Myanmar
In 2024, Myanmar’s conflict settled into a new stalemate, characterised by an urban-rural strategic divide, technological competition and internal friction among both regime and rebel forces. This new paradigm follows significant territorial advancements made by the anti-junta resistance, comprising the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the People’s Defence Force (PDF) militias and the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), in late 2023 and early 2024.[1] The major EAOs, particularly those in the Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Shan and Rakhine States, have continued to play key roles in shaping the conflict.
Trends
The ruling military junta, though still controlling key urban centres, has been unable to decisively quash the resistance, due to the decentralised nature of opposition forces and their growing use of advanced technologies and effective guerrilla warfare tactics. Meanwhile, the anti-junta resistance remains unable to make significant inroads into seizing key urban regions. Fierce clashes have continued throughout the country, especially in rural areas where the military has been leveraging its superiority in air and artillery power to conduct strikes against anti-junta forces. Civilian casualties and displacement remain high, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis resulting from the conflict.
Three key trends are evident: 1) the strategic landscape’s shift along an urban-rural territorial divide; 2) the growing importance of technological innovation; and 3) increasing fragmentation and morale challenges within both the junta and resistance forces. These dynamics will be crucial in determining how the conflict evolves in 2025.
Evolving Strategic Landscape due to Territorial Shifts
Anti-Junta Resistance’s Expanded Operational Territory
According to the Myanmar Conflict Map[2] published and updated by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), regions in the country that have seen a significant increase in conflict events[3] in 2024 include: South Rakhine, North Bago, Northwest and Southwest Shan, and North Mandalay. Regions maintaining a high frequency of conflict events include Central Tanintharyi, Central and North Mon, Central Kayin, East Bago, South Kachin, Central Mandalay, North Magway, South and West Sagaing, and North and Central Rakhine. In contrast, regions which have seen reduced conflict frequency include South Mon, North Kayah, Northeast Shan, West Sagaing and Central Chin.[4]
While the frequency of clashes does not necessarily correlate to territorial control, the expansion of heightened conflict regions aligns geographically with the anti-junta resistance’s claimed territorial gains over the past year. These claims include widely reported territorial gains, such as in the northern areas of Shan State by the Brotherhood Alliance as part of Operation 1027 in October 2023[5], as well as gains made by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Kachin PDF in Kachin State throughout March 2024.[6] The expansion of heightened conflict regions also aligns with more recent claims by the NUG that the junta government’s territorial control has been reduced from 198 out of 330 townships in January 2023, to 98 townships in August 2024.[7] Most notable amongst the military’s territorial losses include the Shan State capital of Lashio as well as several townships in the vicinity of Mandalay City.[8]
At the same time, in regions ostensibly under the junta government’s control, localised PDF militias – mostly operating under the NUG’s banner – continue to conduct guerrilla warfare against a wide range of military targets via armed clashes,[9] bombings,[10] improvised explosive devices (IEDs)[11] and drone attacks.[12]
Strategic Shifts Amidst Stalemate
At present, both sides have been entrenching themselves in the territories they currently control, with anti-junta forces consolidating recent gains by conducting ambushes against military reinforcements headed to key cities such as Lashio[13] as well as along routes leading to ongoing conflict zones such as Momauk,[14] Myawaddy[15] and Tamakhan village.[16]
The military has mostly focused its efforts on defending central territories, banking on its traditional military superiority in artillery and air power to project force into anti-junta controlled areas.[17] The military’s use of heavy artillery has allowed it to retain control over many urban centres in contested regions.[18] At the same time, it has stepped up air power operations, conducting a total of 1,098 reported air/drone attacks between January to July 2024, as opposed to 790 air/drone attacks between June to December 2023.[19] Such a shift in the military’s strategy has paid off in conflict zones such as Pauktaw in Rakhine State, Taze in Saigang and most notably in Loikaw, the capital of eastern Karenni State, where “lightly armed (anti-junta) fighters have been thrown into battles against heavy artillery and unremitting air strikes”.[20]
Furthermore, the military has reportedly adopted anti-guerrilla strategies in some contested regions. An official in the Tanintharyi Region PDF noted in November 2023 that the military has begun employing troops drawn from local villages, who possess “better knowledge about the territory and access to information”.[21] These local troops have also reportedly been utilised in other conflict regions, including Yangon, Bago and Mon.[22] Another anti-junta resistance member in the region also noted that the military has continued to implement a “Four Cuts” strategy,[23] aimed at disrupting the resistance’s access to food, funds, information and recruits via setting up checkpoints, enacting travel restrictions and conducting mass arrests.[24] While not new within the ongoing conflict,[25] the “Four Cuts” doctrine has also reportedly been expanded in Mon State[26] and may see further expansion as the conflict develops.
Western Myanmar
Arakan Army’s Territorial Expansion
In 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) escalated its conflict with the military, seizing control of 10 out of 17 townships in Rakhine State by September, including crucial infrastructure such as an airport[27] and a naval base[28] in Thandwe. Its influence also spread to Paletwa in neighbouring Chin State,[29] which borders India’s Mizoram province. Significant gains were also made in townships near the Bangladesh border.[30] Previously untouched southern Rakhine also saw rising conflict, marking a significant shift in the dynamics of the area.[31] Additionally, these clashes have impacted neighbouring Bangladeshi islands, such as Saint Martin, disrupting transportation and essential supply routes.
This surge in violence followed the collapse of a three-year ceasefire in late 2023. The AA’s offensive against the military junta aims to achieve total control over Rakhine, a strategically important region rich in resources. The exact strength of the group cannot be confirmed, but, in May 2024, the AA claimed that it has nearly 40,000 standing troops, excluding several thousand auxiliary members.[32] AA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha stated that the ethnonationalist armed group seeks self-determination for the ethnic Rakhine people, but does not aim for full independence, instead advocating for a political status that is “no lower than confederate”.[33]
The breakdown of the ceasefire in November 2023, following the military coup of 2021, catalysed the AA’s substantial battlefield advances across Rakhine.[34] While some observers suggest the AA might become a proto-state, the group’s spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha reiterated that they do not plan to secede from the Myanmar state. Meanwhile, non-Rakhine ethnic groups remain apprehensive about the AA, particularly considering its role in recent incidents in Buthidaung and Maungdaw,[35] provocative anti-Rohingya rhetoric,[36] failure to protect civilians in clashes and a lack of support for credible investigations into reported abuses.
Rohingyas in a New Crisis
The Rohingya situation in Myanmar drastically worsened in 2024, with violence in Rakhine State at its peak since 2017, when over 750,000 fled to Bangladesh.[37] Today, only 636,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they face intense violence, including military airstrikes and attacks from the AA. Reports suggest that Myanmar’s military is forcibly conscripting Rohingya men in response to pressure from the AA.[38] In 2024, there were accounts of the military coercing vulnerable Rohingya individuals to fight against the AA, promising them legal status and financial incentives in return. Many marginalised and stateless Rohingya undergo military training under threat of violence, leading to high casualty rates and their use as human shields in combat. Rohingya groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) are also accused of kidnapping Rohingya youth from refugee camps in Bangladesh and sending them back to Myanmar to undergo training with the military.[39]
This forced recruitment exacerbates the ongoing humanitarian crisis, deepening societal rifts and heightening communal tensions.[40] In retaliation for perceived collaboration with the military, the AA has reportedly targeted Rohingyas. The AA is accused of burning a major town and entire villages, and conducting summary executions.[41] Around 20,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh, adding to the strain on overcrowded refugee camps there that house over 1.2 million people.
An August 2024 drone attack on Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar resulted in multiple fatalities, including families with children, as they sought to cross into Bangladesh. The Rohingyas accused the AA of the attack, but the latter denied involvement, blaming Myanmar’s military instead. This incident is among the deadliest assaults on civilians in Rakhine State to date. According to some reports, over 200 Rohingyas died in the incident.[42] The Rohingyas have also accused the AA of burning Buthidaung town in Rakhine State in mid-May, with the United Nations (UN) noting at least four beheadings attributed to the AA.
Meanwhile, the RSO, another significant ethnic armed group in Myanmar, has reached an informal ceasefire agreement with the military as both face threats from the advancing AA. This cooperation is unexpected, given the military’s historical stance on the Rohingya insurgency as a threat. The RSO operates independently, but has opted out of combat to protect civilians following a deadly August 5 attack in Maungdaw. Tensions remain high, particularly with the AA’s targeting of the Rohingya community, underscoring the ongoing ethnic and political conflicts in the region.[43] The AA has also accused Rohingya ethnic armed groups such as ARSA and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) of collaborating with the military.
Overall, the Myanmar military’s heavy-handed tactics and the AA’s retaliatory actions have fuelled a cycle of violence, resulting in significant civilian casualties and a deteriorating security situation in the region. The ongoing hostilities suggest a turbulent future for Rakhine State, as the AA’s advances challenge military authority and threaten further ethnic conflict.[44] Additionally, the evolving dynamics between factions in Western Myanmar are likely to further fragment the political landscape, with shifting alliances, such as between the RSO and the military, altering power balances and increasing tensions. With the potential for large-scale violence and instability, the situation calls for urgent international attention and humanitarian support.
Technological Trends
Drone Warfare
The use of drones has emerged as a key factor in the Myanmar conflict.[45] Anti-junta forces in 2024 demonstrated increasing adoption and sophistication of drone warfare tactics. This included drone strikes against military leaders – including a notable incident targeting the military’s stronghold of Naypyidaw[46] – as well as ambushing reinforcements and logistics convoys.[47] This trend parallels the NUG’s decision in May 2023 to increase its focus on drone warfare, allocating a portion of its budget towards procurement and training for its specialised PDF drone unit, the Federal Wings.[48] According to the IISS Conflict Map, 556 drone strikes were conducted by anti-junta forces between May 2023 to July 2024, as opposed to 332 drone strikes between February 2022 to April 2023.[49] Furthermore, anti-junta forces have reportedly deployed “sophisticated armed quadcopters”, and demonstrated their familiarity with advanced swarm tactics to devastating effect during Operation 1027.[50]
Unsurprisingly, the military in 2024 also chose to step up its procurement and adoption of drones. The military has reportedly expanded its drone fleet with both modified commercial drones as well as relatively advanced models such as armed CH-3 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), allegedly sourced from China and Russia.[51] Reports also indicate that the military has “become better at using” these drones.[52] This represents a shift in the conflict towards leveraging technological advancements in order to break the ongoing stalemates.[53]
3D-Printed Firearms
The anti-junta resistance continued to produce and use 3D-printed firearms in 2024. As noted by experts, these firearms are generally not used in major operations – rather, they are used in training as well as in raids in which anti-junta forces attempt to obtain commercial firearms.[54] Going forward, one trend to look out for is the opportunity for anti-junta forces to expand 3D-printing operations to other equipment that might be in short supply, such as modifications and bomblets for drone warfare[55] as well as parts for IEDs.[56]
Morale and Internal Dynamics
Junta Governance and Morale
With military forces stretched thin, the junta government in 2024 began conscription efforts to shore up its manpower losses. In February 2024, it introduced a new draft law mandating that all men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 must serve mandatory military service.[57] This draft law was subsequently bolstered by similar legislation, including a separate conscription effort in which men up to the age of 65 are forcibly recruited to serve in local militia groups.[58]
This development has caused an increase in public grievances against the junta government, with those affected by the conscription laws seeking ways to evade the draft.[59] Some analysts have also pointed to the conscription efforts as an indicator of the military’s increasing loss of control and a contributor to its image as a “source of instability” within the country.[60] In an indication of shifting sentiments, a previously pro-military monk, Pauk Ko Taw, took the step of publicly criticising the military for its forced recruitment.[61] However, it should be noted that some EAOs have also allegedly engaged in forced recruitment, with accusations naming the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the AA as perpetrators.[62]
With regards to military morale, there have been reports – mainly from anti-junta media sources – of defections within the lower ranks, allegedly due to loss in morale, poor training and disregard from the military leadership.[63] However, there remains no concrete indication of imminent collapse within the military structure, or of soldier-led mutinies or a countercoup. This aligns with long-standing assessments by experts on the military, who point to its general cohesive structure and internal loyalty, particularly amongst veterans who have been a part of its culture for decades, as well as the economic interests of higher-ranking military members who serve as a privileged class within Myanmar’s society.[64]
Inter-Group Cooperation and Coordination in the Anti-Junta Resistance
Among the NUG and the PDFs it established following the 2021 military crackdown, there have been major indicators that coordination and structural cohesion have increased in 2024. In April 2024, a Dawei-based PDF engaged in the killing of civilian informants, contravening NUG directives. This elicited not only strong condemnation, but also promises of prosecution from the NUG.[65] This stands in contrast to past incidents in which the NUG remained unable to enforce its own internal rules against civilian killings.[66]
However, inter-group cooperation and coordination within the anti-junta resistance remain questionable, especially on a wider strategic level. While the formation of the Brotherhood Alliance – which consists of the AA, the MNDAA and the TNLA – prior to Operation 1027 highlights a significant case of inter-group strategic cooperation within the anti-junta resistance, it should be noted that the EAOs involved have been operating closely together since 2014. As such, the formation of the Brotherhood Alliance was “unquestionably unique in Myanmar’s context”.[67]
Meanwhile, the NUG and the various EAOs have yet to reach any significant progress in the realisation of its stated goal for a federal democratic system, largely due to a lack of trust between the EAOs themselves as well as between the EAOs and the NUG, which many ethnic minorities still see as “Burma-centric”.[68] As such, most EAOs remain focused on consolidating themselves within their traditional territories, rather than taking part in operations outside of these territories.[69] Many experts have pointed to a growing risk of balkanisation, or territorial fragmentation, within Myanmar, especially as the various EAOs manoeuvre within the current strategic landscape to maximise the gains for their ethnic communities.[70]
Economic Impact and Supply Chains
Myanmar’s economic situation remains in dire straits due to the ongoing conflict and trade instability. Key sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing in particular have been severely disrupted.[71] With increasing inflation due to disrupted supply chains,[72] the public is facing skyrocketing prices for basic goods such as food and fuel, resulting in significant economic hardship.[73] Efforts by the junta government to stabilise the currency through price controls have thus far been unsuccessful, further exacerbating the issue.[74]
Trade has been similarly affected, largely due to the loss of border trade crossings in parts of the country. With the seizure of many of these border crossings by the EAOs, trade relations have fragmented due to a lack of overall coordination, leading to an overall reduction in trade volume.[75] It should be noted, however, that the junta government is still reportedly receiving imports of jet fuel, allowing it to conduct airstrikes. Such importation suggests that current international sanctions on the junta government are possibly being evaded, raising questions of complicity by various foreign powers and private sector intermediaries.[76]
Conclusion
The conflict in Myanmar remains locked in a stalemate that continues to fuel ongoing violence across the country. The anti-junta resistance has expanded its operational territory, especially through the efforts of the EAOs, while the military government retains control over key urban centres, bolstered by its air and artillery superiority. Both sides have adopted emerging tactics, particularly with regard to drone warfare.
Both camps, however, remain stymied by complex internal dynamics. The junta’s conscription policies have exacerbated civilian grievances and fuelled tensions, while resistance forces struggle to unify politically, with ethnic divisions complicating broader cooperation. Economic instability and collapsing trade networks further complicate the situation, pushing Myanmar closer to economic collapse.
In 2025, key features of the conflict will likely be technological innovation, the cohesion or fragmentation of resistance forces, and how effectively international pressure can be applied to restrict the junta’s access to military supplies. Without significant shifts in these areas, Myanmar’s conflict is likely to continue, prolonging the humanitarian crisis and regional instability.
About the Authors
Benjamin Mok is an Associate Research Fellow and Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Citations
[1] “Myanmar’s Ethnic Armies Consolidate Strongholds as Junta Weakens, Reports Say,” Reuters, May 30, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-ethnic-armies-consolidate-strongholds-junta-weakens-reports-say-2024-05-30/.
[2] International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Myanmar Conflict Map, https://myanmar.iiss.org/.
[3] Conflict events are defined by IISS as attacks/armed clashes, remote explosive/IED incidents, air/drone strikes, crackdowns and infrastructure destruction.
[4] IISS, Myanmar Conflict Map.
[5] Yun Sun, “Operation 1027: Changing the Tides of the Myanmar Civil War?” The Brookings Institution, January 16, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/operation-1027-changing-the-tides-of-the-myanmar-civil-war/.
[6] “KIA Launches Offensive to Drive Myanmar Military From Southern Tip of Kachin State,” The Irrawaddy, May 29, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/kia-launches-offensive-to-drive-myanmar-military-from-southern-tip-of-kachin-state.html.
[7] “Junta Controls Fewer Than 100 of Myanmar’s 350 Towns: NUG,” The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/junta-controls-fewer-than-100-of-myanmars-350-towns-nug.html.
[8] These include Madaya, Taungtha and Thabeikkyin townships.
[9] “Five Myanmar Junta Soldiers Killed in Bank Ambush: Ye Urban Guerrillas,” The Irrawaddy, September 27, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/five-myanmar-junta-soldiers-killed-in-bank-ambush-ye-urban-guerrillas.html.
[10] “Myanmar Guerrilla Groups Claim Responsibility for Bombings,” Radio Free Asia, April 29, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/yangon-bombings-04292024073055.html.
[11] Nicola Williams, “Lower Myanmar: Urban Guerrillas and New Patterns of Resistance,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), May 31, 2023, https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/lower.
[12] Jonathan Head and BBC Burmese, “Myanmar’s Military-Ruled Capital Attacked by Drones,” BBC News, April 4, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68730993.
[13] “MNDAA Ambushes Junta Reinforcement Convoy Heading to Lashio, Inflicts Heavy Casualties,” Burma News International, July 31, 2024, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/mndaa-ambushes-junta-reinforcement-convoy-heading-lashio-inflicts-heavy-casualties.
[14] Maung Shwe Wah and Min Maung, “Fighting Intensifies in Southern Kachin State as Myanmar Junta Attempts to Retake Momauk,” Myanmar Now, September 4, 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/fighting-intensifies-in-southern-kachin-state-as-myanmar-junta-attempts-to-retake-momauk/.
[15] “Junta Reinforcements for Myawaddy Still Fail to Recapture KNLA’s Control over Road Access from Kawkareik,” Burma News International, May 24, 2024, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/junta-reinforcements-myawaddy-still-fail-recapture-knlas-control-over-road-access-kawkareik.
[16] “Regime Reinforcements Ambushed as Fight for Tamakhan Military Camp Intensifies,” Kachin News Group, March 6, 2024, https://kachinnews.com/2024/03/06/regime-reinforcements-ambushed-as-fight-for-tamakhan-military-camp-intensifies/.
[17] Morgan Michaels, “Myanmar’s Regime Shrinks Further Towards the Centre,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), March 2024, https://myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2024-03.
[18] “Military Shifts Strategy in Myanmar’s Far South,” Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/strategy-11012023112206.html.
[19] IISS, Myanmar Conflict Map.
[20] Anthony Davis, “The Dangers of Guerrilla Triumphalism in Myanmar,” Asia Times, December 6, 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/12/the-dangers-of-guerrilla-triumphalism-in-myanmar/.
[21] Radio Free Asia, “Military Shifts Strategy in Myanmar’s Far South.”
[22] “Review of Myanmar Army’s Five Cut Strategy,” Security Risks Asia, March 17, 2024, https://www.security-risks.com/post/review-of-myanmar-army-s-five-cut-strategy.
[23] Nai Aue Mon and Maggi Quadrini, “Return of the ‘Four Cuts’ in Myanmar’s Mon State,” Asia Times, December 5, 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/12/return-of-the-four-cuts-in-myanmars-mon-state.
[24] Radio Free Asia, “Military Shifts Strategy in Myanmar’s Far South.”
[25] Emily Fishbein, Nu Nu Lusan and Vahpual, “What is the Myanmar Military’s ‘Four Cuts’ Strategy?” Al Jazeera, July 6, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/5/what-is-the-myanmar-militarys-four-cuts-strategy.
[26] Nai Aue Mon and Quadrini, “Return of the ‘Four Cuts’ in Myanmar’s Mon State.”
[27] Roe Kyaw, “AA Seizes Thandwe Airport Near Rakhine’s Ngapali Beach, Local Sources Say,” The Irrawaddy, June 24, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/aa-seizes-thandwe-airport-near-rakhines-ngapali-beach-local-sources-say.html.
[28] “Rebel Army Captures Major Myanmar Navy Training Base,” Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aa-rakhine-navy-base-09092024072011.html.
[29] “Myanmar Rebel Group Claims Control of Town Bordering India, Bangladesh,” Reuters, January 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-rebel-group-claims-control-town-bordering-india-bangladesh-2024-01-15/; Grant Peck, “Arakan Army Resistance Force Says It Has Taken Control of a Strategic Township in Western Myanmar,” The Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-arakan-army-paletwa-chin-rakhine-e124bb0ff3dbfef6c84b39f141e972ca.
[30] “AA Claims Seizure of Buthidaung Near Bangladesh Border,” The Irrawaddy, May 18, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20240529073920/https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/aa-claims-seizure-of-buthidaung-near-bangladesh-border.html; “Myanmar’s Junta Loses Another Town to Arkan Army in Rakhine State,” The Irrawaddy, March 18, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmars-junta-loses-another-town-to-arkan-army-in-rakhine-state.html.
[31] “In Myanmar, The War For Rakhine Has Reached Its Southernmost Tip,” The Irrawaddy, August 19, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/in-myanmar-the-war-for-rakhine-has-reached-its-southernmost-tip.html.
[32] Ali M Latifi, “The Arakan Army Responds to Rohingya Abuse Accusations in Myanmar”, The New Humanitarian, May 29, 2024, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2024/05/29/arakan-army-responds-rohingya-abuse-accusations-myanmar.
[33] “Arakan Army Vows to Fight for Total Control of Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Radio Free Asia, March 3, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aa-03042024163837.html.
[34] Latifi, “The Arakan Army Responds to Rohingya Abuse Accusations in Myanmar.”
[35] See Ruma Paul et al., “Myanmar’s Junta Terrorises, Then Rebels Burn a Rohingya Town,” Reuters, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/MYANMAR-CONFLICT/ROHINGYA/dwpkzqnwlvm/; Nathan Ruser, “They Left a Trail of Ash: Decoding the Arakan Army’s Arson Attacks in the Rohingya Heartland,” The Strategist, June 13, 2024, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/they-left-a-trail-of-ash-decoding-the-arakan-armys-arson-attacks-in-the-rohingya-heartland/; “Episode 345: ‘It Felt Like Hell on Earth’: Say Buthidaung Burning Eyewitnesses,” Doh Athan, YouTube video, August 4, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoxmtW_OXJQ.
[36] Morgan Michaels, “Threat of Communal Violence Grows in Western and Central Myanmar,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), May 2024, https://myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2024-05.
[37] Laetitia van den Assum, “Out of the Spotlight, Myanmar’s Rohingya Face Worst Violence in 7 Years,” United States Institute for Peace, September 25, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/out-spotlight-myanmars-rohingya-face-worst-violence-7-years.
[38] “Myanmar: Caught in the Crossfire in Rakhine,” NHK WORLD-JAPAN, September 17, 2024, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/videos/20240917212618684/.
[39] Suza Uddin and Abby Seiff, “Terror in Rohingya Refugee Camp as Boys Kidnapped to Fight in Myanmar,” Radio Free Asia, August 29, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingya-refugee-camp-coxs-bazar-junta-arsa-rso-08282024143335.html.
[40] Kyaw Lwin Oo, Sann Maw Aung and Khet Mar, “Rohingya Ordered by Myanmar Officer to ‘Fight for Our Faith’,” Radio Free Asia, April 4, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingya-conscription-04092024152737.html.
[41] “Rohingya Villages Burned By AA in Maungdaw,” Rohingya Vision, August 29, 2024, https://rohingyavision.com/rohingya-villages-burned-by-aa-in-maungdaw/; “Arakan Army Forcibly Recruiting Youths in Arakan,” Rohingya Vision, September 22, 2024, https://rohingyavision.com/arakan-army-forcibly-recruiting-youths-in-arakan/.
[42] “Drone Attack Kills Over 200 Rohingyas in Myanmar,” New Age, August 12, 2024, https://www.newagebd.net/post/south-asia/242334/drone-attack-kills-over-200-rohingyas-in-myanmar.
[43] Devjyot Ghoshal, “On Myanmar’s Frontline, Rohingya Fighters and Junta Face a Common Enemy,” Reuters, September 6, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-frontline-rohingya-fighters-junta-face-common-enemy-2024-09-06/.
[44] The AA is also involved in intra-ethnic tensions in Chin State, supporting the Chin Brotherhood from southern Chin against the NUG-aligned Chin National Front which is based in the north of Chin. Ethnic Chins in AA-controlled Paletwa have also accused the AA of abuse and mistreatment. See Angshuman Choudhury, “‘Two Lions in a Cave’: Revolutionary Divisions in Chin State,” Frontier Myanmar, August 28, 2024, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/two-lions-in-a-cave-revolutionary-divisions-in-chin-state/.
[45] Prior to 2024, drone strikes were already a long-standing response by the anti-junta resistance to the military’s air power superiority. Meanwhile, the military had by mid-2023 already issued drone jammers to its ground forces, which the anti-junta resistance claimed to have circumvented by September 2023. See “Myanmar’s Resistance Says It Has Cracked Junta’s Anti-Drone Jammers,” Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/anti-drone-jammers-09272023121251.html.
[46] David Scott Mathieson, “Drone Strikes on Myanmar Military Capitol Signify Deteriorating Situation,” Asia Sentinel, https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/drone-strikes-myanmar-military-capitol.
[47] “Myanmar Junta Loses Another Town, Dozens of Soldiers in Four Days of Resistance Attacks,” The Irrawaddy, January 15, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-loses-another-town-dozens-of-soldiers-in-four-days-of-resistance-attacks.html.
[48] “NUG to Assist Myanmar’s Federal Wings Drone Warfare,” Mizzima, May 14, 2023, https://www.mizzima.com/article/nug-assist-myanmars-federal-wings-drone-warfare.
[49] IISS, Myanmar Conflict Map.
[50] Davis, “The Dangers of Guerrilla Triumphalism in Myanmar.”
[51] Morgan Michaels, “Uninhabited Inroads in Myanmar’s Civil War,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), September 23, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/09/uninhabited-inroads-in-myanmars-civil-war/.
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