The initial stages of the Battle for Marawi in 2017 signified the height of Islamic State (IS) influence in Mindanao. Various militant factions from the island-provinces of western Mindanao to the marshlands of central Mindanao coalesced into a fighting force that occupied the commercial heart of the Philippines’ sole Islamic city. The five-month campaign highlighted the weakness of Philippine security forces in defeating a well-entrenched force in an urban environment. On the other hand, the Battle for Marawi underscored how IS-linked groups such as the Maute Group (MG) failed to establish its vision of a wilayah (province), and was almost immediately forced to engage in a fight for survival rather than exercise governance over its areas of control. Nearly five years after the Battle of Marawi, the various IS-linked violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in Mindanao appear to have lost the initiative.

It was initially feared that the COVID-19 pandemic would trigger more violence against security forces as they were dispersed to conduct public health-related tasks such as manning checkpoints and enforcing community quarantine. Instead, movement controls and community quarantines stifled the mobility and freedom of action for VEOs. A marked downturn in violence in Mindanao from Islamist-linked groups and other non-state armed groups from 2017 appeared to have been sustained all the way into the end of 2021. It is expected that there will be an uptick in violence in Mindanao in the run up to the 2022 presidential elections. This expected surge in violence is deeply rooted in local sociopolitical dynamics, rather than the influence of jihadist ideology. This article will examine the status of IS-linked groups in Mindanao and the impact of recent developments, such as the pandemic and Philippines military operations. The impact of the upcoming national and local elections will also be explored.