang dan Masa Depan* (Jakarta: PT Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 2000), pp. 46–55. In November, Wirahadikusumah edited and published another collection of writings of his former classmates at the Military Academy Class 1973, which received warm public applause. While the reform proposals presented in the book had been more refined, most contributors had hardly departed from Yudhoyono's role and power-sharing paradigm. They called for a redefinition, not abolition, of *dwifungsi*, in which civilian-military relations would be based on mutual trust and needs, where one complemented the other and that the military would continue to play a reduced yet influential socio-political role. Kadi, for example, proposed that the TNI could serve as an "interest group" and use its extensive network and resources to supply the government with policy recommendations. He argued that by doing so, the TNI would play an indirect yet more significant political role than it had under *dwifungsi*. See, also, Saurip Kadi, "Dwifungsi dan Penampilan TNI, Sebuah Tinjauan Kritis" in Agus Wirahadikusumah, MPA (ed.), *Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI, Pemikiran Masa Depan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999), pp. 310–311. In their public talks, however, both Wirahadikusumah and Kadi aggressively called for a quick abolition of *dwifungsi*.

- 36 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001.
- 37 At a meeting on 22 December 1999, the *Wantimti* recommended that Army Chief of Staff Tyasno Sudarto take disciplinary action against Wirahadikusumah due to his criticism of the TNI. *Wantimti* was an advisory body comprising 15 high-ranking officers established by Wiranto in October 1998. Sudarto never carried out the recommendation. See, *Tajuk*, "Saya Tak Mau Seperti Prabowo", 3 January 2000. See, also, Hisyam, *Widodo...*, op. cit., p. 207.
- 38 Interview, Soeripto, 11 August 2001. A former *Bakin* operative, Soeripto was later active in Islamic activities. He helped to establish the KAMMI and, later, the Justice Party (PK). According to Soeripto, Sudarto invited him to Semarang for a closed-door discussion on reforms. Present were also a number of academics, including noted psychologist Sarlito Wirawan and economist Sri Mulyani Indrawati.
- 39 Interview, Gunawan, 1 October 2001.
- 40 *Tajuk*, "All Wiranto's Men", 6 January 1999.
- 41 *Tajuk*, "Ayunan Bandul Yang Berubah", 22 July 1999.
- 42 *Forum Keadilan*, "Menjelang Tebang Pilih Versi Gus Dur", 27 February 2000.
- 43 Interview, Gunawan, 1 October 2001.
- 44 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001.
- 45 Azhari, *Bersaksi...*, op. cit., pp. 229–233.
- 46 *Tajuk*, "*Tajuk*, East Timor Is Enough...", 22 December 1999.
- 47 *Media Indonesia*, "Wiranto Lebih Baik Jadi Oposan di Partai Golkar", 14 February 2000. In truth, Wirahadikusumah had never intended to issue such a controversial statement since he meant it as a background information—which was not supposed to be quoted with attribution—at an informal gathering with a few reporters in Makassar. Except for *Media Indonesia*, none of them reported the statement. See, *Tajuk*, "Orang-Orang Wiranto Digusur", 17 February 2000. Wirahadikusumah never retracted his

statement but, in an interview in August 2001, he admitted that it had been blown up inappropriately. He claimed to have tried to clarify the matter with Wiranto but the general refused to grant him an audience.

- 48 *Tajuk*, “*Tajuk*, Gus Dur, Wiranto and Drama...”, 17 February 2000.
- 49 *Tajuk*, “...Dan Tyasno Bermain Politik?”, 10 May 2000.
- 50 *Tajuk*, “*Tajuk*, Orang-Orang Wiranto...”, 17 February 2000.
- 51 *Tajuk*, “Dua Kubu Jenderal...”, 2 March 2000.
- 52 Personal communication. See, also, *Tempo*, “Setelah Hadiah Bintang Keempat”, 17 October 2004.
- 53 *Tajuk*, “Politik Zig-Zag Gaya Gus Dur”, 9 December 1999.
- 54 *Tempo*, “Sebuah Inpres Yang Ragu-Ragu”, 22 April 2001.
- 55 *Tajuk*, “...Dan DPR Pun Mengadilinya”, 25 October 2000. In 1999, Parliament passed Law No. 45/1999, which divided Irian Jaya into three separate provinces, namely West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya and East Irian Jaya. But, in November 2001, Parliament passed Law No. 21/2001 on the Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua, which changed the province’s name from Irian Jaya to Papua, in contradiction with the earlier law. Despite the conflicting laws, the government of President Megawati decided to establish the West Irian Jaya Province in 2003.
- 56 *Kompas*, “Saksi Benarkan Presiden Bantu Rp 1 Milyar untuk Kongres Papua”, 3 July 2001.
- 57 See, for example, Barton, op. cit., pp. 422–423, and Rumidi, *Dinamika Keagamaan Dalam Pemerintahan Gus Dur*, in Khamami Zada (ed.), *Neraca Gus Dur Di Panggung Kekuasaan* (Jakarta: Lakpesdam, August 2002), pp. 119–154.
- 58 *Tajuk*, “Megawati Akan Gagal di Ambon?”, 9 December 1999.
- 59 *Tajuk*, “Ambon Manise, Ambon Manangisee”, 17 March 1999.
- 60 *Tajuk*, “Bukan Letkol Biasa”, 17 February 2000.
- 61 For a concise analysis of the re-emergence of Islamic radicalism after the fall of Soeharto, see, Martin van Bruinessen, *Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia* Southeast Asian Research Vol 10, No. 2, 2002, pp. 117–154 ([www.let.uu.nl/~Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/publicaties.html](http://www.let.uu.nl/~Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/publicaties.html)).
- 62 *Tajuk*, “Jihad Menentang Gus Dur”, 26 April 2000.
- 63 Barton, op. cit., pp. 415–420.
- 64 *Tajuk*, “Bom Dan Sorban Laskar Jihad”, 21 June 2000, and “Maluku Sesudah Darurat Sipil Berlaku”, 19 July 2000.
- 65 For details on the series of bombings that occurred in the period 2000–2002, see a special report published in *Tempo*, 5 January 2003.
- 66 Personal communication. See, also, Barton, op. cit., pp. 365–381.
- 67 *Tempo*, “Malam Kudus, Ramai Bom”, 14 January 2001.
- 68 *Tempo*, “Sebuah Misteri Berumur 800 Hari”, 5 January 2003. For the controversy on the Jemaah Islamiyah and Indonesia’s position on the American-led war on terror, see, Tatik S Hafidz, *The War On Terror and the Future of Indonesian Democracy*, IDSS Working Paper No. 46 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003).
- 69 *Tempo*, “Pesan Untuk Tuan Caday”, 5 January 2003. Dwikarna, who was arrested in Manila in what many Muslim figures in Indonesia alleged as an intelligence set-up, denied the allegation. Interestingly, Indonesian Police Chief Gen. Da’i Bachtiar sustained Dwikarna’s denial, saying that there is no evidence to implicate him in the bombing.
- 70 *Kompas.com*, “Bulakrantai Document Read”, 14 June 2000 ([www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/006/14/English/bula.htm](http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/006/14/English/bula.htm)). Saurip Kadi dismissed the allegation as baseless and filed a lawsuit against Jaelani.
- 71 *Current Data*, 1 January 1999 – 1 January 2001, p. 150.
- 72 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001, and Gunawan, 1 October 2001. See, also, *Tajuk*, “AWK Memimpin AD?”, 11 October 2000.
- 73 *Tajuk*, “Dan, Bondan Pun Kena Sodok”, 7 June 2000.
- 74 *Tempo*, “Tuduhan Seram Ke Arah Jenderal”, 23 July 2000.
- 75 *Tempo*, “Lembar Hitam Neraca Baret Hijau”, 30 July 2000.

- 76 For a concise analysis of military business, see, Indria Samego et al., *Bila ABRI Berbisnis* (Jakarta: LIPI and Pustaka Mizan, 1999).
- 77 *Tempo*, “Bocornya Mesin Uang Militer Itu”, 12 November 2000.
- 78 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001. Wirahadikusumah insisted that he had sought approval from Sudarto and Sutarto to audit the *Kostrad*. However, army sources quoted in *Tajuk* magazine claimed that the army leaders had advised Wirahadikusumah against publishing the audit results. See, *Tajuk*, “Antara Nurani dan Keutuhan TNI”, 15 August 2000.
- 79 *Tajuk*, “Antara Nurani dan Keutuhan...”, 5 August 2000.
- 80 *Tajuk*, “Menunggu Tangan Tuhan”, 10 May 2000.
- 81 Barton, op. cit., p. 413.
- 82 *Tajuk*, “Prof. Dr. Ryaas Rasyid: Saya Bukan *Job Seeker*”, 14 December 2000. For a detailed historical reconstruction of the Wahid-Megawati deal, see, *Tajuk*, “Jalan Panjang Lagoon Tower”, 30 August 2000, and “Antara Siasat Dan Wahyu Langit”, 14 September 2000.
- 83 For Wahid’s version of the event, see, Barton, op. cit., pp. 406–410.
- 84 *Tempo*, “Jalan Kompromi Atawa Wallahualam”, 20 May 2001.
- 85 *Tajuk*, “AWK Memimpin...”, 11 October 2000.
- 86 *Tajuk*, “...Dan Tolleng Mengepalai BAKIN?”, 11 October 2000.
- 87 Interview, Hariyoto P.S., 12 July 2001.
- 88 *Tajuk*, “Drama Gus Dur Vs TNI AD”, 25 October 2000.
- 89 *Tajuk*, “Tragedi Atambua Dan Tekanan Amerika”, 11 October 2000.
- 90 *Tajuk*, “Drama Gus Dur Vs...”, 25 October 2000.
- 91 Widjojo is the son of Major-General Sutoyo Siswomihardjo, one of the six generals murdered during the abortive PKI coup in 1965, and is married to the daughter of Isnaeni, a Soekarno loyalist and a senior member of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). Chaniago hailed from a Nahdlatul Ulama family. Wahid reportedly disapproved of Widjojo due to his “link” to Megawati, and likewise she reportedly objected to Chaniago’s nomination due to his connection to Wahid. See, *Tajuk*, “AWK Memimpin AD?”, 11 October 2000. Sutarto is a nephew of Brigadier-General Abdul Kadir Besar, the author of the *Seskoad Paper*; and is generally seen as a “soldier’s soldier” due to his long career in field operations.
- 92 *Tajuk*, “KSAD Jenderal Endriartono Sutarto: Kita Tidak Menentang Gus Dur”, 25 October 2000. Another version claimed that a week after his installation, Megawati summoned Sutarto and asked him to drop his plan to bring Wirahadikusumah and Kadi before the DKP. See, *Current Data*, 1 January 1999 to 1 January 2001, p. 152. However, the fact that *Tajuk*’s interview with Sutarto was conducted on 9 October, the day of his installation as Army Chief of Staff, indicated that he had from the onset decided to freeze the DKP process.
- 93 *Tajuk*, “Bila Presiden Menabrak Prosedur”, 11 October 2000.
- 94 Barton, op. cit., p. 418.
- 95 Ibid. Details of the police’s interview with Wahid were only released a year later during Soewondo’s trial in June 2001, which in essence confirmed *Tempo*’s earlier report. In his testimony, Wahid acknowledged that he did know Soewondo and had met with Sapuan, but denied he ever requested the disbursement of the *Bulog* fund. See, *Kompas*, “Sidang Kasus Soewondo, Presiden Tidak Hadir, BAP Dibacakan”, 1 June 2001.
- 96 *Tempo*, “Setelah Rusdihardjo Bersaksi” and “Rusdihardjo: Presiden Adalah tersangka”, 10 December 2000.
- 97 *Tempo*, “Skandal Bulog: Kebohongan Demi Kebohongan”, 10 December 2000. For details on the alleged Palace cover-up of the Buloggate scandal, see, Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 140–148.
- 98 *Tempo*, “Sangkakala Pansus”, 4 February 2000.
- 99 Personal communication with Sutarto, 12 February 2001. See, also, *Tempo*, “TNI Tidak Mau Terjebak”, 4 March 2001.

- 100 *Antara*, “President To Freeze DPR/MPR”, 27 January 2001.
- 101 Moh. Mahful M.D., *Setahun Bersama Gus Dur; Kenangan Menjadi Menteri Di Saat Sulit* (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES Indonesia, April 2003), p. 103.
- 102 Barton, op. cit., p. 433.
- 103 For an insider’s account of life as one of Wahid’s spokespeople, see, Wimar Witoelar, *No Regrets: Reflections of a Presidential Spokesman* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte. Ltd., 2003).
- 104 *The New York Times*, “Indonesia’s Ex-President Expects to Be Restored”, 20 October 2001.
- 105 Personal communication with Sutarto, 12 February 2001.
- 106 For an excellent political analysis on Soekarno’s 1959 Decree, see, Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973). For a legal assessment of the Constitutional Assembly and its works, see, Adnan Buyung Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal Atas Konstituante 1956-1959* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1997).
- 107 Personal communication with Sutarto, 12 February 2001. See, also, *Tempo*, “TNI Tidak Mau...”, 4 March 2001.
- 108 Barton, op. cit., p. 434.
- 109 Mahfud, op. cit., p. 104–106. See, also, *Koran Tempo*, “Perlawanan Terhadap Permintaan Keadaan Dekrit”, 19 May 2001.
- 110 Mahfud, op. cit., p. 112.
- 111 Sibarani, op. cit., p. 165.
- 112 Personal communications.
- 113 Interview, Al-Rasid, 20 December 2001. See, also, *Tempo*, “Prof. Dr. Harun Al-Rasid: Saya Merasa Tidak Dihargai”, 10 June 2001.
- 114 Mahfud, op. cit., p. 151.
- 115 *Ibid.*, pp. 106–110.
- 116 For a comprehensive view on the issue, see, Lopa and Mahendra’s polemic in *Tempo*, “Konstitusi dan Memorandum” and “Memorandum dan Sidang Istimewa”, 13 May 2001.
- 117 Personal communications. See, also, *Tempo*, “Siapa ‘Bermain’ Dekrit, Presiden Atau TNI”, 27 May 2001.
- 118 Mahfud, op. cit., p. 110–111.
- 119 Interview, Zen, 23 December 2001. According to Zen, one of Wahid’s confidants offered him the *Pangkostrad* job should he agree to support the president’s emergency decree plan. Zen accepted the offer.
- 120 *Tempo*, “Siapa Bermain Dekrit...”, 27 May 2001.
- 121 *Tempo*, “Netralitas Di Air Keruh”, 25 February 2001.
- 122 *Tempo*, “Kalau Presiden Bersikeras, Kami Tidak Akan Lagi Membantu”, 27 May 2001.
- 123 *Koran Tempo*, “TNI Nyatakan Tidak Terima Jenderal Politik”, 16 May 2001.
- 124 Interview, Wirahadikusumah: Tidak *Fair*, Gus Dur Dikeroyok Banyak Orang”, 27 May 2001.
- 125 Personal communications. See, also, Sibarani, op. cit., p. 273.
- 126 *Media Indonesia*, “Tekad Militer Masuk Barak”, 27 May 2001.
- 127 Interview, Widjojo, 12 October 2001. See, also, former Army Chief of Staff General (retd.) Rudini’s interview in *Media Indonesia*, “TNI Dinilai Masih Main Politik”, 27 May 2001.
- 128 *Kompas*, “Aktivis LSM Keluarkan “Maklumat Demokrasi Tolak Militer Kembali Berpolitik”, 29 May 2001.
- 129 *Indonesian Observer*, “Gelbard: TNI Must Obey Civilian Leader”, 23 May 2001.
- 130 Endriartono Sutarto, “Kewajiban TNI Menaati Perintah”, in *Kompas*, 20 June 2001. See, also, Herman Musakabe, “Dekrit Presiden Versus Sumpah Prajurit”, in *Kompas*, 2 July 2001. Major-General (retd.) Herman Musakabe was former Commander of the Army’s School of Staff and Command. In his article, Musakabe endorsed Sutarto’s

- stance and called for an end to the president's attempt at manipulating the TNI for his political purposes.
- 131 Personal communication with Sutarto, 12 February 2001.
- 132 *Kompas*, "Soal Dekrit dan Pergantian KSAD, Panglima TNI Sudah Klarifikasi ke Presiden", 23 May 2001.
- 133 Personal communication with Sutarto, 23 August 2001. See, also, Mahfud, op. cit., p. 114. According to Mahfud, TNI Chief Widodo and the three Chiefs of Staff as well as Police Chief Bimantoro participated actively in Yudhoyono and his team's efforts at finding a compromise solution, but their participation was kept confidential to maintain the TNI and the Polri's impartiality in the power struggle.
- 134 *Kompas*, "Menko Polsoskam: Kompromi Politik Dapat Dipertimbangkan", 31 March 2001.
- 135 *Kompas*, "Pisahkan Kepala Negara dan Kepala Pemerintahan", 30 March 2001.
- 136 *Media Indonesia*, "Wahid Tolak Kompromi Politik", 3 April 2001.
- 137 *Media Indonesia*, "PDI Perjuangan Marah, Presiden Ragukan Kemampuan Wapres", 4 April 2001. As always, Wahid's spokespeople denied that he had ever delivered such scathing remarks about Megawati, accusing MPR members of twisting the president's statement to pit the two leaders against each other. However, a transcript of the meeting's record obtained by *Tempo* clearly demonstrated that Wahid did make the remarks. See, *Tempo*, "Setelah Cibiran Mas Dur", 15 April 2001.
- 138 See, Sucipto's interview in *Tempo*, "Mega Kecewa pada Gus Dur", 27 May 2001. Sucipto was the Secretary-General of PDI-P and Megawati's trusted right-hand man.
- 139 *Media Indonesia*, "Kejagung Harus Tangkap Ginandjar", 31 March 2001. Ginandjar was arrested in early April, but was later released without being charged.
- 140 *Media Indonesia*, "Wahid Biarkan PBM ke Jakarta", 15 April 2001.
- 141 *Tempo*, "K.H. Abdullah Abbas: Gus Dur Mendapat Selendang Emas", 18 February 2001.
- 142 *Media Indonesia*, "Bughat Antisipasi Memorandum II DPR", 6 April 2001. For an interesting report on the NU's internal debate on the issue of *bughat*, see, *Tempo*, "Bias Politik Fatwa NU", 15 April 2001.
- 143 *Kompas*, "Pertimbangkanlah Keselamatan bangsa", 16 April 2001.
- 144 Interview, Hasyim Muzadi, 24 December 2002. See, also, *Kompas*, "KH Hasyim Muzadi: Tak Ada Instruksi Untuk Jihad", 14 April 2001.
- 145 *Kompas*, "DPR Berikan Memorandum Kedua, Presiden Diberi Waktu Selama Satu Bulan", 1 May 2001.
- 146 Personal communication with Sutarto, 23 August 2001. See, also, *Tempo*, "Netral, Tapi Berpihak", 6 May 2001.
- 147 *Media Indonesia*, "TNI/Polri Siap Tembak Di Tempat", 26 April 2001, and *Koran Tempo*, "Polisi Akan Gunakan Peluru Tajam", 28 May 2001.
- 148 Members of the Team of Seven were: Yudhoyono, Defence Minister Mahfud M.D., Minister of Home Affairs Surjadi Soedirdja, Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, Minister of Law Baharuddin Lopa, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Rizal Ramli and Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman. TNI Commander Widodo, the three Chiefs of Staff, Police Chief Bimantoro, head of Bakin Arie Kumaat and Cabinet Secretary Simanjuntak also participated in the team's efforts. See, also, note 133.
- 149 For the full text of the Team of Seven's recommendations, see, *Koran Tempo*, "Rekomendasi Tim Tujuh", 28 May 2001.
- 150 *Kompas*, "Wapres dan Tim Tujuh Datangi Presiden", 9 May 2001. Another version, however, claimed that Megawati called off the meeting because Wahid had threatened to issue the emergency decree if she refused to halt the impeachment process and accept the power-sharing proposal. See, *Media Indonesia*, "Rencana Membubarkan DPR Mendapat Reaksi Keras", 9 May 2001.
- 151 Personal communications. Another version claimed that Megawati presented only three conditions: a guarantee that she would serve until 2004, abolition of the MPR's annual session and vacating the vice-presidential position. See, *Media Indonesia*, "Megawati Ajukan Tiga Syarat", 9 April 2001.

- 152 *Media Indonesia*, “Poros Tengah Tolak Usul Golkar”, 12 May 2001.
- 153 *Kompas*, “Edi Sudradjat: Delegasikan Kewenangan Pemerintahan Kepada Wapres”, 8 May 2001.
- 154 Interview, Lily Sudarikah Wahid, 8 November 2001. Lily is Abdurrahman Wahid’s youngest sister. See, also, *Media Indonesia*, “Tuduhan Serius bagi Tim Tujuh”, 13 May 2001. Yudhoyono and members of the Team of Seven denied the allegation.
- 155 Members of the Team of Three were: Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman, Minister of Trade and Industry Luhut Panjaitan and Minister of Energy Purnomo Yusgiantoro. They had reportedly drafted a separate proposal entitled “Declaration of the Delegation of Constitutional Duties”, which, in essence, resembled the Supersemar. See, *Tempo*, “Presiden Menggertak, Sidang Istimewa Malah Mendekat”, 3 June 2001.
- 156 *Media Indonesia*, “Kekuasaan Apa Lagi untuk Megawati?”, 12 May 2001.
- 157 *Kompas*, “Megawati Soekarnoputri: Sidang Istimewa Tidak Bisa Dihentikan”, 15 May 2001.
- 158 *Media Indonesia*, “Megawati Siap Jadi Presiden”, 16 May 2001.
- 159 For the full text of the supposedly presidential decree on 18 May 2001, see, *Koran Tempo*, “Dekrit Presiden 18 Mei 2001”, 28 May 2001. The TNI leaders, however, believed that the document was authentic and that Wahid had indeed planned to issue the decree on 18 May. See, *Gatra*, “Tentara Sedia Payung”, 2 June 2001.
- 160 For fascinating details on the breakfast meeting, see, *Koran Tempo*, “Pertempuran Tersembunyi di Hari-Hari Yang Gawat Itu”, 21 May 2001, and *Forum Keadilan*, “Lebih Baik Dipecat Daripada Keluar Dekrit”, 27 May 2001.
- 161 *Koran Tempo*, “Kostrad Berikrar Setia Kepada Negara, Makin Kuat Arus Menentang Dekrit”, 21 May 2001.
- 162 *Media Indonesia*, “TNI dan Skenario Filipina”, 28 January 2001.
- 163 *Gatra*, “Menolak Dengan Meriam”, 26 May 2001.
- 164 *Media Indonesia*, “TNI AL dan AS Latihan Bersama”, 18 May 2001.
- 165 *Kompas*, “Indonesia Kemungkinan Besar Default”, 21 April 2001.
- 166 *Media Indonesia*, “IMF Siap Kerja Sama Dengan Pemerintahan Baru”, 10 May 2001.
- 167 *Gatra*, “Pesan dari Washington”, 2 June 2001.
- 168 *Kompas*, “Abdurrahman Wahid Curigai Amerika Serikat Bantu Naiknya Megawati”, 3 August 2001.
- 169 *Republika*, “Kemungkinan Akan Diberlakukan Dekrit, Mega Walk Out”, 26 May 2001. For details about the tense cabinet session, see, *Tempo*, “Presiden Menggertak, Sidang...”, and *Gatra*, “Tawaran Semar Kepada Nawangwulan”, 2 June 2001.
- 170 Kurdi Mustofa and A. Yani Wahid, *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Dalam 5 Hari Mandat Maklumat* (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia and Harian Umum Sinar Harapan, 1<sup>st</sup> edition, July 2001).
- 171 *Kompas*, “Wawancara dengan Menko Polsoskam: Presiden Berencana Keluarkan Dekrit Pukul 12.00 Kemarin”, 29 May 2001. See, also, Mahfud, op. cit., pp. 160–164; Mustofa, op. cit., pp. 33–46; and, Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 172–175.
- 172 *Media Indonesia*, “DPR Resmi Minta MPR Adakan SP”, 31 May 2001.
- 173 Gumelar led a team of five ministers including Lopa, Mahfud, Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab and State Minister of Women Affairs Chofifah Indar Parawansa to intensify the lobby on Megawati.
- 174 *Kompas*, “Gebrakan Lopa: Kenaifan Politik atau Kegaduhan Politisi”, 23 June 2001.
- 175 *Kompas*, “Menon-aktifkan Kepala Polri Bangkitkan Egosentrisme Militer”, 8 June 2001.
- 176 See, *Tempo*, “Kapal Patroli Yang Menyeret Bimantoro”, 22 July 2001. For Bimantoro’s defence, see, *Tempo*, “Jenderal Surojo Bimantoro: Saya Akan Menyerahkan Tongkat Komando ke DPR”, 29 July 2001. See, also, Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 197–202. For his opponent’s version, see, *Tempo*, “Komisaris Besar Alfons Loemau: Bimantorolah Yang Memulai Pembangkitan Itu”, 5 August 2001.
- 177 Ismail was the best graduate of the Institute of Police Studies in 1981. For Ismail’s profile, see, *Koran Tempo*, “Jenderal Yang Karatan di Korps Reserse”, 6 June 2001, and *Tempo*, “Komandan Tanpa Tongkat”, 22 July 2001.

- 178 *Kompas*, “Bimantoro Ditetapkan sebagai Dubes Malaysia”, 2 July 2001.
- 179 Adrianus Meliala, “Masalah Polri, Masalah Kita Semua” in *Kompas*, 30 June 2001.
- 180 *Kompas*, “Polisi, Front ‘Pertempuran’ Terbaru”, 10 June 2001.
- 181 *Tempo*, “Bimantoro, Pembangkangan dan Puncak Pertarungan Politik”, 22 July 2001.
- 182 *Forum Keadilan*, “Saya Dibentak”, 5 August 2001.
- 183 *Media Indonesia*, “Wakapolri Bingung Dengan Perintah Presiden”, 14 July 2001.
- 184 *Media Indonesia*, “Mereka Dituding Merancang Skenario”, 27 September 2001.
- 185 Personal communications. See, also, Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 302, 325–325.
- 186 *Media Indonesia*, “Buntut Perintah Penangkapan Kapolri, MPR Putuskan SI Dipercepat”, 13 July 2001.
- 187 *Kompas*, “Kostrad Serahkan Peralatan Antihuru-hara ke Kodam Jaya”, 28 May 2001. See, also, Ryacudu’s interview in *Panji Masyarakat*, “Kami Bukannya Mau Melawan Presiden”, 8 August 2001.
- 188 Personal communications. See, also, Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 299–302.
- 189 *Kompas*, “Daerah Siaga Hadapi Keadaan Darurat”, 21 July 2001.
- 190 Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 290–294.
- 191 *Kompas*, “Mega Tidak Ragu Terima Jabatan Presiden”, 23 July 2001.
- 192 Personal communications. See, also, *Forum Keadilan*, “Saya Dibentak...”, 5 August 2001.
- 193 Interview, Wirahadikusumah, 1 August 2001. After his dismissal as *Kostrad* Commander, Wirahadikusumah resigned totally into a reclusive religious life and devoted his entire time to work on a religious book entitled *Shalat, Salawat, dan Doa* (Book of Prayer and Litany). He died suddenly from a heart attack on 30 August 2001 and was honoured at an official military funeral led by his successor and classmate, Ryacudu. His former superior, Herman Musakabe, devoted an obituary and praised him as a reformer and a foresighted thinker. See, *Kompas*, “Agus Wirahadikusumah, Reformis dan Pemikir yang Mendahului zamannya”, 8 September 2001.
- 194 Personal communications. See, also, *Kompas*, “Apel Kesiapan TNI Sepersetujuan Presiden”, 23 July 2001.
- 195 Sibarani, op. cit., pp. 300–301.
- 196 *Forum Keadilan*, “Saya Dibentak...”, 5 August 2001.
- 197 *Tempo*, “Dekrit Angin Lalu”, 5 August 2001. For an interesting debate on Wahid’s futile decree, see, Hermawan Sulisty, “Dekrit Moral”, and Rizal Mallarangeng, “Dekrit Gus Dur”, in *Tempo*, 5 August 2001.
- 198 *Koran Tempo*, “Emmy Hafild: Kami Ikut Menguuslkan Isi Dekrit”, 21 July 2001.
- 199 *Koran Tempo*, “Fatwa MA Telah Disiapkan Sebulan Lalu”, 24 July 2001.
- 200 See, for example, Anwar, *Gus Dur vs Militer*; Haramain, *Gus Dur, Militer dan Politik*; and Honna, *Consolidating Civilian Control: the Indonesian Military Politics under Abdurrahman Wahid Government*.

## EPILOGUE: THEY JUST FADE AWAY

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In 2004, six years after marching into a democracy, Indonesia decided to rewrite its history. For the first time since its independence, the country convened one of the world's largest and most complicated elections, in which more than 100 million Indonesians participated in the three-stage, months-long process to elect parliamentary members, the president and the vice-president directly. In the final round of the presidential elections on 20 September, the popular jury delivered their verdict: they voted incumbent President Megawati Soekarnoputri out of office and elected General (ret'd.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, her former top security minister, as the new president. One month later, Yudhoyono and his vice-president-elect, Jusuf Kalla, took solemn oaths in an unpretentious yet dignified ceremony before the MPR, marking a new beginning that promises to end the cycle of violence that has characterized the country's leadership changes since its independence. Despite her failed re-election bid, Megawati will always be remembered for her success in restoring relative economic and political stability during her tenure and for laying solid foundations for democratic consolidation.

The democratic, orderly and bullet-free power transition seemed to have silenced scepticism about the compatibility of Indonesia's violence-ridden history and Muslim-based society with democracy. Contrary to gloomy predictions that direct elections would spark tension at the grassroots, even bloody conflict, the election results demonstrated that democracy is taking even a firmer hold at the grassroots level. Yudhoyono's victory over Megawati signalled the end of the divisive *aliran* politics and a growing maturity of the Indonesian polity, as the people exercised their newfound sovereignty rationally beyond the confinement of primordial segregations.<sup>1</sup> And for the first time since the fall of Soeharto, there seems to be a light at the end of the very long tunnel of *reformasi* as Indonesia passed the transition period and moves steadily towards becoming a fully-fledged democracy, the third largest in the world.

The success of the 2004 elections culminated the process of political reforms that have taken place since the beginning of *reformasi* in 1998, most importantly being the amendment of the once sacred, unchangeable 1945 Constitution. In the fourth and most significant constitutional amendment adopted during the MPR's annual session in August 2002, the MPR decided to lay the foundations for the new structure of the Indonesian state. They included the following.

- Dilution of the MPR's supreme power

The omnipotent MPR dismantled the New Order's doctrine that the people's sovereignty is exercised through the MPR and established that both the executive and legislative councils must be wholly elected by the people now. Accordingly, the MPR now consists of elected representatives only, namely members of the DPR and the Regional Representative's Council (DPD), a new body established to accommodate regional aspirations, which means that there is no room for appointed candidates from the TNI/Polri and the Societal Group Representatives (*Utusan*

*Golongan*). This consequently led to a formal end to military politics. Moreover, the MPR relinquished its supreme power voluntarily and retained authority only to oversee constitutional amendments and presidential impeachment. However, preconditions for the use of this authority are so strict that it will require extraordinary circumstances for it to be invoked, especially with regards to presidential impeachment.

- Direct elections of president and vice-president  
Consequently, the president and the vice-president are now elected directly by the people on a single ticket. If there is no clear winning ticket, which requires an overall majority of the vote and at least 20 per cent of the votes in half of the country's provinces, the top two candidate pairs will enter a run-off election. Moreover, the power struggle and constitutional disputes that eventually led to Abdurrahman Wahid's impeachment is unlikely to recur as the MPR has decided to establish the Constitutional Court to act as the "guardian of the Constitution". The Constitutional Court has authority over constitutional interpretation, judicial review of legislation, resolution of disputes between state institutions—such as had happened during Wahid's tenure—and electoral disputes. Thus, it is unlikely that Yudhoyono and his successors will suffer Wahid's fate as the MPR can no longer pursue impeachment based simply on political reasons. The MPR can only commence impeachment proceedings once the Constitutional Court finds legal grounds to do so. Moreover, starting from June 2005, all heads of provinces and regencies will be elected directly by the people, a process expected to further cement the democratic structure to the Indonesian state.
- Assertion of a secular state  
The 2002 MPR annual session also reaffirmed its commitment to making Indonesia a religious plurality and secular state. The MPR decided to retain Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution that guaranteed religious pluralism. Other key tenets that personify the spirit of the nation such as the unitary state, state ideology *pancasila* and national symbols were retained and declared non-amendable.
- Abolition of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA)
- Creation of an independent Judicial Commission to oversee judicial ethics issues and Supreme Court appointments
- Provision for an independent Central Bank

In short, amendments to 1945 Constitution have put in place democratic institutions that aspire for a more accountable yet stable government, while at the same time providing strong checks and balances that accommodate Indonesia's diversity both in terms of its populace and vast territory. The actual implementation of the new structures remains to be seen in the years to come, but the success of the 2004 elections sent early encouraging signals that they are functioning.

More encouraging was the TNI's earnest commitment to abolish its socio-political roles. In line with its earlier decision to terminate its presence at the legislatures in 2004, the TNI reaffirmed its neutrality in the elections, which despite some minor violations on the ground had been remarkably observed.<sup>2</sup> To underline the TNI's commitment of impartiality, TNI Commander General Endriartono Sutarto declined invitations from three presidential candidates—incumbent President Megawati, MPR Speaker Amien Rais and DPR Speaker Akbar Tanjung—to become their running mate. He even offered to tender his resignation if he were asked to compromise the TNI's pledge of neutrality.<sup>3</sup>

However, despite some positive signals that Indonesia has escaped the trap of a “failed state”, the road towards a fully-fledged democracy remains rocky as there had been discouraging indications that Indonesians have begun to lose their faith in the promises of *reformasi*. Unlike most other crisis-stricken countries that have fully recovered, Indonesia has been struggling with chronic problems that impeded its speedy recovery—lingering political elite infighting, dire poverty and widespread corruption, to name a few. Against such a backdrop, it can be argued that the results of the 2004 elections also sent worrying signals that disillusioned Indonesians have delivered a vote of no confidence for the chaotic *reformasi*. They voted instead for the symbols of the New Order’s stability and prosperity: the military and New Order’s party, Golkar, which recaptured victory in the parliamentary election. Yudhoyono’s victory, therefore, can be seen as a complete cycle of refurbishment in the military’s public image: from a common enemy in the beginning of *reformasi* to a “resurrected” hero of stability in less than one decade.

No less discouraging is the deep-seated civilian inferiority vis-à-vis the military, which has contributed significantly as an impediment to the democratization process. As we have discussed in the previous chapters, the three civilian presidents who succeeded Soeharto adopted mixed attitudes towards the military: while they acknowledged the need to de-politicize the military, they generally failed to refrain from politicizing the military in order to prop up their administration. Habibie “shared” his power with Wiranto, Wahid crudely tried to subject the TNI to his personal control and Megawati, as we shall discuss below, gave the generals more room for manoeuvres to secure their loyalty. Likewise, most political parties seemed to feel more confident if they had retired military and police generals in their leadership line-ups and competed to recruit active servicemen as candidates both for legislative and executive jobs. The fact that all presidential candidates have tacitly competed to woo the military’s support during the 2004 elections underlined an undeniable fact that despite the formal end of military politics, the TNI will continue to influence Indonesian politics for a long time to come. Time will only tell whether Yudhoyono, the first retired general to assume presidency since the Soeharto era, will escape the trap of power that all his predecessors have fallen into.

This concluding chapter will summarize the progress that the TNI has made in terminating its socio-political roles and the future challenges in military reforms.

## CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI

The fall of Abdurrahman Wahid marked the end of turbulent civilian-military relations. In contrast with her predecessor, Megawati worked out a warm and cordial relationship with the TNI, which brought a relative stability during her tenure. Unlike Wahid who had interfered incessantly into the TNI’s internal affairs, Megawati gave Sutarto, the general who played a key role in Wahid’s fall and whom she appointed the new TNI Commander, a free hand in managing his military house. Fortunately, Sutarto has utilized his powerful position to expedite internal consolidation, which helped to ease inter-service rivalry and primordial factionalism that had long plagued the institution. Key positions in the TNI headquarters, for example, were no longer dominated by the army but were distributed fairly among the three services. He also re-instituted a meritocratic system in personnel promotion that was disrupted under Soeharto and continued until Wahid’s era. This was expected to promote professionalism in the long run. More importantly, he consistently pushed for the TNI’s gradual yet total disengagement from day-to-day politics so that it could concentrate on improving its defence capabilities.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike Wahid, Megawati was sensitive to and catered for the TNI's financial needs. Due to the severe economic crisis and the arms embargo from the Western countries, the TNI had been reduced from one of Southeast Asia's mightiest powers in the 1960s into one of the world's weakest armies. The average annual defence budget was set at only 0.88 per cent of the GDP or 3.86 per cent of the annual state budget, one of the lowest among Southeast Asian countries.<sup>5</sup> During her tenure, Megawati increased the defence budget to between 1.00 and 1.07 per cent of the GDP, yet it was far too insufficient to cover the expenses of the 400,000-strong military. So she made a few "breakthrough" moves to appease the generals and win their loyalty. In 2002, she set aside a significant part of the presidential tactical fund to provide cheap housing for low-ranking soldiers, which later sparked protest from Parliament and was known as the Asramagate incident.<sup>6</sup> A year later, she bypassed normal state procedures to acquire a few units of Russian-made Sukhoi jet fighters through a counter-trade mechanism, which roused even louder protests from Parliament. Sharing her generals' resentment over the Western countries political pressures, she decided to procure armaments from Eastern European countries and China.

Against such a backdrop of mutually beneficial relationship as well as shared sentiment of nationalism and conservatism between Megawati and the military, her rise to presidency raised concerns that Wahid's "liberal" era would be replaced by a soft authoritarianism in which the military would regain much of its lost ground as well as political and economic privileges.<sup>7</sup>

The concerns seemed justified as Megawati had hardly come up with any fresh initiative to expedite military reforms as she left the issue to the TNI. She continued Wahid's policy of appointing a civilian figure, the sacked chairman of the National Awakening Party, Matori Abdul Jalil, as Defence Minister. However, her choice of the largely unknown Jalil was criticized as a sign of her lack of commitment to uphold civilian supremacy since Jalil was known to have neither the will nor comprehensive knowledge to complete reform programmes.<sup>8</sup> Jalil did try to compensate for his deficiencies by assembling a number of respected civilian academics as well as capable military officers to back him up with reform proposals. Yet he failed to earn the respect of TNI leaders, who insisted on maintaining their autonomy. The generals used Jalil's political background and his ensuing conflict with Wahid to justify their reluctance to subject the TNI headquarters under his control for fear that he would politicize the military institution.<sup>9</sup> Worse still, when Jalil was incapacitated by a stroke in mid 2003, Megawati chose to vacate the post after Sutarto declined her request to fill it.

But it was her handling of the crisis in Aceh that drew the harshest criticisms against her perceived "insubordination" to the military. Initially, Megawati continued Wahid's policy of engaging the GAM in peaceful negotiations mediated by the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre (HDC). She authorized Yudhoyono, whom she had re-installed as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, to exhaust all peaceful means to convince the GAM leaders in exile to drop their demand for independence and accept a special autonomy status, clearly to fulfil her earlier promise that she would never let a drop of blood to be shed in Aceh.

Yet she failed to keep her promise. Initially, the negotiation appeared to produce promising results when, in December 2002, both sides signed the cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA) and agreed to establish peace zones in Aceh. The TNI even agreed to restrain from crushing the encircled GAM headquarters to ensure that the peace accord is successful. However, deep mutual distrust between the TNI and the GAM, internal rivalry and hazy coordination between the exiled GAM leaders and their lieutenants on

the ground, and a lack of adequate mediating capability on the part of the HDC all led to the collapse of negotiations when armed contacts intensified despite the peace accord. The HDC tried to save the peace process and persuaded the two sides to return to the negotiating table but it only angered Jakarta when the GAM exiled representatives failed to show up on the agreed date. Fearing that a prolonged instability in the resources-rich Aceh would disrupt its energy supplies, the Japanese government persuaded Megawati to give peace one last chance and offered to host another meeting in Tokyo. As can be expected, the meeting failed and a day later, on 19 May, Megawati authorized Indonesia's biggest military operation since East Timor's annexation to Aceh. However, to ease domestic protests and international concerns, Jakarta devised a "comprehensive" operation in which the destructive impact of military assaults would be compensated by a series of social, welfare and law-enforcement programmes.

Through the implementation of a year-long military emergency status, and its subsequent reduction to "civilian emergency" status, the TNI and Polri have managed to reduce the GAM's armed capability to one third of its initial strength and restored relative stability in the province. In May 2005, two years after extensive military operation, the Yudhoyono government decided to return the situation in Aceh to a normal "civil order" status, indicating that the security situation had improved somewhat. Despite the improvement in physical stability, Aceh remained a sickened society as decades of military operations have weakened its social cohesion, aggravated internal tension and deepened the sense of apathy among the people. Popular support for the GAM may have been diminishing but persistent political repression and injustice resulting from military operations and deprivation of the already impoverished society due to the stagnation of the economy continues to provide fertile ground for the separatist movement.

However, the disastrous impact of the tsunami on 26 December 2004, which killed more than 180,000 people, may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for Indonesia as it may provide the elusive peaceful solution for Aceh. The TNI's prompt decision to launch a massive humanitarian operation to help the affected population has won the hearts and minds of the Acehnese much more effectively than its combat activities and its willingness to accept foreign assistance in spite of the emergency status restored its international image. Moreover, the overwhelming outpouring of national and global solidarity seemed to have strengthened the sense of Indonesia-ness among the Acehnese, as the majority of the population expressed their pride in being Indonesians.<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless, Megawati's administration could claim credit for the peaceful settlement of the Maluku and Poso conflicts, thanks to breakthrough initiatives proposed by (then) Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla. Together with Yudhoyono, he mediated peace talks that eventually succeeded in persuading the warring parties in the two regions to sign the peace accord.

## THE FINAL PHASE OF MILITARY REFORMS

Contrary to many analysts' fears, the TNI decided not to manipulate its cosy relationship with Megawati to regain its lost political and economic ground, which could largely be credited to Sutarto's committed leadership. In June 2002, shortly after taking over from Widodo, Sutarto reaffirmed his predecessor's decision to postpone the implementation of the TNI's voting rights in elections despite the government's offer to do so, which paved way for its neutrality during the 2004 elections.<sup>11</sup> More strategically, he, in consultation with Police Chief General Da'i Bachtiar, declined offers from civilian politicians to extend the service of the F-TNI/Polri during the August 2002 annual session of the

MPR and decided instead to formally end military politics.<sup>12</sup>

Despite its historic results, the 2002 annual session of the MPR will be best remembered for the power play that continued to impede the actual end of military politics. The session was held amidst fear of a deadlock and constitutional crisis, as it deliberated two crucial issues: the structure of the Indonesian state and the role of Islam in it. A group of prominent retired generals and nationalist leaders fiercely opposed the amendment, particularly the dilution of the MPR's supreme powers and its consequences, which they saw as a betrayal of the legacy of the founding fathers. Interestingly, the PDI-P supported their objection as it also resisted the proposal to introduce direct presidential elections for fear that it might reduce Megawati's chance for re-election. At the same time, Muslim groups launched noisy mass protests demanding for the reconstitution of the Jakarta Charter, which brought the half-century-old issue back to the political stage. The draft amendment itself was hammered out of political trade-offs among major political powers, which, despite the impartial assistance from the constitutional law experts hired to assist the MPR's ad-hoc committee, was heavily criticized as being too politicized and incomprehensive. Against such a backdrop, Megawati gave serious consideration to a proposal, put forward by a number of retired generals, including former TNI Commander Wiranto, to issue an Emergency Decree similar to that of her father's 5 July 1959 Decree (see Chapter 4) and authorize a return to the original and unamended 1945 Constitution.<sup>13</sup>

The TNI's response to the threat of a constitutional deadlock reflected the residual praetorian mindset, which could be understood given Sutarto and his generals' strong nationalistic fervour. While it pledged support for progressive amendment proposals, including the abolition of the TNI/Polri seats in the DPR and MPR, the TNI endorsed calls for a return to the unchanged 1945 Constitution should the deliberation process in the MPR come to a deadlock. Even if the process was smooth, the TNI suggested that an impartial Constitutional Commission be established to synchronize the four incomprehensive amendments; and while the commission worked, the amended 1945 Constitution had to be treated as a transitional constitution.<sup>14</sup> As the TNI remained a powerful political lobby, its ambivalent position confused MPR members and intensified the controversy.

In the end, however, Indonesia's cherished tradition of consensus prevailed. Under Amien Rais' admirable chairmanship, the competing parties eventually agreed to strike a compromise. The PDI-P dropped their objection to direct presidential elections, the Muslim lobby agreed to leave the historical Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution unchanged and the TNI/Polri, sensing that consensus was eventually reached, retracted their requirement for the establishment of the Constitutional Commission. Thus the amended 1945 Constitution was adopted peacefully. As was mentioned earlier, the 2002 annual session of the MPR set a historical milestone that cemented the democratic structure of the Indonesian state, including the removal of one of its biggest stumbling blocks: military politics. At the closing of the parliamentary session on 1 October 2004, members of the TNI/Polri faction officially bade farewell to their colleagues, and Indonesian politics was formally de-militarized.

However, other areas of the TNI's internal reforms have yet to move as fast as its political reforms. As some observers have noted, the TNI's internal reforms seem to have stagnated as new initiatives have hardly been produced for their expedition, which could be due to several factors. Importantly, most fundamental ideas for reform have been laid in the TNI's New Paradigm Phases I and II, thus the more important step was to ensure their implementation. But the implementation appeared slow as, true

to his nature as a conservative security-first officer, Sutarto insisted that any change must proceed gradually and manageably so that it would not jeopardize institutional solidity and disrupt organizational cohesion. Moreover, as he had promised during his “fit and proper test” before Parliament, Sutarto seemed to see that his main missions were to depoliticize the TNI and to improve its professionalism,<sup>15</sup> hence his apparent inattention to other areas of reforms. And, under his leadership, the TNI was more preoccupied with pressing issues such as internal consolidation, deterioration of its defence capability, demoralization among its file and rank, and, later, the war in Aceh and other ensuing crises.

Despite the slow pace, the TNI's internal reforms continued under Megawati as her administration managed to submit two key bills that laid the foundation for the emergence of a more professional TNI for Parliament's approval: the State Defence Bill, passed into law in 2002; and the TNI Bill, passed into law in 2004. Drafted and deliberated amidst intense public debate, the two Bills envisaged a de-politicized, de-commercialized, law-abiding and externally-oriented TNI.<sup>16</sup>

Interestingly, there were slight differences between the State Defence Bill and the TNI Bill on the definition of the TNI's specific roles and authorities, which underlined the fact that the TNI's internal reforms did continue. The State Defence Bill defined the TNI's role as a state defence tool to “protect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and to ensure the safety of the entire nation against any form of threats”. The TNI Bill, drafted at the time when *reformasi* was better consolidated, made a significant progress when it defined the TNI's duties as “to carry out the state's defence policy, to uphold national sovereignty, to defend territorial integrity, to protect the entire nation, and to carry out military operation for war as well as military operation other than war, and to take active part in the attempts at maintaining regional and international peace”. Point ‘d’ of the considerations of the TNI Bill stipulated that the “TNI is established and developed professionally in accordance with the state's politics, in line with the principles of democracy, civilian supremacy, human rights, national regulations as well as ratified international regulations, and is supported by adequate state budget managed in a transparent and accountable manner”. Article 3 of the TNI Bill asserted that the TNI remained under direct supervision of the president and is in coordination with the Department of Defence on administrative matters. However, the explanatory note of Article 3 made a provision for the integration of the TNI headquarters into the Department of Defence in the near future, perhaps as early as three years.<sup>17</sup>

The official notion that the TNI will only carry out state policy on defence and that it will adhere to the principles of democracy, civilian supremacy, human rights and respect of national and international laws, clearly indicates that the TNI is moving in the right direction towards fulfilling its commitment of reforms.

In the first year of his tenure, Yudhoyono, the architect of the TNI's New Paradigm First Phase, seemed to be keen on completing his unfinished agenda and consolidating the TNI's internal reforms in a more comprehensive manner. He re-appointed former Defence Minister Professor Juwono Sudarsono, whom many in the TNI see as one of a few civilians capable of holding the job, and tasked him with reviewing TNI reforms. Interestingly, Sudarsono chose a few sticky issues to start with: a review of TNI-Polri relations, the integration of the TNI headquarters into Department of Defence and the restructuring of military business.

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the clearcut separation between the TNI and the Polri has left some unresolved problems as there remained grey areas between the two institutions in the handling of overlapping issues related to internal security. In the cases

of Maluku and Aceh, for example, the Polri's inability to restore order to the troubled areas under the umbrella of civilian emergency status has led to the central government's decision to shift the command back to the TNI. While the TNI's involvement in Aceh could be justified on the grounds that the state was facing an armed rebellion, the TNI's takeover of the security in Maluku sparked some criticism as it violated MPR Decree No. VII/2000, although in the end, it managed to restore security and order in the province.<sup>18</sup>

Such problematic issues led to the re-thinking of the merit of a rigid differentiation between "security" and "defence". Sudarsono, who has from the onset opposed a clearcut separation between the TNI and the Polri,<sup>19</sup> and criticized the State Defence Bill and the Police Bill drafts as "conceptually defect",<sup>20</sup> now found the momentum and opportunity to implement his ideas. Sudarsono argued that, in order to fully implement the concept of *Sishankamrata*, the "security" and "defence" functions need to be systematically integrated, not rigidly differentiated as it is today. Thus, he proposed for the amendments of the laws on State Defence, the Police and the TNI and the drafting of a new State Security Bill, which would serve as a legal umbrella for the Polri's integration into the Department of Home Affairs, and a State Defence and Security Bill, which would synchronize the roles and duties of the TNI and the Polri.<sup>21</sup> He envisaged a situation where the TNI would be placed under the supervision of the Department of Defence and the Polri under the Department of Home Affairs.

Sudarsono's proposal was met with mixed reactions. The TNI headquarters and a number of academics welcomed it, some parliamentary members opposed what they perceived as a conceptual setback, and the Polri adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Interestingly, Agus Widjojo, the chief architect of the rigid separation of the TNI and the Polri concept, defended his original idea. While agreeing that the TNI and the Polri were both instruments of national power, he insisted that the TNI's duty to defend the nation against external aggression is inherently different from the Polri's duty to maintain internal security. Under Indonesia's new political structure, the responsibility of overseeing the defence function of the TNI remains within the jurisdiction of the central government while, in line with the decentralization policy, the responsibility of managing the internal security function of the Polri is delegated to the local governments. Criticizing Sudarsono's rigid interpretation of *Sishankamrata*, he proposed the establishment of a National Security Bill, not the State Defence and Security Bill, as a holistic regulation that would encompass all functions of national security without necessarily integrating the "defence" and "internal security" functions of the two institutions.<sup>22</sup>

With support from the president and the TNI headquarters, Sudarsono is likely to have his ideas implemented in the end. Nevertheless, the intense public discourse on the "proper" roles of the TNI and the Polri demonstrated that the TNI's internal reforms have begun to take a new level. While the whole process of reform is expected to be completed by 2009, there are some residual issues that may impede its implementation and, therefore, need to be addressed seriously.

## The Army's Territorial Structure and Doctrinal Reforms

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the debate on the restructuring of the army's territorial structure had split the generals into "conservative" and "progressive" camps. Despite the adoption of Widjojo's proposal for its gradual phase-out in the TNI's New Paradigm Second Phase, nothing has been done to implement it. As Indonesia faces multifaceted security challenges, ranging from non-traditional security threats such as transnational

crime and terrorism to traditional threats of military aggression such as the recent tension with Malaysia over a jurisdictional dispute, no decision will likely be made in the near future to review the present configuration of the army's territorial structure. While the law on the TNI made subtle provisions for such a review and Sutarto has indicated that his side would comply with it,<sup>23</sup> concrete actions on the part of the army demonstrated otherwise. In March 2005, newly appointed Army Chief Djoko Santoso announced his plan to establish 22 new territorial command posts throughout the country, which was met with strong reaction from academics and NGO activists alike.<sup>24</sup> More importantly, Yudhoyono has indicated during his presidential campaign that he would maintain the present army's territorial structure until an adequate substitute mechanism is devised.

However, now that the concerns over possible political abuse of the army's territorial structure seems to have diminished, given the TNI's remarkable success in maintaining its impartiality during the 2004 elections, and in the light of the present security challenges faced by the nation, the time may have come for the Yudhoyono Administration to conduct an overhaul of the entire defence doctrines. As some academics have suggested, the *Sishankamrata* concept, developed to accommodate the need for a total people's war during the struggle for independence, may no longer be adequate in anticipating future security challenges and need to be substituted with a more relevant concept. Instead of reinforcing the present continental-based territorial structure, Indonesia may need to take advantage of its unique setting as an archipelagic state and develop a marine-based defence doctrine.<sup>25</sup> Nonetheless, the debate on suitable defence doctrines will certainly dominate the post-*dwifungsi* discourse on the TNI's reforms in the next few years.

## Military Business

One of the stickiest points in reforming the TNI is its deep entrenchment in businesses, which had often been justified on the grounds that it was necessary to make up for the meagre salary of its soldiers.<sup>26</sup> However, the TNI Bill made a significant progress when it mandated the TNI to restructure its many business enterprises within the next five years. Interestingly, the TNI headquarters welcomed it and began preparations to surrender its businesses under the government's control in two years, way ahead of its required schedule. While the move signified the TNI's commitment to speed up its reforms, it was nonetheless a logical step as few of the businesses were financially liquid, mostly due to mismanagement. In 2002, following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Wahid government and the IMF on the need of a public audit on the military's businesses—as Army Chief Sutarto had already ordered the closure of more than half of the army's bankrupt businesses—he even welcomed the government's proposal to liquidate the remaining military-linked enterprises. Sudarsono, however, decided that all military businesses would be regrouped and restructured under a professionally run state-owned holding company, whose profit would be utilized to improve the soldiers' welfare.<sup>27</sup> A presidential decree mandating the restructuring of military businesses is to be issued in October 2005.<sup>28</sup>

Another progress in that area was the TNI's willingness to hand over the task of providing security protection to vital industries, which was often abused to provide an illicit source of income for its officers and often led to practices of human-rights abuses, to the respective companies and the police.<sup>29</sup> However, the loosening of the headquarters' control over the regional commands due to decentralization and acute problems of poor soldier welfare all contributed to the flourishing of illegal business activities involving and receiving tacit backing from some military personnel, such as

illegal logging, illegal fishing and other crimes. This and the more-than-three-decades-old military involvement in business would arguably hamper attempts at restructuring the military's business despite a strong political will to do so.

## Intelligence Reforms

The rigid separation in the duties and authorities of the TNI and the Polri affected their intelligence activities too. As the Polri was now responsible for maintaining internal security, it had to take over parts of domestic intelligence formerly handled by the military. However, hasty separation, lack of adequate human resources as well as financial support, and the TNI's overarching control of domestic intelligence for the past three decades have all contributed to the Polri's inability to perform as required yet. The incidence of a series of terror attacks that rocked Indonesia since 1999 have largely been blamed on intelligence failure to provide an early warning system in order to prevent and pre-empt terror attacks.

Shortly after the Bali bombings in October 2002, President Megawati issued two presidential decrees that mandated the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to coordinate all intelligence activities, including those previously under the Polri and the TNI's supervision. BIN, however, does not have an operational arm as it is supposed to function as a coordinating body. Thus it relies on the TNI, the Polri and other institutions for information and to execute the necessary actions.

Apart from acute problems of coordination, the TNI has actually moved to restructure its intelligence agency. In 2003, Sutarto decided to streamline *Bais*, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, was expanded under Wiranto. Unlike its previous structure, *Bais* was now placed under the supervision of the TNI's Chief of General Affairs and was headed by a two-star general. In line with the TNI's decision to concentrate on its defence duty, it was stripped of its political intelligence functions and instead is focused primarily to support the TNI's military operations.<sup>30</sup>

While the moves indicate the TNI's encouraging commitment to reform its intelligence agencies, more concrete steps are needed to ensure the emergence of a professional, responsible and law-abiding national intelligence system, including the enactment of an Intelligence Bill that adheres to democratic principles and respect of civic and human rights.

## Human Rights

Of all the reform programmes stated in the TNI's New Paradigm Second Phase (see Chapter 4), respect of human rights has remained the area where the TNI has failed to make significant progress. The TNI has made some encouraging moves to improve its performance in the area, including surrendering its military tribunals under the Supreme Court as required by Presidential Decree No. 56/2004 enacted during Megawati's tenure, which was expected to end the deep-seated culture of impunity prevalent within the institution. Yudhoyono moved even further by proposing a review on the Military Tribunal Law, which is expected to ensure greater accountability on the part of the TNI on matters related to human rights. The TNI does allow its officers and generals to appear before investigation panels for alleged involvement in human-rights violations and, if implicated, they are brought before an ad-hoc human-rights court for trial. It is working closely with the National Committee on Human Rights (*Komnas HAM*) and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent to issue working

guidelines on human rights to soldiers in combat fields aimed at minimizing cases of human-rights violations.

Apart from that encouraging progress, however, the TNI has failed to deliver convincing deeds in enforcing its commitment to respect human rights. Two of the most notorious and often-cited cases are the ad-hoc tribunals for human-rights violations in East Timor and Tanjung Priok, which acquitted most officers and generals involved. While the courts' poor performance on the said cases reflected the state's questionable commitment to uphold respect of human rights, blame must also be attributed to the weak prosecution and delivery of credible sentences<sup>31</sup>. It underlined deep-seated resistance within the TNI to settle human-rights issues despite its stated pledge to do so. Many in the TNI appeared to object to a genuine enforcement of regulations on human rights, claiming that they carried a foreign-imposed agenda aimed at systematically discrediting and even weakening the TNI. The TNI's much-criticized decision to promote officers allegedly involved in human-rights abuses in spite of public outcry reflected this deep-seated resistance. While most of the officers have been acquitted—hence there is no legal ground to deny their promotion—the decision exposed the TNI's deplorable lack of sensitivity and demonstrated its weak will in respecting human rights.

Another thorny issue in the TNI's commitment to uphold respect of human rights is its apparent reluctance in settling the past legacy of human-rights abuses involving its officers and generals. Parliament has decided to adopt a two-track strategy in resolving human-rights violations issues: while "recent" cases of human-rights violations are tried before ad-hoc human rights tribunals whose establishment are to be decided jointly by the government and the DPR, past cases will be dealt with through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KKR). The Law on the KKR was passed in October 2004, which mandated the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission six months after the passing of the law. However, its heated deliberation in Parliament has raised concerns that the KKR may serve more as a constitutional "whitewash" for the perpetrators of past human-rights abuses than a genuine mechanism to address past human-rights grievances as it emphasizes more on reconciliation than seeking the truth.

Nevertheless, the apparent reluctance on the part of the TNI to genuinely implement its stated pledge to uphold respect of human rights may hamper its efforts at completing its reforms and improving both its domestic and international image.

## **CONCLUSION: THEY JUST FADE AWAY?**

In a less than a decade after the demise of the military-dominated New Order, the TNI has accomplished the once unimaginable feat of abandoning the *dwifungsi* doctrine and put an official end to its socio-political roles. As such, the TNI has delivered a significant contribution to Indonesia's transition to democracy, for without the removal of military politics, the process might have taken a longer and steeper road to arrive into its present state. As this research has traced in great detail, the process of the de-politicization of the military has begun when it decided to distance itself from the beleaguered Soeharto regime and helped to deliver the final push that eventually forced its demise. Since then the TNI has gradually relinquished its deeply entrenched dominance of Indonesian politics. In 2005, seven years after military reforms began, one thing at least seemed to be ascertained: a military takeover that has preoccupied most of the discourse on Indonesian military politics is an issue of the past.

A subtler form of military politics, however, seems to be appearing on the horizon. As Indonesian democracy consolidates and achieves a new level of equilibrium, new challenges are observed. While military politics are diminishing, the vacuum it has left is yet to be properly filled by civilian politicians. Deeply fragmented and decidedly corrupt, most political parties have yet to demonstrate responsible attitudes in cultivating healthy political ethics. In failing to do so, they risk reawakening the military's persistent yet currently quiescent passion for politics. The heated controversy over the nomination of active servicemen in direct elections of head and deputy heads of local governments underlined this worrying phenomenon. As the TNI will likely exercise its pending right to vote and be elected into public offices in 2009, concerns loom large if a new form of civilian-military political collusion will occur. As a stable democracy requires responsible political parties, the question remains whether Indonesia's seemingly solid democracy is indeed solid enough to prevent a probable return of military politics.

As American General Douglas MacArthur once famously said that old soldiers never die as they just fade away, the Indonesian military's appetite for politics may fade away, but it will certainly take a long time to actually die down. Against such a backdrop, it is imperative for civilian politicians and all elements of civil society to take all necessary precaution and ensure the irreversibility of Indonesia's march into a fully-fledged democracy.

## Notes

- 1 See, for example, Lance Castle, "Akhir Politik Aliran?" in *Kompas*, 9 July 2004. See, also, a counter argument to Castle's proposition by Irman G. Lanti, "Politik Aliran dan Mesianisme" in *Kompas*, 13 August 2004.
- 2 Endriartono Sutarto, "Pemilu 2004 dan Netralitas TNI", in *Kompas*, 23 March 2004. For the full text of the TNI's neutrality policy, see, *Pusat Penerangan TNI*, "Netralitas TNI dalam Pemilu" ([www.tni.mil.id](http://www.tni.mil.id)).
- 3 Personal communication with Sutarto, 20 August 2004. See, also, Juwono Sudarsono, "Supremasi Sipil dan Peran Politik Militer" in *Kompas*, 2 August 2004.
- 4 Puspen TNI, "Visi dan Misi Panglima TNI Jenderal TNI Endriartono Sutarto", 15 November 2002 ([www.puspen-tni.info/berita/news30.php](http://www.puspen-tni.info/berita/news30.php)).
- 5 Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, "Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21", March 2003 ([www.dephan.go.id](http://www.dephan.go.id)). See, also, *Kompas*, "Jalan Panjang Menata Hubungan Dephan dengan Mabes TNI", 28 October 2004.
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# GLOSSARY

## OF ACRONYMS AND INDONESIAN TERMS

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ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
ABS	Anyone But Soeharto
AMN	Akademi Militer Nasional (National Military Academy)
Akabri	Akademi ABRI (Academy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
Akmil	Akademi Militer (Military Academy)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Aspri	Asisten Pribadi (Private Assistant)
Assospol Kassospol ABRI	Asisten Sosial Politik Kepala Staf Sosial Politik ABRI (Sociopolitical Assistant to the ABRI's Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs)
Bais	Badan Intelijen Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
Babinsa	Bintara Pembina Desa (Village Guidance NCO)
Bakin	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Coordinating Agency)
Bakorstanas	Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional (Coordinating Agency to Support the Maintenance of National Stability)
Bakorstanasda	Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional Daerah (Regional Coordinating Agency to Support the Maintenance of National Stability)
BCA	Bank Central Asia
BIA	Badan Intelijen ABRI (Armed Forces Intelligence Agency)
BIN	Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)
BLBI	Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (Bank of Indonesia's Liquidity Supports)
BPK	Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Supreme Audit Agency)
BPPT	Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency for Technological Research and Application)
Brimob	Brigade Mobil (The Police's Mobile Brigade)
Bulog	Badan Urusan Logistik (Agency for Logistical Procurements)
CIDES	Centre for Information and Development Studies
CPDS	Centre for Policy and Development Studies
CPIS	Centre for Policy and Information Studies
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Depdagri	Departemen Dalam Negeri (Departement of Home Affairs)
Dephan	Departemen Pertahanan (Department of Defence)
Dephankam	Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Department of Defence and Security)
Dewan Pambina	Advisory Board
Dwifungsi	The Dual Function
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for the Propagation of Islam)
DKM	Dewan Kehormatan Militer (Military Honorary Board)
DKP	Dewan Kehormatan Perwira (Officer's Honorary Board)
DI/TII	Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (The State of Islam/Indonesian Muslim Army)

DPA	Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme Advisory Council)
DPC	Dewan Pengurus Cabang (executive board at the district level)
DPD	Dewan Pengurus Daerah (regional executive board at the provincial level)
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative's Council)
DPP	Dewan Pengurus Pusat (central executive board)
DPK-Eku	Dewan Pemulihan Ketahanan Ekonomi dan Keuangan (Council for the Restoration of Economic and Financial Stability)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council, Parliament)
F-ABRI	Fraksi ABRI (Military faction in the DPR/MPR)
F-TNI/Polri	Fraksi TNI/Polri (Military/Police faction in the DPR/MPR)
FIS	Front Islamique du Salud (Front of Islamic Salvation)
Fordem	Forum Demokrasi (Forum of Democracy)
Fosko TNI AD	Forum Studi Komunikasi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Army's Forum for Study and Communication)
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GBHN	Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (the State's Basic Guidelines)
GMNI	Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)
Golput	Golongan Putih (White Group)
Hankam	Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Defence and Security)
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (Association of All-Indonesia Muslim Intellectuals)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Inpres	Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction)
IPTN	Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (National Aviation Industry)
ITB	Institut Teknologi Bandung (Institute Technology Bandung)
KAMMI	Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students)
Kapolda	Kepala Kepolisian Daerah (Chief of Regional Police Command)
Kapolres	Kepala Kepolisian Resort (Chief of Resort Police Command)
Kapuspen	Kepala Pusat Penerangan (Chief of the Military's Information Office)
Kasdam	Kepala Staf Kodam (Deputy of Regional Military Commander)
Kasum	Kepala Staf Umum (Chief of General Affairs to the Military Commander)
Kassospol	Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs to the Military Commander)
Kaster	Kepala Staf Teritorial (Chief of Territorial Affairs to the Military Commander)
Keppres	Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decree)
KGB	Komunisme Gaya Baru (New Style Communism)
KISDI	Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity to the Muslim World)
KKN	Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (corruption, collusion and nepotism)
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
KOKKN	Komando Operasi Kewaspadaan dan Keselamatan Nasional (Operational Command For National Alertness and Safety)
Kolakops	Komando Pelaksana Operasi (Operational Execution Command)
Komji	Komando Jihad (the Jihad Command)
KONI	Komite Olah Raga Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Sports Committee)

Kontras	Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan (Commission for Victims of Forced Disappearances and Violent Actions)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Kostrad	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (the Army's Strategic Reserve Command)
KPN	Komisi Penyelidik Nasional (National Investigation Committee)
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Election Committee)
LDK	Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus-based Institute for the Propagation of Islam)
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Academy of Sciences)
LoI	Letter of Intent
Mahmilti	Mahkamah Militer Tinggi (High Military Tribunal)
Mahmilub	Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Extraordinary Military Tribunal)
MARA	Majelis Amanat Rakyat (Assembly of People's Mandate)
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Council)
Menhan	Menteri Pertahanan (Minister of Defence)
Menhankam	Menteri Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Minister of Defence and Security)
Menko	Menteri Koordinator (Coordinating Minister)
Menko Ekuin	Menteri Koordinator Ekonomi, Keuangan Dan Industri (Coordinating Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry)
Menko Polkam	Menteri Koordinator Politik dan Keamanan (Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama)
NAM	Non-Align Movement
Nasakom	Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme (Nationalism, Religion, Communism)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NKK	Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Normalisation of Campus Life)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Ulama Renaissance)
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
Operasi sopol	Sociopolitical Operation
Opsus	Operasi Khusus (Special Operation)
OTB	Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk (Formless Organisation)
Pancasila	Five Principles
Pangab	Panglima ABRI (ABRI's Commander-in-Chief)
Panglima TNI	TNI's Commander-in-Chief
Pangdam	Panglima Komando Daerah Militer (Commander of Military Area Command)
Pangdam Jaya	Panglima Komando Daerah Militer Jakarta Raya (Commander of Greater Jakarta Military Area Command)
Pangkostrad	Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Commander of Kostrad)
Parmusi	Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims' Party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
Pemda	Pemerintah Daerah (Local Government)

Pemda DKI Perpu	Pemerintah Daerah Khusus Ibukota (the Local Government of Jakarta) Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang Undang (Regulation in Lieu of Law)
PII	Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students)
PNI	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PPSK	Pusat Pengkajian dan Studi Kependudukan (Centre for Demographic Research and Studies)
Polri	Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (National Police Force of the Republic of Indonesia)
PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party)
Protap	Prosedur Tetap (Standard Procedure)
Puspen ABRI	Pusat Penerangan ABRI (ABRI's Centre of Information)
Satgas P3TT	Satuan Tugas Pelaksanaan Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur (Task Force for Popular Consultation in East Timor)
Sapta Marga	the Seven Pledges
Sesdalopbang	Sekretaris Pengendali Operasi Pembangunan (Secretary for the Supervision of Development Operation)
Sesko ABRI	Sekolah Staf dan Komando ABRI (ABRI's Joint Staff and Command College)
Seskoad	Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Army's School and Command College)
Sishankamrata	Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (Total People's Defence and Security System)
Sishanta	Sistem Pertahanan Semesta (Total Defence System)
SU MPR	Sidang Umum MPR (the General Session of the MPR)
Sumpah Prajurit	Soldier's Oath
Supersemar	Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (the Letter 11 March 1966, a de-facto transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto)
TAP MPR	Ketetapan MPR (MPR's Decree)
Tapol	tahanan politik (political prisoner)
TGPF	Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (Joint Fact Finding Team to investigate the May Riots)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)
TruK	Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan (Voluntary Team for Humanitarian Cause)
UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor
UUD 1945	Undang Undang Dasar 1945 (1945 Constitution)
WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Environmental Forum)
Wanjakti	Dewan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan Tinggi (Council for High Ranking Promotions and Duty Rotations)
YLBHI	Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

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**T**his monograph combines political-historical analysis within a journalistic narrative style to tell the story of the crisis the Indonesian military went through after the demise of the New Order of President Soeharto in 1998. Of the three pillars of the New Order—the government bureaucracy, the ruling Functional Groups (GOLKAR) party and the military or TNI—it was the TNI that received the brunt of the reform movements (*reformasi*) that followed the end of President Soeharto's rule. The *reformasi* forced the TNI to eventually abandon its almost sacred doctrine of "dual function" (*dwifungsi*) that justified its participation in politics during the New Order.

As a narrative, this book is chronologically structured to better guide the reader through the complexities of the TNI's reforms and changing relations with the executive and Parliamentary branches of government. Through personal interviews with key TNI senior commanders and other political leaders, this monograph attempts to present an "insider" account of developments and how key decisions were made by whom, and for what reasons. This monograph will therefore provide much data for students and analysts of the TNI and a useful guide to readers to the evolving role of the TNI in Indonesia today.

#### About the author

Tatik S. Hafidz completed this monograph under a visiting fellowship programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. She was educated at the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, Indonesia and the Department of Politics, University of Leeds, United Kingdom. A British Chevening Scholar, she has written extensively on the issues of military politics, human rights and international affairs during her career as a journalist, which has spanned more than a decade. She is currently a Senior Officer at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.



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