Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS Newsletter
Other Research
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Alumni & Networks
Alumni
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
Commentaries
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Paper
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
2024 Indonesia Elections
Great Powers
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
Media Mentions
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Future Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSIS Newsletter
      Other ResearchScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to Apply
      Financial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      AlumniAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)SRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersCommentariesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PaperInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      2024 Indonesia ElectionsGreat PowersSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesMedia Mentions
      News ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO13073 | The U.S. Rebalancing to Asia: Indonesia’s Maritime Dilemma
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO13073 | The U.S. Rebalancing to Asia: Indonesia’s Maritime Dilemma

    24 April 2013

    download pdf
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Synopsis

    Being located at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans might seem a geostrategic blessing for Indonesia. But it could be a strategic disaster in the event of a heightened Sino-US maritime competition.

    Commentary

    THE INDONESIAN archipelago straddles a strategic location at the ‘crossroads’ of two oceans and two continents – the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the Asian and Australian continents, respectively. In between, and connecting the two regions, are three critical maritime chokepoints for global trade: the Straits of Malacca-Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok-Makassar.

    The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are partly administered by Malaysia and Singapore, while the Sunda and Lombok-Makassar Straits are located within the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL). At a glance, these features might seem a geostrategic blessing. Recent developments in the maritime strategic environment, however, could complicate Indonesia’s strategic calculus.

    The critical chokepoints

    The US rebalancing to Asia is proceeding in parallel with China’s military rise as a potential US adversary. The military dimension of rebalancing involves the shifting of more American air, naval, and marine forces into the Pacific theatre, and re-deploying them to less vulnerable, but still accessible positions, such as Guam, Hawaii, Australia and Singapore.

    Consequentially, the strategic importance of the Malacca-Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok-Makassar Straits would increase. Firstly, the chokepoints would see a heightened and simultaneous presence of different and perhaps, opposing, maritime forces. The growing maritime powers of India and China could extend their naval deployments into the Pacific and Indian Ocean, respectively. A leaked Indian Navy report confirmed that Chinese submarines are already operating in the Indian Ocean.

    Despite the bulk of US forces being concentrated in Northeast Asia, there would be a higher likelihood of them making more transits in Southeast Asian waters and airspace, as the Chinese maritime forces venture south into the Indian Ocean corresponding with Beijing’s expanding interests in the region. Added with Southeast Asia’s own maritime build-ups, this trend could further “saturate” the regional maritime strategic environment.
    Secondly, the chokepoints could become the focus of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities on foreign maritime forces. Heightened presence of maritime forces transiting the chokepoints raises the prospect of increased ISR activities in the area. As a littoral state, Indonesia considers such activities as intrusive and inimical to its national security. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s separate cooperation with the US and China to develop coastal surveillance systems along the chokepoints might be attributed to this concern. Improved situational awareness along the chokepoints could assist the Indonesian military to track and monitor foreign maritime forces in transit.

    Thirdly, in wartime, the chokepoints could become susceptible to “offshore control” against the adversary’s shipping away from its home waters. American analysts such as T. X. Hammes of the US National Defence University argue that offshore control can be applied to deny the adversary the necessary resources for its continuation of war efforts. Control over chokepoints allows the concentration of forces to interdict the adversary’s civilian and military shipping, which would otherwise be more dispersed and difficult to interdict in high seas.

    Implications for Indonesia

    For Jakarta, Washington’s military rebalancing to Asia and Beijing’s maritime rise are complicating its strategic calculus. Jakarta is concerned that heightened presence and intrusive activities of foreign maritime forces in Indonesian waters could trigger accidents or miscalculation. In this situation, Jakarta could face three options.

    Firstly, Jakarta could tacitly support the US camp. This option enables Jakarta to harness US military support as well as aligning itself more closely with US allies, but at a great cost of antagonising Beijing. Although the Indonesian military is unlikely to engage in warfighting operations, it could support ISR activities to monitor Chinese shipping and aircraft within Indonesian waters, while leaving the rest of the job to the US military. The latter in turn could help secure Indonesia’s northern flank in the South China Sea. On the flip side, China could conduct clandestine ISR activities or even sabotage in Indonesian waters, including the chokepoints, against the Allied forces.

    Secondly, Jakarta could enter into Beijing’s maritime orbit, while distancing itself from the US camp. This option envisages a scenario in which China has already showered assistance to Indonesia, and expecting a return of favour. China’s courting of Indonesia of late is pronounced. Beijing has agreed to a maritime pact with Jakarta to develop Indonesia’s capacity in maritime surveillance, naval armaments, shipbuilding, and oceanography.

    Returning the favour means remaining detached from the US and its allies – and even from fellow Southeast Asian states – in any activities inimical to Chinese interests. The downside is Indonesia could face violation of its sovereignty by the Allied forces to conduct unilateral maritime operations within Indonesian waters.

    The “neutral” option

    Thirdly, Jakarta could aggressively or passively declare its neutrality. Aggressive neutrality means enforcing the 1994 San Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea, which forbids hostile actions by belligerent forces in waters of a neutral state. There is a strong likelihood that Indonesia’s current strategic policy is pursuing this option. However, its enforcement would be painstakingly difficult.

    Jakarta’s limited military resources could be strained and drained to monitor all belligerents’ ships and aircraft. And were there to be lapses which permit incidents to occur between the belligerents – while no-one claims responsibility – all fingers would be pointing toward Jakarta for not being able to strictly enforce its neutrality.

    Meanwhile, passive neutrality implies that Jakarta would take little action, if at all, during the hostility out of strict non-involvement. However, the political, economic, military, and environmental costs of passive neutrality would be catastrophic. Hostile encounters between belligerents in Indonesian waters could put Indonesian lives and assets at great risks of collateral damage, while not contributing much to its neutralist credibility.

    These options however are not as unique to Indonesia as to other regional countries, which see the looming Sino-US competition as a strategic disaster. But at least Indonesia could start contemplating the “least bad” option that would maintain its position as a key player in the big power game.

    About the Author

    Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is a Senior Analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in the Nanyang Technological University. He was a researcher with the Centre for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS) at the University of Indonesia.

    Categories: Commentaries / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Last updated on 11/09/2014

    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Synopsis

    Being located at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans might seem a geostrategic blessing for Indonesia. But it could be a strategic disaster in the event of a heightened Sino-US maritime competition.

    Commentary

    THE INDONESIAN archipelago straddles a strategic location at the ‘crossroads’ of two oceans and two continents – the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the Asian and Australian continents, respectively. In between, and connecting the two regions, are three critical maritime chokepoints for global trade: the Straits of Malacca-Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok-Makassar.

    The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are partly administered by Malaysia and Singapore, while the Sunda and Lombok-Makassar Straits are located within the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL). At a glance, these features might seem a geostrategic blessing. Recent developments in the maritime strategic environment, however, could complicate Indonesia’s strategic calculus.

    The critical chokepoints

    The US rebalancing to Asia is proceeding in parallel with China’s military rise as a potential US adversary. The military dimension of rebalancing involves the shifting of more American air, naval, and marine forces into the Pacific theatre, and re-deploying them to less vulnerable, but still accessible positions, such as Guam, Hawaii, Australia and Singapore.

    Consequentially, the strategic importance of the Malacca-Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok-Makassar Straits would increase. Firstly, the chokepoints would see a heightened and simultaneous presence of different and perhaps, opposing, maritime forces. The growing maritime powers of India and China could extend their naval deployments into the Pacific and Indian Ocean, respectively. A leaked Indian Navy report confirmed that Chinese submarines are already operating in the Indian Ocean.

    Despite the bulk of US forces being concentrated in Northeast Asia, there would be a higher likelihood of them making more transits in Southeast Asian waters and airspace, as the Chinese maritime forces venture south into the Indian Ocean corresponding with Beijing’s expanding interests in the region. Added with Southeast Asia’s own maritime build-ups, this trend could further “saturate” the regional maritime strategic environment.
    Secondly, the chokepoints could become the focus of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities on foreign maritime forces. Heightened presence of maritime forces transiting the chokepoints raises the prospect of increased ISR activities in the area. As a littoral state, Indonesia considers such activities as intrusive and inimical to its national security. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s separate cooperation with the US and China to develop coastal surveillance systems along the chokepoints might be attributed to this concern. Improved situational awareness along the chokepoints could assist the Indonesian military to track and monitor foreign maritime forces in transit.

    Thirdly, in wartime, the chokepoints could become susceptible to “offshore control” against the adversary’s shipping away from its home waters. American analysts such as T. X. Hammes of the US National Defence University argue that offshore control can be applied to deny the adversary the necessary resources for its continuation of war efforts. Control over chokepoints allows the concentration of forces to interdict the adversary’s civilian and military shipping, which would otherwise be more dispersed and difficult to interdict in high seas.

    Implications for Indonesia

    For Jakarta, Washington’s military rebalancing to Asia and Beijing’s maritime rise are complicating its strategic calculus. Jakarta is concerned that heightened presence and intrusive activities of foreign maritime forces in Indonesian waters could trigger accidents or miscalculation. In this situation, Jakarta could face three options.

    Firstly, Jakarta could tacitly support the US camp. This option enables Jakarta to harness US military support as well as aligning itself more closely with US allies, but at a great cost of antagonising Beijing. Although the Indonesian military is unlikely to engage in warfighting operations, it could support ISR activities to monitor Chinese shipping and aircraft within Indonesian waters, while leaving the rest of the job to the US military. The latter in turn could help secure Indonesia’s northern flank in the South China Sea. On the flip side, China could conduct clandestine ISR activities or even sabotage in Indonesian waters, including the chokepoints, against the Allied forces.

    Secondly, Jakarta could enter into Beijing’s maritime orbit, while distancing itself from the US camp. This option envisages a scenario in which China has already showered assistance to Indonesia, and expecting a return of favour. China’s courting of Indonesia of late is pronounced. Beijing has agreed to a maritime pact with Jakarta to develop Indonesia’s capacity in maritime surveillance, naval armaments, shipbuilding, and oceanography.

    Returning the favour means remaining detached from the US and its allies – and even from fellow Southeast Asian states – in any activities inimical to Chinese interests. The downside is Indonesia could face violation of its sovereignty by the Allied forces to conduct unilateral maritime operations within Indonesian waters.

    The “neutral” option

    Thirdly, Jakarta could aggressively or passively declare its neutrality. Aggressive neutrality means enforcing the 1994 San Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea, which forbids hostile actions by belligerent forces in waters of a neutral state. There is a strong likelihood that Indonesia’s current strategic policy is pursuing this option. However, its enforcement would be painstakingly difficult.

    Jakarta’s limited military resources could be strained and drained to monitor all belligerents’ ships and aircraft. And were there to be lapses which permit incidents to occur between the belligerents – while no-one claims responsibility – all fingers would be pointing toward Jakarta for not being able to strictly enforce its neutrality.

    Meanwhile, passive neutrality implies that Jakarta would take little action, if at all, during the hostility out of strict non-involvement. However, the political, economic, military, and environmental costs of passive neutrality would be catastrophic. Hostile encounters between belligerents in Indonesian waters could put Indonesian lives and assets at great risks of collateral damage, while not contributing much to its neutralist credibility.

    These options however are not as unique to Indonesia as to other regional countries, which see the looming Sino-US competition as a strategic disaster. But at least Indonesia could start contemplating the “least bad” option that would maintain its position as a key player in the big power game.

    About the Author

    Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is a Senior Analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in the Nanyang Technological University. He was a researcher with the Centre for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS) at the University of Indonesia.

    Categories: Commentaries / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security

    Last updated on 11/09/2014

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info