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Humanitarian Intervention
and Peacekeeping as Issues for
Asia-Pacific Security

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Abstract

This paper examines trends in humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific in the light of the increasing emphasis on these issues at the global level. Particular attention is given to the position adopted by the major Asia-Pacific powers (China, Japan, the United States), ASEAN and Australia. The involvement of the United Nations and non-state actors is also considered. Cambodia and East Timor provide examples of the way in which the various factors affecting humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific are relevant in particular situations. Apart from power considerations, commitment to democratic values is an important factor affecting policies adopted towards humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. While most Asia-Pacific states adopt a cautious approach to this general issue, it is likely to be a continuing concern in the future, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. This concern could lead to various forms of external involvement but not necessarily full-scale intervention.

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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING AS ISSUES FOR ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

In the post-Cold War era issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping have assumed greater importance in international politics than was previously the case. While clearly there are important elements of continuity with the Cold War period, in many respects these issues are part of a 'new' security situation. Conflicts such as those relating to Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone have been well to the fore in helping to define the changed circumstances of international politics. Against the background of what has been happening in relation to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in more global terms, this paper gives particular attention to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The key question concerns the extent to which trends at the global level have been reflected in the Asia-Pacific. How does one explain the dynamics of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific?

The argument presented in this paper is that Asia-Pacific countries have been cautious about expanding the scope of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping within their region. Generally they adhere to a more traditional definition of sovereignty. Where an expanded definition of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping has prevailed it has often been on the basis of the involvement of Western powers in relation to the particular issue. A complication here is that the Asia-Pacific by definition includes Western countries, most notably the United States, but also Canada, Australia and New Zealand. We are not talking simply about East Asia or the subregions of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. The involvement of Western countries means that norms within the Asia-Pacific are pushed in the direction of norms prevailing or developing within the North Atlantic region. However, developments in this direction stem not only from the Western countries in the region. There is increasing recognition by a range of Asia-Pacific countries that growing interdependence (extending well beyond humanitarian and peacekeeping issues) requires greater international cooperation and modifications in traditional understandings of sovereignty. There is also pressure emanating from within Asian as well as Western countries in favour of international regimes that give higher priority to upholding human

rights. This pressure can be related to the process of democratization occurring in a number of Asian countries. In both Western and Asian countries the involvement of concerned publics often appears to encourage a more activist stance in relation to human rights issues. International regimes sympathetic to human rights would, among other things, be more open to a broader understanding of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. While the focus in this paper is on the policies of governments, this is not to ignore the influence of a range of factors on those policies, including the impact of public opinion and various political organizations and movements. It might be argued that September 11 has weakened the prospects for the emergence of an Asia-Pacific regime more sympathetic to human rights. Even without this development it appears that situations where humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific might be considered are very limited. It is more likely that lower-level interventions or involvement by external actors will occur.

In elaborating this argument I will firstly provide an overview of the way in which approaches to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping have developed in the post-Cold War era. Secondly, I will assess the position of key Asia-Pacific players in relation to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping: China, Japan, the United States (in terms of Asia-Pacific issues), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia. The role of non-state actors is also relevant at this point. Thirdly, I will consider Cambodia and East Timor as the most significant of the Asia-Pacific situations where issues of humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping have been involved. Finally, I will give some attention to the future prospects for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific.

Initially it is necessary to define 'humanitarian intervention' and 'peacekeeping' for the purposes of this paper. Taking 'peacekeeping' first, during the Cold War this usually referred to operations conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Forces operating under UN command could be deployed as part of the process for implementing a peace agreement between previously warring parties. During the post-Cold War era, the concept of 'expanded' or 'enhanced' peacekeeping has become widely accepted. With this version of peacekeeping it provides a means of dealing with a problem, rather than being part of the modalities for implementing an agreed settlement. Thus operations are mounted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the Security Council usually determining that there is 'a threat to peace and security' and authorizing the use of 'all necessary means' to carry out its

mandate. Peacekeeping in this context can be conducted by 'coalitions of the willing' rather than being under UN command and control.[1]

Expanded peacekeeping can be a means for implementing humanitarian intervention but the two concepts are not necessarily one and the same. In its broadest sense humanitarian intervention could refer to any intervention designed to influence a situation where human rights are threatened within a particular sovereignty. This could involve diplomatic pressure or the provision of humanitarian assistance to help relieve a situation.[2] Most commonly, however, humanitarian intervention involves the use of force and the absence of consent by the relevant sovereign power. Normally the Security Council has authorized the intervention, although the Kosovo war in 1999 has raised questions as to whether this is strictly necessary in all cases. Humanitarian intervention can be carried out by a 'coalition of the willing' or it might be run directly by the United Nations. Most expanded peacekeeping operations during the post-Cold War era have in fact been for purposes of humanitarian intervention, but such operations could be for other kinds of objectives. There would still be scope for more limited Chapter VI peacekeeping too in certain circumstances.

Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era: An Overview

Before the 1990s the prevailing view in international politics was that humanitarian intervention as previously defined was contrary to both international norms and international law. Within the Westphalian system states were sovereign and controlled developments within their own boundaries. Violations of human rights might arouse international concern and there might be pressure on offending governments, but there was no right for the 'international community' to intervene militarily to rectify the alleged wrongs. In terms of the realist and pluralist conceptions of international politics, human rights issues were a matter for individual states. Realists in particular would argue that in any event the way in which human rights issues were dealt with at an international level was very much related to

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[1] See Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Appendices 2-4, pp. 237-59.

[2] See Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian Action in War', *Adelphi Paper* no. 305 (1996). Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse present a revised typology of humanitarian intervention, ranging from forcible, military humanitarian intervention by governments to transnational, intergovernmental and nongovernmental humanitarian intervention (*Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 114-21).

the international power balance. Powers would act in their own interests, with great powers having greater (but not unrestricted) freedom of manoeuvre in this respect. More powerful states might undertake interventions but they were generally not justified on humanitarian grounds. As opposed to the realist and pluralist positions, there was the solidarist view. As articulated by Hedley Bull, for example, solidarism argued that there was a nascent international society in which there were norms (albeit more weakly held than in most domestic societies). There were certain universally held values and in extreme circumstances international society had a right to act to uphold those values. Bull recognized, of course, that this position was not widely held.[3] Nevertheless solidarism did represent an alternative to the prevailing realist and pluralist conceptions.[4]

The weakness of solidarism during the Cold War era was reflected in the fact that some interventions that did occur and might have been justified on humanitarian grounds were generally defended in national interest terms. Thus Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 was justified on the basis of the argument that the Khmer Rouge regime constituted a threat to Vietnam's security. The argument that the intervention ended the genocide in Cambodia was not used. Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 (leading to the establishment of Bangladesh) and Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979 (leading to the downfall of Idi Amin) were similarly defended on realist rather than human rights grounds.[5] In a similar fashion peacekeeping as employed during the Cold War era for the most part was conducted strictly on Chapter VI grounds. Peacekeeping forces acted under UN command to help implement peace agreements between parties that had previously been in conflict.[6]

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[3] Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966), p. 64.

[4] See R.J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially ch. 7. See further Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of Humanitarian Intervention: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 21 no. 3 (1992), pp. 463-87.

[5] These cases are discussed in Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Part 2.

[6] The UN's Congo intervention of 1960-64 could be seen as an exception to this statement. Originally designed to assist the Congo government in restoring order, during 1961 the operation was transformed into an early version of 'expanded peacekeeping', with UN forces authorized to use force if necessary.

What has happened during the post-Cold War era is that there has been a greater willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention, acting usually through the means of expanded peacekeeping (i.e. Chapter VII). Why has this been the case and what trends can we discern? Many of the conflicts that have occurred in the post-Cold War era have been related to the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism. At the same time there has been greater willingness by the Permanent Five of the Security Council to cooperate in dealing with at least some of the conflicts relating to ethnic nationalism (although this willingness to cooperate has generally declined over time). Humanitarian intervention has been most likely in relation to conflicts that have attracted the attention of Western publics (the 'CNN factor') and that are not within the sovereignty of one of the major powers (for example, Chechnya, Tibet). Realists might add that humanitarian intervention has often occurred where great powers have substantive interests to protect (irrespective of any humanitarian rationale that might be presented).

Ethnic nationalism as the context for most examples of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention is a broad category. Clearly qualifications are necessary in relation to the particular example. In relation to Somalia (1992-94) intervention was a response to a humanitarian crisis that in turn was related to the collapse of the state and the prevalence of clan conflict. The Bosnian intervention (1992-95) was in the context of the inability of the three main groups in Bosnia (Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims) to agree about the future of the state. The belated intervention in Rwanda of 1994-95 (ignoring the ineffective operation earlier in 1994) was an attempt to deal with the aftermath of the genocide perpetrated by Hutu extremists against Tutsis. The 1999 war in Kosovo derived from the conflict between Serbs and Albanians over the future of that province. An ethnic dimension was present in the Allied intervention in support of the Kurds in northern Iraq in 1991 (the Kurds being seen as a minority people unjustly subjected to discriminatory policies by the government of Saddam Hussein). Similarly the 1999 East Timor intervention (discussed further below) had an ethnic dimension in the sense that at the broadest level it developed from a conflict between the opposing forces of Indonesian and East Timorese nationalism. The Haiti intervention (initiated in 1994) related to issues of democratization and US priorities in the Caribbean.

The Sierra Leone operation (authorized late 1999) was an attempt to facilitate an end to civil war (not primarily ethnic) but soon became embroiled in that war.[7]

In most of these cases of humanitarian intervention the means chosen was enforced peacekeeping based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Usually the wording of the Security Council resolution referred to a 'threat to international peace and security'. It is sometimes assumed that humanitarian intervention implies that the consent of the relevant government is lacking. However in a number of these cases it was not clear that there was a government from whom permission could be sought. Government might have collapsed (Somalia) or the particular country might be consumed by conflict even though there was a government formally in control. Haiti appears to be the one clear case where intervention occurred contrary to the wishes of the government. In the case of East Timor the situation was complicated by the fact that Indonesia had been effectively in control even though the UN still recognized Portuguese sovereignty. Kosovo was most clearly an example of peace enforcement but occurred without specific UN authorization and in violation of Yugoslavian sovereignty.

With the large number of humanitarian interventions occurring during the post-Cold War era, questions have arisen about the emergence of new international norms. In his 1992 report on making UN involvement in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping more effective, Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that '(the) time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty … has passed', even though '(the) foundation-stone is and must remain the State.'[8] Kofi Annan went further in 1999 with his suggestion that there were two concepts of sovereignty.[9] According to Annan the international community was moving to recognize a right to intervention in situations where gross violations of human rights were occurring. Such intervention required the authorization of the Security Council. This meant, of course, that any permanent member could veto intervention. If changes in practice and norms were occurring a key factor was the willingness of major powers to act (and to obtain the consent

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[7] Among the many references on the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, the following provide useful surveys of the main episodes: William Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000); Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

[8] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 9.

[9] Kofi Annan, "Two concepts of Sovereignty," *Economist*, 18 September 1999.

of other members of the Permanent Five). Kosovo raised the issue of whether humanitarian intervention could be legitimate in the absence of specific Security Council authorization (the NATO powers argued that previous Security Council resolutions on the Kosovo issue provided sufficient authorization for the action they took, even though these resolutions did not refer to military action as such). While realpolitik is frequently a factor affecting humanitarian interventions, Western governments can find themselves under strong pressure to act when serious and systematic abuses of human rights are occurring in a conflict (extending possibly to ethnic cleansing and even genocide). The fact that Russia and China can block UN-authorized action appears as a hangover from the international history of the 1940s. To move from the current situation in a systematic way without achieving a high degree of international consensus would invite rupture in relation to the norms that have been developed within the international system. The Western powers would be open to the accusation that they were acting simply on the basis of their own norms and interests rather than in terms of more broadly accepted international norms.

While there has been much discussion in relation to the issue of humanitarian intervention, there has also been considerable attention given to various questions concerning peacekeeping. Given the emergence of expanded peacekeeping as the usual means for effecting humanitarian intervention, there is a need to consider how this can be done most effectively. One also needs to keep in mind that peacekeeping (whether of the expanded or more traditional variety) can be used for purposes other than humanitarian intervention. A major debate is about how the United Nations can be in a better position to mount peacekeeping operations when the need arises. The United Nations is essentially dependent on the willingness of member states to contribute peacekeeping forces. Can the United Nations move to a situation where it will be in a better position to call on member states to assist and to place forces under UN command for peacekeeping operations? At the beginning of the twenty-first century the original concept of a Military Staff Committee whereby the UN would have designated forces available (either a UN army or national forces assigned to the UN) appears utopian. In 2000 the Brahimi Report was presented to the UN with proposals of a more practical nature.[10] These involved the development of more robust peacekeeping doctrine supported by the establishment of 'several coherent, multinational,

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[10] http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations

brigade-size forces'; such forces would be based on 'partnership' of member states and function under the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS).

The Position of Key Asia-Pacific Players in Relation to Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping

Having provided an overview of the key developments affecting humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping at the global level in the post-Cold War era, we can now ask whether those developments were replicated in the Asia-Pacific. We will do this first of all at the level of the region as a whole, and then consider some examples. In considering the region as a whole the focus is on key players, particularly the major powers but taking into account the role of other actors. This is not meant to suggest a 'black box' view of the state, since a range of internal and external factors affects the position of any actor. In any given instance we need to ask what individuals or groups are articulating the position of the state and why they are adopting a particular stance. Having indicated the position of key players we proceed to show how their interaction affects the way in which issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific are actually dealt with.

While all regions are constructs, the Asia-Pacific is more loosely constructed than most. As a concept the Asia-Pacific provides a means for legitimizing the involvement of the United States (and other Western powers such as Australia) in the affairs of East Asia.[11] The alternative definition of region is based on East Asia alone. Within the vastness of the Asia-Pacific, the dynamics can vary in relation to the subregions, the most important of which are Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. At a macro-level, however, it is usual to focus on the roles played by the most significant powers, namely China, Japan and the United States. In any given situation local factors invariably play a major role in determining outcomes, but the interaction of the three powers is perhaps the single most important influence on international politics across the region. This is even more the case in Northeast Asia where the major powers relate directly to each other. In reviewing approaches to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific, it is therefore appropriate in the first instance to focus on the perspectives of China, Japan and the United States. However, because we need to consider the role of other actors too, we will give attention to the perspectives of the

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[11] See Barry Buzan, 'The Asia-Pacific: what sort of region in what sort of world?', in Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook (eds), *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order* (London and New York: Routledge in association with the Open University, 1998), chapter 4.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia. We will also consider the role of non-state actors.

China

China's perspective on issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping derives from its adherence to a traditional view of sovereignty.[12] This in turn is the outcome of China's historical experience, and particularly the way in which imperialist powers overrode China's sovereignty during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A major objective for all Chinese nationalists (whether Communist or otherwise) has been to have China regain its 'rightful place in the world'. This includes full respect for Chinese sovereignty. Additional reasons for China being wary about any weakening of traditional notions of sovereignty are some of the situations that China itself faces. The most significant of these is Taiwan. China regards Taiwan as a domestic issue and therefore opposes any international policies that might provide a precedent for external intervention in relation to that issue. In addition there is the situation in Tibet that attracts much international criticism on human rights grounds. China is cautious about supporting humanitarian intervention in other situations where such intervention might be used as a precedent for intervention in relation to Tibet. Although not as prominent in this respect as Tibet, the situation in Xinjiang would also be a cause for concern on China's part.

Despite its support for a traditional view of sovereignty, China has increasingly come to recognize that there are situations in the world where some modification in that view might be necessary. While not being an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations,[13] China has generally not impeded them. Its strongest opposition to the notion of 'qualified sovereignty' was in relation to the Kosovo issue. China saw NATO intervention in Kosovo as a violation of Yugoslavia's sovereignty in relation to that province. Hence China (along

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[12] Useful articles on China's perspective include Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing', *Survival*, vol. 42 no. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 41-59; M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Attitude Toward U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989', *Asian Survey*, vol. 36 no. 11 (November 1996), pp. 1102-21.

[13] China's most substantial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations since 1989 were 400 engineering troops in Cambodia and a small contingent of civilian police in East Timor.   In addition small numbers of Chinese observers have been attached to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East and UN missions relating to Iraq-Kuwait, Western Sahara, Mozambique, Cambodia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. See Bates and Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping', p. 45; *The Military Balance 2000-2001* (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 197.

with Russia) blocked any specific Security Council authorization for that intervention. It was clear that China was concerned about Kosovo being a precedent for international action in relation to Taiwan and Tibet. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade only served to strengthen China in its opposition to the Kosovo intervention. China's stance in relation to Asia-Pacific interventions (potential or actual) has been similar. As we shall see, however, China did support the East Timor intervention in 1999 once Indonesia had given its consent. In this case China could argue that its view of sovereignty was being respected. East Timor had effectively been under Indonesian control, while the UN had continued to recognize Portuguese sovereignty.

Japan

Japan's approach to issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping is related to the broader issue of the international role the country should be playing.[14] In terms of economic criteria Japan is clearly one of the world's leading powers. However because of the experience of World War II and its aftermath Japan has played a very constrained political and security role. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution ostensibly prohibits the development of military forces, but has been interpreted to allow for 'self defence' forces. The purposes for which these forces can be used are severely limited. Over recent decades there have been pressures on Japan, particularly from the US, to assume a more prominent international role. Majority sentiment in Japan appears to favour a more 'normal' international role for the country, but the pacifist tradition is still strong.

It is a measure of the constraints on Japan that its participation in humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping has been so limited. In general Japan has given diplomatic support to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping actions mounted by the major Western countries but in a low key way. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War ('peace enforcement' in UN terms), Japan was a major financial contributor (US$14 billion in the period from August 1990) but did not become militarily involved. This led to criticisms of

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[14] On Japan's peacekeeping role, see Kimberley Marten Zisk, 'Japan's United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma', *Asia-Pacific Review*, vol. 8 no. 1 (May 2001), pp. 21-39; Aurelia George, 'Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?', *Asian Survey*, vol. 33 no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 560-75; Aurelia George Mulgan, 'International Peacekeeping and Japan's Role: Catalyst or Cautionary Tale?', *Asian Survey*, vol. 35 no. 12 (December 1995), pp. 1102-17.

Japan (most notably by US Secretary of State James Baker) for being too narrowly focused on 'checkbook diplomacy'. In August 1990 the Kaifu government introduced a Peace Cooperation Bill in the Diet to allow the Self Defence Force to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and 'collective security', but this was withdrawn in November 1990. In April 1991 Japan agreed to send six minesweepers to the Persian Gulf.[15]

In June 1992, following an initiative of the Miyazawa government, an International Peacekeeping Operations Law (PKO Law) took effect. This was an attempt to allow Japan to participate in UN peacekeeping operations but there were still major constraints. Kimberley Marten Zisk argues that there are an implicit 'Five Principles' in the PKO Law: (1) all parties must have agreed to a ceasefire and (2) have consented to both UN deployment and Japanese participation; (3) the operation must be completely impartial; (4) Japan can withdraw if any of the first three principles begins to be violated; (5) weapons should only be used for self-defence and to protect Japanese peacekeepers.[16] Other conditions accompanying the law effectively confined Japanese forces to a support role with minimal risk.[17] During the 1990s Japan's most significant involvement in UN peacekeeping was in Cambodia (1992-93), with small contingents also being sent to Mozambique and the Golan Heights. Some civilian police were sent to East Timor initially, with 700 peacekeeping troops also due to go there in 2002 for construction work.[18]

Clearly Japan is a follower rather than a leader in relation to issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. While there have been some changes affecting Japan's ability to take part in peacekeeping operations, for the most part the issue is subsumed within the broader debate about Japan's future international role. Japan is likely to develop a more significant role but in an incremental way. As that happens we can expect Japan to assume greater responsibilities in relation to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. Nevertheless Japan's approach will continue to be characterized by caution.

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[15] See J. Mohan Malik, *The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 90, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, pp. 79-87.

[16] Zisk, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[18] 'Japan to send 700 troops to East Timor', *Straits Times*, 7 November 2001, p. A3.

United States

The United States approaches issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping from its perspective as a global power. However it does so not simply in terms of realpolitik. It is also strongly influenced by the country's liberal democratic tradition. Whereas realist considerations might suggest caution in relation to issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, public pressures emanating from the country's liberal democratic tradition can sometimes tip the balance in favour of intervention. In the post-Cold War era the general position of the US has been that regional powers should take the main responsibility for these issues within their particular region, with the US providing leadership and support at the global level. However, if we take the main examples of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, the US has been involved on a number of occasions, most notably in relation to northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Kosovo. Northern Iraq was a humanitarian emergency but was related to the conflict between the US-led coalition and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The involvement in Haiti was related to the country's proximity to the US. Somalia and Rwanda were more clearly instances of humanitarian intervention. Kosovo was justified on humanitarian grounds but there were also issues related to containing Slobodan Milosevic. It should also be noted that US action was decisive in bringing the war in Bosnia to an end in 1995. US support (particularly in terms of logistics and communications) was important in East Timor in 1999. The US also plays a diplomatic and training role in relation to some interventions.

Applying this general perspective to the Asia-Pacific, one can expect the US to be most active when it perceives its own security to be at stake. This is most clearly the case in relation to Taiwan and Korea, but these situations are not relevant in terms of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. The US would also be concerned by situations that might have some impact on the stability of the region. Post-1997 Indonesia is most important in this respect. Beyond situations that are important in terms of how the US perceives its own interests, the 'CNN factor' can sometimes be relevant. Clear evidence of gross abuses of human rights in situations where the US might have some influence can lead to calls for US action, extending possibly to humanitarian intervention. East Timor in 1999 is the most obvious example. However, public pressure on the US government would need to be very

strong because there are so many situations around the world that might be judged to be comparable. From the US perspective it is relevant to consider whether there is support at a regional level for an intervention to be mounted, possibly with backing from the US. Clearly the legitimacy of the intervention in most circumstances will necessitate the authorization of the UN Security Council.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

While the position of the major powers might be regarded as the single most important factor affecting the issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific, clearly the position of other actors needs to be considered. Within Southeast Asia ten states are represented within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is a range of views among ASEAN members relating to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, and these have been reflected in the debates within the organization. While generally a traditional view of sovereignty has prevailed within ASEAN, some members have been more open to 'intervention' across a range of issues. The reason that a traditional view of sovereignty prevails in Southeast Asia is that most states in the region face significant internal tensions and wish to be free to deal with these on their own. Those states that are more open to 'intervention' are those that recognize the reality of increasing interdependence and the need to establish channels for dealing with issues that transcend national boundaries. This openness is more significant in democratic polities or those undergoing democratization. Within ASEAN the debate about 'intervention' in this broad sense focused on the term 'flexible engagement'. Thailand and the Philippines were to the fore in advocating this position, with Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan taking the lead. ASEAN's Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1998 agreed to a compromise position in favour of 'enhanced interaction'.[19]

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[19] John Funston, 'ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Practice and Prospects', in David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts (eds), *Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific* (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 18-19.   On the flexible engagement issue in ASEAN, see also Herman Kraft, 'The Principle of Non-Intervention and ASEAN: Evolution and Emerging Challenges', Working Paper no. 344 (January 2000), Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra; Jeannie Henderson, 'Reassessing ASEAN', *Adelphi Paper* no. 328 (1999), pp. 48-55; Brian L. Job, 'ASEAN Stalled: Dilemmas and Tensions over Conflicting Norms', paper prepared for the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 14-17 (http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/016/016001JobBrian00.html)

Issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping can be seen within the framework of the debate about 'flexible engagement'. These particular issues were not central to that debate. However human rights issues are relevant and humanitarian intervention can be seen as one type of response to situations where gross abuses are occurring. Whether ASEAN members (or some of them) would be in favour of humanitarian intervention would also depend on factors relating to a particular situation. The East Timor situation will be discussed subsequently, with this particular dimension as one relevant consideration. As previously indicated, the sovereignty issue in relation to East Timor was a matter of contention. ASEAN members had supported the Indonesian position on that matter, but with the crisis coming to a head in September 1999, the fact that Indonesian sovereignty was not recognized by the UN did make it easier for ASEAN members to modify their previous positions. In general, however, ASEAN members would not be in favour of humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping in relation to Southeast Asian conflicts defined as 'internal'.

Australia

One of the reasons for considering ASEAN as a factor relevant to issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping is that it does draw attention to the significance of some of the small and middle powers in the region. This is also the justification for considering the Australian perspective. It can be seen as an example of an Asia-Pacific middle power that has been relevant to a number of instances of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the region.[20] While generally supporting US policies both at a global level and within the Asia-Pacific, Australia has also had its own views on how a number of issues should be dealt with. In the early 1990s in particular Australian policy was influenced by the concept of 'good international citizenship' as articulated by Labor Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. This meant that there was a predisposition to become involved in issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, even when those issues were beyond Australia's own region. At the same time it should be recognized that Australia's particular focus was

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[20] For an assessment of Australian participation in peacekeeping in the early 1990s, see Australia, Parliament, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994). A useful early assessment of Australian involvement in the East Timor intervention is James Cotton '"Peacekeeping" in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 53 no. 3 (November 1999), pp. 237-46.

the Asia-Pacific. Australia did take part in operations in Africa (Namibia, Somalia, Rwanda) but declined opportunities to become involved in the Balkans. Within the Asia-Pacific its most significant involvement has been in Cambodia (1992-93) and then in East Timor from 1999 (first as leader of a UN-authorized operation and then within the UN operation). As we shall see further below, in the East Timor case public pressure at the time of the crisis in September 1999 was a very significant factor leading to Australian involvement. On a smaller scale Australia has been the leading contributor to the peace monitoring mission on Bougainville since late 1997 and then to the peace facilitating mission in the Solomon Islands since 2001. Australia can be expected to work closely with the US in relation to issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific, while also pursuing an active diplomacy in relation to significant regional powers. It would not be expected to play the leading role in operations, except in smaller scale situations close to its own shores (such as East Timor).

Other actors

Even allowing for the complexity of states as actors, it might be argued that the foregoing analysis is too state-centred. The United Nations and non-state actors should be considered as relevant too. While realists argue that the role of the UN in any given situation is essentially the outcome of the interaction of the key players, and particularly the Permanent Five, an alternative view is that the UN should be considered as an influence in its own right. The very existence of the UN encourages the development of norms emphasising the role of the 'international community' and a more moral approach to international affairs. These norms can be an important influence in particular situations, even allowing for the fact that the UN's role is often to legitimize actions motivated by realist considerations. Similarly, while the UN Secretary-General works largely within a framework defined by the interaction of the major powers, this framework is also influenced by UN norms and processes and can give him some influence of his own in certain circumstances.

Beyond the United Nations, there are various non-state actors that can influence issues relating to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific. Within more democratic polities there is scope for non-government organizations concerned with human rights to exercise an influence. This can be a factor affecting the decisions of

governments in such polities in relevant situations. From another perspective we might consider the position of political movements advocating secession from an existing state. External intervention, possibly in the form of humanitarian intervention or expanded peacekeeping, might be seen as a goal for advancing the objectives of such movements. Ultimately, of course, a secessionist movement would have as its goal the constitution of a new state based normally on the particular cultural group ('nation') it believes it represents.

Having outlined the position of a range of players within the Asia-Pacific, it is necessary to suggest how the interaction of such players contributes to the way in which issues of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping are dealt with. The position of key actors does not necessarily translate into influence in terms of particular issues. Nevertheless certain generalizations can be ventured. All other things being equal, at a broad strategic-political level the United States and China have the greatest influence over outcomes. The US has an influence throughout the region; China is important in both Northeast Asia and mainland Southeast Asia. In terms of economic influence (for example, applying economic pressure or contributing financially to a peacekeeping operation) the US and Japan have the greatest significance. Southeast Asia is complex because of the number of states involved in that subregion; ASEAN is important as both a forum and a vehicle for regional diplomacy. The Pacific islands are similar to Southeast Asia but on a smaller scale; Australia and New Zealand are major local powers in the South Pacific. In any given situation where humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping might be a possibility, a country's power base is only a starting point. To exert an influence it is important to make the best use of the assets a state has.[21] The state in question has to be motivated to support intervention; in the case of democratic countries (whether Western or Asian) public pressure can be an important factor in this regard (with the role of human rights NGOs being one aspect of this). With the particular issues under discussion the ability to form coalitions in support of a position and to engage in multilateral diplomacy in international organizations and forums is important. In the case of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, legitimacy derives from authorization by the UN Security Council. Therefore those powers favouring intervention need to have the support of the permanent five members of the Security Council. These

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[21] Oran Young's leadership theory, with its analysis of structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leaders, is useful for understanding processes in multilateral diplomacy. See Oran R. Young, 'Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society', *International Organization*, vol. 45 no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 281-308.

general points can be analyzed further in relation to some examples from the Asia-Pacific during the post-Cold War era.

Examples of Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific

In the context of this paper the most significant examples of intervention are Cambodia (1992-93) and East Timor (1999-). Since the Asia-Pacific is such a broad region some attention to examples enables us to see how the broad generalizations attempted previously work out in terms of specific situations. Both Cambodia and East Timor can be seen as examples of peacekeeping, although Chapter VI is relevant in the former case and Chapter VII in the latter. It is debatable as to whether Cambodia and East Timor should be regarded as examples of humanitarian intervention. Cambodia is normally not so regarded. However it has been argued that Vietnam's original intervention in 1978 could be justified as a humanitarian action to end the Cambodian genocide (Vietnam did not use this argument).[22] From this perspective the UN operation in 1992-93 could be seen as a step in bringing the Cambodian conflict to an end and therefore have at least some humanitarian rationale. This, however, is probably stretching the definition too far. In the case of East Timor the Australian-led and the subsequent UN operations have been seen as examples of humanitarian intervention, but this has been denied by Indonesia. The Indonesian argument is that humanitarian intervention involves the violation of a country's sovereignty. Accepting that Indonesia was the sovereign power in East Timor (itself a matter of dispute), humanitarian intervention did not occur because Indonesia gave its consent to the operation. Most accurately the East Timor intervention could be described as an operation to restore order in a situation where the de facto sovereign power was itself a party to the destruction that was occurring. The fact that Indonesia consented to the intervention is not the same as saying that it gave positive support. A strict interpretation of the term 'humanitarian intervention' might question the application of the term to East Timor but in most respects the modalities of the operation do suggest that it is appropriate. It is certainly a good example of expanded peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. In this discussion of the Asia-Pacific situation we will regard both Cambodia and East Timor as examples of peacekeeping, but only the latter as an example of humanitarian intervention. Were the dynamics similar in the two cases or were there important differences?

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[22] For example, Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, ch. 3.

Taking Cambodia as the first example,[23] the most significant step in terms of ending the conflict occurred at the level of the major powers. This was the Sino-Soviet rapprochement of May 1989. The Soviet Union had been the main supporter of Vietnam in the conflict, whereas China had backed the Cambodian resistance (dominated by the Khmer Rouge but involving Sihanoukist and rightist elements as well). Following the accommodation between the two Communist powers the main challenge was to secure agreement about transitional processes among the Cambodian parties (i.e. the Vietnamese-backed government of Hun Sen and the three groups in the Cambodian resistance). Such agreement was achieved with the Paris Accords of October 1991. These provided for the establishment of a transitional UN administration that would supervise key governmental functions and arrange elections. These elections, open to all groups in Cambodia, would legitimize whatever government emerged. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established as a Chapter VI operation under UN Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992.[24] While the Sihanoukists won more votes than any other group in the elections of May 1993, Hun Sen's continued control of the most significant instruments of power enabled him to dominate the government that emerged. In terms of the political dynamics of the UN operation, the interaction between the external and local elements was clearly important. On the first point, it should be noted that while the USSR and China were key players the other permanent members of the Security Council did support

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[23] Useful references on the UN operation in Cambodia include Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr (eds), *Keeping the peace: Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chs. 2-8; Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994; James Mayall (ed.), *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 1; Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[24] Asia-Pacific contributions to UNTAC's military component included (number of military personnel in brackets): Australia (423), Canada (208), China (426), Indonesia (1,180), Malaysia (887), New Zealand (65), Philippines (92), Thailand (710). Source: *The Military Balance 1992-93* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992). The military force totaled 10,200, with contributions from 29 countries. Japan's contribution of 1283 military personnel to UNTAC should also be noted (Zisk, 'Japan's United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma', footnote 3, p. 35).

the plan for UN involvement. Middle powers such as Australia, France and Indonesia were diplomatically active in facilitating discussions and negotiations at both the international and Cambodian levels.[25] This bears out the point concerning the role of multilateral diplomacy in preparing the way for UN operations. The significance of coalitions is reflected most obviously in the composition of UNTAC itself.

In the case of East Timor,[26] there had been a low-level conflict between Indonesia and Timorese resistance forces ever since Indonesia occupied the territory in late 1975 following the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule. The fall of Suharto in May 1998 signified a shift towards democratization in Indonesia and raised the possibility of attempting to deal afresh with the East Timor issue. In January 1999 President B.J. Habibie announced that there would be a vote in East Timor on a proposal to give the territory special autonomy within Indonesia; rejection would be regarded as a vote for independence. This announcement paved the way for agreement between Indonesia and Portugal in May 1999 under UN auspices. The vote would be regarded as an exercise of self-determination by the East Timorese and would be accepted by both Indonesia and Portugal. Preparations for the vote and the vote itself were supervised by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET); the ballot on 30 August resulted in a 78.5 per cent majority in favour of independence. Violence orchestrated largely by the Indonesian military and perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias had marred the campaign. With the declaration of the result this violence escalated,

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[25] On Australian involvement, see Ken Berry, *Cambodia - From Red to Blue: Australia's Initiative for Peace* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, in association with the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1997); on Indonesian involvement, see M. Nagendra Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001).

[26] Useful references relating to the East Timor intervention include: James Cotton, 'The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 22, no. 1 (April 2000), pp. 1-22; 'East Timor', special issue of *Pacifica Review*, vol. 12, no. 1 (February 2000); 'East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community: Resistance, Repression, and Responsibility', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 32, nos. 1 and 2 (January-June 2000); James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds), *Out of the Ashes: The Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor* (Hindmarsh, SA: Crawford House Publishing, 2000); Damien Kingsbury (ed.), *Guns and ballot boxes: East Timor's vote for independence* (Clayton, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, 2000); Leonard C. Sebastian and Anthony L. Smith, 'The East Timor Crisis: A Test Case for Humanitarian Intervention', *Southeast Asian Affairs 2000*, pp. 64-83; Jarat Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor', *Survival*, vol. 42 no. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 27-39; Derek McDougall, 'Regional Institutions and Security: Implications of the 1999 East Timor Crisis', in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (eds), *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Select Publishing, for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), pp. 166-96; Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', *International Affairs*, vol. 77 no. 4 (October 2001), pp. 805-27.

as the Indonesian military appeared bent on revenge. The ensuing destruction led to widespread calls for international intervention.

Intervention in the first instance occurred in the form of INTERFET (International Force East Timor), an UN-authorized and Australian-led operation. As previously indicated, this was essentially a form of expanded peacekeeping (Chapter VII). The mandate in Security Council Resolution 1264 of 15 September focused on the restoration of 'peace and security', with the multinational force being authorized 'to take all necessary measures'. Under Security Council Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999 (again based on Chapter VII), UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) was established to succeed INTERFET; this occurred at the military level in February 2001. At the level of international dynamics the question is how the international condemnation of the situation in East Timor led to intervention. Although the consent of the Permanent Five was necessary for UN authorization, the impetus did not come from the major powers. Pressure from the US was important in achieving Indonesian consent to the operation, and the US did provide important logistical and communications support to INTERFET. However, whether the US would have pushed strongly for intervention in the absence of a more general international clamour is debatable. The strongest pressure for intervention came from Australia where public opinion was aroused by the images of destruction and violence coming from East Timor.[27] Nevertheless Australia on its own could not have mounted an intervention. Consistent with Oran Young's formulation,[28] Australia was able to provide leadership in the context of multilateral diplomacy and assemble an effective coalition. This involved working closely with other Western partners, particularly the US, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, but there was also considerable diplomatic activity in relation to Asian countries. The most supportive Asian countries in terms of contributions to INTERFET (and subsequently UNTAET) were Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea.[29] It seems relevant that these countries are in the vanguard of Asian democracies and were generally more open to involvement in international human rights issues.

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[27] One poll (conducted ahead of the UN Security Council resolution authorizing INTERFET) showed that 72 per cent of Australians supported the despatch of peacekeeping troops to East Timor, with 34 per cent saying that Australia should intervene even without UN authorization. *Sydney Morning Herald online*, 14 September 1999. http://www.smh.com.au/news/9909/14/pageone/pageone11.html

[28] See Young, 'Political leadership and regime formation'.

[29] On the question of ASEAN involvement, see in particular Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 54 no. 2 (July 2000), pp. 163-70.

Comparing these two examples of intervention, East Timor was more clearly an example of humanitarian intervention. Cambodia was more significant as an international issue, and therefore attracted more attention from the major powers (China and the Soviet Union being the most important). In East Timor the involvement of the US was important but not in a dominating way. Japan contributed personnel to UNTAC and has been a major financial contributor in East Timor; its diplomatic involvement in both situations was relatively low key. The importance of UN involvement in both these operations is clear. This again highlights the significance of the role of the major powers (at the very least in terms of not blocking an intervention). It also draws attention to the importance of multilateral diplomacy and the formation of coalitions. This provides scope for middle and small powers to play a significant, if not necessarily a decisive, role. Both Cambodia and East Timor as examples also highlight the way in which Asia-Pacific situations where international intervention might be a possibility are not dealt with simply by Asian or even Asia-Pacific countries. Countries centred on other regions can be involved as part of their global strategic or humanitarian concerns. Humanitarian intervention is most likely to appeal to countries with strong traditions of human rights. It might also be worth observing with these two examples that they are both from Southeast Asia. This could be related to the greater fragility of the states system in Southeast Asia as compared to Northeast Asia, as well as to the fact that the number of states involved in Southeast Asia adds complexity to the situation and possibly provides more scope for multilateral diplomacy.

Future Prospects for Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific

With two major UN operations in the Asia-Pacific over the past decade, at this point it is appropriate to consider the future prospects for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the region. Are the changing norms at the global level likely to have an impact in the Asia-Pacific? What factors are relevant? Are there any situations where humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping could be considered? If so, what should the criteria for mounting such operations be? Are there any longer-term issues relating to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific?

It was argued in the first section of this paper that there had been some changes in norms at the global level in the post-Cold War era. Within the Asia-Pacific a more cautious

attitude towards modifying traditional notions of sovereignty has prevailed. Certainly there is little support for the Kosovo precedent justifying intervention even without UN authorization in certain circumstances. At the same time there is a greater awareness in the Asia-Pacific of interdependence. This clearly affects a number of issues, but situations where humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping might be relevant are one of them. Thus China, traditionally conservative in its approach to sovereignty, has been more willing to contemplate humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. ASEAN, with its commitment to 'enhanced interaction' across a range of issues, seems similarly inclined. Japan has given diplomatic and financial support in a number of situations, while remaining cautious about becoming directly involved itself. Western countries in the region, such as the US and Australia, appear more willing to contemplate modifying concepts of sovereignty where gross abuses of human rights are occurring. However, this generalization also applies to the more democratic Asian countries where there is scope for public pressure to be exerted on human rights issues.

Whether these changes in norms will be relevant depends on the dynamics of international politics relating to a particular situation. Humanitarian intervention in the form of expanded peacekeeping will not be attempted in relation to situations within the jurisdiction of major powers such as China. It is unlikely to occur in Northeast Asia where the major powers relate directly to each other (although what would happen in the event of a North Korean collapse?). Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, where states are not necessarily well consolidated and where there are potential or actual human rights abuses, are more likely subregions. Any UN-authorized intervention in one of these situations would require the consent of the major powers. The US and China (both members of the Permanent Five) are the major powers most likely to play a role in relation to situations in Southeast Asia. China's position would be particularly relevant in relation to mainland Southeast Asia. Japan could play a low key diplomatic role and is also relevant as a potential financial contributor. In the Pacific islands (or more specifically the South Pacific) the US is likely to 'delegate' responsibility to Australia. In both Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands the role of relevant local powers is important. ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum might play a role as the relevant regional organizations, but are unlikely to resolve issues on their own. Within the particular subregion the power configuration will vary depending on the situation. Indonesia is the most significant power in Southeast Asia but it is preoccupied with internal problems; it does not necessarily have a major role to play in many situations affecting

mainland Southeast Asia. A similar point could be made about Papua New Guinea; its role is often important in Melanesia but less so in Micronesia and Polynesia.

If the future of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in the Asia-Pacific will be affected by the interaction of changing norms and the dynamics of international politics in the subregions, are there situations where such operations could be considered? In Southeast Asia there are a number of situations involving conflict between regions or regionally based minorities and central governments. Examples include Aceh and Irian Jaya/West Papua in Indonesia, Mindanao (the Muslim minority) in the Philippines and the position of the various minority peoples in Burma. There have also been examples of conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups without secessionism necessarily being an issue. Examples in Indonesia include Maluku, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Similar situations have arisen in the Pacific islands but on a smaller scale. Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) is the best example of secessionism, and there are significant ethnic conflicts (with other factors involved too) in the Solomon Islands and Fiji. None of the Southeast Asian situations has been seriously discussed as a likely context for humanitarian intervention. International involvement at the diplomatic level has been attempted in some of the situations but generally in a low-key way. In the South Pacific there are peace monitoring missions in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, but these are the outcome of diplomatic activity among the local powers (particularly Australia and New Zealand). These missions do not involve an armed component and are not under UN auspices; the Commonwealth has played some role at various stages.

In discussing the likelihood of humanitarian intervention in some Asia-Pacific situations, it is worth keeping in mind some of the criteria that have been advanced in the general debate on the issue. These include gross abuses of human rights and the likelihood that intervention will be effective. While it is certain that abuses of human rights have occurred in some of the situations referred to, there is debate about the scale. The issue needs to capture the attention of the public in relevant countries and this has mostly not occurred. The states concerned would be opposed to intervention and this would constitute a major obstacle to intervention. Even more importantly perhaps it is unlikely that humanitarian intervention would be effective in dealing with these situations, which often have highly complex local (and sometimes international) causes. Diplomatic and low-key measures (such as those being attempted in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands) should be considered if there is a good probability of their being effective. Humanitarian intervention and

peacekeeping should only be contemplated after other avenues have been exhausted, if the circumstances are extreme, and if there is a good chance of success.

Given these criteria the likelihood of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping in possibly relevant situations in the Asia-Pacific appears limited. In the longer term it appears more likely that lower-level interventions and involvement will occur. This could take the form of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (i.e. facilitating peaceful resolutions but stopping short of full-scale intervention) or humanitarian assistance. Such interventions could be under the auspices of the United Nations but not necessarily so. Regional bodies (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum), the Commonwealth and particular states could also be relevant depending on the circumstances.

Another longer-term issue concerns the way in which humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping develops beyond the initial intervention. In East Timor in particular (less so in Cambodia) the UN has assumed a state-building role. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) has been involved not just in providing security for the territory, but has established a civil administration, set goals for development, and prepared the territory for independence. There have been criticisms about how well the UN has done in assuming this task.[30] Irrespective of the nature of these criticisms, in the future the UN will need to give attention not just to the issue of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in security terms, but to how it should develop its capacity for state-building. While there might not be full-scale state-building exercises as in East Timor, the UN could well be called upon to contribute to state-building in some situations (for example, a post-war Afghanistan). The relationship with UN agencies (such as the UN Development Program) and other relevant international agencies would be an important issue here, but the relationship to peacekeeping as such should also be considered.

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[30] See, for example, J. Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor'; Simon Chesterman, *East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001).

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