

A New Agenda for the

ASEAN
Regional Forum

IDSS Monograph No. 4

A Report on the IDSS Project on the Future of the
ASEAN Regional Forum



IDSS MONOGRAPH NO. 4

A NEW AGENDA
FOR THE
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

TAN SEE SENG
RALF EMMERS
MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY
AMITAV ACHARYA
BARRY DESKER
KWA CHONG GUAN

INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Copyright © 2002 Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Nanyang Technological University

Published by
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Nanyang Technological University
South Spine, S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Telephone: 67906982 Fax: 67932991
E-Mail: wwwidss@ntu.edu.sg
Website: <http://www.idss.edu.sg>

First published in 2002

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.

Body text set in 11/13 point New Century Schoolbook

Produced by
BOOKSMITH *consultancy*

ISBN 981-04-6901-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Preface	1
	About the Authors	3
1	Introduction	7
2	The ARF's Challenges and ASEAN	14
3	The Turn to Multilateralism in Asia-Pacific Security	17
4	The ARF's Agenda	25
5	National Perspectives on the ARF	43
6	Building Linkages with Other Asia-Pacific Multilateral Forums	50
7	Learning from Multilateral Security in Other Regions	55
8	Agenda for Progress	60
9	Conclusion	71
	Appendices	73
	Select Bibliography	112

LIST OF APPENDICES

- Appendix 1
Mechanisms of Confidence-Building and
Conflict Management of Other Regional Organisations
- Appendix 2
The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper
- Appendix 3
ASEAN Regional Forum
Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy
- Appendix 4
Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair
- Appendix 5
Co-Chairs' Paper on the Terms of Reference for the
ARF Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs)
- Appendix 6
APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism
- Appendix 7
2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action
to Counter Terrorism
- Appendix 8
Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism

PREFACE

The international security environment has changed enormously since the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994. Three years after the ARF's inception, the Southeast Asian region witnessed an economic crisis with devastating consequences, followed by the 1999 crisis in East Timor when violence and destruction wrecked the territory. The region's external environment also experienced profound changes. Relationships in the Asia-Pacific region are changing. Major power relations continue to pose new concerns. Under the new Bush Administration, U.S.-China relations have been increasingly tested although both sides now seem to be working toward a more co-operative, constructive relationship. The Korean Peninsula continues to be a source of regional and global tensions. And since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the region is once again confronted by new challenges.

Nevertheless, the region is also gradually recovering from its economic and political crises and the ARF has enjoyed moderate success in confidence-building. Forum members even demonstrated a readiness to consider implementing some preventive diplomacy measures. ASEAN's leading role in the ARF remains unchallenged. However, in the wake of the difficulties that have troubled the region, the ARF's existing framework, which served the Forum reasonably well in the past, has been shown to be deficient. Continuing in the same mode will likely undermine the effectiveness of

the Forum. Any serious effort to make the ARF a relevant institution for the early twenty-first century must look beyond its current incarnation as a forum only for the exchange of views. A more robust institutionalisation is needed where problem-solving and measures to prevent and possibly resolve conflict and disputes are a reality rather than abstract ideals. To be sure, evolutionary change is necessarily incremental, but the Forum should and, indeed, must evolve. For all of its current deficiencies, the ARF is unparalleled as a multilateral security forum of its size, diversity and geographical scope. It remains the Asia-Pacific region's best hope, in conjunction with other complementary efforts, for ensuring regional peace and stability.

To that end, our Institute has produced this monograph, which evaluates the ARF's track record, and examines prospects and proposes a new agenda for moving the Forum forward. We thank our colleague, Mushahid Ali, for his careful reading of an earlier draft, without which this monograph would surely have been much worse off.

Barry Desker
Director
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Tan See Seng

Tan See Seng is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. His research interests include critical social theory, international relations theory, and the politics of identity and security co-operation in and of the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia. He is a member of the Singapore committee of the Conference on Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Prior to joining the IDSS, he had worked for the International Students Incorporated (ISI), a U.S.-based religious non-profit organisation, where he held several portfolios, including that of Assistant to the President in international ministries. In 1996–1997 he was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). He has written book chapters and refereed journal articles in the fields of international relations theory, Asia security and biblical theology.

Ralf Emmers

Ralf Emmers is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Asian Security at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. He completed the doctoral programme in International Relations at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 2001. Dr Emmers worked on the role of the balance of power factor within co-operative security with special reference to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). His PhD dissertation is currently being revised for publication. Dr Emmers is also completing a monograph that considers ASEAN's ability to manage transnational threats including international terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy and illegal migration. Dr Emmers has also published in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*.

Mely Caballero-Anthony

Mely Caballero-Anthony is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. Her research interests cover regionalism and regional security in the Asia-Pacific, focusing among others, on ASEAN affairs, multilateral approaches to security, human security and conflict prevention. She has been very involved in the work and organisation of the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), being the Co-Administrator of its Secretariat until the end of 2001. Prior to joining the IDSS, she was Senior Analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia (1997–2001); Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Japan (2001); Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore (1997), and Research Officer at the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong (1993–1996). She has written several articles in journals, such as *Contemporary Southeast Asia* and *Indonesian Quarterly*, and contributed book chapters on regional security issues. She has also co-edited several books, most recently *The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Political and Security Challenges* (2001).

Barry Desker

Barry Desker is the Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He was the Chief Executive Officer of the Singapore Trade Development Board from 1994 to 2000, after having served in the foreign service since 1970. He was Singapore's Ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1993, Director of the Policy, Planning and Analysis Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984–1986, and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, 1982–1984. Mr Desker concurrently holds a number of other appointments including the chairmanships of the Singapore International Foundation, Jurong Port Pte Ltd and Singapore Technologies Marine. Mr Desker was educated at the University of Singapore, University of London and Cornell University.

Amitav Acharya

Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he also holds a professorship. Prior to this appointment, he was Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto. He has held fellowships at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Asia Center at Harvard University, and the Center for Business and Government of the Kennedy School at Harvard University. He was a faculty member at the National University of Singapore and a visiting faculty at Sydney University. Among his latest publications are *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (2001), and *Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Co-operative Security in the Asia-Pacific* (2002). He is a member of the Expert/Eminent Persons Group of the ASEAN Regional Forum. He sits in the international editorial board of the journal, *Pacific Review*, and is a co-editor of the Asian Security monograph series published by Stanford University Press under the auspices of the East-West Center.

Kwa Chong Guan

Kwa Chong Guan is Head of External Programmes at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. He was with the old Department of Strategic Studies at the SAFTI Military Institute prior to joining the IDSS, the establishment of which he helped plan. Kwa started his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has served in the Ministries of Defence, Community Development and Information & the Arts. At the latter two Ministries, he was assigned to restructure and redevelop the old Oral History Department and the National Museum. He also helped plan the Singapore Philatelic Museum and served as its founding Chairman. He continues to serve as an advisor and consultant to various heritage bodies. Kwa has also served in various National Service command and staff appointments up to Division assignments in the Singapore Armed Forces.

1

INTRODUCTION

Almost a decade has passed since ideas and proposals for a multilateral approach to Asia-Pacific security began to receive serious attention from academics and policymakers in the region. Since then, multilateral security dialogues have proliferated at both inter-governmental and Track II levels. These efforts led to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, marking a high point in the evolutionary efforts of security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region. But multilateralism now faces two major challenges. The first is the slow progress of the ARF's confidence-building and preventive diplomacy agenda. The second is the resurgence of bilateral and unilateral (especially on the part of the U.S.) approaches to strategic and economic affairs. Against this backdrop, what is the contemporary relevance of multilateralism?

This report examines the record of, and prospects for, Asia-Pacific multilateral security co-operation. In this project we seek to address the following questions.

1. What is the rationale for multilateral security approaches (especially the ARF)?
2. How has the agenda of the ARF evolved?
3. What are the responses of key members, such as the U.S., China and Japan, as well as those of the ASEAN states, to the ARF?
4. What is the record of progress of the ARF judged against the blueprint laid out in the 1995 ARF Concept Paper? What are the obstacles to the implementation of the Concept Paper's goals?

5. What can the Asia-Pacific region learn from the experience of multilateralism in other parts of the world, especially the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)?
6. Can we develop common grounds and synergy between the ARF and other forms of multilateralism, such as APEC and ASEAN+3?
7. What are the specific steps that need to be adopted in order to reform and strengthen the ARF process and make multilateralism in this region more effective?

In a Concept Paper issued in 1995 (see Appendix 2), the ARF outlined three stages of security co-operation:

- confidence-building measures (CBMs);
- preventive diplomacy (PD); and
- conflict resolution (later amended to “the elaboration of approaches to conflict” to assuage Chinese concerns).¹

Although the ARF has served the interests of its member nations to some extent, institutional growth and problem-solving mechanisms are necessary if the Forum is to count as a pillar of Asia-Pacific security in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 2 examines the role of ASEAN in helping the ARF meet fundamental challenges facing the Forum today. ASEAN countries have played a pivotal role in the making of the ARF. ASEAN members believe that a multilateral approach can enhance confidence among regional governments, ensure the positive involvement of major powers in the region, and help moderate their interaction in ways that would contribute to a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

It is in the national interests of ASEAN countries to continue their commitment to the ARF process. But, as this report suggests, they should

1 See “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper”, as annexed to the Chairman’s Statement at the 2nd ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 Aug 1995. China has been rather consistent in its viewpoint that the ARF should not proceed too rapidly into PD because of the utmost need for confidence-building among member nations. This position was most recently reiterated by CSCAP China representatives at the recent 3rd Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) General Meeting held in Canberra, 10–11 Dec 2001.

push for the reform of existing processes within the ARF so that the Forum is better institutionalised. Absent meaningful institutionalisation, the ARF risks losing its ability to command the support of several key members and to engage the United States. On the other hand, institutional adjustments and changes could move the ARF closer to its professed goal of developing “a more predictable and constructive pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region.”²

The policy recommendations of this report are aimed at strengthening the ARF in important ways. If implemented, they would create a greater sense of predictability about the purposes and functions of the ARF. They would lessen the risk that domestic changes in member states could reduce their commitments to multilateralism. They should also help the ARF to develop more concrete and self-sustaining (or path-dependent) approaches to security co-operation. Their implementation would serve as an important confidence-building measure, a sign of the ARF’s growing maturity.

Chapter 3 explores the turn to multilateralism in Asia-Pacific security. Multilateral co-operation in Asia-Pacific security marks a departure from a long tradition of bilateral security relations, especially the U.S.-led San Francisco alliance system. The shift was led by proposals for multilateralism initially mooted by the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. The instrumental role in developing the ARF, however, was taken up by ASEAN. ASEAN moved away from its inward-looking ZOPFAN concept and offered its own model of regional security (the “ASEAN Way”) as the *modus operandi* of the ARF.

Chapter 4 reviews the ARF’s agenda on confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. A Concept Paper (which Singapore helped to draft) in 1995 envisaged evolving security co-operation among ARF members in three stages: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution (later amended to “the elaboration of approaches to conflict” as a concession to China). The ARF’s CBM agenda saw some modest progress. To date, most if not all of the measures enumerated in Annex A of the Concept Paper have been realised. These include dialogue on security perceptions, voluntary submissions of defence White Papers, information and personnel exchanges among national defence colleges, search and rescue. However, these measures

2 Chairman’s Statement at the First ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 25 Jul 1994

belong to the category of declaratory and transparent CBMs, and not to the category of constraining CBMs. Several measures listed in Annex B of the Concept Paper are yet to be realised. More deepening rather than expanding of the CBM agenda is also called for. Several important CBMs need to be refined. Examples include the formal adoption of the Pacific Concord (of which a draft exists) and creating a formal template for the drafting of the Annual Security Outlooks.

Transition to preventive diplomacy (PD) has proved immensely difficult owing to the resistance of some member states, such as China. Still at a formative stage, PD measures being developed by the ARF are primarily peacetime, not crisis-time, responses. Progress has been made in articulating the principles of PD, establishing a register of Experts or Eminent Persons, and developing the role of the ARF Chair. However, the scope of PD is limited to dealing with disputes and conflicts between rather than within states. Enthusiasm for the Forum's PD agenda waned following the 1997 economic crisis. At present, Track II efforts to rejuvenate inter-governmental interest in preventive diplomacy and beyond include contributions by the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

Chapter 5 examines the national perspectives of the member nations of the ARF. Attitudes and perspectives on the progress of the ARF vary amongst its members. ASEAN states are generally satisfied with current CBMs and would prefer that they be continued and strengthened. But some ASEAN members would like the ARF to move beyond confidence-building to preventive diplomacy. ARF's Northeast Asian members are equally divided in their views. Japan clearly wants a better-institutionalised ARF that could deal effectively with regional contingencies. China, on the other hand, is uncomfortable with a fast-track approach. It has also vigorously opposed any ARF measure, especially preventive diplomacy, which could entail interference in its domestic affairs. More generally, China has sought to resist what it perceives as attempts by others to internationalise or multilateralise any issue that could potentially affect Chinese sovereignty.

Both Australia and Canada have been actively pushing for greater institutionalisation in the ARF. Australia has promoted innovative ideas such as the ARF Troika. The U.S. has been more circumspect in its expectations. It prefers the Forum to develop problem-solving mechanisms and frank and constructive exchange of views, including discussing specific bilateral issues. In the post September 11 strategic milieu, the U.S. would like the ARF to strengthen co-operation in the fight against terror.

Chapter 6 explores the ARF's growing links with other Asia-Pacific multilateral fora. Other regional bodies, such as APEC and ASEAN+3, should not be viewed as competing against but rather as complementary to the ARF. Although economic in orientation, APEC and ASEAN+3 help to reinforce the ARF process. The APEC Leaders' Summit has been especially important for consultations on security issues such as East Timor and terrorism. The ASEAN+3 framework complements the ARF by focusing on a smaller geographic area, and developing a closer political and economic nexus and understanding between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.

Chapter 7 compares the ARF experience with the experiences of other regions, and asks what the Asia-Pacific region can learn from other regional experiments in multilateral co-operation. Measured against the multilateral experiences of other regions, the ARF has fared reasonably well when compared with the "best practices" of regional organisations in Africa, the Americas and the Middle East. While there are deep and distinct differences between Europe and the Asia-Pacific, over-insistence on Asian "exceptionalism" is unwarranted. Clearly, there are some things that the ARF can and should learn from the OSCE experience: greater institutionalisation, the use of fact-finding and good offices missions to promote conflict prevention and crisis management, adopting constraining CBMs, and establishing a unit for conflict prevention and risk reduction.

Chapter 8 offers a plausible agenda for moving the ARF forward. Rethinking and institutional adjustments are necessary if the ARF is to count as a pillar of Asia-Pacific security. Drawing on the work by IDSS staff and our consultations with ARF specialists, we present 12 recommendations to strengthen the ARF (see box on page 13).

Chapter 9 concludes by noting that while the ARF's minimalist framework has served divergent member interests in the Forum reasonably well, its deficiencies are nevertheless apparent in the wake of the difficulties that have plagued the region. A more robust institutionalisation is needed, backed by a problem-solving mindset and approach. Anything less might spell doom for a multilateral experiment that has worked well in the past, but which now requires strengthening in order to deal with new challenges.

12 Policy Recommendations

1. The ARF should consider implementing measures that were outlined in Annex B of the 1995 Concept Paper.
2. A panel of the ARF Expert/Eminent Persons Group should undertake a review of the 1995 Concept Paper.
3. The ARF should encourage frank and constructive exchange of views, and not ignore contentious issues or “sweep them under the carpet”.
4. The ARF should pursue a thematic and problem-oriented agenda.
5. The ARF should establish a Secretariat.
6. Introduce greater flexibility in the relationship between the ARF Chair and the ASEAN Chair.
7. The ARF should set up a Risk Reduction Centre.
8. The ARF should build closer relationships with the United Nations.
9. The ARF should promote enhanced defence participation.
10. The ARF should develop closer networking with other regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific.

11. The ARF should pay more attention to transnational security issues, especially terrorism. It should create a special ARF task force on terrorism.
12. The ARF should strengthen links with Track II forums.

2

THE ARF'S CHALLENGES AND ASEAN

The ARF, which a Singapore senior official once called “a loose, multi-layered regional political-security system”¹, defies conventional wisdom on regional multilateral institutions. The Forum’s membership includes major powers, but the “driver’s seat” is occupied by ASEAN, a sub-regional coalition of mainly developing nations. Some critics question whether ASEAN can maintain its “proprietary role” in the ARF without compromising the Forum’s capacity and will to address major challenges to regional peace and stability.² Consensual approaches that have worked well for ASEAN may not be entirely suitable for managing tensions that arise from the divergent strategic interests of ARF member states.³ Many analysts have questioned the wisdom of formulating a security approach for the ARF that can more or less be described as “ASEAN writ large”⁴.

-
- 1 Peter Ho, Permanent Secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Defence. See Peter Ho Hak Ean, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Way Forward?” in the 3rd Workshop on ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Peace and Preventive Diplomacy, Shangri-La Hotel, Bangkok, 17–18 Feb 1994.
 - 2 Alan Dupont, “The Future of the ARF: An Australian Perspective” in Khoo How San, ed., *The Future of the ARF* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 1999), p. 36
 - 3 Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand” in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol. 20 No. 2 (1998), p. 115
 - 4 A major point argued by the late Professor Michael Leifer of the London School of Economics. See Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 25.

Prior to the economic crisis of 1997–99, the ARF enjoyed moderate success in CBMs and had begun considering preventive diplomacy measures. However, the combination of the economic crisis and the expansion in its membership severely reduced the effectiveness of ASEAN. These distractions reduced ASEAN's capacity for effective leadership of the ARF. Moreover, caution among some ARF members and a lack of agreement on the definition of preventive diplomacy hampered progress towards preventive diplomacy.⁵

The post September 11 strategic landscape compounds the challenges facing the ARF. The ongoing U.S.-led campaign against terrorism has brought the ASEAN region “back on America's radar scope.”⁶ But this does not necessarily imply greater U.S. support for the ARF. Nor is it clear that the Bush Administration views the Forum as essential to its war on terror. Already there are hints of disenchantment in Washington over the ARF. The ARF barely merited a mention in the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review 2001.⁷ A key challenge for the ARF members is to convince the U.S. to eschew its current unilateralist impulse and offer support to multilateral co-operation in its security approach in the region.

Here, ASEAN can play an important role. ASEAN has been at the forefront of efforts to move the ARF process forward. It was the 1992 ASEAN summit which made the critical leap towards building a new multilateral security framework for the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN was closely involved in drafting the 1995 ARF Concept Paper. ASEAN members, especially Singapore and Thailand, have been instrumental in developing the concepts and principles of preventive diplomacy for the ARF.

5 However, as some observers have pointed out, preventive diplomacy does not, from a conceptual standpoint, necessarily represent “a major break” from confidence-building, for the same principles that have guided confidence-building efforts in the ARF all along will likewise guide efforts in preventive diplomacy. See, for example, Ralph Boyce, “Moving From Confidence-building to Preventive Diplomacy: The Possibilities”, a Paper presented at “Confidence-building and Conflict Reduction, 13th Asia-Pacific Roundtable”, Kuala Lumpur, 30 May – 2 Jun 1999.

6 Ambassador Michael Armacost. Cited in Barry Desker, “The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum”, a Paper presented at the 3rd CSCAP General Meeting, Canberra, 10–11 Dec 2001, p. 2

7 Released on 30 Sep 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was hastily revised following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 Sep 2001. The QDR can be downloaded at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>.

The ARF is based on the principle of inclusiveness, not exclusion. ASEAN's commitment to the ARF reflects a shared belief among its members that the involvement of major powers is essential to the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. As Khong Yuen Foong once noted about the ARF, "the institutionalisation of a security dialogue among Asia-Pacific's most significant actors is probably its most significant achievement."⁸ Through the ARF, ASEAN can play a proactive role in locking in the major powers in a positive and stable relationship.

8 Khong Yuen Foong, "Making Bricks Without Straw in the Asia-Pacific?" in *The Pacific Review* Vol. 10 No. 2 (1997), p. 291

3

THE TURN TO MULTILATERALISM IN
ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

The growth of multilateral activities in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War is well documented.¹ The trend towards multilateralism includes the establishment of APEC (in 1989), CSCAP (in 1993), ARF (in 1994), ASEM (in 1995) and ASEAN+3 (in 1997). It is important to note that many of the new institutions were grafted onto existing frameworks. The ARF grew out of the ASEAN-PMC process. The ASEAN+3 evolved out of ASEAN and, to a lesser extent, ASEM. Moreover, existing institutions were expanded and/or deepened, with ASEAN itself growing from ASEAN-6 in 1995 to ASEAN-10 in 1999.

The growth of multilateralism is a remarkable shift from the Cold War period, when security relationships and approaches in the Asia-Pacific region were primarily bilateral in nature. This traditional approach to regional security emphasised the principles and practice of balance of power and revolved around a system of bilateral alliances involving the U.S. The emergence of ASEAN in 1967 constituted an important, albeit a sub-regional, exception to the dominant role of the balance of power approaches to regional order. The two approaches may be compared as follows.

1 See, for example, Paul M. Evans, ed., *Studying Asia-Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training, and Dialogue Activities* (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, University of Toronto and York University, 1994); Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific Community: Nongovernmental Underpinnings of the Asia-Pacific Regional Community* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Japan Center for International Exchange, 1995)

The first, which may be called the San Francisco System or “the hub-and-spokes model”, grew out of the East-West ideological rivalry and featured a series of strong bilateral security agreements linking the U.S. to its regional allies. The U.S. deployed significant forces in the region to deter the Soviet Union and ensure regional stability and the security of its allies. The U.S. signed a security treaty with Japan during the San Francisco Conference in September 1951. Throughout the Cold War, most Southeast Asian states also relied on external guarantees to ensure their individual security and to react to changes in the regional distribution of power. Western attempts to promote security co-operation came in the form of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) created in February 1955 as a result of the Manila Pact of September 1954. This U.S. vision of a so-called “hub-and-spokes” model of regional security, with the U.S. as the “hub” and its East Asian allies, the “spokes”, is better understood as bilateral, not multilateral, in nature as it basically involved the U.S. coming to the defence of each Southeast Asian ally in the event of external attack.

While bilateralism was the primary mode of security interaction in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War, the creation of ASEAN in 1967 marked a turning point towards the development of a multilateral approach, albeit sub-regionally based. Consciously avoiding a military aspect, ASEAN focused on confidence-building, dialogue and conflict avoidance.² The Association was established through the Bangkok Declaration of August 1967. The member states were anti-communist states that hoped for regional political stability in order to concentrate on economic development. Concluded at the first summit of the heads of government in Bali in February 1976, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord provided the Association with a political identity. A second document, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) in Southeast Asia established a code of conduct for regulating regional inter-

-
- 2 Amongst the vast scholarly literature on ASEAN in the context of Southeast Asian security, the following works stand out: Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community?’” in *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 64 No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 159–177; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Alison Broinowski, ed., *ASEAN in the 1990s* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990); Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982); Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheldon W. Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982).
 - 3 Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security” in Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, eds., *New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging*

state relations. ASEAN adopted a common response during the Cambodian conflict and played an important diplomatic role in isolating Vietnam at the United Nations. The end of the Cold War and the Cambodian settlement made possible the enlargement of the Association to include all ten Southeast Asian states and the establishment of the ARF.

The ASEAN states also developed a web of overlapping bilateral collaborations over defence and security issues, known as the “spider web” approach. This approach involved bilateral modes of dispute settlement as well as bilateral collaboration between the national defence forces of the ASEAN Six (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei). Such defence ties included the exchange of information, cross-border agreements, training exercises and naval operations against piracy. A web of overlapping bilateral collaborations was thus created in Southeast Asia.

These approaches served as building blocks for multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. The advocacy of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific was initially led by non-ASEAN countries. Three different proposals for multilateralism stand out. One idea came from the former Soviet Union (under Gorbachev) and Australia, which proposed separately, the creation of new region-wide security institutions based on the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) model. Secondly, Canada, through then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, called for the establishment of a North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue (PCCSD), which emphasised the retention of bilateral security arrangements while encouraging a gradual process of confidence-building and dialogue.³ Finally, the U.S., opposed to any multilateral initiative that could undermine existing alliance arrangements, envisaged a kind of ad hoc or flexible form of multilateralism involving issue-specific modes of collaborative action by the most relevant actors in a conflict.⁴ The American idea found initial backing from Tokyo. Washington’s logic of the U.S. as the “balancing wheel” of an informal security structure during the early 1990s was an instance of flexible or ad hoc multilateralism.

Policy Issues (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), pp. 183–4

4 Amitav Acharya, “Making Multilateralism Work” in Michael W. Everett and Mary A. Somerville, eds., *Multilateral Activities in South East Asia* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 183

ASEAN and other Asian countries such as Japan and China were initially quite ambivalent about the need for, and merits of, multilateralism. This was due to the fact that the proposals for multilateralism drew heavily from the European experience.⁵ The Asia-Pacific region was simply too vast and diverse to fit into any one institutional mould, especially a European-style grouping.

ASEAN's own turn to security multilateralism in the wider Asia-Pacific region also required a change in its own existing multilateral security concept, ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality). Articulated in 1971, the essence of ZOPFAN was two-fold: first, exclusion of great powers from the region; and second, dependence on regional solutions for regional problems. However, the U.S. military exit from Vietnam in 1975, followed by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, quickly frustrated efforts to make ZOPFAN a reality. In 1991, then Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas alluded to the elusiveness of the ZOPFAN dream when he called for two different regional "equilibriums" to be maintained—first, among the four great powers active in the region, namely, the U.S., the Soviet Union, Japan and China; and second, between those powers and Southeast Asia.⁶

With the relevance of ZOPFAN in doubt, ASEAN's position towards Asia-Pacific multilateralism changed because of three considerations. Firstly, changes in the security environment after the end of the Cold War and the retrenchment of U.S. and Soviet forces in the region prompted ASEAN members to worry about the changing balance of power and question their sub-regional approach to security. Secondly, the Association realised that in order to avoid being ignored by the great powers, it must ensure its place as *primus inter pares* (first among equals) in that architecture. Thirdly, the

5 ASEAN members opted for an enhanced version of their ASEAN post-ministerial conferences (PMCs). This decision eventuated in a multilateral security dialogue focussing on transparency and confidence-building issues in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Differing from others in its preference for regular consultation rather than a OSCE-type institution, the "ASEAN Way" was partly a default option in the ostensible absence of "precedent models." In this respect, some, like Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's permanent representative to the UN, viewed Europe's multilateral experience as "not necessarily relevant to the Asia-Pacific". See Khoo How San, "Executive Summary" in Khoo, ed., *The Future of the ARF*, p. 18.

6 Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, p. 172

Association hoped that by embracing multilateralism and playing a leading role in it, it could consolidate its diplomatic position in the post-Cold War period and gain a managerial role in regional order. This could be achieved by regularising dialogue among the most significant regional actors, namely, the U.S., Japan and China. The apparent success of ASEAN in regional security management during the Cambodia conflict made the ASEAN model an attractive candidate for the wider Asia-Pacific region.

The emergence of post-Cold War multilateralism in the region entailed an extension of the ASEAN model to the wider region. Indeed, its success afforded the Association a significant say in defining the character of Asia-Pacific multilateralism. At the inaugural ASEAN-PMC meeting held in Singapore in 1993, participants opted for an enhanced version of the ASEAN-PMCs. This decision resulted in a multilateral security dialogue focussing on transparency and CBM issues in the Asia-Pacific region, culminating in the ARF. Differing from others in its preference for regular consultation rather than European-styled multilateral institutions, the “ASEAN Way” was thereby a default option owing to the supposed lack of “precedent models”. In short, the end product can well be described as an “ASEANisation” of Asia-Pacific security.

The rationale for the ARF is a slow and gradual process that complements and could perhaps ultimately replace regional alliances and a spider web approach. In particular, the future role of bilateral security arrangements with the U.S. can be questioned due to the enormous U.S. preponderance in military power. The gap that separates U.S. military technology from its East Asian allies is widening at an alarming rate. In addition, defence spending in the region is very small in comparison to the U.S. military budgets. These growing differences make military co-operation and exercises increasingly difficult. The U.S. will likely adopt a more unilateral approach to security if its regional allies can no longer provide significant practical or military help. This would undermine the relevance of bilateral military alliances and therefore increase the importance of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific.

The first ARF meeting took place in Bangkok in July 1994, following the first ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Bangkok in May of the same year. The gathering of 18 foreign ministers to discuss Asia-Pacific security matters was a symbolic achievement. It was agreed that the Forum would meet annually and the different participants accepted ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation as a code of conduct.

The second ARF meeting, which welcomed Cambodia as a participant, took place in Brunei in August 1995 and led to the establishment of Inter-sessional Support Groups (ISGs), to be co-chaired by an ASEAN and non-ASEAN participant, which would meet between the annual ministerial sessions. A series of Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) were also set up to deal with co-operative activities such as peacekeeping operations, CBMs, disaster relief and search and rescue missions. The use of two different names for two evidently similar bodies was again intended to accommodate China's objections by eschewing any impression of continuous institutionalised activities. More importantly, the second meeting also saw the acceptance of an ARF Concept Paper that outlined three stages of security co-operation: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. As a result of China's demands, the third stage was amended to "elaboration of approaches to conflicts" in the Chairman's Statement, a development that demonstrated China's influence on the multilateral process.

The Concept Paper affirmed that the initial phase of the ARF process should concentrate on confidence-building and suggested two complementary approaches to security co-operation—one based on ASEAN's experience and practice of co-operation and the other on "the implementation of concrete confidence-building measures". Two lists (or "baskets") of measures were set out—the first to be implemented in the immediate future and the second in the longer run (see Table 4.2). Track II activities, such as the CSCAP, aimed at discussing sensitive security questions, including proposals mentioned in the second list, were introduced and affirmed. Furthermore, the Concept Paper consolidated ASEAN's status as *primus inter pares* in the ARF. The Forum's procedures had to be based on "prevailing ASEAN norms and practices". This stipulation provoked resentment among some participants, including South Korea that felt annoyed by ASEAN's proprietary attitude and its inability to introduce a Northeast Asian security dialogue.

The third Forum meeting, held in Jakarta in July 1996, accepted the idea of Track II sessions on preventive diplomacy and non-proliferation through CSCAP (see Table 4.4). Furthermore, a set of criteria for membership was adopted. Among other things, ARF participants needed to be sovereign states—a decision which excluded Taiwan's future involvement. The ASEAN initiative to enlarge the membership of the ARF—with the inclusion of Myanmar and India, for instance—was not well received by some participants, including the U.S. and Japan, which would have preferred a deepening, rather than an enlargement, of the diplomatic process.

Partly due to the debilitating effects of the region-wide financial crisis of 1997–99, the more recent annual ministerial meetings have yielded almost no progress or significant developments. Western criticism over the issue of human rights in Myanmar was brought into the ARF. At its 1997 meeting, the ARF decided to move itself to the preventive diplomacy stage, particularly in cases where preventive diplomacy overlapped with confidence-building. Yet, no progress was made at the 1998 and the 1999 ministerial meetings held respectively in Manila and Singapore. Although acknowledging the need to discuss the preventive diplomacy concept, the Chairman's Statement of 1999 emphasised CBMs instead. Movements were hampered due to the lack of agreement over the definition and scope of preventive diplomacy (especially whether it might entail a breach of sovereignty).

The 2001 ARF meeting affirmed that confidence-building would remain “the foundation and main thrust of the whole ARF process”. However, modest progress towards preventive diplomacy was achieved. ARF ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress made on discussions on an ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons to be rendered available for use by Forum participants on a voluntary basis. A second unedited volume of the Annual Security Outlooks was compiled from voluntary contributions by member states. Finally, the adoption at the most recent ARF meeting of the paper on “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy”, produced by Singapore and deliberated at ISG-CBM meetings from 1999 to the present, as a “snapshot” of the state of current discussion on preventive diplomacy in the Forum provided some cause for cheer as a potential building block for more ambitious security co-operation.

4

THE ARF'S AGENDA CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Definitions of CBMs vary widely. For this report's purposes, CBMs are defined as "attempts to make clear to concerned states, through the use of a variety of measures, the true nature of potentially threatening military activities."¹ The scope of CBMs can be rather wide, ranging from transparency and information exchanges, to the advanced notification of military exercises and military deployments to the monitoring of regional arms agreements. These may occur within formal or informal contexts and can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral in kind. Fundamentally, the object of CBMs is the reduction of strategic uncertainty. A 1997 study on the ARF commissioned by the Canadian government identified the following set of common objectives that underscore confidence-building efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.

1. Reducing tensions and suspicions
2. Reducing the risk of accidental war or war by miscalculation
3. Fostering communication and co-operation in a way that de-emphasises the use of military force
4. Bringing about a better understanding of one another's security problems and defence priorities
5. Developing a greater sense of strategic confidence in the region

That same study also identified three categories of CBMs (see Table 4.1): (i) principles/declaratory measures; (ii) transparency measures; and (iii) constraining measures.

1 James Macintosh, *Confidence-Building: Its Contribution to Peacekeeping*, Occasional Paper No. 11 (Toronto: York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, March 1990), p. 2

Table 4.1 – Types of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)**Principles/declaratory measures**

- Generalised statements of interests, norms and beliefs
- Statements can be either explicit and formal (e.g. declarations and treaties) and implicit and informal (e.g. communiqués)
- Common to other approaches to security co-operation, e.g. preventive diplomacy (PD) or conflict resolution (CR)

Transparency measures

- Defence White Papers publications
- Calendar of military activities
- Exchange of military information
- Military-to-military contacts
- Arms registry
- Military personnel and student exchanges
- Mandatory consultation on unusual and dangerous activities
- Notification of military manoeuvres and movements
- Invitation of observers
- Surveillance and control zones
- Open skies
- Troop separation and monitoring

Constraining measures

- Prevention of dangerous military activities
- Incidents at sea agreements
- Demilitarised zones
- Disengagement zones
- Air and maritime keep-out zones
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zones
- Limits on personnel numbers, categories and deployment zones
- Limits on equipment deployment (by geographical area or numbers), category and storage
- Limits on troop and equipment movements and manoeuvres by size and geographical area
- Limits on readiness
- Limits on number of military exercises per year
- Bans on simultaneous exercises, alerts and/or certain force or unit types

Source: Amitav Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, 1997)

Table 4.2 indicates the evolution of multilateral CBMs in the ARF chronologically.

Table 4.2 – Multilateral CBMs in the ARF and CSCAP

Date	Development
1993	<p>The ASEAN-PMC SOM discussed the following CBMs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – information exchanges among defence officials; – prior notification of military exercises; and – ZOPFAN. <p>SOM leaders stressed the need to develop regional dialogues and conduct research into CBMs applicable to the region.</p>
1994	<p>The ISG-CBMs in Australia (in November) proposed a multi-tiered framework for CBMs, based on likely time scales for implementation. In the short term, the ARF would focus on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – promoting dialogue on security perceptions; – enhancing military contacts at both senior and other levels (e.g. information and training exchanges); – voluntary invitations of observers at military exercises; – participation in the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR), sea lanes of communication (SLOC) co-operation and so on. <p>Over the medium term, the ARF would explore the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – establishing a regional arms register, developing a regional security studies centre and co-ordinating security studies activities; – co-operating in maritime information data bases; and – publishing defence White Papers. <p>Over the long term, the ARF would extend such practices to include notification of major military deployment and maritime surveillance co-operation.</p>

- 1995 ASEAN released a Concept Paper which proposed the following CBMs:
- explore the possibility of a regional arms register;
 - establish a regional security studies centre and/or co-ordinate existing security studies activities;
 - develop maritime information data bases;
 - develop SLOC co-operation, beginning with information exchanges and training (in search and rescue, piracy and narcotics control, etc.);
 - develop a humanitarian assistance mobilising mechanism for natural disasters; establish zones of co-operation (e.g. in the South China Sea);
 - develop prior notification systems for major military deployments that have region-wide implications; and
 - encourage arms producers and suppliers to reveal the destination of their exports.

After meetings in October 1994 and May 1995, the CSCAP CSBM Working Group proposed the following CBMs:

- promote greater transparency in military doctrine, capabilities and intentions via contacts and exchanges among military establishments;
- intelligence exchanges;
- prior notification of military exercises;
- greater openness regarding defence planning, procurement and budgets, including the preparation of defence White Papers or reviews;
- increased military-military and military-civilian dialogues on security matters;
- develop a regional arms register.

It argued that formal CBM mechanisms modelled after Europe's OSCE are neither desirable nor feasible in this region. Instead, it advocated the unilateral and bilateral implementation of CBMs, and proposed that the ARF oversee the implementation of any multilateral initiatives.

The 2nd ARF meeting held in Brunei formally adopted the following proposals from the Concept Paper:

- to keep the ARF as a forum for regional security dialogue; and
- to continue discussions on how best to implement CBMs.

It convened an ISG-CBMs that focuses, inter alia, on a dialogue on security perceptions and voluntary submission of defence White Papers.

- 1996 At two meetings held in 1996, the ISG-CBMs agreed to maintain and further develop defence contacts and exchanges. They recommended to the forthcoming ARF SOM meeting in Indonesia the following:
- the ARF to continue dialogue on security perceptions, including during ISG sessions;
 - voluntary sharing of defence information by ARF members on dialogues and other activities;
 - voluntary annual submissions of defence policy statements to the ARF, including White Papers and the exchange of views given in those statements;
 - opening the ARF SOM to defence officials and encouraging their greater participation in ISGs;
 - encourage information and personnel exchanges among national defence colleges;
 - the ARF to maintain a current list of contact points, exchange information on the role of defence authorities in disaster relief (including convening an ISG on it) and voluntarily exchanging information on observer participation in and notification of military exercises.

The above measures were approved at the 3rd ARF meeting in Jakarta on 23 July 1996.

- 1997 At the ISG-CBMs meeting, participants expressed satisfaction with the progress on CBMs but emphasised that more work was needed on current and new CBMs in the ARF agenda. Several inter-sessional CBM-related activities were conducted: conference of heads of national defence colleges, disaster relief, search and rescue (SAR), etc. The meeting of national defence college heads emphasised the importance of co-operation in security education and research, and networking, faculty and student exchanges, exchanges of publications, seminars and conferences on mutually agreed topics, etc., in enhancing confidence-building. The SAR meeting noted the positive steps made by various ARF participants to implement recommendations by the First ISM SAR in 1996 to enhance greater SAR co-ordination and co-operation. It agreed to submit a list of SAR Training Centres (SARTRs) to ARF Ministers for endorsement, and to recommend a list of principles and objectives to the ARF SOM for consideration and adoption by the ARF.

- 1998 At the ISG in March, participants emphasised the need to continue focus on core military defence-related CBMs to address non-military CBMs in accordance with the ARF's comprehensive security

approach. They also addressed the overlap between CBMs and PD (see Table 4.4). There was agreement to recommend to the ARF SOM that the mandate for the ISG on CBMs be extended for the next inter-sessional year based on the following developments:

- good progress made in exchanges on regional security perceptions at the ISG, SOM and ARF Ministerial levels;
- rapidly expanding numbers of high-level bilateral defence contacts;
- frequent defence training and exchanges;
- high level of ARF member participation in the UNCAR;
- encouraging participation in global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;
- voluntary submission of annual defence policy statements by several ARF members; and
- good progress in voluntary development of defence White Papers.

1999 The 6th ARF meeting in Singapore agreed that ASEAN remains the driving force of the ARF process, and that the ARF would maintain its evolutionary approach as the process progresses, at a pace comfortable to all members and on the basis of consensus, from confidence-building to PD, and eventually to conflict resolution. It requested the ISG-CBMs to explore further the overlap between CBMs and PD (see Table 4.4).

The ISG-CBMs considered two lists or “baskets” of new CBMs for implementation in the near future. Basket 1 consists of military medicine co-operation, building a multilateral communications network called “ARFNET”, defence language schools conference, etc. Basket 2 consists of ARF liaison with other regional fora, a second ARF SOM and counter-narcotics and port interdiction seminar, preventing and combating illegal small arms trafficking, etc. New CBM proposals by China and the Maritime Specialists Officials Meeting (MSOM) were added to the two baskets. Other CBM-related activities under ISG-CBMs auspices were as follows: 3rd ARF Meeting of Heads of Defence Universities in Ulan Bator; ARF Professional Training Programme on China’s Security Policy in Beijing; ARF Seminar on Law of Armed Conflict in Newcastle, etc.

2000 The 7th ARF meeting in Bangkok emphasised the importance of CBMs to the overall ARF process and agreed that such efforts be intensified. Ministers underscored CBMs as the foundation and primary focus of the ARF process. The meeting also took note of the ARF Track II Expert Meeting on Pacific Concord in Moscow and continuing efforts to that end. There also was agreement to convene an ARF Expert Group on transnational crime in conjunction with the ISG-CBMs.

At the ISG-CBMs, participants attributed stability of regional security partly to co-operative arrangements that had contained the effects of economic and financial crisis, but agreed to strengthen the process of regional security dialogue and co-operation under the ARF. They welcomed positive developments in the Korean peninsula, the Mekong sub-region, East Timor, and dialogue in the ASEAN-China SOM consultations on—as well as the informal Track II workshop on conflict management in—the South China Sea. They agreed that adoption of a regional Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China would contribute to peace and stability in the South China Sea. The overlap between CBMs and PD was explored (see Table 4.4).

2001 The ISG-CBMs in April noted efforts to achieve progress on securing accession of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. It noted the reports of the following CBMs for consideration at the next ARF SOM:

- meetings of Heads of Defence Colleges and Institutions;
- a second seminar on Law of Armed Conflict;
- a seminar on economic security for the Asia-Pacific in the first decades of the 21st century; and
- an ARF Peacekeeping Seminar.

It was agreed that New Zealand would prepare a concept paper on maintaining a record of CBM activities.

The 8th ARF meeting in July affirmed CBMs as the foundation and main thrust of the ARF process. The Ministers noted the general utility of Expert Groups Meetings (EGMs) on transnational crime, but endorsed the recommendation of the ARF SOM and ISG-CBMs to discuss transnational crime in alternative formats, e.g. ad hoc workshops, seminars and symposia.

Source: Excerpted from various ARF Chairman Statements, Co-Chairmen's Summary Reports of ISG-CBMs meetings and other ARF documents. Texts available at the Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (DFAT) website at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/ar/>.

As Table 4.2 demonstrates, the CBMs implemented by the ARF are mainly the declarative and transparent, but not constraining varieties. Clearly, more can and should be done to encourage the establishment of more constraining measures in this region. Among other things, this can involve revisiting proposals such as ZOPFAN or the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) as plausible constraining CBMs.

Developing preventive diplomacy has proven to be far more contentious for the ARF than confidence-building. A key issue has been the definition of PD. The concept and practice of preventive diplomacy is not new to the United Nations' efforts in international peace and security. Both Dag Hammarskjöld and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in their respective tenures as UN Secretary-General, experimented variously with preventive diplomacy. In the Asia-Pacific region, discussions started in the 1993–94 period with a series of meetings on “ASEAN-UN Co-operation on Peace and Preventive Diplomacy”, jointly organised by the Institute of Policy Studies in Singapore and the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, Japanese think tanks such as the Japanese Institute of International Affairs (JIJA) and the National Institute of Research Advancement (NIRA) launched separate research projects on preventive diplomacy, while the 1994 Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur included, for the first time, a preventive diplomacy panel.²

The establishment of the Forum in 1994 effectively shifted discussions on the issue beyond the Track II level to the Track I level. As noted earlier, the ARF Concept Paper made preventive diplomacy an official part of the ARF security agenda. The theme of three ARF-sponsored seminars and a fourth planned for this year, preventive diplomacy has been described in the Concept Paper as “a natural follow-up to confidence-building.”

The 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* report by the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defined PD as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”³ A

2 CSCAP Singapore, “Review of Preventive Diplomacy Activities in the Asia-Pacific Region” in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, eds., *The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131 (Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University in Association with the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 1999), pp. 293–4

3 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and*

broader definition of PD was offered by Amitav Acharya who, in a 1994 paper, included diplomatic, political, military, economic and humanitarian action taken by governments, multilateral organisations (e.g. the UN and other regional institutions) and international agencies (including non-governmental actors such as NGOs) with a four-fold aim:

1. Preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between and within states
2. Preventing such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation
3. Limiting the intensity of violence resulting from such conflicts and preventing it from spreading geographically
4. Preventing and managing acute humanitarian crises associated with such conflicts, whether as cause or as effect⁴

Turning to specific measures of PD, the paper, reflecting academic writings on PD in general, distinguished between peacetime and crisis-time responses, as per Table 4.3.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of disputes and conflicts “within states” did not sit well with some ARF members. Their discomfort over the tensions between, on the one hand, the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference and, on the other, those of self-determination and humanitarian intervention were evident. China has been one of the key dissenters, being party to numerous disputes involving sovereignty claims, land borders and maritime boundaries. China has insisted on excluding all intra-state disputes from the purview of PD. Beijing also remains wary of the possible inclusion of preventive deployment involving the use of armed forces in the scope of PD.

Participants at a CSCAP CSBM Working Group meeting in early 1999 managed to adopt a compromised “working definition” that stated that only conflicts “between states” could be the objects of PD. This definition reads as follows:

Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 11

4 Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: Issues and Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region” in Bunn Nagara and Cheah Siew Ean, eds., *Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, 1996), p. 238

5 “Preventive Diplomacy: Definitions and Principles”, CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Bangkok, 1 March 1999

Table 4.3 – Preventive Diplomacy (PD) Measures

Peacetime Responses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – CBMs, e.g. dialogue, exchanges of information and avoidance of incidents at sea – institution-building, e.g. norm-setting, developing principles of conduct, generating regularised consultations and building trust – intensifying consultative process at the official (or Track I) level – the use of various ARF meetings and sessions for the exchange of information – establishing a register of Experts/Eminent Persons – fact-finding missions – providing early warning (EW) of developments likely to endanger the maintenance of regional peace and security – taking preventive humanitarian action – encouraging the use of arbitration or judicial settlement by other bodies – providing a PD training capability in the region – co-operating on preventive action on transnational issues, e.g. drug trafficking, disposal of nuclear waste, major movements of population, and so on.
Crisis-time Responses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – fact-finding missions – employing good offices and goodwill missions before or at the onset of crises, e.g. enhancing the good offices role of the ARF Chair – crisis management for reducing the immediate possibility of violent action in a conflict situation – preventive deployment of troops to prevent conflict escalation, whether with or without mutual consent of rival parties.

Source: Amitav Acharya, "Preventive Diplomacy: Issues and Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region", a Paper presented to the 8th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, 5–8 June 1994

As a general rule, Preventive Diplomacy is consensual diplomatic and political action with the aim of:

1. preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between States which pose a serious threat to regional peace and stability;
2. preventing such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and
3. limiting the intensity of violence and humanitarian problems resulting from such conflicts and preventing it from spreading geographically.

This definition was further qualified by a list of key principles.

- Preventive diplomacy is about diplomacy: it relies on diplomatic and peaceful methods, e.g. persuasion, negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation.
- It is voluntary: it is employed only at the request of the parties involved or with their consent.
- It is a non-coercive activity: it does not include military action or the use of force, or other coercive activities, e.g. sanctions.
- It is based on international law: any action should be in accordance with the basic principles of international law.
- It is based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. This includes the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.
- It requires timeliness: it involves preventive, not curative, action. Preventive diplomacy methods are most effectively employed at an early stage of a dispute or crisis.⁵

The above CSCAP definition serves as the basis of subsequent deliberations within the ARF regarding the concepts, principles and modalities of PD. After much debate, the ARF in July 2001 adopted a Paper on “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy”. The paper defines PD as consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties:

- to help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability;
- to help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and
- to help minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region.

The paper outlines eight key principles of PD (as opposed to six in the CSCAP Working Group Paper). While incorporating all six principles of the CSCAP formulation, the new official list further stresses that PD applies only to “conflicts between and among States.” It also specifies that the principles of international law to guide PD are those of the UN Charter, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Co-operation and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. It places specific emphasis on the requirement of a “strong foundation of trust and confidence” for PD which must be “conducted on the basis of neutrality, justice and impartiality.”

The paper refers to the need for pre-crisis measures as well as for those that could be undertaken at the onset of a crisis. However, it does not specify humanitarian contingencies per se as objects of PD. This is a major shortcoming that needs to be addressed, since in our view, many conflict situations in Asia-Pacific are likely to arise over non-conventional threats involving complex humanitarian emergencies.

Table 4.4 charts the evolutions of thinking and approach to PD in the Asia-Pacific region at both first and second tracks.

Table 4.4 – Towards Preventive Diplomacy in ARF and CSCAP**Year Development**

- 1995 Track II members held an ARF-sponsored PD seminar in Seoul. Participants considered whether the definition of PD by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace adequately addressed the needs and concerns of the Asia-Pacific region. They focused on three broad themes:
- how ARF members could most usefully define the concept of PD that would provide a workable solution to regional problems;
 - whether specific threats to regional peace and stability amenable to PD could be identified; and
 - whether the seminar could identify specific mechanisms, frameworks and measures which might enable efforts at PD.

First, regarding PD definitions, it was expressed that PD is not the same as crisis management, but focuses on early prevention of latent conflicts—a desirable but not always workable goal. Here consensus is important. Second, participants identified potential sources of threats and conflicts (territorial disputes, proliferation of conventional weapons and WMD, inter-state conflicts such as those in the Korean peninsula, intra-state conflicts such as between Cambodia and Myanmar, drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation, maritime safety and piracy, unregulated population movements, etc.). It was agreed that application of PD in each instance should be based on consideration of the urgency of the issue in question and its amenability to such efforts.

Thirdly, participants emphasised that focus on PD should be on perceptions, urgency and feasibility, rather than hardware concerns. Suggested PD measures include the following:

- establishing CBM working groups as a first step given the view that the ARF should evolve incrementally;
- rather than direct involvement, the ARF can endorse, enable and/or buttress existing bilateral and multilateral processes (e.g. the U.S.-DPRK talks on nuclear issues) in order to broaden support for them beyond the relevant parties;

- placing emphasis on principles (e.g. codes of conduct), structures (e.g. a regional conflict prevention centre), activities (e.g. promoting crisis prevention exercises) and tracks (e.g. vigorous support for Track II processes);
- establishing a register of experts, discussing principles of peaceful dispute settlement, appointing a High Commissioner for Maritime Affairs, establishing permanent or ad hoc committees or working groups, etc.

Although participants differed on rapid or gradual approaches to the structural development of PD, there was broad agreement, however, that such structures are potentially useful. The importance of political will to the success of any PD effort was also noted.

1996 A second ARF-sponsored PD seminar, also under Track II auspices, was held in Paris. Consistent with the statement by the Chairman of the 3rd ARF meeting (Jakarta), the seminar sought to develop proposals for PD based on principles set out in the UN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea. Participants used as a starting point UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's definition of PD, but recognised that various meanings also existed. They agreed on the following:

- the need for Annual Security Outlooks (ASOs) and collection of relevant information and analyses;
- the possibility of creating in the future a regional research and information centre;
- the possibility of establishing an early warning system; and
- the possibility of the ARF as a repository of information on PD, including monitoring outcomes of specific cases.

Track II, particularly CSCAP, was seen as the appropriate venue for considering these things. Participants agreed that a core list of CBMs specifically oriented towards PD be identified, and proposed that these CBMs be considered by the March 1997 ISG-CBMs. Other PD measures that could be available to the ARF, including those mentioned in the ARF Concept Paper's Annex, were discussed: fact-finding, good offices, mediation, moral suasion and third party mediation.

Furthermore, the meeting agreed to recommend an ARF role in PD through expansion of the good offices of the ARF Chair, guided by the consensus principle among ARF members. As a longer-term measure, it was proposed that the Chair consider the idea of an ARF risk reduction centre. The meeting concluded that any consideration of PD efforts by the ARF is to be subjected to the strict adherence to consensus among all ARF members.

1997 A third ARF-sponsored PD seminar was held in Singapore. The meeting accepted that different circumstances and actual conditions in the region called for different approaches from those employed elsewhere. Some participants felt that CBMs, as one element of PD, had the best prospects of success in the immediate future and efforts should be focused on them. The meeting addressed the EU experience in PD, and exchanged views on prospects for further efforts in PD (as well as CBMs) in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea and in Cambodia. It discussed China's perspective on PD. The meeting agreed to forward the following proposals to the next ISG-CBMs and the ARF SOM for their consideration:

- the codification of principles regulating international behaviour in the region;
- an enhanced role for the ARF Chair or third parties in providing good offices in certain circumstances;
- to explore the relevance of Sino-Indian and Sino-Russian experiences in CBMs for PD in the Asia-Pacific region;
- multilateral co-operation as a form of PD on transnational issues (e.g. drug trafficking, population movements, nuclear waste storage, shipment and disposal) as related to security;
- ASOs to be discussed at Track I, but produced by Track II.

The meeting endorsed the idea that co-operation between the ARF and CSCAP be enhanced. It was agreed that the following proposals be forwarded to CSCAP for further consideration: the utility and feasibility of map (simulation) exercises and freedom of navigation issues.

- 1998 In accordance with the 4th ARF meeting mandate, the ISG addressed areas of overlap between CBMs and PD, although maintaining focus on CBMs. Participants generally agreed to give further consideration to the following tabled proposals:
- an enhanced role for the ARF Chair, particularly the idea of a good offices role;
 - the development of a register of Experts or Eminent Persons among ARF participants;
 - to produce ASOs, provide voluntary background briefings on regional security issues, etc.

The possibility of the ARF developing a set of “principles” or “concepts” to guide the ARF’s consideration of PD was raised. The ISG agreed to recommend to the ARF SOM and Ministers that one of two meetings of the ISG on CBMs scheduled for the next inter-sessional year be set aside to address the overlap between CBMs and PD. It stressed the importance of proceeding in an incremental, step-by-step manner, of decision by consensus and sensitivity to the interests and comfort level of all ARF participants.

- 1999 The ISG-CBMs was briefed on the CSCAP workshop on PD in Bangkok, which produced a broad definition and principles of PD and suggested ways in which the ARF could promote PD in the region. The ISG also exchanged views on existing CBMs/PD arrangements among various ARF members, and noted important lessons to be drawn from a variety of existing regional arrangements: the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula between the two Koreas, the 1996 Agreement between China and India on CBMs along the “line of actual control” (LAC) in the Sino-Indian border areas, etc.

The 6th ARF meeting in Singapore endorsed the recommendations of the ARF SOM and ISG-CBMs to discuss the concepts and principles of PD, noting the common understandings reached on four tabled proposals regarding the overlap between CBMs and PD (cf. Table 4.2 above). It requested ISG-CBMs to further explore these concerns and welcomed ASEAN’s offer to prepare a paper on PD concepts and principles for consideration at the next ARF SOM.

- 2000 Consistent with the request of the 6th ARF meeting that ISG-CBMs should further explore the overlap between CBMs and PD, ISG participants discussed the enhanced roles for the ARF Chair and the Experts/Eminent Persons register. A possible enhanced role included informal liaisons between the ARF Chair and external parties—notably, meetings between current ARF Chair Surin Pitsuwan and the Secretary-Generals of the OAS and the UN—with the consent of ARF members. However, there was agreement that further discussion was needed at the next ISG, due to the complexities of building consensus in the ARF regarding principles and procedures for the enhanced role of the ARF Chair's good offices and of co-ordination between ARF meetings. Participants welcomed and discussed Japan's proposal for an ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons, noted the complexities concerning modalities for implementing such a Register and welcomed proposals by Japan, Canada and New Zealand to further research this issue in preparation for the next ISG. Voluntary submission of ASOs at the Track I level by individual participants was acknowledged. Furthermore, preliminary views on Singapore's paper on PD ("Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy") were exchanged in preparation for fuller discussion at the next ISG. The meeting agreed to recommend to the ARF SOM that discussion on PD be continued in the next inter-sessional year and for Singapore to revise its PD paper in the light of views expressed at the ISG.
- 2001 In view of the 7th ARF meeting's decision to enhance the role of the ARF Chair, the 8th ARF meeting expressed appreciation to Vietnam, as Chair, for continuing and expanding informal contacts with the UN, the OAS and the Non-Aligned Movement. Following up on work done by the ISG-CBMs, the Ministers welcomed further progress on the available use, on a voluntary basis, of the ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons, and agreed to adopt the Paper on Terms of Reference for ARF Experts/Eminent Persons finalised by the ISG-CBMs. It was agreed that the Paper on the Concept and Principles of PD be adopted as a snapshot of the state on current discussion on PD, and that the ISG-CBMs continue discussing PD. It also welcomed the voluntary submission of ASOs, compiled as the second volume.

At the 3rd CSCAP general meeting in Canberra, the CSCAP Co-Chair, Singapore's Barry Desker, made a number of proposals for the ARF's evolution towards its PD, including:

- enhancing the role of the ARF Chair;
- forming consultative committees of Eminent Persons and a register of experts;
- establishing a good offices role for a troika of past, present and next ARF Chairs; and
- forming a Friends of the Chair group of distinguished statesmen from the region to push initiatives on behalf of the Chair.

Source: Excerpted from various ARF Chairman Statements, Co-Chairmen's Summary Reports of ISG-CBMs meetings and other ARF documents. Texts available at the Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (DFAT) website at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/>.

As Table 4.4 shows, preventive diplomacy remains at the formative stage in the ARF process. The bulk of preventive diplomacy measures under consideration are peacetime (or pre-crisis), not crisis-time, responses. But the Asia-Pacific region contains numerous flashpoints and ongoing conflicts where crisis-time responses could be called for.

5

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARF

This section examines the views of members in terms of their expectations of the ARF, their assessment of its record and their views on where they think the ARF should be headed.¹ Based on our findings, the ASEAN states generally concur that the ARF process is moving at a pace appropriate for the Asia-Pacific region. But some ASEAN members (Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand) favour greater and quicker institutionalisation than the others. Northeast Asian members of the ARF are mixed in their reactions. Japan has urged for more substantive change whereas China favours the status quo. The U.S. has largely accepted the evolutionary pace, but will likely push for an enhanced ARF in order to deal with terrorism. The following is an elaboration of these and other positions.

ASEAN

It may not be entirely plausible to speak of an ASEAN position on the ARF given differences among its members on the questions of regional security and the surfacing of bilateral tensions. However, the ASEAN states are generally in agreement that the ARF has met their expectations to some extent. With regard to the evolutionary pace of the ARF, the ASEAN states

1 The information provided in this section is based on the following sources: (i) the results of a recent IDSS survey on the ARF that was conducted among academics and policy analysts throughout the Asia-Pacific region; (ii) Annual Security Outlooks submitted by ARF member nations to the Forum; and (iii) an annual series on security outlooks of ARF countries, published by the Honolulu-based East-West Center on behalf of various agencies.

are generally satisfied with the current CBMs that are in progress and would like them to be continued. Some ASEAN states, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines in particular, are willing to move the ARF beyond CBMs and seriously develop preventive diplomacy measures. As Table 4.4 indicates, Singapore has explored preventive diplomacy mechanisms that are deemed appropriate for the regional context and has sponsored preventive diplomacy workshops. Thailand and the Philippines seem to favour quickening the pace of the ARF agenda.

Vietnam and Myanmar have expressed reservations on quickening the move towards preventive diplomacy. In fact, if one looks at this within the context of ASEAN, it is significant to note that it was during the Vietnamese chairmanship of the Association that the idea of pushing ahead with the ASEAN troika fizzled out. Malaysia and, to some extent, Indonesia have been more circumspect, calling instead for progress in areas which are not perceived as particularly threatening to the interests of any party. One of these could be the adoption of the proposal to enhance the good offices role of the ARF Chair. Overall, considering their preoccupation with domestic political, security and economic challenges, ASEAN members favour maintaining the status quo.

On the issue of leadership, ASEAN states prefer to keep the chairmanship of the ARF within ASEAN. The idea of sharing the chairmanship with non-ASEAN states with a view to proactively engage major powers like the U.S. has been more or less dismissed by ASEAN. ASEAN members feel that the ARF's Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) are already co-chaired, thereby obviating the need of any further dilution of its leadership. Moreover, the Forum relies heavily on the expertise and ideas of non-ASEAN members in its various activities.

With regard to the expectation of the ARF as a norm-building enterprise, most ASEAN states, notably Vietnam and the Philippines, anticipate that the ARF will adopt or endorse the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea in the foreseeable future.

Regarding future directions, while most agree that the next stage of development for the ARF is to move to preventive diplomacy, many ASEAN states are still ambivalent about what pace of development is most appropriate. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and even Singapore have openly pushed for more progress in this area. Countries like Vietnam and Malaysia have voiced their reservations against rushing the institutionalising of preventive diplomacy measures.

Most ASEAN states see merit in the idea of establishing an ARF Secretariat. The need to have an ARF Secretariat has constantly featured in Track II discussions. But there is a lingering sense that such a move would create formal structures that might go against the grain of the ASEAN Way.

JAPAN

Japan recognises that the ARF has established habits of dialogue among member countries. As described most recently by a Japanese academic, “the ARF provides variable points of diplomatic contact and dialogue for the regional major powers as well as other local countries.”² However, Japan has expressed reservation on the ARF’s evolutionary approach and decision-making by consensus. Tokyo has argued that this could work against the Forum’s ability to respond effectively to regional contingencies.³ At the 8th ARF meeting in July 2001, Japan played a major role in the preparation of the ARF paper on the expanded role of the ARF Chair (see Appendix 4). The Japanese contribution highlighted the possibilities of the Chair performing roles such as providing good offices and/or serving as a co-ordinator in between ARF meetings.

Concerning future directions, among the three Northeast Asian states, Japan has been most vocal in supporting the idea of pushing the preventive diplomacy agenda forward in the ARF. As mentioned above, Japan has been instrumental in the drafting of an enhanced role of the ARF Chair—an indication of the extent to which Japan would like to institutionalise the preventive diplomacy mechanisms. China, on the other hand, would be most reluctant to push such an agenda due to its long held reservation about the possibility of interference in its domestic affairs.

2 Yasuhiro Takeda, “Prospects of Security Co-operation in Asia-Pacific: Japanese Perspective”, a Paper delivered at the Workshop on Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia, Singapore, 28 Nov 2001

3 Shikekatsu Kondo, “The ARF: A Japanese Perspective” in Khoo, ed., *The Future of the ARF*, p. 110. Kondo cites the Japanese perspective reflected in the 1997 Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook that had expressed reservations on ARF’s management style.

4 Noted in Shin-wha Lee, “Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia: The Case of the Republic of Korea”, a Paper delivered at the IDSS Workshop on Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia, Singapore, 28 Nov 2001

CHINA

The Chinese attitude towards the ARF has evolved significantly. Its initial suspicions of the ARF as a possible tool of American “containment” and for its smaller neighbours to “gang up” against Chinese interests and its territorial claims have substantially lessened. China is no longer concerned that the ARF might be used by the U.S. to internationalise the Taiwan issue. On the other hand, Beijing has found the ARF useful in articulating its own security perspectives and reassuring its neighbours about its strategic intentions.

China prefers to keep the ARF moving at its current pace. It is uncomfortable with a fast-track approach. Beijing maintains that the ARF should focus on consolidating its CBM agenda, which it sees as its most important and useful role. The Forum should be in no hurry to implement preventive diplomacy measures, beyond exploring overlaps between CBMs and preventive diplomacy measures. For China, it is premature for the ARF to move beyond a consultative and confidence-building role to a problem-solving mode. China is especially sensitive to the issue of sovereignty, which has led it to oppose any ARF measure, especially preventive diplomacy, which might entail interference in its internal affairs. China also supports keeping ASEAN in the “driver’s seat” of the ARF.

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea is satisfied with the current state and progress of the ARF. Seoul has agreed to maintain the ARF tradition of continuous efforts for confidence-building, the development of mechanisms towards preventive diplomacy and open discussions on sensitive security issues.⁴

The inclusion of North Korea in 2000 as a full-fledged ARF member was seen as a major breakthrough in the Forum’s effort in providing a framework for cultivating habits of dialogue and co-operation in the region. Furthermore, Seoul hopes to build on the Forum’s CBMs to complement its existing bilateral efforts at strengthening security co-operation with Pyongyang.

AUSTRALIA

Australia views the ARF as having made an important contribution to regional security. It has been especially active in the ARF's work on transnational crime, such as money laundering and the trafficking of drugs, people and small arms. In this regard, Australia has encouraged ARF members to support an initiative for an ARF declaration on small arms.⁵

Australia believes that since progress on consolidating CBMs is well underway, the ARF should now develop a preventive diplomacy capacity. In this regard, Australia has been promoting the idea of an "ARF Troika"—quite similar to the ASEAN Troika—whereby the ARF Chair could be supported in its activities by the immediate past Chair, along with a non-ASEAN member of the Forum. The troika is to be based on a rotational system.⁶

CANADA

Canada, an original promoter of the co-operative security ideal underlying the ARF, remains supportive of the ARF's work on confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. It is somewhat frustrated with the ARF's slow progress. It believes that the ARF's urgent challenge is to seriously consider the development of mechanisms to contend with regional security issues.

Canada has called for the ARF to promote co-operation in peacekeeping and human security. Canada also seeks to move the ARF beyond a strict adherence to the principle of sovereignty. It believes that the scope of the ARF's preventive diplomacy agenda should cover both inter-state and intra-state issues. Canada has sought more multilateral action to address both traditional and non-traditional security issues. It sees no conflict between the ARF's multilateral approach and the bilateral security alliances in the region.

5 See section on Australia in ASEAN Regional Forum: Annual Security Outlook 2001; also available online at http://www.aseansec.org/aso_aus.htm.

6 Report on the ARF ISG on CBMs, Seoul, 1–2 Nov 2000, cited in Australian-CSCAP Newsletter No. 11, May 2001

UNITED STATES

The U.S. views the ARF as not having made much progress. Yet, Washington never expected the Forum to move fast on concrete issues. The “development of a habit of discussion and some consensus on process” was deemed as the only realistic expectation over the medium term. In regards to future directions, the U.S. maintains realistic expectations of the ARF, being fully aware of the Forum’s limitations. In the light of the events of September 11 and their enormous impact on American security thinking, the U.S. would likely want the ARF to strengthen co-operation in the fight against terrorism through, for example, the ARF-ISG work on transnational crime.

The U.S. would prefer that the ARF develop problem-solving mechanisms. Its members should engage in frank and constructive exchange of views, even to the extent of the ARF moving from discussing international security in general to more specific bilateral issues as and when the need arises. The U.S. also supports the continued ASEAN chairmanship of the ARF.

RUSSIA

Russia has been perceived as not really an active player in the ARF and its expectations of the ARF should therefore most likely be modest. Nevertheless, Russia has of late played an active role (together with ASEAN) in drafting the Declaration on Principles Guiding Mutual Relations in the Asia-Pacific (the Pacific Concord). Moreover, with the inclusion of North Korea in the ARF, Moscow can be expected to play a part in helping the regional engagement of Pyongyang. Russia sees the Forum as a multilateral mechanism that reinforces the peace efforts of other multilateral ventures, e.g. the Four-Party and Six-Party talks in the Korean Peninsula. Russia hopes that the ARF would adopt the Pacific Concord soon, preferably at the next ARF Ministerial Meeting in Brunei. The Russian Foreign Ministry has actively sought the support of ASEAN states to endorse the Pacific Concord.

EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

In the post September 11 strategic milieu, the EU recognises the potential role that the ARF can play in addressing some of the more urgent issues, such as terrorism and transnational crime. In the past, the EU’s participation in the ARF has been limited or confined to the country holding the EU presidency.

With its new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), EU participation in the ARF meetings could be increased to three—a development that is not necessarily welcomed by some ASEAN countries. However, with the EU’s experience in building multilateral security institutions, joint sharing of experience and expertise between the EU and the ARF—particularly with regard to developing and consolidating CBM and preventive diplomacy mechanisms—would be most useful.

6

BUILDING LINKAGES WITH OTHER
ASIA-PACIFIC MULTILATERAL FORUMS

The emergence and expansion of regional groupings in the Asia-Pacific since the 1990s reflect a desire among governments to strengthen their capacity for collective action with a view to addressing emerging security and economic challenges. Regional organisations today underlie a “new” type of regionalism. The old regionalism has been characterised as a product of the Cold War; it was inward-looking, exclusive and created by governments for specific security or economic purposes. The new regionalism, in contrast, has been described as outward-looking, non-exclusive and multidimensional in function. APEC and ASEAN+3 reflect these characteristics and can complement and reinforce the ARF’s activities.

APEC’s main objectives are the facilitation and liberalisation of trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Its more ambitious goal is to develop a Pacific community where economic, technological and financial co-operation can take place. Since its establishment in 1989, APEC has made major contributions to the liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment. APEC has also helped to support some of its members to convert to market economies. Its basic principle is to support the elimination of trade restrictions, voluntary liberalisation and non-exclusive regionalism.

APEC has produced two important documents to date. The first, the Bogor Declaration, sets forth APEC’s main goals of “the commitment to complete the achievement of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific

no later than the year 2020... with the industrialised economies achieving the goal of free and open trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and developing economies no later than the year 2020.¹ The second is the Osaka Action Plan which maps out a concrete plan to achieve its goals of liberalisation of trade and investments. Thus far, APEC has been working to “strengthen markets”, namely, to help economic systems carry out much needed structural reforms, strengthen their industrial base, build financial systems, strengthen the base of small and medium-sized enterprises and so on.

The very fact that a collective body like APEC—whose membership encompasses 21 nations from the entire Asia-Pacific region—was established carries considerable political significance. This is similar to the consequent creation of the ARF, whose gathering of similar actors in the entire Asia-Pacific is also probably its most significant achievement. APEC’s annual Leaders’ Meetings hold great political significance. While focusing on efforts to liberalise and facilitate trade and investment, the fact that all the leaders of the APEC nations meet together in one place makes it possible for them to address issues of common concern to countries throughout the APEC region. Moreover, the APEC Leaders’ Meetings have created the opportunity for annual bilateral (either at the formal or informal) summits among APEC leaders of which the U.S.-China leaders meeting is perhaps the most important one.

APEC has also shown itself to be capable of meaningful political and security discussions over the past years. Examples include the discussion of the East Timor crisis at Wellington in 1999 and the discussion of terrorism at Shanghai in 2001. The latter produced a declaration on terrorism (see Appendix 6), the first political/security declaration by APEC, even before the ARF had a chance to discuss the issue.²

1 See APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of Common Resolve, Bogor, Indonesia, 15 Nov 1994.

2 See APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism, Shanghai, China, 21 Oct 2001.

Compared with APEC, ASEAN+3 comprises less than half of APEC's membership. It is a loose consultative forum for the discussion of mainly economic co-operation—with the possible inclusion of political and strategic issues at a later date—within a more restricted geographical region of East Asia. ASEAN+3 is therefore a form of expanded regionalism that can be viewed as the outcome of “functional multilateralism”.

ASEAN+3 is a response to the economic and political challenges brought about by the 1997–99 Asian crisis. It highlights the interdependence of East Asian countries. Thus, at the 5th ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, ASEAN heads of state and government decided to build on this interdependence “in search for sustained dialogue and co-operation.”³ Within the framework of ASEAN summitry, the Association's leaders decided to continue with the collective ASEAN+3 meeting.

In the 1999 Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation of the ASEAN+3 Summit in Manila, leaders of the ASEAN+3 nations agreed to “enhance this dialogue process and strengthen co-operation with the view to advancing East Asian collaboration in priority areas of shared interest and concern even as they look to future challenges.”⁴ In this respect, two specific concerns are noteworthy.

- In the political-security area, the ASEAN+3 leaders agreed to “continuing dialogue, co-ordination and co-operation to increase mutual understanding and trust toward forging lasting peace and stability in East Asia.”
- In the area of transnational issues, they agreed to “strengthen co-operation in addressing common concerns in this area in East Asia.”⁵

3 See Political Statements on Political and Security Co-operation at the 5th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, December 1997; also available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/>.

4 Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation, ASEAN+3 Summit, Manila, the Philippines, 28 Nov 1999; also available online at http://www.aseansec.org/politics/ov._psc.htm.

5 Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation

The East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), comprising official and nonofficial representatives from 13 East Asian nations, has articulated a vision and an action agenda which includes financial and economic co-operation, human resource development, the environment and information technology. Among the highlights of the EAVG report which was submitted to the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 2001 was the proposal to set up an East Asia Forum and the possibility of an East Asian Summit.⁶

Besides stepping up efforts for closer co-operation among East Asian nations in the economic, political, security, environmental, socio-cultural and educational areas, the EAVG has also envisioned East Asia as evolving from a “region of nations to a bona fide regional community—a community aimed at working towards peace, prosperity and progress.” Moreover, the EAVG has agreed not to duplicate the existing work of other related organisations but instead to build upon existing consultative and co-operative processes.⁷

Nevertheless, how this new regional institution will take shape remains to be seen. But one can see why this particular organisation was formed in the first place. As cited above in the rationale as to why regional bodies are formed, ASEAN+3 underscores the need for sub-regional states to look beyond the immediate region to hedge themselves against future shocks (such as the Asian financial crisis) and to search for alternative mechanisms when current mechanisms prove inadequate in responding to growing economic, political and strategic challenges (as was the case with APEC).

ASEAN, ASEAN+3, APEC and ARF together create an overlapping network of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific. Their roles should be viewed as complementary and mutually reinforcing. It is interesting to note that while the term ASEAN+3 connotes an ASEAN-centred framework, a great deal of the conceptual work on this forum has been undertaken by

6 See Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN+3 Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 Nov 2001; also available online at <http://aseansec.org/politics/>.

7 Shin-wa Lee, “Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia: The Case of the Republic of Korea”, a Paper delivered at the IDSS Workshop on Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia, Singapore, 28 Nov 2001

Northeast Asian countries, especially South Korea. China has also shown a growing interest in this forum, with several staff in its Foreign Ministry assigned to work on its further development. An ASEAN+3 framework driven by Northeast Asian states should complement the ASEAN-driven ARF process and offer an additional mechanism for bringing China into a co-operative regional framework. The ASEAN+3 process also offers a platform for developing mechanisms of financial co-operation to guard against instability-causing future financial shocks, a task which neither ASEAN nor APEC have been able to fulfil.

7

LEARNING FROM MULTILATERAL SECURITY
IN OTHER REGIONS

What can the Asia-Pacific region learn from multilateral security institutions in other parts of the world? The accomplishments of the ARF in the area of confidence-building measures compare favourably with the “best practices” achieved by most regional organisations in Africa, the Americas and the Middle East (see Appendix 1). More interesting for our purposes is the question of how the ARF measures up against quite possibly the most successful regional organisation in security co-operation, the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE and the ARF have rather different institutional experiences. The former resulted from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and remained until the end of the Cold War an example of conference diplomacy. Since 1990, it has developed numerous formal structures, including a Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The member states have also agreed on provisions for OSCE peacekeeping operations.

In contrast, the ARF was developed after the end of the Cold War. It is based on an ASEAN model of consensual and “soft” institutionalism.

Many Asian scholars and policymakers seem to believe that Europe’s multilateral experience is not necessarily relevant to the Asia-Pacific because of some basic differences in their strategic and political environment. Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore’s envoy to the UN, views Europe’s multilateral

experience as “not necessarily relevant to the Asia-Pacific.”¹ At least eight basic differences between Europe and Asia can be identified.²

1. Asia lacks the strict bipolarity of Cold War Europe because of the presence and role of China, and because of the non-alignment stance of many Asian states.
2. Asian threat perceptions are more diverse and divergent than those of Europe, the structure of Asian alliances is more or less bilateral, and the U.S. force posture in Asia is maritime-based rather than, as was in Europe, land-based.
3. Asia had (and still has) a larger number unresolved conflicts and disputes.
4. Cold War Europe’s preoccupation was with nuclear war, whereas Asia’s primary concern was and is economic development. Asians therefore see regional co-operation as the means to that end.
5. The absence of true “adversaries” among Asians, whose ties are more complex, ambiguous and deeply rooted than those of a strictly security-related nature, make it exceedingly difficult to institutionalise security co-operation of the sort and level common to the OSCE, such as formal CBMs.
6. All OSCE member states are committed to the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is clearly not the basis of the ARF, given that three of its members are Leninist governments and a number of others are not fully committed to promoting human rights as a matter of policy.
7. European multilateralism succeeded largely because it could build on a foundation of economic interdependence (the EU and its precedents go back to the 1958 Treaty of Rome). In Asia’s case, while Asia-Pacific economic dynamism in the 1990s may have provided the basis for the initial optimism in the ARF, several Asian states adopted a beggar-thy-neighbour attitude after 1997.

1 Kishore Mahbubani, cited in Khoo How San, “Executive Summary” in Khoo, ed., *The Future of the ARF*, p. 18

2 The first five points are attributed to Yukio Satoh, a Japanese senior MFA official. Cited in Acharya, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building*, p. 6.

8. Notwithstanding national differences, Europe has a strong sense of regional identity centred on common interests, which is lacking in Asia. The latter region's diverse culture, geography, history and ideology, and its compressed timeframe for regionalism make the construction of common interests and that of regional identity rather difficult.

Asian leaders often play up the sense of regional "exceptionalism" and disregard the notion that norms, institutional structures and conflict management modalities from Europe are transferable to an Asian context.³ This aphorism notwithstanding, there are some things that the ARF can learn from the OSCE experience. The Forum should consider the OSCE model of co-operation as a potential source of ideas for institutional development and to promote conflict management structures.

The OSCE is involved in a wide range of activities that covers CBMs, fact-finding missions, preventive diplomacy, civil-military relations, elections monitoring, mediation and the implementation of peace agreements. Its key norms are the peaceful resolution of disputes, comprehensive security, acceptance of territorial boundaries, accountability and the protection of minorities. Its practices comprise a decision-making process based on consensus and transparency, good offices, "troikas" of past, present and future leaders, and seminar diplomacy.

There are at least six areas in which the ARF can learn from the OSCE.⁴

1. The OSCE possesses independent institutional resources as well as the necessary staff to organise events, gather information and supervise the activities of the various missions. The ARF, however, is under-institutionalised. It should have adequate staff resources, analytic capabilities and information sharing and gathering structures.
2. The ARF could develop fact-finding and good offices missions based on the OSCE experience. ARF representatives could engage in such missions to promote conflict prevention and crisis management in politically tense areas.

3 Brian Job, "Reconciliation: Learning From the European Experience", a Paper prepared for the CSCAP CSBM and North Pacific Working Groups Joint Meeting, Paris, 28–29 Jun 2001, p. 1

4 Adapted from Job, "Reconciliation: Learning From the European Experience"

3. The OSCE holds meetings to address emergency situations and allows a consensus minus one decision in specific circumstances. Following this approach, the ARF could organise meetings on an emergency basis and introduce a “consensus minus x” in its decision-making procedures.
4. The OSCE adopts a wide approach to CBMs that includes the issue of arms control in Europe. The ARF could endorse a broader vision of CBMs that includes areas beyond the military issues currently addressed. As noted earlier, the Forum ought to consider adopting constraining CBMs. Furthermore, a group meeting of Experts or Eminent Persons could be organised to promote arms control in the Asia-Pacific.
5. Like the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the ARF could establish a unit to deal with conflict prevention and risk reduction. Such a unit can institutionalise activities such as fact-finding and good offices missions as part of its mandate.
6. Based on the European experience, the ARF could formulate a set of norms that ensures the security of minority populations while discouraging secessionist aspirations.

Regional groups in the Americas, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and MERCOSUR, have imitated the OSCE or EU practice of stipulating as membership criteria a democratic polity. They have also provided mechanisms for multilateral mediation and intervention in the event of democratic breakdowns or turnovers. In contrast, no regional body in Asia has developed norms concerning the protection of human rights and democracy. Nor is there any Asian regional human rights body similar to those in Europe or even in the Americas.

The above point raises crucial questions about the materialist and/or ideational bases—or simply put, the interests, ideas and/or identity—for Asia-Pacific multilateral security. If economic interdependence serves as the basis for regional security and therefore a disincentive for war, then initiatives to restart the ARF will likely be hampered until Asia-Pacific economic relations pick up again, whether powered by the Chinese economic engine or a revitalised Japanese economy, or a combination of both. In this respect, the rationale for ASEAN+3 is strengthened.

Even then, such a scenario becomes complicated rather quickly because economic development and growth in the Asia-Pacific promotes not only (or is the result of) economic interdependence, but it also enables potentially destabilising arms modernisation and build-up programmes. Further, if proponents of the so-called “democratic peace” notion are right, then the absence of democratic norms in the Asia-Pacific multilateral experience would either mean one less foundation on which regional security can be established, or one less palliative for lubricating potentially destabilising situations.

8

AGENDA FOR PROGRESS
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Rethinking and institutional adjustments are necessary if the ARF is to count as a pillar of Asia-Pacific security. Drawing on the work by IDSS staff and our consultations with ARF specialists, we present 12 proposals to strengthen the ARF.¹

Recommendation 1

The ARF should consider implementing measures that were outlined in Annex B of the 1995 Concept Paper.

Since its inception, the ARF has focused on developing CBMs. The first Annex to the 1995 Concept Paper contained 16 measures for implementation in the immediate timeframe and most of which have been implemented. Annex B contained 19 measures for exploration with a view to implementation in the longer time frame. A good start has been made with regard to many of these. However, several of these measures have not been fully developed. These include:

¹ These recommendations incorporate some of the ideas and suggestions originally developed by Barry Desker and Amitav Acharya. Recommendations 8 and 10 were originally presented by Amitav Acharya in a Paper presented at a conference in Hanoi organised by the Asia Europe Foundation in December 2001 and parts of Recommendation 2 concerning specific ways to revise the Concept Paper is based on his subsequent work on the ARF. These recommendations also form the basis for a CSCAP Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entitled “The ARF in the 21st Century”, drafted by Barry Desker (in his capacity as CSCAP Co-Chair) and IDSS for submission to the ARF.

- a. improving the drafting of the Annual Security Outlooks (ASOs) by creating a standard template and improving transparency in arms procurement data;
- b. making the annual meetings of the heads of defence colleges of ARF member countries more substantive and focused; and
- c. developing co-ordination and co-operation in natural disaster relief.

The ARF must further build those CBMs and preventive diplomacy proposals that are already agreed upon, but not fully implemented. It should “deepen” existing confidence-building efforts and proposed preventive diplomacy measures.

Recommendation 2

A panel of the ARF Experts Eminent Persons Group should undertake a review of the 1995 Concept Paper.

Since 1995, the Concept Paper has served as the de facto “road map” for the ARF. It envisaged three stages of co-operation: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”. Notwithstanding its usefulness, the Concept Paper needs to be infused with new ideas and modalities of co-operation, taking into account recent developments and challenges. The division of the ARF into three stages is somewhat arbitrary and there is considerable overlap between the stages. The use of concepts with political baggage, such as preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution (the original term for what became “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”) has created much debate and misunderstanding that could have been avoided. There is a need to consider whether “conflict prevention” as defined by the UN Secretary-General’s recent report might be appropriate for the ARF’s objectives and action. The existing Concept Paper gives no sense of whether the ARF should have a role in peace-building activities (both pre-conflict and post-conflict), which are vital to the maintenance of regional peace and stability. While many elements of the existing Concept Paper could be retained, the revised Concept Paper could envisage two broad categories of security approaches: (i) confidence-building and conflict prevention, and (ii) peace-making and peace-building.

Recommendation 3

The ARF should encourage frank and constructive exchange of views, and not ignore contentious issues or “sweep them under the carpet”.

Avoiding discussion of contentious intra-mural issues and “sweeping conflicts under the carpet” has been a long-standing practice in ASEAN. ASEAN’s approach seeks consensus and compromise, that is, the “ASEAN Way”. The ARF has followed this tradition. But there is a need for the ARF members to engage in frank and constructive exchanges of views. While observing the norm of politeness, ARF members should express their concerns and differences so that positions may be clarified and a better understanding of divergent perspectives could arise. They should be prepared to accept divergent analyses and agree to disagree where there are fundamental differences of views. The process of engagement and of attempting to understand divergent views is constructive.

Recommendation 4

The ARF should pursue a thematic and problem-oriented agenda.

The ARF is itself a confidence-building measure but it needs to develop some problem-solving approaches in order to implement its agenda. For example, the ARF has adopted three papers on preventive diplomacy: “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy”, “Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair” and “Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs)” (see Appendices 3, 4 and 5). However, implementation of these and other measures of preventive diplomacy requires the ARF to move from an exchange of views and adopt a more problem-solving mindset.

To this end, the ISG meetings could deal with more specific themes and issues related to challenges to regional security. Such thematic discussion would lead to more focused exchanges of views and the building of an agenda

for regional security co-operation. Co-ordination and linkage between ISG, SOM and ministerial meetings could be improved. The establishment of an ARF secretariat could facilitate such linkage.

Recommendation 5

The ARF should establish a Secretariat.

The ARF as constituted now is too loose and informal. There is a growing realisation among members that the lack of institutionalisation may be undermining its credibility. The ARF should seriously consider establishing a Secretariat. One approach could be to co-locate it with the APEC Secretariat. This would encourage an increasingly symbiotic relationship between these two key institutions for co-operative regional security and regional economic integration. Another approach could be to co-locate it with the ASEAN Secretariat. Alternatively, in lieu of an actual Secretariat, the ARF can construct a “virtual” Secretariat in cyberspace that, for all intents and purposes, serves the same function until member nations agree to establish a real one. This virtual Secretariat can either be based in Jakarta or in any member country that wishes to host it.

The ARF Secretariat, headed by a Co-ordinator, should be entrusted with the following tasks: serving as the main depository of ARF documents, maintenance of an official ARF website, improving co-ordination between various ARF meetings, serving as a point of contact and co-ordination between the ARF and the UN and other regional organisations such as the EU. Other possible tasks could include housing a Risk Reduction Centre, organising specialised conferences and workshops on important security issues such as migration, terrorism and transnational crime, acting as a clearing house for public documentation about the foreign policy and national security policies of ARF member states, and as a clearing house for the schedules and reports of security dialogues organised on a Track II basis in the region.

Recommendation 6

Introduce greater flexibility in the relationship between the ARF Chair and the ASEAN Chair.

Chairing meetings of the ASEAN Standing Committee, including hosting the AMM followed by the PMC and ARF meetings, can be major challenges for a number of ASEAN countries. One option would be to leave it to the ASEAN Chair to decide whether it also wants to chair the ARF. If it does not want to do both tasks, then it should be allowed to do so and another ASEAN member could be asked to take over the ARF Chairmanship. In that case, the ARF meeting might be moved to the ARF Chair's own country. Such flexibility would allow those countries with greater resources and political will to move the ARF process forward. Another way of introducing greater flexibility to the ARF process would be to introduce a co-chair system for the Forum. Whilst meetings of the ARF would continue to be held in an ASEAN country, future ARF meetings could be co-chaired by a non-ASEAN ARF member. This would extend a principle of de-synchronising the ARF Chair—a principle already applied in the ISG, which is co-chaired by a non-ASEAN member. The effect would be to lock in the participation of the major or middle powers as well as give them a greater stake in the ARF process. The objective would be to build a commitment to the ARF as well as a better understanding of the evolving character of the ARF, especially amongst Western powers whose leaderships may change rapidly after domestic elections.

Recommendation 7

The ARF should set up a Risk Reduction Centre (RRC).

Providing the ARF Chair or panel of Experts/Eminent Persons with research support and expertise is a fundamental requirement for successful co-operation. The ARF will eventually need to consider some form of Risk Reduction Centre that can provide the ARF Chair and eminent persons the data and relevant information they will need to perform their functions. Such a centre, as noted in Recommendation 5, could be located within the

ARF Secretariat. But until an ARF Secretariat is established, such a centre could be set up in a member state, perhaps within a think tank. The aim of the RRC would be to co-ordinate with national governments, NGOs and UN agencies in collecting and analysing early warning information. The unit should function as a network. ARF members should designate various agencies within their own governments to provide information on conflicts as a matter of self-reporting. The ARF Chair will be able to call upon the RRC for information on any significant development in ongoing and emerging armed conflicts as and when needed.

Recommendation 8

The ARF should build closer relationships with the United Nations.

The past decade has seen a growing demand for regional organisations to develop closer working relations with the UN, especially with the holding of three meetings between the UN Secretary General and representatives of regional organisations. Since 2000, the rotating ARF Chairs have initiated informal contacts with the United Nations. Building on these initiatives, the ARF should foster closer relationships with the United Nations. In tandem with the formation of an ARF Risk Reduction Centre (see Recommendation 7), the Forum could also benefit significantly by developing programmes that draw upon the UN's expertise and resources, especially in the emerging paradigm of conflict prevention. For example, the ARF could learn from the UN's efforts to develop early warning capabilities. The ARF's preventive diplomacy agenda envisaged early warning, but no action to this end has been undertaken to date. Various agencies of the UN, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), are now engaged in developing early warning indicators. Although these are for internal purposes only, modalities for information-sharing can be arranged. Furthermore, ARF members could ask the UN to help organise a regional equivalent of its training course on "Early Warning and Preventive Measures: Building United Nations Capacity". As with the case of the UN training course, such regional workshops would be geared to developing "home-grown" strategies for conflict prevention and to offer tools and techniques specifically designed to meet the needs of member states.

Recommendation 9

The ARF should promote enhanced defence participation.

The ARF should consider holding meetings (either separate or joint) of senior officials of the defence ministries, possibly at the ministerial level, concurrently with the meetings of the foreign ministers. At the present time, there is a meeting of defence officials over lunch during the ARF. However, it would be useful to raise the level of defence involvement in the ARF process. Exposure of defence officials to the norms of co-operative security and engagement in the process of dialogue and discussion would create an awareness of the changing global and regional security environment. The objective would be to reduce the risk of misperception or misjudgement as well as creating a momentum for co-operative security endeavours, including consideration of measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict and tensions.

These gatherings can be used to explore and promote practical co-operative measures. One possibility is to conduct a half-day Map Exercise involving an accident by or hijacking of a vessel in some part of the region (such as the Malacca Straits) to demonstrate the co-operative aspect of the search and rescue efforts involved.

Eventually, there could be the convening of meetings of senior defence officials, possibly at the ministerial level, of the ARF.² It should stimulate consideration of practical ways to develop defence co-operation among members. It would make an important statement about the growing maturity of the multilateral security dialogue and confidence in the region. A senior defence officials meeting could produce greater appreciation of the interdependence of Asia-Pacific states in security terms. It would nudge the ARF as a whole towards more substantive consideration of security issues, and encourage more focused and coherent implementation of its CBM agenda. Such a meeting could also create modalities for interaction among the armed forces of the member states in areas such as peacekeeping.

Recommendation 10

The ARF should develop closer networking with other regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific.

In developing a broader agenda for conflict prevention and security cooperation, the ARF should network with other regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC and the emerging ASEAN+3 framework. An annual meeting involving the UN's regional offices in Asia and these other regional bodies should be held to discuss and implement conflict prevention strategies. An example of this can be found in Europe.

Recommendation 11

The ARF should pay more attention to transnational security issues, especially terrorism. It should create a special ARF task force on terrorism.

At the 8th ARF meeting in Hanoi in July 2001, transnational security issues emerged as the Forum's principal area of interest. There was some discussion of "traditional" security issues, including the Korean peninsula, non-proliferation of WMD and the South China Sea dispute. However, the meeting identified transnational crimes as the critical issue facing the ARF. These crimes included piracy, illicit trafficking in small arms, illegal migrations, money laundering, terrorism and cyber crime.

2 We are grateful to Ron Huisken, Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University, for sharing his thoughts and proposals concerning a defence ministers meeting for the ARF.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. occurred after the ARF had held its annual session. However, an ARF ISG in New Delhi in January 2002 did discuss terrorism and Thailand recently hosted an ARF Workshop on the prevention of terrorism. The ARF should strive to arrive at a common understanding of terrorism, and develop norms and modalities of co-operation in combating terrorism. To this end, a task force on terrorism comprising a number of member states and some experts should be established.

A special ARF task force on terrorism can play an important part in the struggle against international terrorism. The ARF needs to formulate a comprehensive strategy to combat the problem in the Asia-Pacific region. The member states should start by declaring their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all acts of terrorism.³ They need then to discuss the root causes of terrorism, the technological challenges posed by the new terrorists and ways to respond to terrorist threats. An ARF task force on terrorism should be created to step up regional co-operation and co-ordination and introduce a series of socio-economic, coercive, political and technical measures. The task force should seek to develop more effective intelligence sharing, improve co-operation among law enforcement agencies, enhance co-ordination on border and visa systems, increase the technological capabilities of the less developed members, and share information on identity fraud and counterfeit documentation. The ARF states also need to combat the financing of terrorism by freezing and confiscating terrorist assets, reporting suspicious transactions and fighting against money laundering. In due course, this task force can either be linked to or evolve into an ARF Inter-sessional Group (ISG) focusing on counter-terrorism.

3 See, for example, the statements and measures adopted by the ASEAN states through the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 Nov 2001 (see Appendix 7) and the Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 20–21 May 2002 (see Appendix 8).

Recommendation 12

The ARF should strengthen links with Track II forums.

The second track process provides a mechanism for developing ideas that can be utilised to promote regional security co-operation. However, its contribution to Track I would depend on the effectiveness of the linkages between them. At present, the principal Track II forum for security issues in the Asia-Pacific is the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). The CSCAP has no official standing with the ARF but many of CSCAP's dialogues and recommendations are of direct and immediate relevance to the ARF. The ARF should set aside some time during its annual SOM to consider CSCAP's recommendations regarding security co-operation.

The first track should provide clear guidelines regarding its preoccupations on which it would welcome new approaches and thinking. Analysts on the second track must be better acquainted with real-world issues defined by policymakers. However, Track I must be receptive to the work of Track II and how theoretical work can provide breakthrough ideas. This will involve a change of attitude in official establishments. There should be a close working relationship (without excessive overlap) between the CSCAP leadership and members of the newly created group of ARF Experts/Eminent Persons. The latter should comprise people with expertise on specific issue areas who could be nominated to the group depending on the issue area.

Recent years have seen the emergence of "Track III" actors—non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other grassroots advocacy groups that operate both domestically as well as transnationally. Track II can serve as the conduit through which third track concerns can be brought to the attention of the first track. Efforts by Track III to directly approach Track I may prove counterproductive, given the mistrust that has long existed between governments and certain civil society groups in many Asia-Pacific countries. In this respect, the first track should encourage the third track to use Track II groupings, such as the ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP, for liaison purposes.

9

CONCLUSION

This report reassesses the relevance of the multilateral approach to security in the Asia-Pacific, with a specific focus on the ARF. Multilateralism is no panacea for all of the region's troubles. Indeed, the pursuit of multilateralism has brought to the surface differences and conflicts among Asia-Pacific countries. Bilateralism and unilateralism remains alive and well in Asia-Pacific security relations and approaches. Multilateral security co-operation in the ARF, comprising CBMs and preventive diplomacy, is an incremental, even laborious, process shaped by the interests and wills of ARF members.

The ARF process has seen some modest advances in helping to socialise the more intractable among its members concerning the wider interests of the region as a whole. But making the ARF a relevant and effective security institution requires us to look beyond its current profile as merely a forum for the exchange of views. This minimalist framework served the Forum with divergent member interests reasonably well. However, in the wake of the difficulties that have plagued the region, the existing framework has been shown to be deficient. Anything less would likely spell trouble for the Forum and jeopardise multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific, the only of its kind in a region unparalleled in terms of its vast "geographical footprint". At best, the ARF would be consigned to irrelevance. At worst, the entire process might simply unravel towards an unwarranted demise. A more robust institutionalisation is needed, backed by a problem-solving mindset and approach. No longer can the ARF afford,

as a recent editorial put it, to “remain diffident [to] the more purposeful area of preventive diplomacy.”¹ To this end, we hope the “Agenda for Progress” contained in this report could be a helpful starting point of debate and initiative.

1 See “ARF Security in Numbers” in The Straits Times Opinion/Editorial, 11 Apr 1996; also available online at <http://asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/pages/stopin1.html>.

APPENDIX 1

MECHANISMS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING & CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OF OTHER REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

THE AMERICAS

Organization of American States (OAS)

The Organization of American States (OAS) was founded in 1948 as a collective security arrangement. Under its charter, the OAS is mandated to focus on dispute settlement and conflict management in the Western hemisphere. The organisation consists of different bodies that include: a General Assembly, the Permanent Council, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the General Secretariat. According to the Rio Pact of 1947, the Meeting of Consultation is entitled to use diplomatic, economic and military sanctions to re-establish or maintain regional peace. Since its creation, the OAS has also implemented confidence-building measures, promoted the peaceful settlement of disputes and organised mediation and peacekeeping activities. It carried out its first peacekeeping operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it took part in the Central American Peace Process. Working together with the United Nations, the OAS helped monitor elections and demobilise military forces in Nicaragua and supervised the reconciliation process in El Salvador. It monitored elections in Haiti in December 1990 and imposed economic sanctions against that country after the coup d'état against its President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

MERCOSUR

MERCOSUR was created by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 and resulted from an initiative by Argentina and Brazil. Its members are Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The purpose of inter-state co-operation in the Southern Cone is to promote economic stability and growth, to consolidate recently re-established democracies and to increase the level of confidence and trust in regional relations. At the economic level, a regional common market has been constituted since January 1995. MERCOSUR has also focused on regional peace and security. It has implemented a series of confidence-building and arms-control measures and it has helped to resolve or ease some border disputes. As a result, MERCOSUR has contributed to the growth of political consultation and the decline of military spending in the Southern Cone.

AFRICA

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in May 1963 by the Addis Ababa Charter to promote African co-operation, solidarity and unity. The founding charter stresses the respect for national sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. The original objective was to peacefully preserve the state structure and the existing frontiers in Africa. In the early 1980s, the OAU sent a peacekeeping force to Chad but failed to impose a ceasefire in the country. The activities of the OAU in the field of conflict management have generally focused on mediation and good offices. At the Cairo Summit of 1993, the Heads of State and Government of the African countries adopted a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Within this Mechanism, the OAU concentrates on conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-building. This structure has had some success in the case of the Eritrea-Ethiopia War and observer groups and preventive diplomatic missions have been sent to Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and other African states.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a sub-regional organisation set up in 1992 to address regional economic and security issues. The SADC relies on a set of principles, namely, the respect for national sovereignty, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the observance of the rule of law, human rights and democracy. Its member states are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mauritius. In 1993, the members introduced the SADC Framework and Strategy for Building the Community. This framework adopts a broad approach to security and calls for a reduction in military budgets. At the Maseru Summit of June 1996, the heads of state agreed to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Security, and Defence. The Organ works on the application of preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation, conflict resolution and a series of other measures. Its central focus is on confidence-building and preventive action. The Inter-State Defence and Security Community is the main structure of the SADC Organ and consists of ministerial committees and subcommittees on defence, policing and intelligence.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975, with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. Its aim is to enhance trade and co-operation in West Africa. Its member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The institutional structure consists of a yearly conference of heads of state and government and a bi-yearly council of ministers. The Treaty of Lagos makes no reference to collective security or peacekeeping. Still, ECOWAS adopted in 1978 a Non-Aggression Pact and in 1981 a Mutual Defence Pact. In 1990, ECOWAS decided to intervene in the Liberian crisis and set up the Standing Mediation Committee as well as the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Carried out by ECOMOG, the ECOWAS Peace Plan called for the implementation of a ceasefire, the formation of an interim government and the holding of national elections. ECOMOG failed to impose a ceasefire and rapidly became a peace enforcement operation. The Liberian conflict ended in 1996 and elections were held in July 1997 under ECOMOG supervision.

EUROPE

European Union (EU)

Founded in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, the European Union (EU) has evolved into a unique and complex institutional structure. It consists of inter-governmental and supra-national bodies that include the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank. The activities of the EU are varied and include a common agricultural policy, an economic and monetary policy, external relations, humanitarian aid and recently, a foreign and security policy. The EU has successfully established a Single European Market and a single European currency. The enlargement of the EU and the implementation of a common defence policy are some of the challenges currently faced by the Union.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 as the military and institutional structure of the North Atlantic Treaty. Based on collective security, NATO defended Western Europe from the Soviet bloc. The Council is the supreme body of the alliance and consists of permanent representatives from each member state. It implements the provisions of the Treaty. NATO activities are organised by its Secretariat in Brussels. In addition to its military dimension, NATO has established numerous committees and agencies that deal with the settlement of disputes, foreign policy consultation, economic co-operation, human rights and other issues. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has had to redefine its political and military objectives. While still a collective defence arrangement, it has become a peacekeeping and co-operative body. It intervened militarily in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and has deployed long-term peacekeeping missions in the Balkans.

MIDDLE EAST

The League of Arab States

The League of Arab States was established in March 1945 to enhance Arab unity and ensure the independence and national sovereignty of the Arab states. Through the vehicle of diplomatic dialogue, the Arab League seeks to

improve inter-state relations, reduce feelings of suspicion and co-ordinate policies. The Council, which is the supreme body of the Arab League, offers provisions for mediation, consultation, and dispute resolution. Yet, the Council has only the right to address disputes when the parties involved have agreed to present the matter to the League. Moreover, the latter does not dispose over specific procedures to resolve regional disputes. The League of Arab States may also operate as a collective security arrangement. If an Arab state is attacked, the Council can in the case of a unanimous vote decide on the kind of measures required to restore the national sovereignty of the member state. The Arab League has some experience in organising peacekeeping operations. It authorised a peacekeeping force to intervene in the Kuwait crisis of 1961 and in Lebanon in 1976.

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was founded in 1981 to promote co-ordination and deepen relations between the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. Consisting of the heads of states, the Supreme Council is the central authority of the GCC and meets once a year. The institutional structure of the GCC also involves a Ministerial Meeting composed of foreign affairs ministers, a Consultative Commission and a Commission for the Settlement of Disputes that operates on an ad-hoc basis. The areas of co-operation include foreign policy, military and security issues, economics and finance. At the military level, the GCC created the Peninsula Shield Force in 1982 and an early-warning communication network in 1997. Internal security co-operation, involving the sharing of intelligence, has also been achieved among the GCC states.

Table of Best Practices

Organisations: Organization of American States (OAS), Mercosur, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), League of Arab States, Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)

Institutional mechanisms: Preventive Diplomacy (PD), Peacekeeping Force (PF), Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSMs), Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), Minority Protection (MP), Democracy and Human Rights (DHR), Collective Security (CS)

Options: used/not used, formal/informal, ad hoc/permanent

Organisations	Institutional mechanisms						
	PD	PF	DSMs	CBMs	MP	DHR	CS
OAS	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Not used	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.
Mercosur	Used formal ad hoc	Not used	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Not used	Used formal ad hoc	Not used
OAU	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Not used	Not used	Not used
SADC	Used formal perm.	Not used	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Not used	Not used	Not used
ECOWAS	Used informal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Not used	Used informal ad hoc	Not used	Not used	Used formal perm.
OSCE	Used formal perm.	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Not used
EU	Used formal ad hoc	Not used	Used formal perm.	Used formal perm.	Used formal perm.	Used formal perm.	Not used
NATO	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal perm.	Used formal perm.
Arab League	Used informal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used formal ad hoc	Used informal ad hoc	Not used	Not used	Used formal perm.
GCC	Used informal ad hoc	Not used	Used formal ad hoc	Used informal ad hoc	Not used	Not used	Used formal perm.

APPENDIX 2

THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: A CONCEPT PAPER 18 MARCH 1995

Introduction

1. The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. For the first time in a century or more, the guns are virtually silent. There is a growing trend among the states in the region to enhance dialogue on political and security co-operation. The Asia-Pacific is also the most dynamic region of the world in terms of economic growth. The centre of the world's economic gravity is shifting into the region. The main challenge of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity.
2. This is not an easy challenge. The region has experienced some of the most disastrous wars of the twentieth century. It is also a remarkably diverse region where big and small countries co-exist. They differ significantly in levels of development. There are cultural, ethnic, religious and historical differences to overcome. Habits of co-operation are not deep-seated in some parts of the region.
3. ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in the ARF. It has a demonstrable record of enhancing regional co-operation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. It has also fostered habits of co-operation and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional co-operation in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings have contributed significantly to the positive regional environment today. There would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants.

4. Although ASEAN has undertaken the obligation to be the primary driving force of the ARF, a successful ARF requires the active participation and co-operation of all participants. ASEAN must always be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF participants.

The Challenges

5. To successfully preserve and enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, the ARF must dispassionately analyse the key challenges facing the region. Firstly, it should acknowledge that periods of rapid economic growth are often accompanied by significant shifts in power relations. This can lead to conflict. The ARF will have to carefully manage these transitions to preserve the peace. Secondly, the region is remarkably diverse. The ARF should recognise and accept the different approaches to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues. Thirdly, the region has a residue of unresolved territorial and other differences. Any one of these could spark a conflagration that could undermine the peace and prosperity of the region. Over time the ARF will have to gradually defuse these potential problems.
6. It would be unwise for a young and fragile process like the ARF to tackle all these challenges simultaneously. A gradual evolutionary approach is required. This evolution can take place in three stages:
Stage I – Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures
Stage II – Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms
Stage III – Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
7. The participants of the first ARF Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 agreed on “the need to develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region”. In its initial phase, the ARF should therefore concentrate on enhancing the trust and confidence amongst its participants and thereby foster a regional environment conducive to maintaining the peace and prosperity of the region.

Stage I – Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures

8. In promoting confidence-building measures, the ARF may adopt two complementary approaches. The first approach derives from ASEAN’s experience, which provides a valuable and proven guide for the ARF. ASEAN has succeeded in reducing tensions among

its member states, promoting regional co-operation and creating a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity without the implementation of explicit confidence-building measures, achieving conditions approximating those envisaged in the Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The concepts of ZOPFAN and its essential component, the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), are significantly contributing to regional peace and stability. ASEAN's well established practices of consultation and consensus (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*) have been significantly enhanced by the regular exchanges of high-level visits among ASEAN countries. This pattern of regular visits has effectively developed into a preventive diplomacy channel. In the Asian context, there is some merit to the ASEAN approach. It emphasises the need to develop trust and confidence among neighbouring states.

9. The principles of good neighbourliness, which are elaborated in the concept of ZOPFAN, are enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia (TAC). One simple concrete way of expanding the ASEAN experience is to encourage the ARF participants to associate themselves with the TAC. It is significant that the first ARF meeting in Bangkok agreed to “endorse the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security co-operation”.
10. The second approach is the implementation of concrete confidence-building measures. The first ARF meeting in Bangkok entrusted the next Chairman of the ARF, Brunei Darussalam, to study all the ideas presented by ARF participants and to also study other relevant internationally recognised norms, principles and practices. After extensive consultations, the ASEAN countries have prepared two lists of confidence-building measures. The first list (Annex A) spells out measures which can be explored and implemented by ARF participants in the immediate future. The second list (Annex B) is an indicative list of other proposals which can be explored over the medium and long-term by ARF participants and also considered in the immediate future by the Track Two process. These lists include possible preventive diplomacy and other measures.
11. Given the delicate nature of many of the subjects being considered by the ARF, there is merit in moving the ARF process along two tracks. Track One activities will be carried out by ARF governments.

Track Two activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-government organisations in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. To be meaningful and relevant, the Track Two activities may focus, as much as possible, on the current concerns of the ARF. The synergy between the two tracks would contribute greatly to confidence-building measures in the region. Over time, these Track Two activities should result in the creation of a sense of community among participants of those activities.

Moving Beyond Stage I

12. There remains a residue of unresolved territorial and other disputes that could be sources of tension or conflict. If the ARF is to become, over time, a meaningful vehicle to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, it will have to demonstrate that it is a relevant instrument to be used in the event that a crisis or problem emerges. The ARF meeting in Bangkok demonstrated this by taking a stand on the Korean issue at the very first meeting. This was a signal that the ARF is ready to address any challenge to the peace and security of the region.
13. Over time, the ARF must develop its own mechanisms to carry out preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. In doing so, the ARF will face unique challenges. There are no established roads or procedures for it to follow. Without a high degree of confidence among ARF participants, it is unlikely that they will agree to the establishment of mechanisms which are perceived to be intrusive and/or autonomous. This is a political reality the ARF should recognise. However, it would be useful in the initial phase for the Track Two process to consider and investigate a variety of preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution mechanisms. A good start was made with the three workshops organised by the Intentional Studies Centre (Thailand) and Institute of Policy Studies (Singapore) on ASEAN-UN Co-operation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy, and the Indonesia-sponsored series of workshops on the South China Sea.

Stage II – Development of Preventive Diplomacy

14. Preventive diplomacy would be a natural follow-up to confidence-building measures. Some suggestions for preventive diplomacy measures are spelled out in Annex A and Annex B.

Stage III – Conflict Resolution

15. It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms for conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.

Organisation of ARF Activities

16. There shall be an annual ARF Ministerial Meeting in an ASEAN capital just after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The host country will chair the meeting. The incoming Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee will chair all inter-sessional Track One activities of the ARF.
17. The ARF shall be appraised of all Track Two activities through the current Chairman of the Track One activities, who will be the main link between Track One and Track Two activities.
18. In the initial phase of the ARF, no institutionalisation is expected. Nor should a Secretariat be established in the near future. ASEAN shall be the repository of all ARF documents and information and provide the necessary support to sustain ARF activities.
19. The participants of the ARF comprise the ASEAN member states, the observers, and consultative and dialogue partners of ASEAN. Applications to participate in the ARF shall be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants.
20. The rules of procedure of ARF meetings shall be based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices. Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultations. No voting will take place. In accordance with prevailing ASEAN practices, the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee shall provide the secretarial support and co-ordinate ARF activities.
21. The ARF should also progress at a pace comfortable to all participants. The ARF should not move “too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast”.

Conclusion

22. ARF participants should not assume that the success of the ARF can be taken for granted. ASEAN's experience shows that success is a result of hard work and careful adherence to the rule of consensus. ARF participants will have to work equally hard and be equally sensitive to ensure that the ARF process stays on track
23. The ARF must be accepted as a "sui generis" organisation. It has no established precedents to follow. A great deal of innovation and ingenuity will be required to keep the ARF moving forward while at the same time ensure that it enjoys the support of its diverse participants. This is a major challenge both for the ASEAN countries and other ARF participants. The UN Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace" has recognised that "just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of co-operative work and its division of labour must adjust to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity".

ANNEX A TO THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: A CONCEPT PAPER

I. Confidence-Building Measures

Principles

1. The development of a set of basic principles to ensure a common understanding and approach to inter-state relations in the region; and
2. Adoption of comprehensive approaches to security.

Transparency

3. Dialogue on security perceptions, including voluntary statements defence policy positions;
4. Defence Publications such as Defence White Papers or equivalent documents as considered necessary by respective governments;
5. Participation in UN Conventional Arms Register;
6. Enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities;
7. Exchanges between military academics, staff colleges and training;
8. Observers at military exercises, on a voluntary basis; and
9. Annual seminar for defence officials and military officers on selected international security issues.

II. Preventive Diplomacy

1. Develop a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes, taking into account the principles in the UN Charter and the TAC;
2. Promote the recognition acceptance of the purposes and principles of the TAC and its provisions for the Pacific settlement of disputes, as endorsed by the UNGA in Resolution 47/53 (B) on 9 December 1992; and
3. Seek the endorsement of other countries for the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in order to strengthen its political and moral effect (as endorsed by the Programme of Action for ZOPFAN).

III. Non-proliferation and Arms Control

1. Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).

IV. Peacekeeping

1. Seminars/Workshops on peacekeeping issues; and
2. Exchange of information and experience relating to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

V. Maritime Security Co-operation

1. Disaster Prevention

ANNEX B TO THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: A CONCEPT PAPER

I. Confidence-Building Measures

1. Further exploration of a Regional Arms Register;
2. Regional security studies centre/co-ordination of existing security activities;
3. Maritime information databases;
4. Co-operative approaches to sea lines of communication, beginning with exchanges of information and training in such areas as search and rescue, piracy and drug control;
5. Mechanisms to mobilize relief assistance in the event of natural disasters;
6. Establishment of zones of co-operation in areas such as the South China Sea;
7. Systems of prior notification of major military deployments that have region-wide application; and
8. Encourage arms manufacturers and suppliers to disclose the destination of their arms exports.

II. Preventive Diplomacy

1. Explore and devise ways and means to prevent conflict;
2. Explore the idea of appointing Special Representatives, in consultation with ARF members, to undertake fact-finding missions at the request of the parties involved to an issue, and to offer their good offices, as necessary; and

3. Explore the idea of establishing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre as suggested by the UN Secretary-General in his “An Agenda for Peace” and as commended by UNGA Resolution 47/120 (see section IV, operative para 4). Such a centre could serve as a database for the exchange of information.

III. Non-proliferation and Arms Control

1. A regional or sub-regional arrangement agreeing not to acquire or deploy ballistic missiles.

IV. Peacekeeping

1. Explore the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping centre.

V. Maritime Security Co-operation

1. A multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents that apply to both local and external navies;
2. Sea Level/Climate Monitoring System;
3. Establishment of an ASEAN Relief and Assistance Force and a Maritime Safety (or Surveillance) Unit to look after the safety of the waters in the region;
4. Conventions on the Marine Environment
 - Dumping of Toxic Wastes
 - Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution;
5. Maritime surveillance; and
6. Explore the idea of joint marine scientific research.

APPENDIX 3

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

INTRODUCTION

1. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established by ASEAN in 1994 to maintain peace and stability in the region and to promote regional development and prosperity. It was recognised that rapid developments in the regional and global environment had impacted on the security and strategic concerns of countries in the region. It was also acknowledged that the region was remarkably diverse, and that there remained challenges to regional peace and prosperity.
2. The ARF sought to meet these challenges by putting into place a three-stage process—Stage 1 on promotion of Confidence-building Measures, Stage 2 on development of Preventive Diplomacy and Stage 3 on Elaboration of Approaches to Conflicts. It was generally recognised that the ARF would have to establish ‘itself, over time, as a meaningful forum to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region. To do so, the ARF process would have to adopt a gradual evolutionary approach, decision-making by consensus and move’ at a pace comfortable to all its members in order to achieve its long-term objectives. Discussions should be aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and trust among the Asia-Pacific countries, furthering their dialogue and co-operation, and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the region.
3. Much progress has been made over the past six years, a relative short time in the life of regional organisations. Constant interaction among Ministers and senior officials of the ARF members, and confidence

building measures that have been initiated, have helped to build up comfort levels. This has allowed for discussions among ARF members to be candid and frank, thereby encouraging greater transparency, mutual trust and understanding of each others concerns and positions. It was stressed that the confidence building would continue to be the main thrust of the whole ARF process, since it is impossible to move the ARF forward without a high degree of mutual understanding and trust among ARF participants.

4. Hence, at the 4th ARF, the Ministers instructed the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures (ISG on CBMs) to identify areas in the overlap between CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy, and ways and means of addressing them while maintaining the focus on CBMs. In addressing the issue of overlap, a common understanding on a working concept of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) and the principles governing its practice is necessary to provide a common basis on which to explore this overlap and to enhance confidence in the process. Pursuant to this, the Ministers at the 6th ARF in Singapore instructed the ISG on CBMs to further explore the overlap between CBMs and PD, focussing inter alia on the development of the concepts and principles of PD.

DEFINITION, CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF PD BY THE ARF

5. Agreement on the definition and, more importantly, a common understanding of the concept of PD and the principles governing the practice of PD, would be useful for further progress on the development of PD within the ARF. The definition of PD by the ARF sets out very broad objectives, and the concept would serve as a guide as to the approach to take, while the principles would serve as a guide as to fundamental parameters for the practice of PD in the ARF.
6. The definition, concept and principles of PD as agreed by ARF members are not legal obligations. They are shared perspectives that would apply only to the ARF and should be understood as representing the current status of an evolving consensus in the ARF as discussions continue. These discussions should be aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and trust among ARF members, take into account the actual conditions of the region and be consistent with basic principles of international law and established ARF processes.

DEFINITION OF PD

7. The definition of PD has proven to be controversial. However, there appears to be general consensus that PD is consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties:
 - to help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability;
 - to help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and
 - to help minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region.

CONCEPT OF PD

8. Much academic work has been done within this broad definition of PD, and various concepts have been suggested. We can view PD along a timeline in keeping with the objectives; to prevent disputes/conflicts between states from emerging, to prevent such disputes/conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation, and to prevent such disputes and conflicts from spreading. Some measures could be taken even before a crisis has actually arisen.
9. PD measures could include the following.
 - a. **Confidence Building Efforts**, i.e. efforts to build mutual trust and confidence between states. The successful application of PD has to be built upon continuous efforts to maintain and enhance trust and confidence. Without a high degree of trust among ARF participants, it is unlikely that PD in the later stages of any conflict can be carried out. While the ARF has succeeded in fostering dialogue among ARF members over the past few years, it is now time to look into strengthening the habit of co-operation. Co-operation among ARF members can pre-empt disputes as well as prevent disputes from developing into conflicts by enhancing trust and understanding.

- b. **Norms Building**, i.e. nurturing of accepted codes or norms of behaviour guiding the relationships among states in the Asia-Pacific region. To the extent that the codes enhance predictability and strengthen co-operative behaviour in ensuring regional peace, norms building enhances trust between and among states in the region. The ARF could consider measures in this area, such as developing a code of conduct governing relations among ARF members which is consistent with existing codes such as the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the UN Charter.
 - c. **Enhancing Channels of Communication**. Open, easy and direct communications or channels among ARF participants which serve to promote transparency with a view to avoid misperception or misunderstanding. Such channels would advance information-sharing, provide early warning and facilitate dialogue.
 - d. **Role of the ARF Chair**. The ARF Chair could play a role as determined by ARF members.
10. At the onset of a crisis, further measures could be considered as appropriate. The ARF should continue to consider possible further measures with a view to reaching consensus on them.

PRINCIPLES OF PD

11. Principles to guide the practice of PD are necessary to increase understanding of the scope and mechanisms of PD and to provide consistency and reasonable expectations of the process. In formulating and applying these principles, it would be useful to draw on the approach that has contributed to ASEAN's success and resilience. This includes the non-use of force in inter-state relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of members, pragmatism, flexibility and consensus, consultation accommodation.

12. The following are 8 key principles of PD, drawn mainly from discussions in CSCAP.
- It is about diplomacy. It relies on diplomatic and peaceful methods such as diplomacy, negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation.
 - It is non-coercive. Military action or the use of force are not part of PD.
 - It should be timely. Action is to be preventive, rather than curative. PD methods are most effectively employed at an early stage of a dispute or crisis.
 - It requires trust and confidence. PD can only be exercised successfully where there is a strong foundation of trust and confidence among the parties involved and when it is conducted on the basis of neutrality, justice and impartiality.
 - It operates on the basis of consultation and consensus. Any PD effort can only be carried out through consensus after careful and extensive consultation among ARF members, with due consideration for the need for timeliness.
 - It is voluntary, PD practices are to be employed only at the request of all the parties directly involved in the dispute and with their clear consent.
 - It applies to conflicts between and among States.
 - It is conducted in accordance with universally recognised basic principles of international law and inter-state relations embodied, inter alia, in the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the TAC. These include respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of a State.

CONCLUSION

13. The ARF's process should progress at a pace comfortable to all members on the basis of consensus. A step-by-step approach is needed to ensure consensual progress in order to secure the maintenance and continuing enhancement of commitment of all participants in the ARF process. We should seek to proceed with the possible while keeping an eye on what can be done in the longer term. For the ARF to further develop, it is important to achieve a common understanding and consensus on the concept, definition and principles of PD.

APPENDIX 4

ENHANCED ROLE OF THE ARF CHAIR

OBJECTIVE

The 6th Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in May 1999 agreed that the next ISG (1999–2000) would continue to explore the principles and procedures for an enhanced role for the ARF Chairman in good offices and co-ordination in between ARF meetings. The 6th Ministerial Meeting in July 1999 noted the common understandings reached on the four tabled proposals relating to the overlap between CBMs and PD. These common understandings include the above agreement at the SOM.

Consistent with this request, the ARF ISG on CBMs of the 1999–2000 inter-sessional year at its meeting in Tokyo in November 1999 discussed these roles and agreed that such a role for the ARF Chairman in liaising with external parties should be further encouraged as far as it was carried out informally with prior consultation with all ARF members and their consent. The ARF ISG meeting in Singapore in April 2000 had a substantive exchange of views on this issue. The meeting agreed that the ARF Chair could serve as a useful conduit for information-sharing in between ARF meetings, and that members could utilise this on a voluntary basis.

The 7th Ministerial Meeting in July 2000 requested the ISG to continue its work in exploring the overlaps between CBMs and PD, and strengthening the four CBM/PD overlap proposals already agreed upon, which include an enhanced role of the ARF Chair.

The aim of this paper is to help clarify and facilitate the ongoing discussions at the ISG on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair. The paper is mainly focused on the role of the ARF Chair in the CBM stage, and outlines principles and procedures that could serve as a basis for further discussions. These principles and procedures are shared perspectives that would apply only to the ARF and should be understood as representing the current status of an evolving consensus in the ARF as discussions continue.

1. PRINCIPLES

In accordance with universally recognised basic principles of international law and inter-state relations embodied, inter alia, in the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the TAC, including respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state, the Enhanced Roles of the ARF Chair in good offices and co-ordination in between ARF meetings are aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and promoting the continuity and efficiency of the ARF process.

2. ROLES AND PROCEDURES

- (1) Definition of the ARF Chair means the Minister for Foreign Affairs or its equivalent of the ARF Chair Country in the inter-sessional year. The ARF Chair could appoint a representative (such as the SOM Leader) to assist the Chair.
- (2) Roles
The ARF Chair could perform a role in good offices and/or a role in co-ordination in between ARF meetings which includes:
 - a) Promoting confidence building among ARF members by facilitating information exchange and dialogue between and among ARF members, such as by holding conferences and workshops.
 - b) Fostering co-operation between ARF members by facilitating discussion on potential areas of co-operation.
 - c) Facilitating discussion on norms building in the ARF to enhance mutual trust and understanding.

- d) Encouraging exchange of information and highlighting issues that can impact on regional security for consideration by the ARF by serving as a conduit for information sharing in between ARF meetings.
- e) Serving as a focal point for consultations among ARF members on the basis of consensus of all the ARF members. Upon prior consent of directly involved states and the consensus of all ARF members, the ARF Chair may convene an ad hoc meeting of all ARF members at an appropriate level.
- f) Liaising with external parties, such as heads of international organisations, and Track II organisations on an informal basis and with prior consultation with all ARF members and their consent.

(3) Mechanism to Support the ARF Chair

The ARF should discuss an appropriate mechanism to support the ARF Chair so that the Chair can carry out the roles in good offices and co-ordination in between ARF meetings smoothly and effectively. The following modalities of mechanism could be taken into consideration.

- a) The ARF Chair will be supported by the resources of its country as is the current practice.
- b) The ARF Chair could draw on the expertise and resources of other ARF member(s). In this context, particular attention should be paid to the need to ensure effective continuity during a transition period of chairmanship.
- c) The ARF Chair could call upon the Experts and Eminent Persons (EEP) to provide their views on issues of relevance to their expertise in accordance with the Terms of Reference of EEP to be established with the consensus of all ARF members.
- d) The ARF Chair could draw on the expertise and resources of external parties and Track II organisations as far as this was undertaken informally with consent of ARF members.

(4) Reporting

The ARF Chair should report to all ARF members on its activities in a timely manner.

APPENDIX 5

CO-CHAIRS' PAPER ON THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE ARF EXPERTS/EMINENT PERSONS (EEPs)

The 7th ARF Senior Officials' Meeting in May 2000 agreed that "the ARF proceed with collating nominations of Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs) for the Register on a voluntary basis for submission. However, discussions on the terms of reference for the use of the Register would continue in the next inter-sessional year." The 7th ARF Ministerial Meeting in July 2000 also agreed that "pending further discussions and agreement on the terms of reference for the Register, the ARF participants proceed with collating nominations of Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs) for the Register on a voluntary basis with the ARF Chair serving as a focal point."

Consistent with this request, the ARF ISG on CBMs of the 2000/2001 inter-sessional year should continue discussions on the terms of reference for the use of the Register while ARF participants forward the list of their EEPs for the Register on a voluntary basis. The purpose of this paper is to generate further exchange of views among ARF participants on the development of an appropriate draft Terms of Reference for the EEPs.

- (1) Nomination on Experts/Eminent Persons
 - a) Each ARF participant can nominate, on a voluntary basis, up to five Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs), after having obtained their consent.
 - b) Each ARF participant may only nominate its own nationals to the Register. (In the case of the EU, it may nominate EEPs holding the nationality of any EU country). An ARF participant cannot veto the nominees of another ARF participant.

-
- (2) Contents of the Register
 - a) The Register should contain the following information on each EEP: name, nationality, contact details (address, phone/fax numbers, e-mail address, etc.), curriculum vitae, areas of expertise, as well as any additional information deemed relevant.

 - (3) Management of the Register
 - a) The ARF Chair will manage the Register throughout each intersessional year. Copies of the Register should be made available during meetings of the ARF SOM and upon the request of any ARF participant.
 - b) ARF participants should keep the ARF Chair informed of any changes in the information regarding their respective nominees including the addition and/or withdrawal of an EEP. The ARF Chair will then update the Register accordingly.

 - (4) Scope and Procedure for Activities of the EEPs
 - a) The EEPs may provide non-binding and professional views or recommendations to the ARF participants, when they are requested to undertake in-depth studies and researches or serve as resource persons in ARF meetings on issues of relevance to their expertise.
 - b) The ARF Chair or any ARF participant may propose to activate the EEPs for the above-mentioned tasks. Such proposals will be collected by the ARF Chair and circulated to all ARF participants. In the absence of any objection from concerned ARF participants, the proposals will be put into effect.
 - c) The activities and findings/results of the EEPs should be reported to the ARF Chair which would share it with all ARF participants. In this regard, the EEPs should be informed in advance on the way their findings/results will be used by the ARF chair or ARF participants.

(5) Funding

- a) The ARF participants that engage the services of the EEPs will bear the costs involved.
- b) In the event that the EEPs are commissioned for a task by the initiative of the ARF Chair, the Chair may mobilise voluntary contributions from ARF participants. The modality of funding should be indicated in the proposals.

(6) Future Review of the Terms of Reference

- a) These Terms of Reference for the use of the Register of EEPs will be reviewed for possible amendments and revisions when and if the need arises in the future. Any amendments and revisions shall be made on the basis of consensus of all ARF members.

APPENDIX 6

APEC LEADERS STATEMENT ON COUNTER-TERRORISM SHANGHAI, 21 OCTOBER 2001

1. Leaders unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and express their deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims of a large number of nationalities and their families and to the people and Government of the United States of America.
2. Leaders consider the murderous deeds as well as other terrorist acts in all forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever as a profound threat to the peace, prosperity and security of all people, of all faiths, of all nations. Terrorism is also a direct challenge to APEC's vision of free, open and prosperous economies, and to the fundamental values that APEC members hold.
3. Leaders reaffirm that it is more important than ever for every economy to forge ahead in its commitment in achieving Boger's goal of free, open trade and investment.
4. Leaders deem it imperative to strengthen international co-operation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that UN should play a major role in this regard, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions.

5. Leaders commit to prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in the future in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, pledge to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373 faithfully and immediately, strongly support all efforts to strengthen the international anti-terrorism regime, call for increased co-operation to bring perpetrators to justice, and also call for early signing and ratification of all basic universal anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

6. Leaders are determined to enhance counter-terrorism co-operation in line with specific circumstances in their respective economies, through:
 - Appropriate financial measures to prevent the flow of funds to terrorists, including accelerating work on combating financial crimes through APEC Finance Ministers' Working Group on Fighting Financial Crime and increasing involvement in related international standard-setting bodies;
 - Adherence by all economies to relevant international requirements for the security of air and maritime transportation. Leaders call on Transport Ministers to actively take part in the discussions on enhancing airport, aircraft, and port security, achieve effective outcomes as early as possible, and assure full implementation and co-operation in this regard;
 - Strengthening of energy security in the region through the mechanism of the APEC Energy Security Initiative, which examines measures to respond to temporary supply disruptions and longer-term challenges facing the region's energy supply;
 - Strengthening of APEC activities in the area of critical sector protection, including telecommunications, transportation, health and energy.
 - Enhancement of customs communication networks and expeditious development of a global integrated electronic customs network, which would allow customs authorities to better enforce laws while minimising the impact on the flow of trade.
 - Co-operation to develop electronic movement records systems that will enhance border security while ensuring movement of legitimate travellers is not disrupted.

- Strengthening capacity building and economic and technical co-operation to enable member economies to put into place and enforce effective counter-terrorism measures.
 - Co-operation to limit the economic fallout from the attacks and move to restore economic confidence in the region through policies and measures to increase economic growth as well as ensure stable environment for trade, investment, travel and tourism.
7. Leaders also pledge to co-operate fully to ensure that international terrorism does not disrupt economies and markets, through close communication and co-operation among economic policy and financial authorities.

APPENDIX 7

2001 ASEAN DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM

We, the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered in Bandar Seri Begawan for the 7th ASEAN Summit,

Recalling the agreement among Heads of State/Government during the Second Informal Summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crime,

Reaffirming our primary responsibility in ensuring the peaceful and progressive development of our respective countries and our region,

Deeply concerned over the formidable challenge posed by terrorism to regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development,

Underlining the importance of strengthening regional and international co-operation in meeting the challenges confronting us,

Do hereby,

Unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 and consider such acts as an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us;

Extend our deepest sympathy and condolences to the people and Government of the United States of America and the families of the victims from nations all around the world, including those of our nationals;

View acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

Reject any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race;

Believe terrorism to be a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020;

Commit to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions;

Ensure that, in observing the above, all co-operative efforts to combat terrorism at the regional level shall consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country;

Recommit ourselves to pursue effective policies and strategies aimed at enhancing the well-being of our people, which will be our national contribution in the fight against terrorism;

Note that, towards this end, ASEAN had established a regional framework for fighting transnational crime and adopted an ASEAN Plan of Action that outlines a cohesive regional strategy to prevent, control and neutralise transnational crime;

Approve fully the initiatives of the 3rd ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) held in October 2001 to focus on terrorism and deal effectively with the issue at all levels and endorse the convening of an Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting and special sessions of the SOMTC and AMMTC that will focus on terrorism;

Warmly welcome Malaysia's offer to host the Special AMMTC on issues of terrorism in April 2002. This meeting would represent a significant step by ASEAN to the United Nations' call to enhance co-ordination of national, sub-regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

In strengthening further ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts, we task our Ministers concerned to follow up on the implementation of this declaration

to advance ASEAN's efforts to fight terrorism by undertaking the following additional practical measures.

1. Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism;
2. Call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
3. Deepen co-operation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing "best practices";
4. Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;
5. Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organisations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel;
6. Strengthen existing co-operation and co-ordination between the AMMTC and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorists acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organisations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice;
7. Develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts;
8. Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN's role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour;

9. Strengthen co-operation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.

We, the Leaders of ASEAN, pledge to remain seized with the matter, and call on other regions and countries to work with ASEAN in the global struggle against terrorism.

Adopted this Fifth Day of November 2001 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.

APPENDIX 8

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE SPECIAL ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING ON TERRORISM KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, 20–21 MAY 2002

1. We, the ASEAN Ministers responsible for transnational crime issues, gathered in Kuala Lumpur from 20th to 21st May 2002 for the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Hj Ahmad Badawi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia;
2. We recall the initiative taken by ASEAN to combat transnational crime in the 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime adopted at the Inaugural ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in the Republic of the Philippines and the 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime adopted at the 2nd AMMTC in Myanmar;
3. We recall the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted at the 7th ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam to advance ASEAN's efforts in the global struggle against terrorism;
4. We unequivocally condemn acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and underscore the urgency for a cohesive and united approach to effectively combat terrorism;
5. We strongly emphasize that terrorism must not be identified with any religion, race, culture or nationality;

6. We reaffirm our commitment and support to undertake the fight against acts of terrorism committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever without discrimination and with due respect to religion, race, culture and nationality;
7. We note with concern the close links between transnational crime and terrorism, and that this lends greater urgency to our efforts to combat transnational crime;
8. We dedicate our efforts and resources towards implementing practical measures underlined in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism;
9. We recognize that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic laws of each ASEAN Member Country shall be respected and upheld in undertaking the fight against terrorism;
10. We recognize the right of individual ASEAN Member Countries to continue pursuing practical preventive measures to address the root causes of terrorism;
11. We commit to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions;
12. We commit to follow-up on this Communiqué by entrusting the Senior Officials to execute the Work Programme on Terrorism to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime approved on 17th May 2002 in Kuala Lumpur which is deemed to be an integral part of this Communiqué and to review its progress at subsequent meetings of the ASEAN Ministers responsible for transnational crime issues. The Work Programme includes, among others, programmes on:
 - exchange of information,
 - compilation and dissemination of relevant laws and regulations of ASEAN Member Countries,

- compilation and dissemination of bilateral and multilateral agreements and information on relevant international treaties where feasible,
 - development of multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, prosecution, extradition, inquiry and seizure in order to enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries where feasible,
 - enhancement of co-operation and co-ordination in law enforcement and intelligence sharing, and
 - development of regional training programmes;
13. We note with appreciation the projects and initiatives to be undertaken as follows:
- training by Malaysia on intelligence procurement in relation to terrorism,
 - workshop by Malaysia on psyops and psywar in relation to terrorism,
 - workshop by Indonesia on combating international terrorism,
 - logistical support by Singapore for training on bomb/explosives detection, post-blast investigation, airport security and passport/document security and inspection in relation to terrorism,
 - offer by Singapore to facilitate a dialogue session at the upcoming ASEANAPOL meeting to discuss practical measures and explore avenues of co-operation against terrorism,
 - designation of principal contact points in all ASEAN Member Countries on counter-terrorism matters;
14. We task the Chairman of the Annual SOMTC to continue to liaise with all ASEAN Member Countries, with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat, on the successful implementation of the Work Programme;
15. We laud the signing of the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures between the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Republic of the Philippines in Kuala Lumpur on 7th May 2002 under which the Parties to that Agreement will co-operate among themselves to combat transnational crime, including terrorism;

16. We express our deepest appreciation to the Government of Malaysia for the warm and generous hospitality accorded to us and our respective delegations.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Acharya, Amitav, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, 1997)
- APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve, Bogor, Indonesia, 15 Nov 1994
- APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration, Shanghai, China, 21 Oct 2001
- APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism, Shanghai, China, 21 Oct 2001
- 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 Nov 2001
- ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, as annexed to the Chairman's Statement at the 2nd ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 Aug 1995
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy
- ASEAN Regional Forum: Annual Security Outlook 2001
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Co-Chairs' Paper on the Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs)
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair
- Australian-CSCAP Newsletter No. 11, May 2001
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992)

- Chairman's Statement at the First ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 25 Jul 1994
- Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meeting of the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), Seoul, Republic of Korea, 1–3 Nov 2000 and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18–20 Apr 2001
- CSCAP Singapore, "Review of Preventive Diplomacy Activities in the Asia-Pacific Region" in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, eds., *The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131 (Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University in Association with IDSS, Singapore, 1999)
- Desker, Barry, "The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum", a Paper presented at the 3rd CSCAP General Meeting, Canberra, 10–11 Dec 2001
- Ho, Hak Ean Peter, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Way Forward?", a Paper presented at the 3rd Workshop on ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Peace and Preventive Diplomacy, Shangri-La Hotel, Bangkok, 17–18 Feb 1994
- Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 20–21 May 2002
- Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation, ASEAN+3 Summit, Manila, the Philippines, 28 Nov 1999
- Political Statements on Political and Security Co-operation at the 5th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, Dec 1997
- Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN+3 Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 Nov 2001
- "Preventive Diplomacy: Definitions and Principles", CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Bangkok, 1 Mar 1999
- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 Sep 2001)
- Report on the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), Seoul, 1–2 Nov 2000

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Acharya, Amitav, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?" in *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 64 No. 2, Summer 1991
- , "Preventive Diplomacy: Issues and Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region", a Paper presented to the 8th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, 5–8 Jun 1994
- , "ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security" in Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, eds., *New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995)
- , "Making Multilateralism Work" in Michael W. Everett and Mary A. Sommerville, eds., *Multilateral Activities in South East Asia* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995)
- , "Preventive Diplomacy: Issues and Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region" in Bunn Nagara and Cheah Siew Ean, eds., *Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Security and International Studies, 1996)
- , *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (New York: Routledge, 2001)
- "ARF Security in Numbers" in *The Straits Times* (Opinion/Editorial), 11 Apr 1996
- Ball, Desmond and Acharya, Amitav, eds., *The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131 (Canberra, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australia National University, 1999)
- Boyce, Ralph, "Moving from Confidence-building to Preventive Diplomacy: The Possibilities", a Paper presented at "Confidence-Building and Conflict Reduction", 13th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 30 May – 2 Jun 1999
- Broinowski, Alison, *ASEAN in the 1990s* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990)
- Dupont, Alan, "The Future of the ARF: An Australian Perspective" in Khoo How San, ed., *The Future of the ARF* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 1999)
- Evans, Paul M., *Studying Asia-Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training, and Dialogue Activities* (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, University of Toronto and York University, 1994)
- Job, Brian, "Reconciliation: Learning From the European Experience" a Paper prepared for the CSCAP CSBM and North Pacific Working Groups Joint Meeting, Paris, 28–29 Jun 2001


- Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn, *Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982)
- Khong, Yuen Foong, "Making Bricks Without Straw in the Asia-Pacific?" in *The Pacific Review* Vol. 10 No. 2 (1997)
- Khoo, How San, "Executive Summary" in Khoo How San, ed., *The Future of the ARF* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 1999)
- Kondo, Shikekatsu, "The ARF: A Japanese Perspective" in Khoo How San, ed., *The Future of the ARF* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 1999)
- Lee, Shin-wah, "Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia: The Case of the Republic of Korea", a Paper delivered at the IDSS Workshop on Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia, Singapore, 28 Nov 2001
- Leifer, Michael, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989)
- , *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996)
- Lim, Robyn, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand" in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol. 20 No. 2 (1998)
- Macintosh, James, *Confidence-Building: Its Contribution to Peacekeeping*, Occasional Paper No. 11 (Toronto: York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1990)
- Simon, Sheldon W., *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982)
- Takeda, Yasuhiro, "Prospects of Security Co-operation in Asia-Pacific: Japanese Perspective", a Paper delivered at the Workshop on Evolving Approaches to Security Co-operation in East Asia, Singapore, 28 Nov 2001
- Yamamoto, Tadashi, *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific Community: Nongovernmental Underpinnings of the Asia-Pacific Regional Community* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Japan Center for International Exchange, 1995)

RELATED READINGS

- Alagappa, Muthiah, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998)
- Asia-Pacific Security Outlook (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center in co-operation with Research Institute for Peace and Security and ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, various years)
- Bundy, Barbara K., Stephen D. Burns, and Kimberly V. Weichel, *The Future of the Pacific Rim: Scenarios for Regional Co-operation*, foreword by Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994)
- Capie, David and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002)
- Carpenter, William M. and David Wiencek, *Asian Security Handbook* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, various years)
- Clements, Kevin, *Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Post-Cold War Problems and Prospects* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1993)
- Cossa, Ralph A., *Asia-Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995)
- Da Cunha, Derek, *The Evolving Pacific Power Structure* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996)
- Dobbs-Higginson, Michael S., *Asia-Pacific: A View on Its Role in the New World Order* (Hong Kong: Longman Group, Far East, 1993)
- Klintworth, Gary, *Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996)
- Peou, Sorpong, *The ASEAN Regional Forum and Post-Cold War IR Theories: A Case for Constructive Realism?* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999)
- Simon, Sheldon W., *The Many Faces of Asian Security* (Lanham, MD: NBR/Rowman and Littlefield, 2001)
- Singh, Udai Bhanu, *ASEAN Regional Forum and Security of the Asia-Pacific*, Delhi Papers No. 15 (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2001)
- Wanandi, Jusuf, *Asia-Pacific After the Cold War* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996)

Since its establishment in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has had to face a number of challenges in promoting multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. In the current setting, two major challenges stand out. The first is the slow progress of the ARF's confidence-building and preventive diplomacy agenda. The second is the resurgence of bilateral and unilateral approaches to strategic affairs. Against these challenges, the relevance of multilateralism in the region is being questioned.

This monograph on *A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum* speaks to these challenges. Beyond providing a scorecard of the ARF's performance, this volume addresses a number of questions which include: the obstacles to the implementation of the goals of the ARF as laid out in the 1995 Concept Paper; possible lessons to be learnt from other experiences of multilateralism; and building linkages with other multilateral forums. Most importantly, this monograph offers specific recommendations to reform and strengthen the ARF process in order to make multilateralism more effective in this region.



Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies

Nanyang
Technological University

ISBN 981-04-6901-2



9 789810 469016