• Home
  • About RSIS
    • Introduction
    • Building the Foundations
    • Welcome Message
    • Board of Governors
    • Staff Profiles
      • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
      • Dean’s Office
      • Management
      • Distinguished Fellows
      • Faculty and Research
      • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
      • Visiting Fellows
      • Adjunct Fellows
      • Administrative Staff
    • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
    • RSIS Endowment Fund
    • Endowed Professorships
    • Career Opportunities
    • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
    • Research Centres
      • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
      • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
      • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
      • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
      • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
    • Research Programmes
      • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
      • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
    • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
    • [email protected] Newsletter
    • Other Research
      • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
    • Graduate Programmes Office
    • Overview
    • MSc (Asian Studies)
    • MSc (International Political Economy)
    • MSc (International Relations)
    • MSc (Strategic Studies)
    • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
    • PhD Programme
    • Exchange Partners and Programmes
    • How to Apply
    • Financial Assistance
    • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
    • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
    • Alumni
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
    • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
    • SRP Executive Programme
    • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
    • RSIS Publications
      • Annual Reviews
      • Books
      • Bulletins and Newsletters
      • Commentaries
      • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
      • Commemorative / Event Reports
      • IDSS Paper
      • Interreligious Relations
      • Monographs
      • NTS Insight
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • RSIS Publications for the Year
    • Glossary of Abbreviations
    • External Publications
      • Authored Books
      • Journal Articles
      • Edited Books
      • Chapters in Edited Books
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • Op-Eds
      • External Publications for the Year
    • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
    • Great Powers
    • Sustainable Security
    • Other Resource Pages
    • Media Highlights
    • News Releases
    • Speeches
    • Vidcast Channel
    • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsis.sg
Linkedin
instagram instagram rsis.sg
RSS
  • Home
  • About RSIS
      • Introduction
      • Building the Foundations
      • Welcome Message
      • Board of Governors
      • Staff Profiles
        • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
        • Dean’s Office
        • Management
        • Distinguished Fellows
        • Faculty and Research
        • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
        • Visiting Fellows
        • Adjunct Fellows
        • Administrative Staff
      • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
      • RSIS Endowment Fund
      • Endowed Professorships
      • Career Opportunities
      • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
      • Research Centres
        • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
        • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
        • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
        • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
        • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      • Research Programmes
        • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
        • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
      • [email protected] Newsletter
      • Other Research
        • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      • Graduate Programmes Office
      • Overview
      • MSc (Asian Studies)
      • MSc (International Political Economy)
      • MSc (International Relations)
      • MSc (Strategic Studies)
      • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
      • PhD Programme
      • Exchange Partners and Programmes
      • How to Apply
      • Financial Assistance
      • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
      • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      • Alumni
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      • SRP Executive Programme
      • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      • RSIS Publications
        • Annual Reviews
        • Books
        • Bulletins and Newsletters
        • Commentaries
        • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
        • Commemorative / Event Reports
        • IDSS Paper
        • Interreligious Relations
        • Monographs
        • NTS Insight
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • RSIS Publications for the Year
      • Glossary of Abbreviations
      • External Publications
        • Authored Books
        • Journal Articles
        • Edited Books
        • Chapters in Edited Books
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • Op-Eds
        • External Publications for the Year
      • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
      • Great Powers
      • Sustainable Security
      • Other Resource Pages
      • Media Highlights
      • News Releases
      • Speeches
      • Vidcast Channel
      • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
  • instagram instagram rsis.sg
Connect

Getting to RSIS

Map

Address

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

View location on Google maps Click here for directions to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
    RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
    instagram instagram rsis.sg
      RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    RSIS Intranet

    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
    Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University

    Skip to content

     
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO14117 | Xisha (Paracel) Islands: A Rejoinder
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers
    • RSIS Publications for the Year

    CO14117 | Xisha (Paracel) Islands: A Rejoinder
    Nguyen Thi Lan Anh

    20 June 2014

    download pdf
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Synopsis

    Purely based on the application of international law of the sea, and notwithstanding the sovereignty dispute over the Paracels, the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig was transported by China recently to a location deep inside the EEZ and continental shelf of Vietnam.

    Commentary

    IN HER response to my commentary, Associate Prof Li Dexia brought the debate back to the sovereignty question and ignored the application of the international law of the sea which I argued was China’s main problem.

    While I am happy that the writer shared some of my views regarding role of international law, I believe her comments on other aspects (RSIS Commentary 116/2014 dated 20 June 2014 entitled Xisha [Paracel] Islands: Why China’s Sovereignty is ‘Indisputable’) warrant a rejoinder.

    Why international law of the sea matters

    The writer argued that the two square km Woody Island, the largest of the Paracels, which is 103 nautical miles away from the current location of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig, is entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf. I beg to differ.

    The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as international jurisprudence gives no decisive answer on the maritime zones of a small and remote island like Woody. Even if Woody Island is entitled to an EEZ, there has been a consistent tendency in state practices and jurisprudence of reducing the significance effect of such island in maritime delimitation with an opposite mainland.

    Bach Long Vi, similarly-sized and located in the Gulf of Tonkin but with a permanent population, was only granted 25% effect in maritime delimitation between China and Vietnam.

    Even in the unrealistic hypothetical scenario that the Woody is given 50% effect, at a distance of 103 nautical miles from the Woody and 130 nautical miles from Vietnam’s mainland, the oil rig would be very deep within the EEZ and continental shelf of Vietnam.

    The writer also argued that the oil rig would be located within the contiguous zone of the Triton in the Paracels to which proximity the oil rig is located. It might be correct, but under UNCLOS, entitlement from the contiguous zone creates no right over natural resources including conducting an exploration drill.

    I also disagree with the writer’s statement that Vietnam’s unilateral claim of EEZ is illegal. Under UNCLOS, Vietnam is firmly entitled up to 200 nautical miles EEZ whereas the similar entitlement of the Paracels’ features are uncertain. These conclusions are purely drawn from the application of international law of the sea, regardless the sovereignty issues.

    Objective fact should be respected

    It is true that the resulting public anger towards China fuelled some riots in a few industrial zones which led to the unfortunate consequences towards some Chinese workers and foreign investors in Vietnam. However, these riots were provoked by some outlawed opportunists who took advantage of the situation. These criminals were arrested and punished.

    I therefore disagree with the writer when she associated these people with the Vietnamese government. In fact, the Vietnamese government immediately stopped the riots. The Vietnamese prime minister personally instructed government agencies and all citizens to restore public order.

    He also met with the affected foreign investors and promised tax refund, tax reduction, land rental reduction and more flexible labour policy. I wonder whether the Chinese government implemented similar policies toward Japanese investors who also faced damages in the anti-Japan riots after Japan nationalised the Senkaku/Diaoyu in 2012.

    In addition, who conducted violent and aggressive activities such as engaging in ramming, using water cannons and sinking Vietnamese fishing boats? The international reporters at the scene already have their own objective reports. In the sunken fishing boat incident, ten Vietnamese fishermen could have died had they not been rescued by other Vietnamese fishing boats within the vicinity.

    Need for proper understanding of sovereignty claims

    Like it or not, under international law, there is a sovereignty dispute over the Paracels as both China and Vietnam have stated their competing claims over the group. The writer has not only echoed the wrong ‘indisputable’ statement, but also misquoted several facts to support the ‘indisputable” claim:

    Firstly, France had numerous activities in exercising sovereignty for a long time and publicly declared its sovereignty over the Paracels to the world since 1933. France then maintained control over the Paracels until the end of the Second World War and officially ceded its rights in the Paracels to the State of Vietnam on 15 October 1950.

    Secondly, the Cairo Declaration of 1943, Potsdam Declaration of 1945, San Francisco Treaty of 1951 and the Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and Japan of 1972 have listed all the territories (the Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores) that Japan had to return to China but excluded the Paracels and Spratlys. It was noteworthy that the Chiang Kai Shek administration participating in the drafting process of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations made no reservations concerning the Paracels and Spratlys.

    Thirdly, at the San Francisco Conference, the proposal of the then Soviet Union to revise the Treaty text to include the Paracels and Spratlys in those territories to be given to China was decisively ruled out by a majority vote of 46 to 51.

    Meanwhile, as a participant and signatory to the Peace Treaty at the San Francisco Conference, the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, Tran Van Huu, issued a statement at the Seventh Plenary Session which affirmed Vietnam’s right to the Spratlys and Paracel Islands. This statement was not contested by any participants, indicating universal recognition. South Vietnam then peacefully fortified and maintained its control of the Paracels until 1974.

    Fourthly, in the period from 1954 to 1975, there was more than one Vietnam. The 1954, the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into two by the 17th parallel. Accordingly, the Paracels and Spratlys were under the administration of and continuously controlled by the Republic of Vietnam, not by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As a signatory country of the Geneva Accords, 1954, China was well aware of this fact. By focusing on discrediting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s claim, the writer actually missed the point.

    The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a unified State since 1976, immediately inherited and consistently reaffirmed sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys which were well established by different representatives of Vietnam throughout the history of the country.

    Lastly, it may be wise for the current generation of Chinese to look at history as objectively as did their late leader, Deng Xiaoping, who used to recognise the existence of the dispute over the Paracels in 1975 and promised to constructively cooperate with Vietnam to settle the dispute by peaceful means.

    Following international law only makes a super-power-to-be respectful and credible in the eyes of its smaller neighbours.

    About the author

    Nguyen Thi Lan Anh is Vice Dean at the International Law Faculty of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The views are strictly her own and do not necessarily reflect any official position.

    Categories: Commentaries / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Last updated on 05/09/2014

    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Synopsis

    Purely based on the application of international law of the sea, and notwithstanding the sovereignty dispute over the Paracels, the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig was transported by China recently to a location deep inside the EEZ and continental shelf of Vietnam.

    Commentary

    IN HER response to my commentary, Associate Prof Li Dexia brought the debate back to the sovereignty question and ignored the application of the international law of the sea which I argued was China’s main problem.

    While I am happy that the writer shared some of my views regarding role of international law, I believe her comments on other aspects (RSIS Commentary 116/2014 dated 20 June 2014 entitled Xisha [Paracel] Islands: Why China’s Sovereignty is ‘Indisputable’) warrant a rejoinder.

    Why international law of the sea matters

    The writer argued that the two square km Woody Island, the largest of the Paracels, which is 103 nautical miles away from the current location of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig, is entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf. I beg to differ.

    The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as international jurisprudence gives no decisive answer on the maritime zones of a small and remote island like Woody. Even if Woody Island is entitled to an EEZ, there has been a consistent tendency in state practices and jurisprudence of reducing the significance effect of such island in maritime delimitation with an opposite mainland.

    Bach Long Vi, similarly-sized and located in the Gulf of Tonkin but with a permanent population, was only granted 25% effect in maritime delimitation between China and Vietnam.

    Even in the unrealistic hypothetical scenario that the Woody is given 50% effect, at a distance of 103 nautical miles from the Woody and 130 nautical miles from Vietnam’s mainland, the oil rig would be very deep within the EEZ and continental shelf of Vietnam.

    The writer also argued that the oil rig would be located within the contiguous zone of the Triton in the Paracels to which proximity the oil rig is located. It might be correct, but under UNCLOS, entitlement from the contiguous zone creates no right over natural resources including conducting an exploration drill.

    I also disagree with the writer’s statement that Vietnam’s unilateral claim of EEZ is illegal. Under UNCLOS, Vietnam is firmly entitled up to 200 nautical miles EEZ whereas the similar entitlement of the Paracels’ features are uncertain. These conclusions are purely drawn from the application of international law of the sea, regardless the sovereignty issues.

    Objective fact should be respected

    It is true that the resulting public anger towards China fuelled some riots in a few industrial zones which led to the unfortunate consequences towards some Chinese workers and foreign investors in Vietnam. However, these riots were provoked by some outlawed opportunists who took advantage of the situation. These criminals were arrested and punished.

    I therefore disagree with the writer when she associated these people with the Vietnamese government. In fact, the Vietnamese government immediately stopped the riots. The Vietnamese prime minister personally instructed government agencies and all citizens to restore public order.

    He also met with the affected foreign investors and promised tax refund, tax reduction, land rental reduction and more flexible labour policy. I wonder whether the Chinese government implemented similar policies toward Japanese investors who also faced damages in the anti-Japan riots after Japan nationalised the Senkaku/Diaoyu in 2012.

    In addition, who conducted violent and aggressive activities such as engaging in ramming, using water cannons and sinking Vietnamese fishing boats? The international reporters at the scene already have their own objective reports. In the sunken fishing boat incident, ten Vietnamese fishermen could have died had they not been rescued by other Vietnamese fishing boats within the vicinity.

    Need for proper understanding of sovereignty claims

    Like it or not, under international law, there is a sovereignty dispute over the Paracels as both China and Vietnam have stated their competing claims over the group. The writer has not only echoed the wrong ‘indisputable’ statement, but also misquoted several facts to support the ‘indisputable” claim:

    Firstly, France had numerous activities in exercising sovereignty for a long time and publicly declared its sovereignty over the Paracels to the world since 1933. France then maintained control over the Paracels until the end of the Second World War and officially ceded its rights in the Paracels to the State of Vietnam on 15 October 1950.

    Secondly, the Cairo Declaration of 1943, Potsdam Declaration of 1945, San Francisco Treaty of 1951 and the Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and Japan of 1972 have listed all the territories (the Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores) that Japan had to return to China but excluded the Paracels and Spratlys. It was noteworthy that the Chiang Kai Shek administration participating in the drafting process of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations made no reservations concerning the Paracels and Spratlys.

    Thirdly, at the San Francisco Conference, the proposal of the then Soviet Union to revise the Treaty text to include the Paracels and Spratlys in those territories to be given to China was decisively ruled out by a majority vote of 46 to 51.

    Meanwhile, as a participant and signatory to the Peace Treaty at the San Francisco Conference, the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, Tran Van Huu, issued a statement at the Seventh Plenary Session which affirmed Vietnam’s right to the Spratlys and Paracel Islands. This statement was not contested by any participants, indicating universal recognition. South Vietnam then peacefully fortified and maintained its control of the Paracels until 1974.

    Fourthly, in the period from 1954 to 1975, there was more than one Vietnam. The 1954, the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into two by the 17th parallel. Accordingly, the Paracels and Spratlys were under the administration of and continuously controlled by the Republic of Vietnam, not by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As a signatory country of the Geneva Accords, 1954, China was well aware of this fact. By focusing on discrediting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s claim, the writer actually missed the point.

    The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a unified State since 1976, immediately inherited and consistently reaffirmed sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys which were well established by different representatives of Vietnam throughout the history of the country.

    Lastly, it may be wise for the current generation of Chinese to look at history as objectively as did their late leader, Deng Xiaoping, who used to recognise the existence of the dispute over the Paracels in 1975 and promised to constructively cooperate with Vietnam to settle the dispute by peaceful means.

    Following international law only makes a super-power-to-be respectful and credible in the eyes of its smaller neighbours.

    About the author

    Nguyen Thi Lan Anh is Vice Dean at the International Law Faculty of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The views are strictly her own and do not necessarily reflect any official position.

    Categories: Commentaries / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security

    Last updated on 05/09/2014

    Back to top

    Terms of Use | Privacy Statement
    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
    OK
    Latest Book
    CO14117 | Xisha (Paracel) Islands: A Rejoinder

    Synopsis

    Purely based on the application of international law of the sea, and notwithstanding the sovereignty dispute over the Paracels, the Haiyang Shiyou 981 ...
    more info