Assessing the Gaza War’s Impact on Salafi-Jihadist Messaging in MENA, Following Resistance Axis Losses
Amidst an all-consuming conflict between Hamas, Hezbollah, Ansar Allah (colloquially known as the Houthis), Iran and Israel, subsuming neighbouring countries over the past year, Salafi-jihadist groups such as the Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliate Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have significantly stepped up their messaging and propaganda efforts,[1] in a bid to inspire attacks and would-be plotters globally.[2] The ability to tap into the zeitgeist around the war in Gaza, Israeli military action,[3] high-level assassinations of rival groups[4] and an increasing civilian casualty count in the tens of thousands,[5] has not just been a boon for propagandists,[6] but has also been part and parcel of the co-opting of the Palestinian cause for their messaging for decades.[7]
Trends
The Palestinian Cause
Salafi-jihadist messaging on the Palestinian cause is not new in any sense of the word. Released in 1998, Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders” made Palestine its number three reason to wage jihad against the United States (US). Scholars Thomas Heggehammer and Joas Wagemakers reviewed AQ texts between 1990 and 2002, and found 158 references to Palestine and concluded that it was primarily used as a “motivational mechanism”.[8] Matthew Levitt, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted nearly every public statement by Osama bin Laden since 1990 had made reference to Palestine in some shape or form.[9] This led to one of the group’s most vaunted tacticians, Abu Musab al-Suri, claiming bin Laden’s use of the Palestinian cause had “advanced jihadism to a new level”.[10]
Bin Laden and al-Suri were of course comfortable using the Palestinian cause to advance their ideological and strategic aims, just as the Islamic State (IS) and its current leadership have done over the course of 2024.[11] Yet, have these efforts led to what al-Suri envisioned in the region as “jihadism at a new level”? If in fact the statement was taken at face value and applied to attacks by IS and AQ in the Middle East and North Africa, the answer would be a no. Both AQ and IS are shells of their former selves in the region, despite a resurgence of attacks by the latter in Syria and Iraq,[12] and the ability of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to hold its ground in Yemen.[13] Both groups are experiencing strategic successes in Central Asia[14] as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa,[15] including the re-establishment of AQ training camps in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule and IS’ persistent attacks across the Sahel and West Africa. However, a slew of targeted strikes and arrests on IS in Iraq and Syria by the US, Iraq and Turkey have likely tempered some of their capabilities in the region.[16]
AQ and IS Exploiting the Gaza War
Regardless, this has not stopped both AQ and IS propaganda arms from messaging around the war in Gaza,[17] launching both online and offline campaigns to inspire lone actors, much of which has emanated from the groups’ leadership as well as their numerous official and unofficial propaganda arms. For instance, AQ’s supposed leader Sayf al-Adl, believed to be on house arrest in Iran, has produced more than nine instalments of a paper series titled This is Gaza, in which he has argued that “the events in Gaza are the final nail in the coffin of the colonialist, Crusader-Zionist West”.[18] Similarly, AQAP’s leader Khubaib al-Sudani has called for lone-actor attacks in the West, and specifically in the US, in the wake of October 7, which he has compared in terms of significance to the 9/11 attacks.[19] AQAP’s Malahem Media arm has produced more than 80 “Inspire Tweets” amidst these calls,[20] referencing Gaza and Israel in calls for attacks in the Middle East and the West.[21] IS has followed suit, with its spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari declaring in March 2024 that in the wake of the war in Gaza the group was to “renew and repeat [it]s incitement for the lone lions to strive intensely to target the Crusaders and Jews in every place”.[22] Numerous posters, magazines, articles and videos produced by both IS’ official and unofficial propaganda arms have since called for targeting Western as well as Middle East governments for their complicity in the war.
Much of this messaging has passed through channels affiliated with either AQ or IS networks online, such as Rocket.Chat forums affiliated with the groups, but has similarly appeared on popular social media platforms such as Facebook and TikTok. In July 2024, for instance, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) found 55 videos on TikTok featuring AQ and IS ideologues, using a simple randomised search for their names; together, the videos received more than 1.1 million views.[23] IS has not only been focused on propaganda efforts, of course. As the scholar Aaron Zelin noted, there have been 16 IS-linked plots against Israel since October 7, 2023, two of which likely had handlers inside Syria.[24] Yet, despite these developments, IS has tempered its own prognosis of attacking Israel directly, as its adversaries, such as Hezbollah and those in the “Axis of Resistance”, continue to face setbacks, stating “it was not the time for an all-out jihadist confrontation with Israel”.[25]
Iran’s Resistance Axis
While AQ and al-Suri’s vision of jihad may not have reached “new levels” and IS’ continued efforts to incite attacks globally have been tempered in some regards, Iran-aligned armed groups such as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen, have seen their messaging and worldviews mainstreamed in the wake of the conflict. Despite significant command structure blows, such as the recent assassination of Yahya Sinwar, the leader of the Hamas government in Gaza, and the deaths of longtime Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and members of the Hezbollah leadership council, the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance, otherwise known as the Resistance Axis, has found its version of jihad worldwide talking points. Even in the face of the assassinations of key ideologues, commanders and strategists linked to Hezbollah and Hamas, these groups continue to experience notable popular support online,[26] with hundreds of thousands of views on content grieving for the leadership of both groups and daily exultations with regard to their attacks on Israel.[27] Similarly, rocket attacks by the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah have yet to subside in the wake of these key losses and seem to have entrenched some of their positions further, despite continued Israeli assaults on both groups.[28]
Much of this can be attributed to the groups’ direct involvement in the October 7, 2023 attack, in which Hamas launched the largest ever terror attack on Israeli soil, and the subsequent aftermath, along with the phalanxes of accounts spread across social media platforms such as X, Facebook, Telegram and TikTok, as well as the websites linked to the various groups in the Resistance Axis. Following the October 7 attacks, the Telegram accounts for Hamas, the al-Qassam Brigades and its leadership grew by tenfold.[29] The Tech Transparency Project found Hezbollah accounts on X – including one attributed to the now deceased Hassan Nasrallah – which were verified by the platform, ultimately prioritising their posts and replies.[30] The Houthis’ expansive digital ecosystem includes similarly verified accounts on X with hundreds of thousands of followers.[31] Thus, these groups’ ability to reach more audiences and grow their respective social media footprints in comparison to AQ and IS, has been incomparable.
Fragile Socio-Political Environment
AQ and IS still see an advantage to messaging in an environment where their messaging is likely drowned out by rival groups, specifically around the perceived complicity or ineffectuality of governments across the region to stop or intervene in the war. This long-standing narrative by both groups seeks to highlight the fragility and incompatibility of regimes in zones of influence such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. By focusing on taghut,[32] or “tyrant”, states, the groups hope the ongoing decimation of Gaza spurs attacks on Arab governments that can be leveraged by either group While that may be where the groups converge in relation to their messaging, they diverge on support for the groups involved in the fighting, most notably Hamas. AQ has embraced Hamas as an extension of itself around the October 7 attack; meanwhile, IS has largely shunned Hamas in lieu of its own ideological “purity”. Instead, IS has sought to position itself as the vanguard of “liberating Palestine”, with a view that both Hamas and AQ are “apostates” for their support from Iran. As scholar Aymenn al-Tamimi noted, “there is no evidence that the Gaza war has brought them nearer to realization of these goals, whether in terms of strengthening the affiliates or bringing the organizations in general a significantly increased level of popular support in the Muslim world”.[33]
Even more fragile are the environments where there is direct influence of Resistance Axis groups, given the likelihood of internal conflict amidst power vacuums in groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. As the author, analyst and commentator Hassan Hassan noted, “[Hamas leader] Sinwar’s death would not have been as significant had it not been so close to the killing of his predecessor Ismail Haniyeh in July as well as Hezbollah’s Nasrallah and almost all key public faces of the Iran axis like Soleimani in 2020. The *optics* is that of an edifice collapsing”.[34]
Conclusion
Despite these narratives, both AQ and IS face an uphill battle in inspiring “jihadism at a new level” simply because they have been out-messaged and their capacity to message has been degraded by rival groups. Throughout 2024, and likely 2025, the groups will continue to use Palestine as a rhetorical device to spur attacks or further seed their ideological aims. This strategy may spur lone-actor attacks in the West, but it will not shift the narrative landscape in AQ and IS’ favour in the face of the Resistance Axis, the latter of which has gained a relatively stronger position regionally with its messaging and high-profile losses in the conflict with Israel. AQ and IS may see Palestine as a means to an end, but their ability to turn that into strategic wins which could alter their respective images regionally has yet to come and likely never will. For now, the idea of “jihadism at a new level” remains out of grasp, even if they claim it is not the case.
As the year rounded out, over 11 days at the end of November and through December 8, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ran through Bashar al-Assad’s forces, as Russian and Iranian-backed armed groups retreated, and Türkiye-backed rebels took over Syria. The move, swift and decisive, ended one of the longest-running authoritarian regimes of the modern Middle East, and dealt another blow to IS and AQ’s brand of jihadism, signaling, at least for now, a new era of nationalist and technocratic jihad, framed around the ability to not just fight, but similarly govern. The victory of HTS and aligned rebels was a similarly decisive victory over the Iran-backed militia groups of the Resistance Axis. Just what this holds for the region remains to be unseen.
The Resistance Axis faces an unclear future with command structures obliterated through Israeli military action, though the groups’ ability to continue strikes against Israel through the use of drones and rockets continues relatively unabated.[35] This capability, coupled with continued messaging in support of the attacks and the daily drumbeat of casualties out of Gaza, have made the groups digital folk heroes with an amalgamation of regional and international support online. The ability to continue this level of pressure on Israel,[36] weighed against the civilian death toll in Lebanon and Gaza, remains both a challenge and an opportunity for the groups, who are using the attacks to highlight an inherently corrupt international order.[37] Whether this can translate to support for the Resistance Axis on the ground, beyond its current state of play, is a shaky premise. As shown earlier in 2024 by the Arab Barometer, the long-standing and largest repository of publicly available data on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)’s citizens, support for Iran and its various proxies in the region is not as strong as believed.[38] Recent events may challenge this perception. Until then, the groups will continue to use the wars to challenge the prevailing international order and highlight their commitment to fighting Israel as a popular cause rather than a means of survival. What is clear for now is that the region continues to burn, civilians continue to die and destabilisation hangs like a pall over the Middle East.[39]
About The Author
Moustafa Ayad is the Executive Director for Africa, the Middle East and Asia (AMEA) at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), headquartered in London, the United Kingdom.
Citations
[1] Colin Clarke, Lucas Webber and Peter Smith, “ISKP’s Latest Campaign: Expanded Propaganda and External Operations,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), June 27, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/06/27/iskps-latest-campaign-expanded-propaganda-and-external-operations/; John Hudson, “Gaza War a Recruiting Boon for Terrorists, U.S. Intelligence Shows,” The Washington Post, July 5, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/05/gaza-terrorism-israel-us-intelligence/.
[2] “US Intelligence Agencies on High Alert After European Terror Attacks,” ABC News, August 28, 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/US/video/us-intelligence-agencies-high-alert-after-european-terror-113211642.
[3] “Explainer: The Dahiya Doctrine & Israel’s Use of Disproportionate Force,” The Institute for Middle East Understanding, July 31, 2024, https://imeu.org/article/the-dahiya-doctrine-and-israels-use-of-disproportionate-force.
[4] Peter Beaumont, “Impact of Hezbollah Assassinations May Take Months to Emerge,” The Guardian, September 29, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/29/impact-of-hezbollah-assassinations-may-take-months-to-emerge.
[5] David Gritten, “UN Condemns ‘Large Number of Civilian Casualties’ in North Gaza,” BBC News, October 14, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y5zy1vvmlo.
[6] Caleb Weiss, “Al-Qaeda’s North and West African Branches Respond to the Hamas-Led Invasion of Israel,” FDD’s Long War Journal, October 13, 2023, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/10/al-qaedas-north-and-west-african-branches-respond-to-the-hamas-led-invasion-of-israel.php.
[7] Aaron Zelin, “The Gaza War Has Jump-Started a Weakened al-Qaeda,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 4, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-war-has-jump-started-weakened-al-qaeda.
[8] Thomas Heggehammer and Joas Wagemakers, “The Palestine Effect: The Role of Palestinians in the
Transnational Jihad Movement,” Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 53, No. 3-4 (2013), pp. 281-314, https://doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334P0001.
[9] Matthew Levitt, “Israel as an Al-Qa`ida Target – Sorting Rhetoric From Reality,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 10 (2009), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/israel-as-an-al-qaida-target-sorting-rhetoric-from-reality/. Bin Laden, now dead for almost 15 years, had told his daughter back in 1986 that “we ought to strike inside America” because of Palestine. See Nelly Lahoud, The Bin Laden Papers: How the Abbottabad Raid Revealed the Truth about al-Qaeda, Its Leader and His Family (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022), p. 124.
[10] Lahoud, The Bin Laden Papers, p. 124.
[11] Aymenn al-Tamimi, “’In the Time of the Massacre’ – Islamic State Editorial on Gaza and Jihad,” Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications, August 28, 2024, https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/in-the-time-of-the-massacre-islamic; Samar Batrawi, “What ISIS Talks About When It Talks About Palestine,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2015-10-28/what-isis-talks-about-when-it-talks-about-palestine.
[12] Abbas Kadhim, “ISIS Fell, but the Conditions That Created the Terrorist Group Still Exist in Iraq,” The Atlantic Council, June 10, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/iraq-isis-corruption-economy-mosul/.
[13] Tom Joscelyn, “Wake Up Call: UN Security Council’s Report on ISIS and al-Qaeda,” Just Security, August 5, 2024, https://www.justsecurity.org/98429/security-council-report-isis-qaeda/.
[14] Vibhu Mishra, “UN Counter-Terrorism Chief Highlights Da’esh Surge, Calling for Global Action,” United Nations – UN News, August 8, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152986.
[15] Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: Al Qaeda’s Da’wah Campaign in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, October 19, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/10/analysis-al-qaedas-dawah-campaign-in-west-africa.php.
[16] United States Central Command, “Iraqi Security Forces Target, Kill Multiple Senior ISIS Members, With Support From CJTF-OIR Forces,” press release, October 23, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3943013/iraqi-security-forces-target-kill-multiple-senior-isis-members-with-support-fro/; United States Central Command, “Iraqi Security Forces, Partnered with Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Conduct Targeted Strike that Killed Senior ISIS Leader,” press release, October 18, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3939218/iraqi-security-forces-partnered-with-combined-joint-task-force-operation-inhere/; United States Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Conducts Airstrikes Against Multiple ISIS Camps in Syria,” press release, October 12, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3934398/us-central-command-conducts-airstrikes-against-multiple-isis-camps-in-syria/; “Suspect Linked to Daesh Bomb-Making Arrested in Istanbul,” Turkiye Today, October 21, 2024, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/turkiye/suspect-linked-to-daesh-bomb-making-arrested-in-istanbul-68057/.
[17] Christopher Wray, “Director Wray’s Remarks at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), March 4, 2024, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/director-wrays-remarks-at-west-point.
[18] Kevin Jackson (@alleyesonjihad), “Two days ago, al-Qa’ida central released a new piece by Sayf al-Adl. This is the 9th installment in his writing series titled ‘This is Gaza’,” X, July 18, 2024 , https://x.com/alleyesonjihad/status/1813949009586966959.
[19] Elisabeth Kendall (@Dr_E_Kendall), “#AlQaeda in #Yemen marks 9/11 anniversary with new 35-minute video featuring Ibrahim al-Qusi; Stresses parallels between 9/11 & 7Oct attack on #Israel; Casts America as Enemy no.1…,” X, September 11, 2024, https://x.com/Dr_E_Kendall/status/1833852933475057838.
[20] “Al-Qaeda’s “Inspire Tweets” Continue Comparison Between 9/11 and 7 October,” BBC Monitoring, September 15, 2024, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002e4o.
[21] Ahmad Mukhtar, “The Taliban Vowed to Cut Ties With al Qaeda, But the Terror Group Appears to Be Growing in Afghanistan,” CBS News, Feburary 1, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-taliban-al-qaeda-growing/.
[22] Aymenn al-Tamimi, “New Speech by Islamic State Spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari: ‘By God this matter will be fulfilled’,” Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications, March 30, 2024, https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/new-speech-by-islamic-state-spokesman-c7c?utm_source=publication-search.
[23] Moustafa Ayad, “The ‘Original Sounds’ of Terrorist Leaders: A TikTok Feature Enables Terrorist Content to Flourish,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, July 18, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-original-sounds-of-terrorist-leaders-a-tiktok-feature-enables-terrorist-content-to-flourish/.
[24] Aaron Zelin (@azelin), “5 Israelis linked to ISIS arrested for plotting car-bombing of Tel Aviv’s Azrieli Mall https://timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/5-israelis-arrested-for-plotting-car-bombing-of-tel-avivs-azrieli-mall-linked-to-isis/…,” X, October 10, 2024, https://x.com/azelin/status/1844371036822962637.
[25] Mina al-Lami (@MinaLami), “2/ The group said the time was not right now for an all-out jihadist confrontation against Israel, and that until then, ‘Muslims’ need to focus on fighting the Shia as well as ‘apostate’ armies in the…,” X, September 27, 2024, https://x.com/Minalami/status/1839654364576727343.
[26] Omar Abdel-Baqui and Summer Said, “In Death, Hamas Leader May Have Won Wider Support Than When He Was Alive,” The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-death-hamas-leader-may-have-won-wider-support-than-when-he-was-alive-7d3b5ef5.
[27] Simon Speakman Cordall and AJLabs, “How Does Hezbollah Function – And What Arsenal Does It Have?,” Al Jazeera, October 1, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/10/1/how-does-hezbollah-function-and-what-arsenal-does-it-have.
[28] Seth Franzen, “Hezbollah Continues to Fire Large Barrages of Rockets at Israel,” FDD’s Long War Journal, October 24, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/10/hezbollah-continues-to-fire-large-barrages-of-rockets-at-israel.php.
[29] Donie O’Sullivan and Brian Fung, “Hamas’ Social Media Following Has Skyrocketed Since Its Attack. America Is Powerless to Stop It,” CNN, October 17, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/16/tech/hamas-telegram/index.html.
[30] “X Provides Premium Perks to Hezbollah, Other U.S.-Sanctioned Groups,” Tech Transparency Project, February 14, 2024, https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/x-provides-premium-perks-to-hezbollah-other-us-sanctioned-groups.
[31] “The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, May 28, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem/.
[32] Aymenn al-Tamimi, “Islamic State Editorial on Media and the Masses,” Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications, February 11, 2022, https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-editorial-on-media?utm_source=publication-search.
[33] Aymenn al-Tamimi, “The Problem With ‘Return of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda’ Media Stories,” Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications, October 18, 2024, https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-problem-with-return-of-the-islamic.
[34] Hassan Hassan (@hxhassan), “Sinwar’s death wouldn’t have been as significant had it not been so close to the killing of his predecessor Ismail Haniyeh in July as well as Hezbollah’s Nasrallah…,” X, October 17, 2024, https://x.com/hxhassan/status/1846911962258559096.
[35] Seth Frantzman, “Multi-Front Drone Threats Against Israel Increase,” FDD’s Long War Journal, October 22, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/10/multi-front-drone-threats-against-israel-increase.php.
[36] Paul Millar, “Israel’s Attacks Have Devastated Hezbollah. How Is It Still Fighting Back?” France24, October 24, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241024-israel-s-attacks-have-devastated-hezbollah-how-is-it-still-fighting-back.
[37] Patrick Wintour, “Iran Calls Missile Attack on Israel ‘Legal, Rational and Legitimate’,” The Guardian, October 1, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/iran-calls-missile-attack-on-israel-legal-rational-and-legitimate.
[38] Barometer Wave VII (2022-2023) revealed that few citizens in Sudan (30 percent), Lebanon (24 percent), Mauritania (23 percent), Iraq (16 percent) and Jordan (six percent) agreed with the statement, “It is good for the Arab region that Hezbollah is getting involved in regional politics”. See Salma Al-Shami, “Iran’s Position on Palestine Is Not Enough to Win the Favor of MENA Citizens,” Arab Barometer, July 31, 2024, https://www.arabbarometer.org/2024/07/irans-position-on-palestine-is-not-enough-to-win-the-favor-of-mena-citizens/
[39] Nassim Badani, “Israel Killed Nasrallah. Lebanon Will Burn Because of It,” New Lines Magazine, October 21, 2024, https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/israel-killed-nasrallah-lebanon-will-burn-because-of-it/. “For Nasrallah, protecting the Assad regime was essential for maintaining the Axis of Resistance against Israel. That axis, which linked Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and allied militias, has been the backbone of anti-Israeli efforts in the region for decades. Without Assad, the axis crumbles. Without Nasrallah, it may collapse entirely.” See Hassan Hassan and Kareem Shaheen, “End of an Era: What Hassan Nasrallah’s Assassination Spells for the Middle East,” New Lines Magazine, September 28, 2024, https://newlinesmag.com/argument/end-of-an-era-what-hassan-nasrallahs-assassination-spells-for-the-middle-east/.
