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# Varied Dynamics of Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism

The October issue observes different dynamics of responses to terrorism, in terms of observing case studies, deconstructing methods and improving mechanisms to deal with the evolving threat. The articles focus on key aspects of counter-terrorism – through transnational cooperation and specifically interoperability, countering violent extremism – through counter-ideology and rehabilitation. Overall, while there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to fight terrorism, there is a need to holistically incorporate diverse approaches that both counter terrorism and counter violent extremism in order to witness tangible and measurable gains.

In the lead article, **Rohan Gunaratna** discusses the circumstances surrounding the death of Bahrin Naim, the effects on the threat landscape in Indonesia and lessons for effective counter-terrorism. Bahrin Naim’s links to the Islamic State (IS) and ability to radicalise and recruit supporters in Southeast Asia until his death, while operating from Syria, highlights the success of social media propaganda and outreach. The article also focuses on his recruitment tactics and network base that enabled him to plan multiple terrorist attacks, highlighting the need for long-term collaboration, cooperation and information sharing between security agencies within and beyond the Southeast Asian region.

Next, **Patrick Blannin** discusses cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region as a key aspect of counter-terrorism efforts. The author puts forward the concept of interoperability, in which two or more states act in a coordinated manner to address a common problem. This will facilitate the translation of policy-making rhetoric into operational responses to security threats. It is argued that improved interoperability will enhance regional counter-terrorism cooperation at the strategic and tactical levels.

**Muhammad Haniff Hassan** delves into the counter-ideology domain and attempts to refute IS’ claims on jihad as a personal obligation where the consent of parents is not necessary. The author analyses the IS’ argument and counters it with the historical story of Uwais Al-Qarni, who did not participate in jihad or migrate to Medina because he was taking care of his sick mother. The author contends that use of historical Islamic examples can assist in countering IS’ extremist arguments that are intended to reduce barriers to engaging in violence. This story can then also be useful in countering the extremist thoughts of groups such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Lastly, **Zohreh Vakilpour and Behnam Rastegari** focus on the need for a rehabilitation programme in Iran for terrorists, specifically with the rise of the Islamist extremist threat since 2017. The authors state that while Iran has a rehabilitation programme for non-terrorist offenders, it remains limited in terms of legislation on its methods, scope and implementation. This requires improving the existing rehabilitation programme while using the relatively successful rehabilitation programmes for terrorists in countries such as Singapore and Sri Lanka as models for Iran.

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# Mastermind of Terror: The Life and Death of Bahrn Naim

Rohan Gunaratna

*In June 2018, Bahrn Naim, a key Southeast Asian terrorist was killed in a counter terrorist operation in Syria. He was one of the most notorious directing figures of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia. His activities and reach underline the need for greater cooperation and collaboration among governments in counter-terrorism efforts.*

## Introduction

On 8 June 2018, Muhammad Bahrn Naim Anggih Tamtomo alias Abu Rayyan was killed in a US airstrike as he was riding a motorcycle in Ash Shafa, Syria.<sup>1</sup> Bahrn Naim had been the mastermind of several terrorist attacks in Malaysia and Indonesia. He had joined the Islamic State (IS) and was using the cyber domain to radicalise and recruit Southeast Asians to join the group. After tracking Bahrn Naim for close to two years, a US counter terrorism operation killed the Indonesian high-value target.

After the rise of IS from June 2014 onwards, many Southeast Asian terrorist recruits travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the group. A significant number of failed terrorist plots and successful terrorist attacks in the region were planned by Southeast Asian terrorists in the two countries.<sup>2</sup> They included three Indonesians - Bahrn Naim, BahrumSyah and Abu Jandal - and one Malaysian, Muhammad Wanndy. These terrorists planned to direct and inspire attacks against

various targets, including political and security leaders. Reports and online postings have revealed that General Tito Karnavian from Indonesia<sup>3</sup> and Dato Ayob Khan Bin Mydin Pitchay from Malaysia<sup>4</sup>, who oversaw counter terrorist operations, were targets of these Southeast Asian terrorists.

All four terrorist-masterminds have been killed – two in suicide bombings and two in decapitation attacks. On 5 November 2016, Abu Jandal was killed in a suicide mission in Mosul.<sup>5</sup> On 29 April 2017, Muhammad Wanndy Mohammad Jedi alias Abu Hamzah al Fateh was killed in Raqqa, Syria.<sup>6</sup> On 19 April 2018, BahrumSyah Mennor Usman was killed at an IS meeting in a US air strike in Hajin, Syria.<sup>7</sup> While Abu Jandal and BahrumSyah did not die in targeted killings, Wanndy and Bahrn Naim's deaths represented successful counter terrorist operations. This article focuses on Bahrn Naim, his links with the cyber domain and involvement in various terrorist plots and attacks.

<sup>1</sup> Amy Chew, "Indonesian Islamic State Leader in Syria Killed in Drone Strike," *Channel NewsAsia*, July 4, 2018, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesian-islamic-state-leader-in-syria-killed-in-drone-strike-10499142>.

<sup>2</sup> Amy Chew, "Indonesian Islamic State Leader Bahrn Naim Recruited Malaysians to Launch Terror Attacks in Country," *Channel NewsAsia*, July 13, 2018, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesian-islamic-state-leader-bahrn-naim-recruited-malaysians-10528876>.

<sup>3</sup> Facebook. 'Bahrn Naim'. Accessed April 4, 2018.

<sup>4</sup> "Malaysia's anti-terror chief targeted", *The Star Online*. June 24, 2017, <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/06/24/malaysias-antiterror-chief-targeted-indonesian-militants-calling-on-comrades-in-the-country-to-elimi/>.

<sup>5</sup> Haeril Halim, "IS Fighter's Death May Throw Followers into Frustration," *The Jakarta Post*, November 14, 2016, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/11/14/is-fighter-s-death-may-throw-followers-frustration.html>.

<sup>6</sup> The Star, "Top Malaysian ISIS Terrorist Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi is Dead," *The Straits Times*, May 8, 2017, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/top-malaysian-isis-terrorist-muhammad-wanndy-mohamed-jedi-is-dead-police-chief>.

<sup>7</sup> Haeril Halim, Tama Salim and Nurul Fitri Ramadhani, "Top Indonesian Fighter with IS Killed in Syria," *The Jakarta Post*, March 16, 2017, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/16/top-indonesian-fighter-with-is-killed-in-syria.html>.

## Bahrn Naim's Background

Bahrn Naim was born in Pekalongan, Central Java on 6 September 1983 and was raised in Solo, which is regarded as the centre of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. He had joined Hizbut Tahrir, while he was a senior high school student and spoke Javanese, Indonesian and Arabic fluently. Most of his recruits came from Hizbut Tahrir and Tim Hisbah, a splinter group of the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). After qualifying as an informatics engineer from Surakarta State University (UNS), he worked at an Internet cafe in Surakarta and sold flags decorated with Islamic symbols. Bahrn Naim taught archery to Nurul Azmi at-Tibyani, an imprisoned female terrorist involved in the hacking of investment companies, because he believed that women are obligated to wage 'jihad'. He got to know Nurul Azmi through his friend Fuad Zaki, who was a student of Abdul Rochim Bashir, the son of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) leader Abu Bakr Bashir.

In November 2010, Bahrn Naim was arrested by Detachment 88 for possession of ammunition in his home and was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison by Solo's District Court in June 2011.<sup>8</sup> Reports revealed that the police seized 547 ammunitions for AK-56, 32 bullets of a 9mm caliber handgun holder, compact discs, books on jihad, a laptop and six computer hard disks. Although the court found insufficient evidence to pursue terrorism charges, ammunition supplied by Bahrn Naim is suspected to have been used by Abdullah Sunata's men to assassinate police officers in Purworejo, Central Java.<sup>9</sup> In February 2015, he left Indonesia for Syria with his two wives and children and first stayed in Raqqa. He then moved to the Manbij town (also called 'Little London'), near Aleppo, where he interacted with foreign fighters from Europe.

<sup>8</sup> Muh Taufiqurrohmah and Ardi Putra Prasetya, "A Rising Indonesian Jihadist Plotter: Bahrn Naim," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 8(11) 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Rahmatullah, Afrizal, "Ditangkap Densus di Solo, Bahrn Akui Simpan 200 Peluru di Rumah," *Detiknews*, November 24, 2010, <https://news.detik.com/berita/1491533/ditangkap-densus-di-solo-bahrn-akui-simpan-200-peluru-di-rumah->

Bahrn Naim created five categories of targets that he referred to as the 'Ring System of Muslims' Enemies'. These included infidels, polytheists, atheists and oppressors of people. First, he included the *thoghut* which he referred to as governments that don't implement Islamic Law and those assisting them. Second, the *anshar thoghut*, which include those who protect the interest of *thoghut* and non-Muslim entities. Third the *munafiqin*, who are Muslims supporting the infidels, their government and *anshar thoghut*. The last two targets include both the *jahil* and *ashobiyyin*, or those who justify the act of infidels, *thoghut*, apostates, *ansharut thoghut*, and hypocrites. These people were classified as legitimate targets for terrorist attacks.

## Bahrn Naim's Use of Social Media

Bahrn Naim focused on recruiting friends and students to conduct terrorist attacks through strategic use of social media. Even though, he appeared in a few photographs cradling a weapon, Bahrn Naim was not a frontline fighter. He had a degree in informatics engineering and communicated discreetly using a range of online platforms, including encrypted messaging applications to radicalise Southeast Asians, and urge them to attack their own governments.

Bahrn Naim also attempted to seed an IS capability in Southern Thailand where IS Malaysian and Indonesian operators attempted to source weapons from Runda Kumpulan Kecil, the most violent threat group in Thailand. Together with one of his two wives, Rafiqah Hanum, they ran a travel agency to move Southeast Asians to fight for IS. Although IS was reluctant to support Bahrn Naim's projects, he built a support and operational infrastructure from Indonesia to Turkey, the gateway to Iraq and Syria.

Since 2015, Bahrn Naim used multiple online and social media platforms such as, Facebook, Twitter and Google+ to radicalise and recruit. Bahrn Naim had multiple Facebook accounts and they had 578 friends in November 2015<sup>10</sup>, 259 friends in December 2015<sup>11</sup> and 850 followers in

<sup>10</sup> Facebook, 'Muhammad Bahrnaim Anggih Tamtomo' Accessed November 19, 2015.

<sup>11</sup> Facebook, Muhammad Bahrnaim Anggih Tamtomo, Accessed December 31, 2015.

January 2016 respectively<sup>12</sup>. Bahrn Naim's main Facebook account had 1099 friends on 12 May 2016<sup>13</sup>, while his Twitter account had 184 followers in May 2016 and 258 followers in July 2016<sup>14</sup>. His YouTube channel had 12 subscribers in June 2016<sup>15</sup>.

Bahrn Naim was the first Southeast Asian terrorist to use Bitcoins and basic artificial intelligence to disseminate terrorist content to future attackers and supporters. In April 2017, Bahrn Naim used an internet Bot in his website 'Wahai Muslimin', which allowed visitors an interactive and instant platform to communicate with him. He used his blog called, 'Bahrn Naim: Analisis, Strategi dan Kontra Intelijen' (Bahrn Naim: Analysis, Strategy and Counter Intelligence), to disseminate manuals on becoming a hacker and spying. He also shared manuals titled, 'How to Make a Bomb in 10 Minutes' and 'Make Explosive Materials in Your Kitchen'. Naim's 'Nuclear for Dummy' manual in his personal website inspired Indonesian terrorist Young Farmer to build a 'dirty bomb' aimed at Indonesian targets.<sup>16</sup>

Bahrn Naim had been inactive on social media since October 2016. However, until May 2017, his blog 'Wahai Muslimin' remained active.<sup>17</sup> In a 335-page e-book titled 'Sebuah Perjalanan, Rahasia...' (A Journey, Secret), Bahrn Naim reminded IS supporters who pledged allegiance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi to obey the 'caliph's instructions'. He used encrypted communication channels, mostly Telegram and WhatsApp to plot attacks and assign missions. In order to counter this threat, the Indonesian government threatened to shut down Telegram in July 2017. However, Telegram's representatives focused on blocking IS content to prevent the threat from escalating, which led to Bahrn Naim's account being taken down. He attracted further attention after his associates led by

<sup>12</sup> Facebook, Muhammad Bahrunnaim AT, Accessed January 19, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Facebook, M Bahrn Naim AT, Accessed May 12, 2016.

<sup>14</sup> Twitter. Bahrunnaim15. Accessed July 2016.

<sup>15</sup> YouTube. Bahrn Naim. Accessed June 2016.

<sup>16</sup> Online source - website: [www.bahrunnaim.wordpress.com](http://www.bahrunnaim.wordpress.com), Accessed November 2016.

<sup>17</sup> Online source – website: [www.wahaimuslimin.wordpress.com](http://www.wahaimuslimin.wordpress.com), Accessed May 2017.

Gigih Rahmat Dewa planned to attack Marina Bay Sands in Singapore. On 9 June 2016, after escaping a US strike he used his Facebook page to declare: "Kuffar (disbelievers), I'm still alive. And war [will] still continue in your country."

Bahrn Naim became elusive after he realised that he was being targeted and faked his death in May 2017 by ending communication with his supporters and sympathisers. Authorities from multiple countries believed that Bahrn Naim was killed fighting the Syrian army in Abu Hammam, Syria in November 2017. Nonetheless, he continued to operate discreetly, building social media platforms to disseminate propaganda, recruiting handlers and creating bots to spread computer generated content to large audiences.

### **Terrorist Operations Directed and Inspired by Bahrn Naim**

The terrorist attacks and plots that Bahrn Naim had directed are listed below:

(i) *Planned Bombing on Independence Day, Indonesia (2015)*: Ibadurrahman alias Ali Robani alias Ibad, Yus Karman, and Giyanto alias Gento planned to bomb the Pasar Kliwon police post, a Christian church and Confucian temple on the Indonesian Independence Day in 2015.<sup>18</sup> Members of Laskar Hisbah in Solo were coopted to join IS by Bahrn Naim. He acted as a coach for a restricted Telegram group called 'Explosive and Electrochemistry Division' managed by Ibad, which showed others how to make a bomb and use it effectively, tactics on laundering money and making online purchases by stealing credit card numbers.

(ii) *Planned Series of Attacks, Indonesia (2015)*: A schoolmate of Bahrn Naim and former member of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Arif Hidayatullah alias Abu Musab, planned to launch a series of

<sup>18</sup> Muh Taufiqurrohman and Ardi Putra Prasetya, "Radical Terrorist Man behind Five Terror Plots in Indonesia," *Today Online*, December 15, 2016, <https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/radical-terrorist-man-behind-five-terror-plots-indonesia>; Farouk Arnaz. "Solo Suicide Bomber Was a Member of Hisbah Terror Group: Police Source," *Jakarta Globe*, July 5, 2016, <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/solo-suicide-bomber-member-hisbah-terror-group-police-source/>.

attacks. His targets included Jewish and Shia communities, Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama known as Ahok, Indonesian National police leaders and foreigners in end-2015. Reports revealed that Bahrn Naim funded the attack using bank transfers.<sup>19</sup>

(iii) *Planned Marina Bay Sands Rocket Attack, Singapore (2016)*: Katibah Gonggong Rebus (KGR), a cell in Batam led by Gigih Rahmat Dewa planned to attack Marina Bay Sands, Singapore's iconic hotel in October 2015. The cell hosted two Uighur foreign fighters including a suicide bomber.<sup>20</sup>

(iv) *Attempted Suicide Bombing in Solo, Indonesia (2016)*: On July 5, 2016, Nur Rohman conducted a suicide bombing by riding a motorcycle into the Solo Police Headquarters compound. Rohman was killed during the attack that also injured a policeman. Bahrn Naim used Paypal to fund this attack. Nur Rohman was connected to other Bahrn Naim's cells - Ibad, Abu Musab, and Gigih - but managed to escape detection.<sup>21</sup>

(v) *Planned Presidential Palace Bombing, Indonesia (2016)*: Dian Yulia Novi, a former maid in Singapore and Taiwan, was recruited by Nur Solikin who later married her and planned multiple attacks. Their main targets included the security guards in the Presidential Palace, which was to be attacked in December 2016. Other back up targets included, the security detail guarding then Governor of Jakarta and Police Mobile Brigade officers who prayed at the Brimob Headquarters Mosque in Depok.<sup>22</sup>

The following plot was enabled by Bahrn Naim:

(i) *Planned Dirty Bomb Attacks, Indonesia (2017)*: Young Farmer's cell in Bandung planned to attack an armory warehouse of Pindad in Bandung, police's mobile brigade (Brimob) headquarters in Depok, and the presidential palace in Jakarta during Indonesia's independence day in August 2017.<sup>23</sup> Farmer together with Anggi Indah

Kusuma alias Khanza Syafiyah al-Fuqron and her husband Adilatur Rahman extracted Thorium from petromax lamps to build a series of 'dirty bombs'.<sup>24</sup> Anggi, who was a former maid in Hong Kong, joined seven Telegram chat groups and managed 'Redaksi Khilafah' (Caliphate Editorial). Although Farmer and Anggi never met Bahrn Naim, they were inspired by the content developed and disseminated by him.

The following attack was inspired by Bahrn Naim:

(i) *Attempted Stabbing and Bombing, Indonesia (2016)*: On 25 June 2016, Ivan Armadi Hasugian stabbed a priest in Medan church and carried a home-made bomb that did not explode.<sup>25</sup> Ivan copied the modus operandi of the church attack in northern France that occurred a month before the Medan attack in July 2016. Two terrorists with fake suicide vests, took five worshippers hostage, and stabbed the priest in the chest in Normandy, France.

### Future of IS Southeast Asian Leadership

Bahrn Naim's case demonstrates that terrorists functioning in cyber space can be as violent as terrorists operating in physical space. In May 2018, two weeks before Bahrn Naim's death, another Indonesian foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) identified as Ghana Prayadharizal alias Abu Ghaida was killed in a US airstrike while driving in Kashma in Syria.<sup>26</sup> Abu Ghaida, an Indonesian IS propagandist joined the IS media wing, before travelling to Syria, and was the only producer of Philippines

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Bomb' Attack –Sources," *Reuters*, August 25, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-idUSKCN1B51FW>.

<sup>24</sup> Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, "A Husband and Wife Face Death Penalty on Terror Charges in Indonesia," *The Straits Times*, March 12, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/husband-and-wife-face-death-penalty-on-terror-charges-in-indonesia>.

<sup>25</sup> Arlina Arshad, "Suicide Bomber Blows Himself Up in Indonesian Church: Report," *The Straits Times*, August 28, 2016, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/suicide-bomber-blows-himself-up-in-indonesian-church-report>.

<sup>26</sup> "Terrorism is 'Every Country's Enemy,' Indonesian Defense Chief Says," *Benar News*, August 31, 2018. <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesia/indonesia-militants-08312018163151.html/>.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

<sup>21</sup> *ibid*

<sup>22</sup> *ibid*

<sup>23</sup> Tom Allard and Agustinus Beo Da Costa, "Exclusive: Indonesian Militants Planned 'Dirty

propaganda. In order to support IS siege of Marawi, Abu Ghaida promoted IS in the region and helped to build IS Philippines media unit. Although both Bahrun Naim and Abu Ghaida have been killed, they have created capabilities and an infrastructure that will outlast them. Increasingly, terrorists like Bahrun Naim and Abu Ghaida spent more time online than offline. As they have an extraordinary reach, they pose a greater threat than most terrorists on the ground.

Although there are emerging terrorist leaders for directing attacks from Syria and Iraq, such as Mohammed Yusop Karim Fais alias Abu Walid, the death of Bahrun Naim will be a hard blow to both IS central and IS regional for three reasons. First, Bahrun Naim was talented in motivating his recruits and indoctrinating them to sacrifice their lives. Second, Bahrun Naim was technically competent, harnessing technology to enhance terrorist capabilities. Third, Bahrun Naim was hardworking, resourceful and very experienced. Away from the glare of the international media, Southeast Asian governments disrupted multiple terrorist plots by Bahrun Naim. He was a passionate propagandist trained to communicate securely, while living in a conflict-ridden territory with a laptop and limited funds to motivate terrorist attacks.

### Lessons on the Terrorist Threat

Bahrun Naim's case underlines the need for governments to work together to contain, isolate and eliminate the current and emerging transnational terrorist threat. His case also indicates how terrorists are leveraging new technologies like virtual currencies and showing a significant interest in conducting cyber-attacks. It is paramount to counter the online threat by promoting religious moderation, tolerance and coexistence, paired with adequate surveillance and tracking. The terrorism threat in Southeast Asia has proliferated from groups to networks and the community. In order to manage the threat, the governments in the region will have to shift from cooperation to collaboration where military, law enforcement and national security services work together. Because Southeast Asian terrorists operate outside the region, governments should build partnerships with

key countries in the West and parts of the Middle East.

Considering the possibility of Southeast Asians traveling to Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern theatres, the threat to the region will be directed from other countries beyond Iraq and Syria. The terrorist theatre is transforming and requires wider coverage. Bahrun Naim himself scanned the IS global expansion and educated his networks. After IS targeted Paris in November 2015, Bahrun Naim's blog post titled 'Lessons from the Paris Attacks' called on his supporters to learn from the strike. Similarly, referring to the Dhaka attack in July 2016, Bahrun Naim urged his supporters to 'Learn from the Caliphate Army in Bangladesh'.

As transnational terrorist networks have linked international epicenters of terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) to Southeast Asia, future responses need to be underscored by transnational cooperation. In this case, mitigating the future threat will require a shift from regional cooperation to international collaboration. Governments should build common databases, conduct joint training and operations and share experiences, resources and expertise.

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# Interoperability: Enhancing Indo-Pacific Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

Patrick Blannin

*Transnational terrorism is a significant common problem for states in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper posits that a fundamental element of effective counter-terrorism (CT) is cooperation, whether it is in the form of joint, interagency, multinational or a combination of each (JIM).<sup>1</sup> Interoperability, in which two or more states act in a coordinated manner to address a common problem, facilitates a translation of policy-making rhetoric to operational responses to security threats. Improved interoperability will enhance regional CT cooperation at the strategic and tactical level.*

## Background: Improving Regional Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

Improving regional CT through cooperation and coordination to deliver strategic and operational results is a common policy objective of many countries in the Indo-Pacific. A distinctive and indispensable aspect of CT cooperation is interoperability. Interoperability is broadly defined as “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.”<sup>2</sup> At its core, interoperability involves two or more actors (states) acting in a coordinated manner to address a common problem. Transnational terrorism is a significant common problem for Indo-Pacific states and necessitates high levels of interoperability. This paper proposes a coherent CT response framework that connects policy, strategy and tactics.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Joint refers to cooperation between branches of the state’s armed forces whereas interagency refers to cooperation between domestic, civilian security-oriented agencies and multinational refers to cooperation between sovereign states.

<sup>2</sup> *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 146.

<sup>3</sup> Strategic Studies is a useful lens to view the interaction between states, comprehend the drivers of policy and to explain the differing ways states respond to challenges and interact with one another.

Defence and security-oriented cooperation is central to the efficacy and sustainability of a regional security architecture (of which CT is a component).<sup>4</sup> This sentiment was echoed by Indonesia’s Chief Security Minister Wiranto at the 2018 Indonesia International Defense Science Seminar in mid-July, where he highlighted the important of intelligence sharing to counter the threat of terrorism, transnational organized crime and cybercrime<sup>5</sup>. However, there is a need to move beyond statements of intent. Several policy-makers have articulated the need for common security objectives, using terminology such as ‘it takes a network to fight a network’ and that ‘the fight against terror needs a local face’ as they seek to bring together the complex and disparate threads of regional counter-terrorism threats and current responses.<sup>6</sup> Policy-makers

<sup>4</sup> Patrick Blannin, *Defence Diplomacy in the Long War* (The Netherlands: Brill Research Perspectives, 2017), pp. 1-163; Patrick Blannin, “Unity of Effort: Why Military and Political Coordination is Vital to Success in Iraq and Syria,” *Modern War Institute*, January 23, 2018, <https://mwi.usma.edu/unity-effort-military-political-coordination-vital-success-iraq-syria/>;

Patrick Blannin, “The Critical and Enduring Role of Confidence in Preventive Diplomacy,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 2018,

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/critical-and-enduring-role-confidence-preventive-diplomacy>;

Patrick Blannin, “The Good Operation: Notes on A Whole-Of-Government Approach To National Security,” *Modern War Institute*, May 2018,

<https://mwi.usma.edu/good-operation-notes-whole-government-approach-national-security/>.

<sup>5</sup> Sheany, “Defense Diplomacy Essential for World Peace: Chief Security Minister,” *Jakarta Globe*, July 12, 2018, <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/defense-diplomacy-essential-world-peace-chief-security-minister/>

<sup>6</sup> The ‘network’ is attributed to Gen. Stanley McChrystal in a 2011 *Foreign Policy* article see Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes A Network,” *Foreign Policy*, 21 February 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/21/it-takes-a-network/> where he emphasised that the disaggregated multi-nodal organisational framework of contemporary terrorist groups required a multi-actor strategic and operational framework to counter them. The joint, interagency and multinational

almost universally champion the development and growth of strategic partnerships and enhanced CT cooperation. But there is a need for constructive solutions to address a number of security threats unique to the region. Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf (ASG) have maintained a regional presence by aligning themselves with local populations, grievances and causes.<sup>7</sup> These groups have been reinforced by a new generation of active and passive supporters. Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu recently warned that "third-generation terrorism," referring especially to returning Islamic State (IS) fighters from the Middle East, could become "a region-wide crisis" that would dominate regional security debates in the near term.<sup>8</sup>

Improving interoperability in CT incorporates four general elements: joint exercises, exchanges, dialogue and capacity building. These elements address key areas such as knowledge intelligence, education and information gathering. Contemporary CT revolves around a core of risk-informed and intelligence-driven operations. Intelligence is an essential element in the fight against terrorism and is directly related to gaining extensive field experience and training. CT practitioners also require a deep understanding of the terrorist organizations they are dealing with and the key people within them. The ability to comprehend regional geo-political dynamics and its impact on domestic security is also crucial for strategic planning. Another key factor in improving operational outcomes would be to build and sustain a broad repository of field experience and to provide pathways for

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concept discussed in this paper is an evolution of Gen. McChrystal's vision. Likewise, the 'local face' phrase is used at a majority of security-oriented conferences/dialogues on transnational terrorism. The 'local face' approach incorporates the unique geographic, social, historical and political elements of a specific locality to generate a comprehensive CT strategy.

<sup>7</sup> Joseph Liow, "ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing Terrorism In Southeast Asia and the Threat to the Homeland," *Brookings*, April 27, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/isis-in-the-pacific-assessing-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-and-the-threat-to-the-homeland/>

<sup>8</sup> Sheany, "Defense Minister Warns of 'Third-Generation Terrorism' Threat," *Jakarta Globe*, July 13, 2018, <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/international-community-must-come-together-to-address-third-generation-terrorism-threat-defense-minister/>

greater civilian and military engagement. These essential structural changes are supplemented with practical engagement through gaming exercises and operations to inform the decisions of policy-makers and the actions of practitioners.

Interoperability requires an extensive network of communication channels, relating to intelligence sharing in particular. Effective CT requires intelligence that is both timely and actionable. Only when partners are 'aware' of a threat can they act pre-emptively to allocate resources, carry out the necessary target hardening, communicate the threat to the public and effectively target those involved in a possible attack. The legacy of intelligence sharing in the region is long and continues to improve. For example, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance that comprises of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States was formalized in 1956. In January 2018, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense launched the "Our Eyes" surveillance and intelligence-sharing initiative, involving Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines to strengthen regional responses.<sup>9</sup>

### Interoperability in Context

There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically and geopolitically diverse as the Indo-Pacific.<sup>10</sup> The region is home to more

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<sup>9</sup> J Vitor Tossini, "The Five Eyes – The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere," *UK Defence Journal*, November 14, 2017,

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/>; Jeffrey Dailey, "The Intelligence Club: A Comparative Look at Five Eyes," *Journal of Political Science and Public Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2017): 1-8; Prashanth Parameswaran, "What's Next for the New ASEAN 'Our Eyes' Intelligence Initiative?," *The Diplomat*, January 27, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/asean-launches-new-our-eyes-intelligence-initiative/>.

<sup>10</sup> 'Indo-Pacific' was frequently used by strategic analysts and high-level government/ military leadership in Australia, Japan and the US from 2011 with a formal commitment to the term in Australia's 2013 Defence White Paper. See Mercy Kuo, "The Origin of 'Indo-Pacific' as Geopolitical Construct," *The Diplomat*, January 25, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-origin-of-indo-pacific-as-geopolitical-construct/>; Alan Chong and Wu Shang Su, "Indo-Pacific' vs 'Asia-Pacific': Contending Visions?" *RSIS Commentary*, February 28, 2018, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CO18034.pdf>; Lloyd

than 50% of the world's population, two of the three largest and ten of the smallest economies. The Indo-Pacific also contains the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation, the smallest republic globally and the smallest nation in Asia. Containing seven of the world's ten largest standing militaries and five of the world's declared nuclear nations, the region is also heavily militarised.<sup>11</sup> The geo-strategic complexity of the region presents both challenges and opportunities for policymakers within.

Cross border movement in the region is significant and presents many security risks. Approximately 4 billion people inhabit the Indo-Pacific and "1.3 billion people travel through or within the region every year."<sup>12</sup> As a consequence, security officials have pointed out that 'jihadi tourism' is a salient threat that has surged, specifically after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. For example, around 220 people from Australia have travelled to the Middle East since 2012, joining the thousands of foreign fighters (FFs)

engaged in terrorist related conflicts there. While this number has fallen from its peak in 2015, officials claim there are approximately 110 Australians who are still actively engaged in terrorism related activities in the Middle East.

This number would have been significantly higher if not for the intervention of the Australian security, law enforcement and intelligence community. For example, the Australian Border Force reports that their Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) have offloaded almost 900 airline passengers in recent years. Other countries in the region have faced more challenges. Indonesia's Defence Ministry recently released figures that detailed that up to 800 people (400 from Indonesia) had managed to evade Southeast Asian authorities to travel and join the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.<sup>13</sup>

Adding to the complexity of the issue, the sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean are strategically important for the energy needs of some of the world's largest economies, including China. Approximately 80% of the world's oil tankers sail across the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz, the Babel-Mandeb Strait, and the Straits of Malacca onto Singapore, eventually bound for China and beyond.<sup>14</sup> However, the Indian Ocean also contains several maritime chokepoints that could threaten these strategic supply routes.<sup>15</sup> From an Australian perspective, the significance of maritime security is clear, as it is the largest nation in the world that is surrounded by water. Protecting a coastline of 38,000 km and an extensive maritime zone, which comprises 11 per cent of the earth's oceans, relies on a coordinated joint-interagency effort supported by regional security partners.

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Adducul, "The Indo-Pacific Construct in Australia's White Papers: Reflections for ASEAN-Australia Future Strategic Partnership," *CIRSS Commentaries* V, no. 6 (2018), <http://www.fsi.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Vol-V-No-6-0314-The-Indo-Pacific-Construct-in-Australia%E2%80%99s-White-Papers-Adducul-1-1.pdf>. However, not everyone agrees. Toloraya in his article

Georgy Toloraya, "On Geopolitical Configurations in Asia," *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 19, 2018, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/On-Geopolitical-Configurations-in-Asia-19426> argues that "countries in this Indo-Pacific area have little in common with each other and hardly deserves to be called a 'region' at all." This article will use 'Indo-Pacific' for consistency and reflect the official rhetoric of the day.

<sup>11</sup> Harry Harris, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Guidance, August 12, 2016, [http://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/Documents/pdf/guidance\\_12\\_august\\_2016.pdf?ver=2016-08-16-140701-960](http://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/Documents/pdf/guidance_12_august_2016.pdf?ver=2016-08-16-140701-960)

<sup>12</sup> Australian Government, *Foreign Policy White Paper*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, <https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper>; Andrew Zamitt, "Australian Jihadism in the Age of Islamic State," *CTC Sentinel* 10, no 3 (2017); James Mattis, "Media Availability with Secretary Mattis En-Route to Brussels," *Department of Defense*, February 13, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1441004/media-availability-with-secretary-mattis-en-route-to-brussels/>; CNNpolitics, (July 19, 2018), <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/18/politics/syrian-allies-foreign-terrorists/index.html>.

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<sup>14</sup> "Policy Recommendations By The Quadripartite Commission On The Indian Ocean Regional Security Towards A More Stable Security Environment In The Indian Ocean Region", *The Sasakawa Peace Foundation*, 2018, pp. 1-28, <https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/RecommendationsByQuadripartiteCommission.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Dan McDaniel, "India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific Region: Coalition, Co-Existence Or Clash?" (Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2012), pp. 1-54, [http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/Commanders/2012/09\\_US\\_China\\_India\\_in\\_the\\_Indo-Pacific\\_Region\\_Coalition\\_Co-existence\\_or\\_Clash\\_McDaniel%202\\_2.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/Commanders/2012/09_US_China_India_in_the_Indo-Pacific_Region_Coalition_Co-existence_or_Clash_McDaniel%202_2.pdf).

## Foundations for Improved Cooperation

Increasing interoperability is an ongoing process and achieving an ‘ultimate’ state of multinational readiness is implausible. Fostering closer engagement inevitably causes friction arising from competing geopolitical interests as well as political and legal systems. China and India, for example, are seeking spheres of economic and political influence in the region as emerging superpowers. Constructive diplomacy can help to mitigate some of these inherent challenges. The *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America report*, which was released earlier in 2018, asserts that terrorism is no longer the primary national security concern of the U.S., with interstate strategic competition as the principal threat.<sup>16</sup> While this statement may concern policymakers and practitioners who seek to enhance regional CT cooperation, it does not reflect the current reality. While the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy remains opaque, the U.S. still has very strong security partnerships with many allies and partners in the region and still regards itself as the security partner of choice for these countries. The improved defence cooperation efforts with India and Vietnam is also evident of a sustained U.S. presence in the region, whereas ‘traditional’ partners such as Singapore, Japan and Australia continue to anchor their security policies around the assumption that the U.S. will remain the prevailing military power in the region in the medium-term.

The 2017 seizure of a large part of Marawi city in the Philippines by IS aligned terrorists, including many from outside the Philippines, was an important wake-up call for governments in Southeast Asia, on the evolving nature and potential scale of the terrorist threat facing the region. Responding to the siege was a major challenge for the Filipino Armed Forces and revealed an urgent need to restructure training programs and implement organisational reforms.<sup>17</sup> The U.S.

<sup>16</sup> US Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, 2018, Washington, DC, p.1, <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> Clive Williams, ‘Marawi Battle has Implications for Australians’, *The Interpreter*, October 24, 2017,

has stepped in by providing US\$75 million for the Philippines to augment its manned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; Maritime Special Operations Group armor, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems and Joint Special Operations Tactical enhancement. Similar financing was also extended to countries such as Indonesia and the Maldives.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, the U.S. will provide the Philippines US\$26.5 million over the next two years to boost specific law enforcement-oriented CT programs.<sup>19</sup> These efforts reaffirm an ongoing U.S. commitment to provide the whole-of-government support and assistance to CT efforts (including CVE initiatives) in the Philippines and beyond as part of a comprehensive plan to address shared threats to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia appears to match the U.S. engagement efforts.<sup>20</sup> Australia has provided over US\$ 18.3 million in foreign assistance for post-Marawi security programs, for example. The Australian Army has also trained Philippine soldiers in combined urban warfare exercises in the wake of the Marawi siege. Two Australian Navy patrol boats also arrived in Palawan, in the Southern Philippines in mid-July to participate in a maritime security exercise to enhance training, interoperability

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/battle-marawi-implications-australians>

<sup>18</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Counterterrorism: DoD Should Fully Address Security Assistance Planning Elements in Global Train and Equip Project Proposals*, GAO-18-449, Washington, DC, May 2018, pp. 37-38,

<https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/692152.pdf>; The U.S. PACOM area of responsibility

(<http://www.pacom.mil/About-USPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/>); United States Department of the Army Comptroller, *Operations & Maintenance, Army, Justifications of Estimate*, Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates, Vol. 1, February 2018, pp. 1-681, [https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Document%2Fdefbudget/fy2019/FY2019\\_Budget\\_Request\\_Overview\\_Book.pdf](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Document%2Fdefbudget/fy2019/FY2019_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> Seth Robson, ‘US to give Philippine Police \$26.5 Million to Fight Terrorism,’ *Stars and Stripes*, July 19, 2018, <https://www.stripes.com/news/us-to-give-philippine-police-26-5-million-to-fight-terrorism-1.538379>

<sup>20</sup> Trevor Alexander, ‘Australia’s Role in the Pacific During the Age of Trump,’ *The Regionalist*, 2017, 1-5, <https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/resources/Documents/Trevor%20Alexander%20-%20Australia's%20Role%20in%20the%20Pacific%20During%20the%20Age%20of%20Trump.pdf>

and cooperation in areas of terrorism and kidnapping.<sup>21</sup> Additionally, the U.S., the Philippines, Australia and Japan have also participated in the annual Balikatan multinational military exercise in May 2018, that focused on mutual defense, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and *disaster relief*.<sup>22</sup>

### Cooperation Propagation

This article advocates cultivating interoperability to enhance regional CT efforts, to bring about an improvement of outcomes at the tactical and strategic level. At both levels, the impact of these improvements relies on political will and the ability of policymakers to commit the personnel and funding necessary to enhance cooperation. Domestically, improving CT capabilities requires clearly defined objectives and parameters for each participating country that must cover all levels of the operational hierarchy, from the individual CT practitioner, through to the inter-agency networks and flowing up to the key policymakers. Regionally, capacity building is most effective when partners face common security threats that align with their interests.<sup>23</sup> There are obvious advantages when it comes to pooling resources, sharing knowledge and tactical knowhow through the development of training programs and other CT doctrine.<sup>24</sup> However, the nature of such enhanced cooperation efforts may pose a challenge to some governments who are either new to the concept or reluctant to enter into such security-oriented cooperation agreements due to geo-political considerations.<sup>25</sup> They

could also place less emphasis on military-led responses to transnational terrorism, whereby the military is the default responder. This is especially relevant in a region with a history of domestic interventions by military, paramilitary or other proxies within some states.

Although CT-oriented cooperation in general and interoperability, in particular, is clearly warranted, operational activities must occur as part of a dynamic, yet clearly defined regional security framework. There are mechanisms in place to build this framework and a key component of CT cooperation includes supporting existing regional agreements and fora. While Bilateral Treaties, security-oriented Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Cooperative Partnerships are purposeful, multilateral engagement significantly amplifies interoperability. Useful multinational mechanisms include the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Singapore and Malaysia), the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation as well as ASEAN and ASEAN-centric institutions such as the East Asia Summit. Additionally, insight into ways to enhance interoperability can be derived from a vast network of academic and private sector expertise.

In conclusion, interoperability for both offensive and defensive CT will remain an important aspect of CT cooperation between Indo-Pacific states for the foreseeable future. However, it should be embedded within a whole-of-government approach to national and regional security cooperation and anchored on broader strategic relationships. For example, the aforementioned intelligence sharing relies on a high degree of trust and transparency that can be generated through operational engagement yet sustained through strategic coordination. Without cross-regional acquiescence to a clear and present threat including a clear strategy to counter it, identifying ways to improve interoperability will remain difficult.

<sup>21</sup> Celeste Anna Formoso, "PH, Aussie Navies To Hold Maritime Security Activity In Palawan," *Philippine News Agency*, July 16, 2018, <http://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1041516>

<sup>22</sup> Christian Vicedo, "Balikatan Exercises 2018: Philippines-US Security Cooperation Forging Ahead," *CSIS*, May 29, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-36-balikatan-exercises-2018-philippines-us-security-cooperation-forging-ahead>

<sup>23</sup> Benjamin Schreer and Ian Hall, "After Marawi: Advancing Australia-Philippines Strategic Relationship," *The Strategist*, July 2, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/after-marawi-advancing-australia-philippines-strategic-relations>

<sup>24</sup> Patricia Weitsman, "Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare," *ASPJ Africa & Francophonie*, 2011, pp. 29-53

<sup>25</sup> For example, while "India has historically resisted signing these agreements, many Indian objections

are rooted in domestic political calculations rather than substantive strategic concerns." See Samir Saran and S. Paul Kapur, "How India and the US Can Lead In The Indo-Pacific," *The Lowy Interpreter*, August 18, 2017, <https://www.loyyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/how-india-and-us-can-lead-indo-pacific>

Conversely, the positive operational outcomes derived through improvements in interoperability can build sustainable relationships, generate trust and improve the security environment within the region.

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# Refuting Islamic State (IS) Jihad Propaganda with the Story of Uwais Al-Qarni

Muhammad Haniff Hassan

*One of the arguments put forth by the so-called Islamic State (IS) to urge Muslim youths to wage jihad and travel to Iraq and Syria centres on the irrelevance of parental consent. IS has interpreted its jihad as fard `ayn (personal obligation) whereby Muslim youths do not need to feel guilty about ignoring their parents' disapproval. This article<sup>1</sup> seeks to refute the above argument using the story of Uwais Al-Qarni who was not able to migrate to Medina and participate in jihad as he was taking care of his aged mother in Yemen. Although this refutation specifically counters IS ideology, it could also be applied to similar religious justifications by other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).*

## IS' Ideological Threat

Despite IS' defeat in Iraq and Syria, the group still poses a dangerous threat in three ways. Firstly, IS has highly committed cadres who continue to instigate and solicit support from Muslims worldwide to commit acts of terrorism in the name of IS' vision of jihad. Second, the ideology adopted by IS is deceptively made legitimate with the use of past classical scholars' theological arguments and opinions that can influence young Muslims with limited religious knowledge. Third, IS propaganda is still being circulated through the Internet, where regulation by state authorities remains difficult.

IS' ideological threat from the three aforementioned factors is heightened by

<sup>1</sup> This article is adapted from the original Malay version: Muhammad Haniff Hassan (2018), "Menolak fahaman jihad melampau ISIS dengan kisah Uwais Al-Qarni (Refuting ISIS jihad propaganda with Uwais Al-Qarni's story)", *Berita Mediacorp*, 18 June.

attempts to establish a base in the Mindanao islands in the southern Philippines.<sup>2</sup> The conflict-stricken area has experienced decades of clashes between Moro Muslims and the Philippine government. Even though IS was eventually defeated in Marawi, its affiliated groups and members continue to operate and spread propaganda. The active networks and desire to hold territory in the Philippines in contrast to traveling to Iraq and Syria, makes recruiting easier for IS. Both Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, and Malaysia, a Muslim-majority country, have had traction with extremist groups similar to IS. Both of these factors are worrying for mainstream and moderate Muslims who seek to protect the religion from extremist ideologies.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The so-called Islamic State (IS) attempted to take over Marawi city in May 2017 with the Philippine security forces liberating it in October the same year.

<sup>3</sup> The Straits Times, "Philippine Congress Passes Autonomy Bill For Volatile Muslim Region", May 30, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippine-congress-passes-autonomy-bill-for-volatile-muslim-region> (accessed June 28, 2018); Joseph Liow Chin Yong, "Shifting Sands of Terrorism in Southeast Asia", *RSIS Commentary*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co18025-shifting-sands-of-terrorism-in-southeast-asia/#.WzCphNizbs0> (accessed June 28, 2018); Emile Amin, "Southeast Asia: The New Terrorist Destination", *Asharq Al-Awsat*, November 20, 2017, <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1089481/southeast-asia-new-terrorist-destination> (accessed June 28, 2018); Greg Fealy, "The Battle For Marawi And ISIS In Southeast Asia", *The Strategist*, August 23, 2017, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/battle-marawi-isis-southeast-asia/> (accessed June 28, 2018). See Rohan Gunaratna, "The Islamic State's Eastward Expansion", *Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asian Responses* (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung and RSIS, 2016), 9-26; Vanessa Panes, "The Influence of Daesh in Philippines",

## IS' Misguided Argument

IS propaganda aims to gain Muslims' support to mount attacks in its name by claiming that armed jihad against infidels today is *fard 'ayn* (personal obligation). The overall objective is to liberate Muslim lands from the occupation of non-Muslim armies and to re-establish the historical Islamic caliphate.

Under this condition, young Muslims who wish to join IS and migrate to its territories are not required to seek their parents' consent to fulfil the obligation, which is considered similar to the performance of the obligatory five daily prayers. Thus, according to IS, even if their parents disapprove, there should not be any feelings of guilt in disobeying them as one's duty to God must be above one's duty to their parents.<sup>4</sup>

*Dabiq*<sup>5</sup>, IS' official online magazine, states that:

*“Amongst the major sins that many parents order their children with is the abandonment of the fard 'ayn jihad (jihad which is obligatory upon each and every individual). They intentionally or unintentionally distort the meaning of various ahadith on the obligation to obtain the permission of one's Muslim parents before performing fard kifayah jihad (jihad which is an obligation on the Ummah as a whole but not obligatory upon each and every individual)...The scholars mentioned numerous cases that make jihad against the kuffar (non-Muslims) fard 'ayn, including the invasion of the Muslims' lands, the imprisonment of Muslims, the imminent threat of attack against the Muslims, and the faceoff of the opposing armies. The Khalifah (hafidhahullah) has made a call for a general mobilisation, further emphasizing this obligation – as one of the cases making jihad fard 'ayn is the Imam*

*Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asian Responses*, (Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and RSIS, 2016), 124-38; Kumar Ramakrishna (2017), “The Growth of ISIS Extremism in Southeast Asia: Its Ideological and Cognitive Features—and Possible Policy Responses”, *New England Journal of Public Policy*, 29:1, 2017, pp. 1-16.

<sup>4</sup> *Dabiq* (1436H), no. 10, pp. 14-7; *Dabiq* (1437), no. 13, pp. 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Dabiq* is now discontinued. It was issued from July 2014 to 2016 and has 15 issues.

*commanding all the Muslims with jihad – so how can one ignore this clear-cut obligation now and be satisfied with submission to his lower self? How can one claim to be a muwahhid (monotheist).”<sup>6</sup>*

This ideological justification is a key reason for the sudden disappearances of young Muslims who did not inform their families. According to reports, many parents were unaware that their children had been radicalised and were in Iraq or Syria as members of IS.<sup>7</sup> Thus, countering and refuting this propaganda is important to mitigate IS' influence and ability to radicalise young Muslims. In this regard, the story of Uwais Al-Qarni contains several arguments against IS' fallacious claim.

## Story of Uwais Al-Qarni<sup>8</sup>

Al-Qarni's full name is recorded in his biography by Muslim scholars as Abu Amr Uwais bin Amir bin Juz' bin Malik Al-Qarni.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, pp. 15-6.

<sup>7</sup> Kevin Sullivan, “Bolingbrook Teens' Parents ‘Stunned’ By Islamic State Recruitment Claims”, *Chicago Tribune*, December 9, 2014, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/bolingbrook-plainfield/ct-chicago-islamic-state-met-20141208-story.html> (accessed June 28, 2018); Mario van San, “Belgian and Dutch Young Men and Women Who Joined ISIS: Ethnographic Research among the Families They Left Behind”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 41:1, 2018, pp. 39-58; Lizzie Dearden, “Mother Of British Teenager Killed Fighting For Isis Starts Group To Help Parents Counter Radicalisation”, *Independent*, December 3, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-foreign-fighters-british-islamic-state-syria-rasheed-nicola-benyahia-birmingham-radicalisation-a7453936.html> (accessed June 28, 2018); Janet Reitman, “Children of ISIS: Why did Three American Kids from the Suburbs Of Chicago Try to Run Away to The Islamic State, and Should The Feds Treat Them As Terrorists?”, *Rolling Stone*, March 25, 2015, <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/teenage-jihad-inside-the-world-of-american-kids-seduced-by-isis-20150325> (accessed June 28, 2018); CBS, *Desperate Alabama family: Woman, 20, left to join ISIS*, April 21, 2015, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/desperate-alabama-family-woman-20-left-to-join-isis/> (accessed June 28, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> See *Sahih Muslim*, The book of the merits of the Companions, Chapter: The virtues of Uwais Al-Qarni, hadith no. 319, available at <https://sunnah.com/muslim/44/319> (accessed June 28, 2018); Al-Zahabi (2001), *Siyar A'alam Al-Nubala'*, No place: Muassasah Al-Risalah, vol. 4, pp. 19-33.

Although he lived during Prophet Muhammad's lifetime, he was not one of the Prophet's Companions, as he never had the opportunity to meet him. Al-Qarni was thus regarded only as a *Tabi`* (sing. of *Tabi`in* – a Muslim who met a Companion of the Prophet and died as Muslim).

Al-Qarni embraced Islam when it was spread to Yemen by the Prophet's Companions. He was held back in Yemen from joining the Prophet in Medina as he was taking care of his aged mother. However, it was reported that Al-Qarni once sought permission from his mother to travel to Medina to meet the Prophet in person. His mother had asked him to not stay in Medina and return back to her after meeting the Prophet.

When Al-Qarni visited Medina, the Prophet was travelling on a military expedition. Al-Qarni waited for three days and returned back to Yemen without meeting the Prophet. Even though Al-Qarni never met the Prophet and never participated in jihad, he was not condemned. The Prophet did not declare that Al-Qarni was sinful, disobedient or negligent in performing jihad by prioritising his mother above jihad or his faith.

On the contrary, the Prophet praised Al-Qarni for his personal righteousness and dedication to his mother when he heard about his story after returning to Medina. The Prophet then announced to his Companions that God had bestowed a privilege on Al-Qarni whereby God would always forgive the sins of any person who Al-Qarni prayed for. The Prophet also announced that anyone who had the opportunity to meet Al-Qarni during his lifetime should ask him to pray to God for the forgiveness of their sins. This was an honour that was not bestowed upon even the Prophet's senior Companions who had endured hardships during the Meccan period and had performed jihad after their migration to Medina.<sup>9</sup>

### Argument Against IS

Based on Al-Qarni's story, IS' claims -- that Muslims who do not join the group to wage jihad have sinned -- are misguided and inaccurate. They are merely an attempt to arouse fear in Muslims who lack religious

knowledge and are unclear about IS' vision of jihad. In addition, IS' justifications nullifying parental consent for jihad are a ruse to induce young Muslims to disobey their parents without the fear of committing a sin. This is evident from the following questions:

If non-migration and non-participation in jihad (when it is deemed *fard `ayn*) are deemed to be sinful, why was Al-Qarni still praised and given a high status by the Prophet?

If *hijrah* (migration) to a caliphate is obligatory and living under a non-Muslim rule is sinful for Muslims, why was Al-Qarni not reprimanded by the Prophet for remaining in Yemen to take care of his mother?

If living outside the caliphate is contemptible in Islam, lowers a Muslim's level of faith and would incur God's wrath, why was Al-Qarni bestowed high honours by God? Al-Qarni attained closeness to God to the extent that He would forgive the sins of any person whom Al-Qarni prayed for – an honour that was not given even to senior Companions of the Prophet such as Abu Bakr and Umar, the first and second caliph after the Prophet respectively. It was even reported that Umar envied Al-Qarni for the privilege and requested Al-Qarni to pray for forgiveness of his sins when he chanced upon him during his rule.<sup>10</sup>

It was the Prophet's duty to explain an act that was sinful or against the spirit of Islam. The fact that he did not condemn Al-Qarni implies that what Al-Qarni did was permissible. In addition, all classical scholars who wrote biographies of the Companions and *Tabi`in* recorded Al-Qarni's biography impeccably.<sup>11</sup>

Here, a contrast can also be made between the Prophet and IS. The Prophet did not attempt to influence Al-Qarni to abandon his mother in favour of supporting his jihad. In contrast, IS intentionally instigates Muslims to ignore their parents and the adverse

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> See Biography of Uwais Al-Qarni (may Allah have mercy on him), *islamqa.info*, <https://islamqa.info/en/125276> (June 28, 2018).

consequences their children's departure would inflict on them.

Moreover, Al-Qarni's story is also consistent with the stories of other individuals intending to participate in jihad. These are related in the following hadiths:

*"Abdullah bin Umar narrated: A man came to the Messenger of Allah asking permission to go out for jihad. The Messenger of Allah asked him: Are your parents alive? He replied: Yes. The Messenger of Allah then said to him: Then your jihad would be with them (in looking after them and being at their service)."*<sup>12</sup>

*"When a man came to the Prophet from Yemen to participate in jihad, the Prophet asked him: Did they [your parents] give you permission?' The man said: No. He said: Go back to them and seek their permission, and if they give you permission, then go for jihad, otherwise honour and respect them."*<sup>13</sup>

*"Abdullah bin Amr bin Al-As narrated: A man came to the Prophet and said: I came to you to take the oath of allegiance to you on emigration, and I left my parents weeping. He (the Prophet) said: Return to them and make them laugh as you made them weep."*<sup>14</sup>

However, IS propagandists may argue that the above hadiths refer to jihad when it was considered as *farḍ kifayah* (collective obligation). Thus, they are not relevant to jihad which becomes *farḍ 'ayn* today because many Muslim territories are allegedly occupied by non-believers and non-

Muslim armies, and the caliphate is not established.

This claim can be refuted by referring to the occupation of Mecca and Jerusalem by pagan Arabs and Roman Christians respectively during the Prophet's lifetime. Although two of the holiest sites in Islam – the Kaabah in Mecca and Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem -- were located in the two cities, the Prophet did not declare that jihad was *farḍ 'ayn* in order to liberate both cities; nor did he encourage Muslims to abandon their parents and join him in Medina. There is no evidence that the Prophet applied the same ruling adopted by IS today.

Since IS' dismissal of parental consent for joining its jihad is anchored on the argument that jihad is *farḍ 'ayn* today, it must be highlighted that Al-Qarni's story also informs us that the *farḍ 'ayn* or *kifayah* status of jihad falls under the sole jurisdiction of a legitimate Muslim authority that bears semblance to the position of the Prophet during his lifetime. It cannot be dictated by extremist Islamist groups such as IS, AQ and JI. This is the definitive position of many Muslim scholars:

*"...it is important to note that Muslim scholars have ruled that laws of war can only be administered and executed by the Uliil Amri, or persons of appropriate authority. No individuals or groups are allowed to declare and wage war or jihad in the name of Islam or the community. As war will always affect the public at large, the declaration of war requires a proper mandate. The best people to hold such a mandate are those who are mandated to be the government. Furthermore, the teaching of syura (consultation) in Islam requires proper consultation of the people before war can be waged in their name. A serious matter such as the waging of war, if left to individuals or Muslim groups to decide and without going through a proper consultation process, will only create chaos and injustice - which is against the principle of any religion."*<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Al-Bukhari, *Sahih Al-Bukhari*, "Chapter: One Should Not Go For Jihad Without The Permission Of The Parents", <https://sunnah.com/bukhari/78/3> (accessed August 6, 2018); Muslim, *Sahih Muslim*, "Chapter: Being dutiful to one's parents, and which of them is more entitled to it", <https://sunnah.com/muslim/45/5> (accessed 6 August 2018).

<sup>13</sup> Abu Dawud, Sunan Abu Dawud, "Chapter: Regarding a man who goes to battle while his parents object", at <https://sunnah.com/abudawud/15/54> (accessed August 6, 2018).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, <https://sunnah.com/abudawud/15/52> (accessed August 6, 2018).

<sup>15</sup> Muhammad Haniff Hassan, *Unlicensed to Kill: Countering Imam Samudra's Justification for the Bali Bombing*, (Singapore: Peace Matters, 2006), p. 75. See also Wahbah A I-Zuhaili, *Al-Fiqh Al-Islami Wa Adillatuh*, vol. 6, (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 1996), 419; Ibn Qudamah, *Al-Mughni*, vol.10 (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr,

Even though the two holy lands were in the hands of Pagan Arabs and Roman Christians, the fact that the Prophet did not apply the same ruling issued by the IS implies that it was his discretionary power to declare whether jihad is *fard ayn* or *kifayah*.

In today's context, jihad becomes *fard `ayn*: (i) only when a legitimate Muslim authority declares so in response to an enemy's transgression of a Muslim land, and (ii) if one is a professional soldier serving in a country's military.<sup>16</sup> In other words, Muslims do not carry the burden of jihad as *fard `ayn* based on any declaration or exhortation by Muslim groups with dubious religious credibility. Further, the individual Muslim does not automatically bear the burden of jihad when a Muslim land is being invaded, before a legitimate Muslim authority issues such a ruling. Since extremist Islamist groups like IS do not have the theological mandate to issue such a ruling, Muslims should not hesitate to ignore their propaganda or calls to jihad.

## Conclusion

This article has attempted to expose the fallacies in a key aspect of IS' misinterpretation of jihad that has influenced a segment of Muslim youth today. Even though the issue addressed here relates specifically to IS, the story of Al-Qarni could also be applied in countering the propaganda of groups such as AQ and JI on the irrelevance of parental consent in jihad that is *fard `ayn*.<sup>17</sup> The counter-argument to IS'

recruitment rhetoric could be useful in de-radicalisation efforts and be incorporated in theological refutations against IS in the online and off-line domains.

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1984), 368-7; Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyah*, (Beirut: Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, 1982), 35.

<sup>16</sup> See Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mohamed Ali, *Questions and Answers on Jihad*, (No place: No publisher, 2007), 15, <https://counterideology2.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/my-booklet-questions-and-answers-on-jihad/> (accessed June 28, 2018); Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh Al-Jihad*, vol. 1 (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), 95-105.

<sup>17</sup> See *Inspire* (2009), no. p. 43; *Inspire* (2014), no. 13, p. 49; *Inspire* (2016), no. p. 38; Ayman Al-Zawahiri (no date), *Al-Tabriah*, (No place: As Sahab Media), 83-88; Ayman Al-Zawahiri, *Exoneration* (translation of *Al-Tabriah*), Federation of American Scientist, chapter 5, <https://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/exoneration.pdf> (accessed 28 June 2018); Muhammad Haniff Hassan, *Unlicensed to Kill*, 2016, p. 74-84; Muhammad Haniff Hassan, *The Father of Jihad: `Abd Allah `Azzam's Jihad Ideas and Implications to National Security*, (London: Imperial College Press, 2014), 114-119.

# The Need for Rehabilitation of Terrorists in Iran

Zohreh Vakilpour and Behnam Rastegari

*Iran's legislature includes rehabilitation as a method to deal with criminal offenders to ensure successful reintegration into the society. This piece observes Iran's laws on rehabilitation and states that while such a programme is in place for non-terrorist offenders, there is no cohesive rehabilitation programme for terrorists. It is argued that the benefits of this model in other cases such as Singapore and Sri Lanka necessitate its application in Iran's case.*

## Background: Terrorist Threat in Iran

Terrorism has been a major security concern since the 1979 Iranian revolution when opposition groups used terrorism as a means of protesting the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Extremist groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO) have perpetrated violent attacks to oppose the regime.<sup>1</sup> More recently, Iran has faced a threat from Sunni Islamist terrorists group that have targeted the country partly due to the Shia government.

On 22 September 2018, gunmen opened fire at a military parade in Iran, killing at least 25 people including military personnel and civilians. While the so-called Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack, the group has offered no proof. Meanwhile, the Patriotic Arab Democratic Movement in Ahwaz denied responsibility after it was reported that the local Sunni separatist group had claimed responsibility for the attack. Another group, the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz, was also accused of being responsible for the incident. This attack took place a year after the June 2017 attack on the Iranian Parliament that killed 17 and injured 56 others. Both of these recent attacks highlight the terrorist threat within the country. Approximately 70

<sup>1</sup> Institute for Political Studies. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation: The Beginning to the End (1965-2005), (A summary of the three volumes), Tehran, (2011): P. 277

suspects were arrested in connection with these attacks.<sup>2</sup> In the two years before the terrorist attacks on the parliament, 100 terrorist acts such as bomb blasts in public places were also thwarted by the Iranian security forces. The suspects who plotted the potential attacks were arrested. In fact, 48 IS members were found to be carrying large quantities of ammunition in five provinces (Tehran, Fars, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan). The recent rise in the terrorist threat necessitates long-term approaches beyond traditional and kinetic means of counter-terrorism. This article discusses the need for rehabilitation programmes for other criminals to be extended to terrorists in the Iranian context.

## Rehabilitation of Criminals in Iran's Legislation

In a bid to fight terrorism, authorities globally have stepped up their security measures significantly. A key question that authorities face is apprehending and using appropriate methods to deal with terror suspects. The securitisation of terrorism and its exclusion from the International Criminal Court's statute has paved the way for states to punish these criminals according to their domestic laws. Indeed, states may legally arrest terrorist offenders, but it is important that these offenders' rights should be respected in trials.<sup>3</sup> The right to a fair trial is a sign of respect for the rule of law in legal and criminal cases and is one of the fundamental rights emphasised by international human rights law.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Mahdieh Mohammadi. The latest state of the case related to the ISIS terrorist group, see: <https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4114260>, (2017).

<sup>3</sup> Behnam Rastegari & Shohreh Mousavi and Rohaida Nordin. "Violation of Human Rights under the Pretext of Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Critical Legal Analysis of the United States of America's Declaration of War on Terrorism", *International Conference on Law, Order, and Criminal Justice*, (2014): p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p 7.

The Constitution of Iran states, in Article 156, that the judicial system must shoulder the responsibility for reforming the perpetrators.<sup>5</sup> This forms the basis of support of rehabilitation and fair treatment of criminals. Both of these themes recur in the Constitution of the Prisoner Supporting Societies (1982), the Law on the Transformation of the Supervisory Board of Prisons and the Provisional Measures to the Organisation of Prisons and Measures of Provision (1986). According to Article 1 of the Constitution of the Prisoners' Cooperatives, Professions and Industries (1983), the prisoners' capacities should be increased by preventing the loss of their creativity by training prisoners and adolescents in detention centers and preparing them for their release. Several other articles also discuss the reformation of prisoners – underscoring the importance of rehabilitation in prison.

Regardless of these provisions, specific instruction on methods, length of rehabilitation and classification of criminals according to offenses remain insufficient. To a certain extent, principles of rehabilitation appear to apply only to non-terrorist criminal offenders. For example, officials at the Central Prison of Sanandaj provide non-terrorist prisoners with corrective, professional, cultural, and educational programmes and classes to prepare them for successful re-entry into the community. This prison has been successful in paving the way for reforming offenders and returning them to the society with the help of professional instructors, and by creating jobs for the prisoners released who are supported financially and psychologically.<sup>6</sup> Prisons in Fars province, among others, have been successful in the rehabilitation of criminals by providing similar facilities that improve their well-being and chances of reintegration into society upon release.<sup>7</sup> In these programmes,

<sup>5</sup> Amir Hassan Niazpour, "Criminological Assignments of the Judicial System in the Light of the Law of the 5th Programme of Economic, Social, and Cultural Development", *The Judiciary Law Journal*, (2012): pp. 193-222.

<sup>6</sup> "Promoting the teachings of the Holy Qur'an is an important solution for the rehabilitation of prisoners"; Release Date: (February 4, 2012), <http://iqna.ir/fa/news/2485145> (accessed May 9, 2018)

<sup>7</sup> Shiraz Public Prosecutor and Revolution, "The purpose of the prison is to reform and rehabilitate the

religious clerics have the task of teaching the concepts of Quranic sciences.<sup>8</sup> The prisoners are also provided education for employment,, where they can study carpentry and welding in workshops for one year. A report showed that about 6,000 people were able to obtain a certificate in their choice of profession.<sup>9</sup> In addition, recreational activities such as sports including football, volleyball, and chess are also prioritised.<sup>10</sup>

### Importance of Rehabilitation for Terrorists

Pathways to radicalisation include a number of variables including, but not limited to economic, social, political and psychological conditions. Research studies have also established that integration into society, in contrast to harsh punishment, reduces and thwarts terrorists' alienation.<sup>11</sup> Rehabilitation programmes help offenders return to normal life through education and treatment.<sup>12</sup> They help perpetrators develop the confidence and ability to integrate into society as well as reduce the likelihood of recidivism. Programmes that include teaching of life skills that increase employability, improve mental and physical health, and foster positive family relationships while ensuring proper housing, make it easier for prisoners to reintegrate into society. Studies have also shown that terrorists who have not been rehabilitated tend to go back to extremism and violence after their release.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, communication with fellow

help-seekers", *Farprisons*, <http://farsprisons.ir> (accessed May 9, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> "Director General of Fars Prison: It is the duty of cultural custodians to strictly implement Quranic programmes and prayers in prisons." <http://farsprisons.ir> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>9</sup> "Chief Justice of Fars' General: Executions Have Been Carried Out in Prisons In Shiraz For The Rehabilitation Of The Prisoner's Personality", *Borna*, <https://www.borna.news> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>10</sup> "Closing ceremony of the 2nd Sport Olympiad in Prisoners of Central Prison in Shiraz", *Farprisons*, <http://farsprisons.ir> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>11</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "The Prevention of Terrorism and Rehabilitation of Terrorists: Some Preliminary Thoughts", RAND, Pub. (1985).

<sup>12</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, "Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative", *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, Taylor & Francis Online, 6, 1, (April 2011): pp. 65-82. See: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/staff-publication/1240-terrorist-rehabilitation-a-g/#.WwulzCAVTIU> (accessed May 15, 2018).

<sup>13</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, (2015), Op.Cit, p. 6.

prisoners might increase the chances of terrorists being radicalised and recruited in prison.<sup>14</sup>

In Singapore, a terrorist rehabilitation programme began because of the threat that Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah posed in the early 2000s. In December 2001, the Internal Security Department (ISD) disrupted a plot against US, British, Australian and Israeli targets, which partly resulted in a need to counter the ideology and curb radicalisation through a rehabilitation programme. In early 2002, two religious clerics established the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), where religious scholars de-radicalised and rehabilitated the JI detainees. Family members of the detainees also received counselling. The Singapore model has since been seen as a 'gold standard' for other countries. Besides religious rehabilitation, Singapore has a holistic programme that includes social and psychological rehabilitation to increase effectiveness.

The Sri Lankan programme is another commendable rehabilitation effort that focused on de-radicalisation of former fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who fought against the government in a 26-year long civil war. One of the significant aspects of the rehabilitation programme was the vocational educational courses designed to prepare the detainees for integration in the society upon their release. These courses have focused on giving the detainees vocational training to ensure economic security and employment.<sup>15</sup> This resulted in attitude change with LTTE members seen as less likely to engage in violence upon release.

## Conclusion

Since criminals are also members of the community, they can possibly be dissuaded from committing crimes by helping them change their mindset through rehabilitation

<sup>14</sup> Muh Taufiqurrohman, Muhammad Ali Usman, and Ardi Putra Prasetya, "Extremism beyond Nusa Kambangan Prisons", *Counter Terrorist Trends & Analyses*, 9, 10, (2017): p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Malkanthi Hettiarachchi. "Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Programme: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency," *PRISM* 4, no 2., pp 105 – 122.

programmes. Even though Iran has seen relative success in implementation of hard power and preventive security measures, soft measures for long-term peace need to be explored. Terrorist offenders should have access to rehabilitation programmes to effectively counter the terrorism threat, based on lessons from other successful programmes. The core of a rehabilitation programme should focus not only on rehabilitating terrorists during their prison sentence but continuing to monitor them afterwards to ensure successful reintegration into society.

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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