Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future
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Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific. The journal publishes peer-reviewed research articles and policy essays, roundtables on policy-relevant topics and recent publications, and book review essays, as well as other occasional formats.

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- a Topic Statement
- the Main Argument
- the Policy Implications

A sample Executive Summary is provided in Section III below.

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- the specific question that the paper seeks to answer
- the policy importance of the question
- the main argument/findings of the paper

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III. Sample Executive Summary

This essay examines the linkages between China’s national economy and foreign policy over the past 30 years, and assesses the claim that Chinese foreign policy has undergone an important shift in which domestic demand for energy and other raw materials heavily influence foreign policy decisions.

Main Argument

Assessments of Chinese foreign policy intentions and goals rely on the idea that China desires reliable access to oil and other natural resources to support its economic growth. The essay argues that the coherence of China’s economic goals and the coordination needed to achieve them are eroding as multiple competing interests within the Chinese polity emerge to pursue and protect power and resources. This fragmentation of economic policy into multiple competing agendas has to be understood alongside assessments that resource needs drive Chinese foreign policy. The essay first surveys how shifting economic priorities have influenced Chinese foreign policy over the past 30 years. A second section discusses China’s shift from an export-led, resource-dependent growth model to one that is more balanced toward domestic consumption. The essay concludes by noting that China’s search for a rebalanced economy and for a new growth model creates opportunities and constraints on Chinese foreign policy.

Policy Implications

- While China’s domestic economic factor in foreign policy, Chinese demand toward oil-producing states are driven by a combination of factors other than a simple narrative of “oil diplomacy.”
- China’s pluralized political economy makes such rebalancing much more difficult politically, given the potential winners and losers in this process. Those who now urge China to make a shift away from an export-heavy growth pattern are likely to grow increasingly frustrated unless they understand that the central leaders do not possess the instruments to quickly transform the Chinese economy.
- Given that China, like no other economy, has benefitted from the institutions of the global economy, China has a strong interest in maintaining these institutions and their liberal principles, even as the Chinese government seeks to play a stronger role in their operation and governance.
IV. Note Format and Examples

Citations and notes should be placed in footnotes; parenthetical notation is not accepted. For other citation formats, refer to the Chicago Manual of Style.

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  Author’s interview with Hamit Zakir, Los Angeles, July 17, 2003.
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ROUNDTABLE

Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future

Christopher P. Twomey
Rajesh Basrur
Benjamin Schreer
Noboru Yamaguchi
Kang Choi
P.K. Singh
Aaron L. Friedberg

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Introduction: Dangerous Dynamism in Asia’s Nuclear Future

Christopher P. Twomey

One of the defining elements of the post–Cold War era has been the diffusion of power away from the two superpowers. This has occurred across a wide variety of measures, including nuclear weaponry. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, proliferation across states and increasing arsenal capabilities within some of them have characterized Asia’s international security affairs. Given the importance of nuclear weapons to the development and conduct of the Cold War, we should expect these changes in the post–Cold War era to be similarly important.

These changes have been the subject of significant scholarly analysis already. Dubbed the “second nuclear age” by eminent strategists Colin Grey and Paul Bracken, this epoch seems to pose new dangers and challenges. Important debates have developed about the degree to which the most engaged dyad—India and Pakistan—is more dangerous than the dyads in the Cold War, to which nuclear weapons provided apparent stability. Other studies have examined a broader range of countries facing this new environment. A burgeoning quantitative literature surveys both Cold War and post–Cold War crises and dyads to evaluate a wide range of hypotheses about stability and coercive leverage.

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NOTE ~ The views expressed are those of the author alone.


To further these discussions, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has initiated a broad-based research program entitled “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s the Multipolar Nuclear Future.” With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the project began with the publication of Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age in 2013.5 Building on this and other work, NBR in January 2014 convened a conference jointly with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore to further explore several important themes.

Several key themes emerge from the essays in this roundtable. First and foremost, it is important to find the right geometric analogy to describe contemporary nuclear dynamics in Asia. Two promising candidates are nuclear triangles and nuclear hierarchies. While, as the essay by Rajesh Basrur reminds us, it is true that bipolar dynamics were not the only form of interaction during the Cold War, competition with the Soviet Union was the dominant driver for the United States for nearly the entire period. Today, for several countries, at least two other nuclear states play an important constitutive role in shaping nuclear policy. Thus, in Asia the United States worries about both Chinese and North Korean nuclear developments. The nature of the nuclear capabilities of those two states is dramatically different, and so is the nature of the strategic competition between the United States and each of them. This at least raises the possibility that steps taken to address one potential competitor are suboptimal with regard to the other. Similarly, P.K. Singh’s essay cogently makes the point that Indian strategic dynamics must be situated in a broader regional context that includes both Pakistan and China. Other interactive triangles may include the United States, China, and India or the United States, Russia, and China. Triangles might vary in terms of the degree to which they are tightly coupled (or not), in the symmetry across the different legs of the triangle, and likely in other dimensions. Further development of this concept is likely to be useful.

Additionally, the essays raise the issue of nuclear hierarchies. While different arsenal sizes existed among different actors during the Cold War, today there is a greater degree of interaction among states with such different sized nuclear forces. Arsenals run from barely existent (North Korea) to midsized (China, India, and Pakistan) to large (United States). Although analogues to each existed in the Cold War (South Africa, France,

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and the Soviet Union, respectively), there was limited strategic interaction across those categories. Today, there is much more.

Further, it is worthwhile to consider the traditional approaches to hierarchies and ask whether such a descriptive moniker is accepted by the players in the system. Can coercive leverage be exerted across the levels? Do nations feel pressured to move up within the hierarchy? The limited pace of any strategic arms racing (another common theme among the essays) suggests not.

Beyond geometry, a second major theme to emerge from these papers is the complexity of managing extended deterrence in Asia’s second nuclear age. As highlighted by Noboru Yamaguchi’s and Benjamin Schreer’s contributions, changes in China’s capabilities are driving regional responses in terms of both internal and external balancing. Kang Choi’s essay raises a similar point with regard to the implications of North Korea’s nuclear development. These challenges are at once less and more dangerous than those presented by the security environment in the Cold War. During the Cold War, the intensity of the security dilemma in Central Europe was high, even in purely conventional terms. That is not the case now in Asia, neither across China’s first island chain nor across the Korean demilitarized zone. Yet that said, U.S. interests in Asia today are more susceptible to being doubted than U.S. interests in Europe were during the Cold War.⁶

A third theme further complicates both core and extended deterrence: the source of the risk of violence. In the current Asian security environment, the threat of large-scale conflict erupting suddenly is relatively low. Instead, the dominant concern—expressed across all of the essays in this roundtable—is inadvertent escalation that begins with a lower-level crisis. In Japan, these are “gray zone” crises; in South Korea, they are “provocations.” India is concerned about a state-sponsored terrorist incident that escalates into military conflict, while China worries about U.S. allies overplaying their hands in territorial disputes over small islands or reefs. Nuclear weapons are far removed from these scenarios, to be sure. But this shift in the locus of conflict has implications for how we think about the utility of nuclear weapons, and the ensuing essays each grapple with this problem.

There thus remains much work to be done in developing an understanding of just how the proliferation and deployment trends in Asia will affect its strategic future. The shifting balance of power within the region suggests that continued attention to these issues is warranted. The following essays begin to escort us down that path.

⁶ Of course, even those interests were questioned at times; that said, cultural ties and deeply integrated alliances provided a glue to supplement what was perceived to be a global threat from the Soviet Union.
Nuclear Stability and Polarity in Post–Cold War Asia

Rajesh Basrur

Contrary to the widespread notion that the “second nuclear age” is hugely different, and for the worse, from the first nuclear age, the reality is more complex. The post–Cold War period is indeed different from the preceding one, but the differences have not been properly grasped. While there are certainly dangers associated with the current age, we need not be distracted by many of the so-called risks—such as arms racing, brinkmanship, and irrationality—identified by strategic experts.

The nature of the “second nuclear age” has been widely misunderstood. The apparently sharp divide between the Cold War era and the present age is illusory. There has been no great transformation from nuclear bipolarity to multipolarity; on the contrary, strong similarities persist. Nor is the view accurate that the relative stability of yesteryear has been replaced by a high degree of uncertainty and instability. In important ways, the current nuclear-strategic landscape is more stable than before. Yet in other ways that are also important, it is less stable. It would be wise to jettison our penchant for simple contrasts and recognize today’s complexities if we are to attend properly to the nuclear problems of our time.

How Different Is the Post–Cold War Era?

Analysts often identify four chief differences between the two periods, of which only two are accurate. The first difference is that the center of gravity in nuclear politics has shifted from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Asia-Pacific. This is correct: Europe is no longer a focal point of contention, and two important European players during the Cold War, Britain and France, do not figure as prominently in contemporary nuclear politics. Russia, which has a partly Asian identity, remains a key player, however.

Second, whereas the Cold War was dominated by a single rivalry with global dimensions (between the United States and the Soviet Union), there is no relationship of comparable magnitude today. This too is correct: China...
promises to be a challenger to U.S. dominance but is still a regional power and shows no sign of being a serious global competitor for strategic primacy.

The third reputed difference is that the Cold War era was “bipolar,” whereas the post–Cold War period is “multipolar.” This is incorrect. If we take 1989 as the year when the Cold War began to wind down with the dismantling of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, then the number of nuclear-armed states before and after remains the same. Before 1989, there were nine nuclear powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan. After 1989, South Africa denuclearized, and the only new state that developed nuclear weapons capabilities was North Korea. It may be objected that the U.S. and Soviet arsenals were so far removed from the rest in magnitude that the term multipolarity does not really apply. But then, the difference between the big two and the rest remains enormous even today. More importantly, conventional notions of balance do not apply to nuclear weapons given that very small arsenals have regularly deterred very large ones. Moreover, strategic politics among the nuclear-armed states in the pre-1989 period was often multipolar: for example, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China were hostile toward each other in the 1960s, and the United States and China were antagonistic toward the Soviet Union in the 1970s and the 1980s. There were also strategic dyads centered on South Asia, with India and the Soviet Union loosely aligned against China and Pakistan.

Fourth, the Cold War is often held to have been a stable geopolitical environment, whereas the Asian multipolar environment is said to be unstable and likely to become more so. This is also incorrect. In fact, the first quarter-century of the Cold War (1949–74), beginning with the appearance of the first nuclear weapons dyad, was just as unstable, if not more prone to crisis, than the comparable period after the Cold War (1989–2014). The first period was characterized by four major confrontations between nuclear powers: the Berlin Crisis in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, and periodic low-level Sino-U.S. armed

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clashes during the Vietnam War. The post–Cold War era has also witnessed four such face-offs: two between India and Pakistan (1999 and 2001–2) and two between the United States and North Korea (1994 and 2006). One only has to compare the alert nuclear postures adopted by the belligerents in Berlin and Cuba with the restrained undeployed postures manifested in Kargil in 1999 and Kashmir in 2001–2 to see which period was more unstable and dangerous.

**Types of Nuclear Weapons Relationships**

Before addressing the question of stability directly, it is important to classify the different kinds of nuclear-strategic relationships that have existed during and after the Cold War and their associated tendency for stability or instability. Five basic types of adversarial relationships can be identified among nuclear powers.

*Simple nuclear dyads.* Simple nuclear dyads are strongly adversarial, characterized by the absence of significant nonstrategic interaction (especially economic ties), intense bilateral competition (sometimes including proxy wars), crisis instability, and occasional arms racing (present only in the U.S.-Soviet and India-Pakistan cases). Examples of these dyads include the United States and Soviet Union (1949–89), the United States and China (1964–70), the Soviet Union and China (1964–89), India and Pakistan (1989 to the present), and the United States and North Korea (1994 to the present). All these relationships exhibited a high proneness to crisis during their early phase, followed by the onset of relative stability.3

*Complex nuclear dyads.* Complex nuclear dyads are quasi-adversarial and are characterized by the presence of significant nonstrategic interaction (especially economic ties), a degree of mutual distrust and strategic hedging, avoidance of alliance-like entanglements, consequent (relative) crisis stability, and restraint with respect to arms racing. This type of dyad is a post–Cold War phenomenon. Examples, all contemporary, include the United States and Russia, the United States and China, and India and China. The probability of crisis is low within these dyads but cannot be ruled out.

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3 In a sense, U.S.-North Korean relations have been dogged by periodic tensions, but the actual risk of war has been usually much less than that presented in the media. See, for example, Zachary Keck, “No, North Korea Did NOT Threaten War over Seth Rogen Movie,” *Diplomat*, June 28, 2014 — http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/no-north-korea-did-not-threaten-war-over-seth-rogan-movie. For diverse representations of North Korea in the Western literature, see Hazel Smith, “Bad, Mad, Sad, or Rational Actor? Why the Securitization Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea,” *International Affairs*, 76, no. 3 (2000), 593–617.
**Alliances.** Alliances are features mainly of the Cold War period when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact confronted each other in what is often viewed (inaccurately) as a bipolar system.\(^4\) While after 1990 the old alliances have remained in diminished form, no new ones have been created, which is not surprising in an increasingly interdependent world. The decline of alliances is a source of strategic stability in the current age, since there are fewer strategic entanglements that might drag nuclear powers into conflict.

**Loose alignments.** Loose alignments have existed in both periods, with “strategic partnership” being the current nomenclature for such relationships. They involve strategic consultation, arms transfers, military exercises, and the absence of tight security commitments. Examples from the Cold War include the alignment of the United States and China against the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Union and India against China and Pakistan. Post–Cold War examples include the alignment of China and Pakistan against India and of the United States and India against China.\(^5\) Although these relationships are unlikely to affect crisis stability directly, given that they do not involve alliance-like commitments (which are scrupulously avoided), they do raise tensions generally and have the potential to negatively affect arms race stability through arms transfers and consequent arms racing.

**State-nonstate dyads.** State-nonstate dyads are the sharply adversarial relationships between states and nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups, that are potentially capable of acquiring and utilizing nuclear or radiological weapons. Nonstate actors are unlikely to obtain the level of capacity that would produce instability from arms racing. But crisis instability is very likely if a terrorist group does acquire nuclear capability: unlike states, such groups would almost certainly be inclined to use this capability or at least threaten to use it.

**Stability Issues**

It is often argued that the post–Cold War era is less stable than the Cold War period. Some of these arguments, however, turn out to be untenable upon closer examination.

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\(^4\) During the Cold War, there were nuclear-capable players (namely, China, India, and South Africa) that for long periods were not part of either alliance system, though they may have leaned toward one side or the other.

\(^5\) Note that while India and China officially have a strategic partnership that incorporates joint military exercises, it is mostly symbolic in nature.
Polarity. It is frequently claimed that the Cold War period was bipolar and therefore more predictable and conducive to management than the multipolar world today. This is wrong on two counts. First, as noted above, the two periods have been similar in the number of poles or nuclear powers. Even small nuclear powers have been able to exercise a high degree of strategic autonomy, which is why China, with its minimal arsenal, was a pole during the Cold War. Second, and more importantly, there is no evidence that nuclear multipolarity is inherently unstable. All the major crises that have occurred through both periods have been bilateral.

Second-strike capability. New nuclear powers, it is regularly argued, do not possess secure second-strike capabilities and are therefore constantly beset by the problem of crisis instability, given that incentives always exist in such settings for an early first strike. In fact, “weak” nuclear powers regularly deter “strong” ones. Deterrence has been exercised by both large and small arsenals—for example, the mutual deterrence exercised by the large U.S. and relatively small Soviet arsenals during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. It has also been exercised in both unequal and equal distributions of capability—the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis are once again examples of the former scenario and the India-Pakistan crisis of 2001–2 of the latter. The putative absence of secure second-strike capability has not produced early first strikes, though these have been contemplated. For example, the United States did not strike China in the early 1960s or North Korea in the mid-1990s; and the Soviet Union did not strike China in 1969.

Rationality. It is frequently said that new nuclear powers may not possess the “mature” and “rational” qualities that brought a measure of stability to the Cold War, and may be inclined to take undue risks. In fact, decision-makers in all nuclear-powered states have regularly worried that their adversaries may not be rational. Some Americans feared this about the Soviet Union, Americans and Russians worried likewise about China, and

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Indians have periodically expressed the same sentiment about Pakistan. Moreover, high rhetoric and risk-taking have always been part of hostile relationships between nuclear-armed states, as is evident from history. It is harder to refute the opposite argument: that the chief antagonists of the Cold War exhibited less-than-rational thinking in producing some 63,000 nuclear warheads by 1986, whereas the new powers have been relatively circumspect in adopting low-profile postures and have not exhibited the pace of arms racing that was characteristic of the Cold War.

A more balanced comparison of the two periods reveals that in several ways the post–Cold War era is more stable than the preceding period, though there is room for caution in each respect. First, there is no massive, high-voltage arms racing today. The only arms race currently visible is between India and Pakistan, which is at a comparatively low level and likely to remain so because neither side has the financial capacity to build a large arsenal. The nuclear force modernizations under way in China, India, and Pakistan are primarily consolidations. However, optimism on this score should not be undiluted. The ubiquitous and untenable notion that the bottom line for deterrence is the capability for “assured retaliation” tends to facilitate competitive open-ended acquisitions. Second, the younger nuclear powers do not practice Cold War–type deployments with hair-trigger alerts. On the contrary, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea employ a more restrained recessed deployment posture. There is no guarantee, however, that this will not change, which points to a need for reassurance and confidence building on all sides.

Third, three major nuclear dyads today—the United States and Russia, the United States and China, and India and China—are complex ones in that they are characterized by high levels of economic cooperation and therefore possess a built-in resistance to strategic instability. Nevertheless,

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8 Typical Cold War–type deployments (China excepted) involved a high state of readiness so that the time taken from a decision to fire nuclear weapons and the actual implementation of the decision was minimal. In contrast, China, India, and Pakistan are widely known to have adopted a recessed or non-deployed posture wherein a nuclear weapon is normally kept separate from its launch vehicle.
the possibility of normal accidents and unanticipated escalation remains. The incident in December 2013 when U.S. and Chinese warships nearly collided in the South China Sea is a warning against complacency.

And fourth, compellence threats in the post–Cold War era have not been overtly nuclear. Crises between India and Pakistan have involved at most indirect signaling in the form of missile tests. Neither side has resorted to visible deployment, let alone a hair-trigger posture. On the other hand, North Korea has been prone to use verbal metaphors that could be interpreted as direct nuclear threats.

In several important respects, however, the current period is less stable than the Cold War epoch. To begin with, the United States, in trying to dampen the chances of nuclear conflict, may unwittingly facilitate it. The 1999 and 2001–2 crises between India and Pakistan were at least partly initiated to invite U.S. intervention favoring one side. In the first event, Pakistan sought U.S. support to bring India to the negotiating table on Kashmir; in the second, New Delhi pressured Washington to coerce Islamabad into ceasing support for terrorists based on Pakistani soil. Whether such tactics work is open to debate, but Washington’s readiness to intervene for stability can be manipulated for destabilizing purposes.

The development of missile defense technology has brought a modicum of arms race instability among nuclear powers that see themselves as disadvantaged by the phenomenon. Russia and China are uncomfortable with U.S. missile defense, while Pakistan worries about India’s initial efforts to develop a missile defense system.

New conventional arms technologies such as precision-guided munitions and drones can also engender fresh insecurities and provide incentives for states to build stronger nuclear arsenals. In particular, the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike program has the potential to generate arms race instability. At a lower level of technology, India’s acquisition of advanced conventional capabilities is likely to produce the same effect on Pakistan. Besides, these conventional weapons may be considered more “usable,” which could encourage the initiation of combat during a severe crisis. Notably, these technologies are almost entirely unregulated.

The growth of disruptive cybertechnology that combines stealth and surprise with attribution problems is another emerging threat to crisis stability. Dangerous potential effects include false warnings of attack and the real and potential breakdown of command and control systems. While command and control failures have not yet produced calamitous consequences, they have certainly occurred with disturbing regularity.
In 1983 a Senate Armed Services Committee investigation revealed that there were as many as 151 false alarms in the U.S. command and control system during a six-month period.9

A final respect in which the current era is less stable than the Cold War period pertains to the rise of terrorism. The phenomenal growth of terrorism not only raises the direct threat of nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks, should terrorists gain access to nuclear weapons, but also carries the potential to provoke crises between nuclear-armed states. The India-Pakistan crisis of 2001–2, for example, was the direct result of a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001.

Conclusion: Addressing Instabilities

The discussion above highlights the stable and unstable elements of the current age. While this essay does not attempt to solve the problems identified in the present, it does highlight the following instabilities that must be addressed.

Simple nuclear dyads need to be stabilized because they are prone to both crisis instability and arms race instability. In the India-Pakistan case, for instance, major obstacles to crisis stability include possible escalation from a border confrontation and the potential for terrorists based in Pakistan to trigger conflict. The chief obstacle to preventing arms racing is the unfounded belief that a secure second-strike capability is the sine qua non of stable deterrence. In the U.S.-North Korea case, it would be a good idea to go beyond the failed effort to roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear capability and begin a process of stabilization through confidence building.

In complex nuclear dyads, the problem is less serious but still cannot be ignored. Because the probability of things going wrong will always exist, nuclear-armed states need to build trust through improved communication, greater transparency, and regular mechanisms of consultation on matters of conflicting interest. The relationship between China and India is a case in point. The China-India Border Defense Cooperation Agreement is a positive sign, although it is obviously limited in its potential because the Line of Actual Control, which divides the two countries’ forces, remains open to interpretation. Pending a border settlement, an accord on the Line of Actual Control would be a major stabilizing move. As things stand, arms

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race stability does not appear deeply problematic, though technological innovations and their disruptive potential need to be addressed. India and China and the United States and China need to engage in nuclear confidence building in order to strengthen the present level of stability.

Loose alignments are crisis stable, but they do carry the potential for producing (or exacerbating) arms race instability. This risk needs to be attended to both at the nuclear and conventional levels. A broad-based multilateral dialogue bringing together the Asian nuclear powers could add to bilateral dialogues in all three types of relationships discussed so far. A disarmament-cum-arms control process that brings in all the major players early could have a stabilizing effect.\(^{10}\) The process could profitably address some of the major challenges identified above: missile defense, advanced conventional weapons, and cyberthreats.

Although rules to reduce the risk of proliferation to nonstate actors are being developed, more needs to be done to contain the risks associated with state assistance to terrorist groups that can generate nuclear crises. This is especially true with regard to radiological weapons. It should not be forgotten that civilian nuclear facilities, such as nuclear plants and storage sites for radioactive materials, are potential bombs with enormous destructive potential.

If the instabilities characteristic of the current age are to be appropriately addressed, we need above all to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of its realities than has hitherto been the case. A preoccupation with sharp changes in polarity and stability is a diversion—neat, but neither accurate nor profitable. We need instead to recognize that some things have not changed all that much, while others have. Simple nuclear dyads remain, but there are also complex ones. Old types of instability persist, but new ones have appeared. And unworkable ideas of sufficiency are giving way—ever so slowly—to new, if not always consistent, ones. It is clarity about the nature and limits of change that will serve us best in the quest for a safer world.


Benjamin Schreer

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of improving its nuclear arsenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since the details of this nuclear modernization process remain clouded in secrecy, estimates of the numbers of China’s nuclear warheads vary significantly. Pessimists believe that Beijing could possess well over 1,000 warheads, most of which are assumed to be hidden in a complex system of underground tunnels.¹ In contrast, this essay agrees with conservative assessments that the total size of China’s nuclear arsenal is approximately 250 warheads, delivered by land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, and an emerging ballistic submarine fleet. The U.S. intelligence community expects that the number of these nuclear warheads capable of threatening the U.S. homeland will more than double to over 100 by the mid-2020s.²

China is on a long-term path of replacing its old liquid-fuel, moveable DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was also expected to conduct its first patrol by the end of 2014 while armed with the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The PLA Navy is estimated to have three Jin-class boats, which could increase to four to five SSBNs by 2020. China is also reportedly developing a next-generation SSBN, called the Type 096. It is therefore gradually making progress toward a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.³

Therefore, as one scholar wrote in the pages of this journal, “after decades of reliance on a small and potentially strategic deterrent, China is finally achieving the ‘lean and effective’ nuclear force” that its leaders believe to be essential to protect the nation’s security interests.\(^4\) The PRC’s incremental development of this more secure second-strike nuclear capability began more than two decades ago. The rapid advances in U.S. conventional precision-strike capabilities observed in military operations during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s was a key driver behind those efforts.

However, while Beijing’s reasons for wanting to enhance mutual nuclear vulnerability with the United States are clear, the implications for China’s strategic behavior, U.S.-Sino crisis stability, and Asian security in general are less certain. Optimists argue that China’s development of a more secure second-strike capability that enhances mutual vulnerability will strengthen U.S.-Sino crisis stability. One proponent of this view is Robert Ross, who argues that such a capability would minimize the risk of the United States launching a disarming first strike, while leaving intact Washington’s ability to respond with its dominant conventional forces to any attempt by Beijing to alter the regional status quo.\(^5\) Yet given the changing strategic context underlying the U.S.-Sino relationship, there are reasons to caution against such a positive reading.

**The Changing Strategic Context and U.S.-China Strategic Stability**

China’s nuclear modernization occurs in the midst of Asia-Pacific power shifts. Beijing is increasingly willing to contest U.S. leadership in the region, which has long been based on the United States’ unrivaled military power. To do so, China is not only modernizing its nuclear forces but also significantly upgrading its conventional capabilities. By investing in anti-access/area-denial capabilities, China is raising the costs for a third-party intervention (for example, by the United States) in a dispute in its “near seas”—that is, the Yellow Sea, the Philippine Sea, and the South China Sea. The goal of this strategy seems to be to displace the United States as the dominant power in the western Pacific.\(^6\)

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In this context, the assumption that the United States’ conventional superiority will guarantee U.S.-Sino strategic stability in contemporary Asia could be problematic. To be sure, in absolute terms U.S. conventional forces will still outweigh China’s by a wide margin for years to come. However, as China is increasing the costs of U.S. intervention in its near seas, U.S. allies and partners in Asia worry that the balance of resolve might tip in favor of China. That is, greater confidence in its conventional and nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis the United States could lead Beijing to display even more coercive behavior against its neighbors in maritime territorial disputes. Although a good case can be made that mutual nuclear vulnerability is more stabilizing for the U.S.-Sino relationship than a purely conventional military balance, a more secure Chinese second-strike capability does not automatically lead to greater crisis stability.

First, there are significant challenges in regard to the emergence of a nascent Chinese nuclear triad (nuclear weapons launched from land-, air-, and sea-based platforms). A particular worry is the imminent introduction of the new SSBNs into the Chinese fleet. Command-and-control arrangements for nuclear submarines are notoriously difficult, particularly during times of crisis. There are, for example, questions within the analytical community about the ability of commanding officers of Chinese nuclear submarines to make informed decisions in such circumstances, not least given the limited degree of autonomous decision-making assigned to People’s Liberation Army officers. Since this is the first time a sea-based nuclear deterrent will be part of China’s strategic architecture, it is not entirely clear how effective the command and control of such forces would be during a severe U.S.-Sino crisis.

Second, growing confidence in a more secure nuclear second-strike capability could embolden Chinese leaders to behave more assertively in maritime territorial disputes with neighboring countries—with potentially serious consequences. A growing number of U.S. analysts are calling for the United States to raise the costs of China’s maritime assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea. Thus, the possibility of a U.S.-Sino crisis cannot be discounted. China’s strategic leaders display a strong confidence in the so-called stability-instability paradox—that is, the existence of clear firebreaks that would prevent a conventional conflict from escalating into a

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nuclear confrontation.\(^9\) However, because these leaders could also assume that the “balance of interest” is on their side in regional territorial disputes and that the United States would not risk a conventional conflict—or, even if it did, that any conflict could be kept at the conventional level—they could feel emboldened to take greater risks during a crisis.

Such thinking could prove disastrously wrong. Should the United States choose to intervene, which would possibly involve a significant loss of face for the Chinese leadership, Beijing could quickly face a “use them or lose them” nuclear dilemma. China’s nuclear infrastructure (such as command-and-control systems and potentially some missile bases) is closely linked to its conventional military capabilities. The latter would certainly be subject to U.S. precision strikes as a means to control escalation and coerce China to return to the *status quo ante*. Yet attacks against the country’s conventional forces could be interpreted by Chinese leaders as a disarming U.S. strike. As Thomas Christensen has pointed out, recent Chinese writings on nuclear policy argue that under certain circumstances conventional military strikes could pose an existential threat to China, in which case its traditional no-first-use policy could quickly be reconsidered or amended.\(^10\) China’s trust in the stability-instability paradox might therefore be unwarranted, and strategists in Beijing should spend more time considering the risks of a conventional crisis with the United States escalating to the nuclear level. They also should consider that a secure nuclear second-strike capability might not necessarily provide China with a greater coercive capacity vis-à-vis the United States in regional contingencies.\(^11\) Should Chinese leaders, for example, assume that the threat of nuclear escalation will be sufficient to deter Washington from intervening in a future conflict over the Taiwan Strait, they could well be mistaken, given the strategic importance of Taiwan for the United States.\(^12\)

It is too early to conclude whether China’s more secure second-strike capability will enhance or diminish U.S.-Sino crisis stability. What is clear is that both sides need to intensify their strategic dialogue on how to manage the risks associated with China’s nuclear modernization. As Brad Roberts has argued, this is critical to narrow the persisting “major perception

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11 Ibid.; and Goldstein, “First Things First.”

gaps” between U.S. and Chinese strategists with regard to their respective nuclear and conventional postures and minimize the potential negative impact on nuclear crisis stability. In sum, simply assuming that a greater level of mutual nuclear vulnerability equals greater stability in U.S.-Sino strategic relations is insufficient. China’s growing nuclear arsenal poses key questions, which in many ways mirror Cold War debates about U.S.-Soviet nuclear relations. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to address them, these questions include the following:

- What are the requirements of “strategic stability” in U.S.-Sino relations?
- What is the basis of the nuclear relationship? Is it a new type of mutual assured destruction?
- How robust are the firebreaks between conventional and nuclear operations, and what are the implications for effective signaling during a crisis?
- Do Chinese leaders believe that a more secure second-strike capability provides them with political leverage in a crisis of lower intensity?
- What are emerging concepts of Chinese nuclear warfighting, including command-and-control arrangements?

Contrary to political preferences in many Western countries, including the United States, nuclear weapons will continue to play a significant role in international relations. Indeed, in the future they will probably become more, not less, important in Asia as the region undergoes significant power shifts. That is why such questions should be discussed not only by a relatively small circle of U.S., Chinese, and international experts but by the broader strategic community.

**Implications for U.S. Extended Deterrence Commitments**

China’s nuclear modernization could exacerbate existing challenges for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Some regional strategists argue that its more secure second-strike capability could decrease the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, thereby complicating the relationship between the United States and China. This development could necessitate reevaluation of U.S. nuclear policy and posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

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of U.S. commitments in Asia.\textsuperscript{15} In some ways, the current debate among the United States’ Asian allies is not so much about the specific details of extended nuclear deterrence as it is about the future of U.S. leadership in the region. They wonder whether Washington is willing and able to resist Chinese attempts to change the territorial status quo in the western Pacific through low-level coercion, and what role, if any, nuclear weapons could play? Just as during the Cold War, nuclear weapons are still intended to deter only extreme aggression. However, the likelihood in Asia’s current strategic theater of such contingencies—for instance, a Chinese nuclear attack against U.S. bases in Guam or Japan—seems very remote.

Furthermore, U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea worry that in the face of a more secure second-strike capability the United States, by default rather than by design, might be forced to accept mutual nuclear vulnerability as a reality in its relationship with China—despite the fact that the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains far superior and regardless of Washington’s official denial that it accepts mutual nuclear vulnerability as a basis for U.S.-China strategic stability.\textsuperscript{16}

Even a tacit acceptance of such a condition could undermine the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for its Asia-Pacific allies. It has not escaped their attention that Washington in recent years has de-emphasized the role of nuclear weapons, including in the Asia-Pacific theater. As a result, uncertainty over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence has led to renewed debates in Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan over the potential need for an independent nuclear deterrent. Although these discussions are far from translating into policy changes yet, they demonstrate that the respective strategic communities do not perceive increased U.S. efforts in the areas of theater ballistic missile defense (BMD) or conventional prompt global strike as sufficiently reassuring. Limited U.S. BMD systems in the Asia-Pacific are targeted against the North Korean ballistic missile threat and are insufficient to defend against China’s growing capabilities. BMD is also perceived in China as potentially destabilizing. Meanwhile, the details and effects of conventional prompt global strike for allies’ security and...

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, Rory Medcalf et al., “Debate: Is Extended Nuclear Deterrence Dead?” Lowy Institute, Interpreter, web log, January–March 2011 ~ http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/?d=D%20-%20Is%20extended%20nuclear%20deterrence%20dead?.

regional stability are still unclear.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, the United States’ greater reliance on the threat of precision strikes against China from a safe distance could lead to fears of “decoupling” among the Asian allies. That is, allies might worry that U.S. strategic interests might no longer be inextricably linked to their own.

In sum, Washington needs to intensify efforts to explain to its Asian allies how the United States intends to react to China’s more secure nuclear second-strike capability and how it aims to maintain the credibility of its extended deterrence guarantees. As one example, the Obama administration has announced plans to modernize the nuclear triad, including a new class of SSBNs.\textsuperscript{18} SSBNs are well-suited for the Asia-Pacific, and the United States could consider forward deploying more to places such as Guam as a means of deterrence and assurance. In the future, the United States could also rotate its new class of long-range strategic bombers through Australia to send a signal to the region, and China specifically, that the future role of the U.S. nuclear posture in Asia goes beyond deterring a Chinese nuclear strike against Hawaii and the continental United States. However, because such developments will take place under the conditions of a secure Chinese second-strike capability, it is imperative for Washington to first reverse the strategic narrative that U.S. nuclear weapons are of diminished relevance in the Asia-Pacific region. ◊


The Utility of Nuclear and Conventional Forces in the Second Nuclear Age: A Japanese Military Perspective

Noboru Yamaguchi

In the recent debate on Japan’s security policy, the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means, such as missiles, has been one of the central issues. This issue is particularly critical to Japan, given North Korea’s acceleration of its nuclear weapons program alongside its long-range missile project. Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) focus on both nuclear proliferation and the emerging nuclear threat posed by North Korea. At the same time, tension between Japan and China in the East China Sea has been increasing, while tensions between China and countries in the South China Sea have similarly been on the rise.

This essay will present a Japanese perspective on the nuclear dimension of regional security by, first, explaining Japan’s nuclear-related policies; second, discussing the roles of nuclear forces in Japan’s security policy; and, third, exploring Japan’s security strategy for managing a possible stability-instability paradox in the region, with particular emphasis on the East China Sea.

Japan’s Non-Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Forces

One of the most important aspects of Japan’s security policy since World War II is its non-nuclear policy based on the “three non-nuclear principles,” referring to the principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their entry into Japan. Not only does Japan adhere to these three principles as fundamental elements of its national policy, but Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Law also prohibits the country from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in June 1976 and put itself under strict obligation not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear weapons state.

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1 This policy is explained in Japan’s annual defense white paper. See Ministry of Defense (Japan), Defense of Japan 2013 (Tokyo, 2013) ~ http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper.
Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons, however, is not necessarily restrained by its constitution. While designed to make the nation as peaceful as possible, the constitution does not exclude outright Japan’s pursuit of nuclear options. The government’s basic interpretation is that Article 9.2 of the constitution does not prohibit the possession of force that is within the minimum range necessary for self-defense.\(^2\) Therefore, if the weapon in question, whether conventional or nuclear, is within these bounds, it is not constitutionally banned. If thus confined to the minimum necessary level for self-defense, the possession of nuclear weapons is considered constitutional for Japan. Here it should be noted that the minimum necessary level applies to the limit of individual self-defense and does not include collective self-defense in the government’s interpretation of the constitution.

**The Role of Nuclear Forces in Japan’s Security Strategy**

Japan has continuously relied on the United States to deter nuclear threats against itself and has maintained that “the extended deterrence of the United States with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable.”\(^3\) At the same time, conventional elements of deterrence have become more important in recent years with dramatic improvements in technologies such as ballistic missile defense and precision-guided weapons. U.S. reliance on conventional elements of deterrence has increased alongside the reduction in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, as Japan improves its ballistic missile defense and other capabilities for deterrence by denial, it no longer needs to depend solely on nuclear forces to maintain credible nuclear deterrence. Although Japan currently has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, it is worth exploring why Japan would not be better off possessing its own nuclear option. This section of the essay aims to clarify the utility of nuclear weapons for Japan from a military point of view based on Robert Art’s analysis of the different roles of force: deterrent, defensive, compellent, and swaggering use.

*Deterrent use of nuclear weapons.* According to Art, the deterrent use of force is “the deployment of military power so as to be able to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacceptable

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\(^2\) The government has repeated this argument on many occasions. For example, the director general of the cabinet legal office expressed this as the government’s position in answering a question in the Diet on April 5, 1972.

punishment if he does it.” In the bipolar world of the Cold War, deterrence relied on the threat of mutually assured destruction defined as the capability to “deter a deliberate nuclear attack...by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first strike.” In the case of U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, possession of their own nuclear capabilities reinforced the extended deterrence provided by the United States. For example, British prime minister Harold McMillan noted in 1958 that “the independent contribution...gives us a better position with respect to the United States.”

While U.S. nuclear deterrence, supported by the nuclear capabilities of U.S. allies, functioned well against the Soviet Union, this form of deterrence raises serious challenges for Japan. First, Japan may be drawn into a “balance of terror” situation in a bipolar context, such as a conflict with North Korea. In this scenario, because Japan’s industry, population, and infrastructure are highly concentrated and vulnerable, and as Japan has become prosperous through international trade, while being highly dependent on the peace and stability of various areas throughout the world, mutual deterrence based on a balance of what the opponents lose may not work. Second, Japan may be constrained in its ability to reinforce U.S. extended deterrence with its own nuclear force. The issues raised by this challenge are more complicated and depend on how the United States would perceive Japan if it were to go nuclear.

**Defensive use of nuclear weapons.** The defensive use of force is “the deployment of military power so as to be able to do two things—to ward off an attack and to minimize damage to oneself if attacked.” On this account, “a state can deploy its forces in place prior to an attack, use them after an attack has occurred to repel it, or strike first if it believes that an attack upon it is imminent or inevitable.” In the case of Japan, a preemptive first strike against a potential opponent is hard to conceive of under any circumstances, even for defensive purposes. Furthermore, it is highly doubtful, both militarily and politically, that Japan would initiate

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7 Art, “The Four Functions of Force,” 133.
a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on an opponent. Nuclear weapons with a smaller yield have been considered as battlefield assets, particularly in supporting conventional warfare or in compensating for conventional inferiority. In the case of China today, the tactical/theater nuclear forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can be deployed or employed to reinforce conventional forces where China has a shortage of personnel strength, firepower, or advanced weapons. By contrast, because the United States and its allies have traditionally enjoyed conventional superiority in the Pacific theater, with the U.S. Navy supported by allied navies such as Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), they have not had to rely on tactical nuclear weapons. In short, states with conventional superiority do not need to rely on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, as information and communication technology advances, smart conventional weapons can be used for pinpoint attacks. As a result, there is now less need to depend on the larger yield of nuclear weapons to destroy key targets in order to compensate for the inaccuracy of conventional weapons.

Compellent use of nuclear weapons. The compellent use of force is “the deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken.” The nuclear attacks against Nagasaki and Hiroshima were demonstrations of this, as the United States was able to compel Japan to surrender. Although the compellent use of nuclear weapons is hard to conceive of today, conventional smart weapons may be used in some cases in order to convey a strong message to potential opponents, such as leaders of rogue states.

Use of nuclear weapons for swaggering. According to Art, the use of force for swaggering is “the most egoistic”:

It aims to enhance the national pride of a people or to satisfy the personal ambitions of its ruler. A state or statesman swaggers in order to look and feel more powerful and important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision making, and to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others. If its image is enhanced, the nation’s defense, deterrent, and compellent capabilities may also be enhanced.

8 Such arguments are found in the debates on NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons. For example, see NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1975), 17.
10 Ibid., 137.
Initially, one of the objectives of Chinese nuclear forces was to “demonstrate China’s international importance and reinforce Chinese national pride.”

France and Britain may have had similar motivations when they first developed their nuclear weapons. In Japan’s case, however, there is no need to go nuclear in order to play a leading role in the international community and to gain greater respect. Japan has already achieved international prestige and influence and does not need to enhance its standing by becoming a nuclear weapons state.

A Strategy to Cope with the Stability-Instability Paradox

The preceding analysis shows that Japan is unlikely to gain much by acquiring nuclear weapons in terms of the deterrent, defensive, compellent, and swaggering use of such weapons. This section will discuss security problems caused by situations in which conflicts at lower levels are hard to prevent while mutual deterrence at higher levels, including the nuclear level, works well.

The stability-instability paradox in the East China Sea. Japan’s latest National Security Strategy, released in December 2013, states that there has been a shift in the global power balance: while today’s security environment provides “opportunities for security cooperation, it has also given rise to regional issues and tensions.” The NSS also states that “the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to the so-called gray-zone situations; that is, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interest.” It stresses that “these gray-zone situations could further develop into grave situations.”

The concern over gray-zone situations expressed in the NSS is to some extent similar to worries caused by the stability-instability paradox. Specifically, if the United States and China maintain a form of strategic stability with their nuclear forces, the probability of lower-intensity confrontations between the two countries may increase, particularly in the East China Sea. For Japan, a nation that is not suited to go nuclear, this situation has a positive aspect as well as a negative one. The bad news is that nuclear deterrence would not extend to lower levels of confrontation. That is, the U.S. nuclear umbrella may have little effect on


deterring provocations by North Korea and China, as was demonstrated in cases such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea or the harassment of the USNS *Impeccable* by Chinese paramilitary forces. The good news is that situations may arise where the possibility of nuclear escalation will not become a major concern, even though tension between the law-enforcement organizations of China and Japan may escalate into a military confrontation involving the naval or air forces of the two countries. In other words, while deterrence at the nuclear level will continue to work well, nuclear deterrence is unlikely to deter confrontation at a conventional military or paramilitary level.

*A crisis management mechanism in the East China Sea.* A more serious challenge is how to prevent tension from escalating from a law-enforcement level to a higher one. On the one hand, U.S. extended deterrence may have the effect of preventing Sino-Japanese military tension from ever escalating to a nuclear level. On the other hand, there is always the risk that a low-level skirmish between these two militaries in the East China Sea could have the grave consequence of two of the world largest economies—each with huge influence over international politics—plunging into a negative-sum game.

Chinese maritime law-enforcement organizations have been extremely active in recent years in the areas close to the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China), and this activity has increased markedly since Japan’s purchase of the islands in September 2012. The Japan Coast Guard is thus on high alert and encounters its Chinese counterpart almost every day. More generally, encounters between the PLA Navy and the JMSDF, as well as the U.S. Navy, have become more frequent throughout the East China Sea and western Pacific. This is simply because Chinese naval activities have expanded geographically and intensified with the rapid development of the PLA Navy in recent years. Meanwhile, the air components of the Chinese military and law enforcement have also become increasingly active as they too have rapidly modernized. Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced that the Japan Air Self-Defense Force conducted over 567 missions to secure territorial air space in 2012.13 This was the highest number since the Cold War, and over half of the missions were against Chinese aircraft. In the future, Chinese and Japanese military aircraft are likely to encounter each other more frequently across a wider geographic area. In light of these observations, it is urgent that the two countries further accelerate

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cooperation on confidence-building measures to avoid serious incidents in the wider maritime and air spaces around the East China Sea. This issue has become increasingly important since China’s declaration that its air defense identification zone overlaps with those of Japan and Korea. Because it is critical that the escalation of tension between China and Japan be controlled and halted at the lowest possible level, Japan should take every measure to quickly manage confrontations before they intensify.

Conclusion

Japan is increasingly facing serious security challenges that range from worldwide proliferation of WMD through North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile programs and possible instability on the Korean Peninsula to rising tension with China in the East China Sea. Different measures may be required to confront the various challenges. For example, as long as North Korea’s nuclear capability remains limited to a small number of weapons, measures such as ballistic missile defense will be necessary and could be effective in avoiding or at least limiting damages. Traditional deterrence based on nuclear and conventional offensive capabilities, however, does not seem to be perfectly effective in controlling North Korea’s leadership. In order to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula, international efforts to shape North Korea’s future along with the conventional deterrence of the U.S.–South Korea alliance will be key. Meanwhile, China’s growing arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons should be dealt with through both arms control efforts between China and other nuclear weapons states, such as the United States, and traditional approaches to preserve strategic stability at the nuclear level. To maintain strategic stability, the international community should work together to prevent the current tensions in the East and South China Seas from escalating by confining them to the law-enforcement arena at best or, if that is not possible, to the lowest possible level of confrontation between military organizations short of an actual exchange of fire.
The North Korean Nuclear Problem: Twenty Years of Crisis

Kang Choi

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.¹ Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.² Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have “bought the same horse” three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the “leap day” agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea—involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States—have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea’s nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.

This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang’s inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community’s efforts toward the denuclearization of North

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Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea’s current trajectory through increased engagement.

**North Korea’s Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of Denuclearization**

North Korea’s actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea’s nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heavy-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.\(^3\) When North Korea’s uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program’s existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country’s development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.\(^4\) As North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities

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\(^4\) In February 2014 the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report on North Korea’s military and security development mentioned that the Hwasong-13 missile, recently displayed during a military parade, would be capable of reaching the continental United States if it were successfully developed. It also assessed that the Taepodong-2 missile launch test in December 2013 was a success. In July 2014, North Korea fired short-range ballistic missiles using transporter erector launchers into waters off its east coast from different locations in Hwanghae and Pyongan Provinces. For details on these developments, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2013* (Washington, D.C., February 4, 2014); “N. Korea Fires 4 Short-Range Projectiles,” Yonhap News, July 30, 2014; and “North Korea Fires Short-Range Missile into Sea,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 2014. The Nuclear Threat Initiative website also offers an up-to-date summary of North Korea’s missile development. See “Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile,” Nuclear Threat Initiatives website — http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/delivery-systems/. }
have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.

The key to understanding North Korea’s changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. guarantee of its regime security by the cessation of combined military exercises between the United States and South Korea, the withdrawal of the United States Forces Korea, and the termination of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The North Korean leadership has argued that as long as the United States pursues a hostile and threatening policy toward the DPRK, North Korea must develop nuclear weapons capabilities for defensive purposes. Therefore, North Korea demands a peace treaty with the United States before any denuclearization deal could be in sight. In sum, North Korea’s stance has evolved to position of a peace regime (consisting of a peace treaty or nonaggression treaty) first, then denuclearization.

Yet North Korea’s recent declaration of the byungjin policy indicates that the government has little genuine interest in taking steps towards denuclearization. First, DPRK authorities have praised the nuclear program as one of the greatest achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-un, gaining his legitimacy from his family’s legacy, cannot do away with these accomplishments without undermining his position as a member of the regime. For instance, in his speech to the UN General Assembly last year, Ambassador Sin Son-ho, North Korea’s permanent representative to the United Nations, stated that to ease tension and establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the United States should abandon its hostile policy toward the DPRK and replace the armistice with a peace treaty. He argued that the prerequisite for denuclearization is the removal of U.S. nuclear threats against North Korea, meaning that the United States should abandon its nuclear deterrence policy for South Korea. For more information, see “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Sin Son Ho, Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations” (general debate of the first committee of the 68th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 2013) ~ http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com13/statements/14Oct_DPRK.pdf.
of the Kim family and defender of the *juche* (self-reliance) ideology. Second, byungjin is Kim Jong-un’s signature policy, in the same way that Kim Jong-il propagated the “military first” policy; thus, there is no possibility that the regime will disavow byungjin as long as Kim Jong-un stays in power. Indeed, under his leadership, North Korea now makes more assertive demands to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state.

Although North Korea proclaimed itself as a nuclear state in its revised 2012 constitution, formal international recognition would allow it to shift the focus of talks from denuclearization to nuclear arms control. Recognition and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power state by the international community would also benefit Kim by serving as a useful propaganda tool that could help him consolidate support among the more hardline factions in the regime.

**Challenges: International Cooperation and the North Korean Regime**

The six-party talks have been undermined by their lack of coordination. There are three general reasons for this: (1) differences over approach, (2) different priorities among the various regional powers, and (3) the tendency to subordinate the North Korea problem to the U.S.-China relationship.

All the concerned parties agree that the North Korean nuclear program needs to be addressed peacefully and through dialogue. Nevertheless, the current approach is ineffective and the momentum for dialogue is practically nonexistent. The United States and other regional powers are currently adopting a position of strategic patience, waiting for North Korea to take concrete action toward denuclearization. The concerned parties cannot agree on whether to implement sanctions or adopt an approach of more flexible engagement. More generally, they cannot agree on whether peace talks should be a condition for denuclearization or the desired outcome of denuclearization. For example, China, as well as to

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6 The *Rodong Sinmun* published an article in December 2011 that described North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as one of Kim Jong-il’s three revolutionary legacies. In a separate column by the same party organ in July 2014, Kim Il-sung, among many things, was praised for preparing the ground for the development of the DPRK army and the glory days of its songun revolution, which includes the nuclear program. For the original columns in Korean, see “Gim Jeong-il dongjiui hyegomyeong-yusan” [Kim Jong-il's Revolutionary Heritage], *Rodong Sinmun*, December 28, 2011 ~ http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2011/12/12-28/2011-1228-009.html; and “Widaehan Gim Il-seong daewonsumim-ui jeonseung-eobjeog-eul husonmandae bichnae yeonagaja” [Let’s Glorify the Exploits Performed by the Great Grand Marshal Kim Il-sung for the Victory in War for Ages], *Rodong Sinmun*, July 27, 2014 ~ http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=gsa2&no=91066.
a certain degree Russia, has always emphasized flexibility, engagement, and a peace treaty as a starting point for denuclearization. On the other hand, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have emphasized denuclearization as a precondition for establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. These different preferences for how to approach the nuclear problem make it much more difficult to enforce any punitive measures against the North Korean regime.

This disagreement over approaches is due to differences in priorities among the key regional powers. The United States’ primary preoccupation is preventing nuclear proliferation. China, which borders North Korea, is primarily focused on the stability of the DPRK regime. President Xi’s state visit to Seoul in July 2014, for example, did not bring about any change in China’s policy of seeking denuclearization of the peninsula rather than denuclearization of North Korea. South Korea and Japan, on the other hand, prioritize the goal of denuclearization of North Korea to lessen the threat to their national security. Thus, whereas Japan and South Korea are highly concerned by the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea, China will likely oppose or undermine any actions that could weaken the regime.

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7 At the 68th session of the UN General Assembly, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that “the right way to solve the nuclear issue on the [Korean] Peninsula” is to have negotiations between the related parties through dialogue. President Xi Jinping stressed the same argument when he met President Barack Obama at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. President Xi went on to urge the relevant parties to implement the September 19 Joint Statement signed in 2005, which affirmed that North Korea should abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and return to NPT and IAEA safeguards, while the United States and South Korea should accommodate North Korea’s security concerns in return. For more details, see “China, U.S. Reaffirm Commitment to Promote New Type of Major-Country Ties,” Xinhua, March 25, 2014; http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8577084.html; and Wang Yi, “China at a New Starting Point” (statement during the general debate of the 68th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 27, 2013) ~ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1082330.shtml.


9 The joint statement said that South Korea and China “reaffirm their firm opposition to the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.” It is understood that the phrase was chosen because China does not want to directly point its finger at North Korea. Later on, South Korean president Park Geun-hye emphasized that South Korea and China have agreed to achieve “denuclearization of North Korea.” For media coverage on the ROK-China summit meeting, see Jane Perlez, “China and South Korea Affirm Antinuclear Goals,” New York Times, July 3, 2014; http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/world/asia/presidents-of-china-and-south-korea-reaffirm-push-for-north-korean-denuclearization.html?r=0. For a summary of President Xi’s state visit to Seoul, see Wi Tack-whan and Yoon Sojung, “Korea, China Reaffirm ‘Good Neighbor Relations,’” Korea.net, July 4, 2014 ~ http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=120405.
Exacerbating this problem is the growing strategic distrust in the U.S.-China relationship, which is limiting coordination beyond a general agreement that both sides do not wish to see a nuclear-armed North Korea. The United States is emphasizing the importance of China’s compliance with sanctions against the Kim regime. China, on the other hand, is beginning to see the U.S. strategy toward North Korea as a broader attempt to contain China. Each of these differences in priorities, perceptions, and approaches has rendered the current sanctions regime ineffective in making progress toward North Korean denuclearization.

While weakened international cooperation presents significant challenges, there is also a more fundamental element of the problem—the nature of the North Korean regime. After decades of isolation, disastrous mismanagement of the economy, and gross human rights abuses, nuclear weapons are a valuable tool for ensuring the regime’s survivability. Domestically, the nuclear program can be trumpeted as an enormous domestic achievement. Externally, nuclear weapons provide a deterrent against any outside power that may seek to overthrow the regime. Therefore, as long as North Korea maintains authoritarian rule under the Kim family, North Korea will have a vital interest in continuing its nuclear weapons program.

Sudden regime change, however, is not a viable policy option for resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. The instability that might result from rapid regime change could be more deleterious for regional stability than the current status quo, and the regime that replaces the Kim regime could be even more radical, unpredictable, and hostile toward outside powers. Thus, gradual regime transformation must be pursued. This cannot occur in a vacuum but must be complemented by increased deterrence from all the concerned parties.

Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge: Principles and Recommended Approaches

Time is running short for resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, given that the completion of a uranium program will heighten the possibility of proliferation. Furthermore, North Korea will likely enhance both its nuclear and delivery capabilities. If North Korea obtains the ability to target the U.S. mainland, it would challenge and potentially invalidate the underlying assumption that the United States would be able to retaliate.
as well as defend its Asian allies. \(^\text{10}\) These problems are exacerbated by the fundamentally unstable and unpredictable nature of the Kim Jong-un regime. As the old guard is replaced by a younger generation, the type of relationship and structure between the Korean People’s Army and the Korean Workers’ Party is increasingly unclear.

To effectively address the North Korean nuclear challenge, policymakers need to recognize that resolving the problem will require a long-term outlook. As such, any strategy will require a comprehensive approach that also addresses regime transformation. Similarly, countries interested in resolving the North Korean problem must agree on objectives and establish a common approach. This requires that the other five countries in the six-party talks must reach a clear consensus on the objectives of negotiations and on the priorities of denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace regime through the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Once these fundamental objectives are shared, the states involved can adopt a comprehensive roadmap and plan of action.

The United States and the regional countries should also adopt an approach of comprehensive integrated denial that aims to block North Korea’s pursuit of its byungjin policy by utilizing various tools in an integrated manner. To be effective, however, this policy must be consistent, durable, and proactive rather than reactive. This author recommends four general strategies: (1) strengthening the current extended nuclear deterrence posture to deny North Korea the utility of nuclear weapons, (2) adopting a smarter sanctions strategy to make North Korea pay a high price for possessing nuclear weapons, (3) adopting a conditional and targeted strategy of engagement (especially in terms of humanitarian measures) to bring about changes in North Korean society, and (4) maintaining a strong coalition among concerned parties to ensure the effectiveness of these strategies by denying North Korea any chance of exploiting differences over its nuclear ambitions.

First, the United States must strengthen its extended nuclear deterrence posture. This requires that policymakers tailor deterrence with full-spectrum dominance and escalation controllability. This might include

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\(^\text{10}\) During his speech to a military rally in Pyongyang on July 27, 2014, Hwang Pyong-so, director of the North Korean military’s General Political Bureau, threatened to strike targets on the U.S. mainland with nuclear warheads if the “U.S. imperialists” threaten North Korea’s “sovereignty and survival.” Although it is not the first time such rhetoric was made in public by a North Korean official, the level of threats recently made by North Korea is rapidly rising. See “North Korea Threatens Nuclear Strike on White House,” Agence France-Presse, July 28, 2014, available from http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140728/DEFREG03/307280014/North-Korea-Threatens-Nuclear-Strike-White-House.
upgraded and integrated missile defense systems and enhanced strike capabilities. Such an approach would leave all options on the table, thereby allowing for considerable strategic ambiguity and, as a result, deterrence, dissuasion, and defense. By adopting a more robust deterrence posture vis-à-vis North Korea, the United States could convince North Korea that nuclear weapons have no political and military utility.

Second, a smart sanctions strategy must be developed to complement deterrence. This strategy would require more targeted sanctions, implemented in cooperation with other major parties, especially China. In this respect, there at least exists the potential for greater coordination between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Introduction of smart and targeted sanctions will make life for North Korean elites more difficult, causing nuclear weapons to ultimately become a liability rather than an asset. In other words, the international community must make North Korea pay an unbearable cost for possessing a nuclear option.

Third, any engagement with the North Korean regime must be conditional. The door for dialogue must be kept open, but dialogue should not occur just for its own sake. Furthermore, it must be pursued through multiple channels, including reducing tension through military-to-military dialogues. Some forms of assistance can remain unconditional, such as the provision of humanitarian assistance. This soft and indirect approach would complement military-to-military exchanges. When focusing on exchange and cooperation projects between North and South Korea, both parties must focus on small, not big, programs, which are more likely to be mutually beneficial to both countries. Parallel to this, both sides should seek to implement education and training programs in technical areas. Other multilateral forums should also be utilized when engaging North Korea. Such engagement on humanitarian issues can gradually bring about changes in North Korea.

Last, as described above, any approach toward North Korea requires enduring cooperation among the coalition of concerned parties on the desired resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. This necessitates that the coalition agree on the desirable end state for the Korean Peninsula and what the implications would be for Northeast Asia. Adopting a common goal would help the coalition identify tangible areas for improving cooperation.
Conclusion

North Korea’s policies and rhetoric indicate that it has no interest in giving up its nuclear weapons. Additionally, the response from the concerned parties toward the North Korean nuclear program has been undermined because of differences over approach, varying priorities among regional powers, and the tendency to view the North Korea problem through the lens of the U.S.-China relationship. Therefore, the nuclear problem will not likely be resolved in a short period of time. Any solution will require addressing the North Korean problem as a whole—keeping in mind that the gradual transformation of the North Korean regime may be the only enduring solution to the nuclear problem. The current denial strategy must be pursued more actively by the parties involved, requiring a well-calculated mix of carrots and sticks. The starting point for this strategy is not only to develop robust and reliable deterrence. It is also essential to forge greater cooperation within the coalition of concerned parties.
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad and Regional Nuclear Dynamics

P.K. Singh

Nuclear weapons in various stages—in established armories, latent capacity, or merely embryonic potential—are alive, well, and thriving in Asia. Ashley Tellis has very aptly written that “given the contested geopolitics of Asia, which is defined by several enduring rivalries, many unresolved territorial disputes, significant local power transitions, and now the continent-wide anxieties provoked by the rise of China, it is not surprising that nuclear weapons have retained their critical importance.”

To put the South Asian dimension of the nuclear environment in its correct perspective, it is critical to view the disputes, rivalries, and players involved in a historical and regional context. This essay begins with a brief historical overview of the regional dimension of India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics and then looks more specifically at the perspectives and nuclear policies of India and Pakistan, as well as on China’s nuclear policy vis-à-vis India. Finally, the essay concludes by asserting that the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad must be understood within the context of broader nuclear dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Regional Dimension of India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics

Before 1947 the Indian subcontinent was surrounded by the buffer states of Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma, and the external players in the region were Britain and Russia. Soon after independence, Pakistan fought a war with India and occupied a part of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan later joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), bringing the United States and its alliances into the subcontinent in an effort to resist the influence of the Soviet Union. Tibet was taken over by China in the 1950s, introducing China as an important actor in the South Asian geopolitical and strategic environment.

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NOTE: The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of India or the United Service Institution of India.

In the mid to late 1950s, China also occupied Aksai Chin, a part of Jammu and Kashmir, which in 1962 led to the Sino-Indian War. Two additional wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 ultimately involved both the United States and Soviet Union. Then, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan met with an insurgency supported by the United States and China, among others.

Consequently, while the Cold War was raging, South Asia experienced four major wars. This count excludes the wars in Afghanistan; the breakup of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh; the persistent involvement of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China on the subcontinent; and the nuclearization of China and its entry into the United Nations and the UN Security Council. Was all this due to the creation of the India-Pakistan dyad and the India-China dyad, or was it instead the product of the “great game” between the United States, Soviet Union, China, India, and Pakistan? Can we today forget this recent history and simply look at the subcontinent’s dynamics through the lens of the Cold War binary? The Cold War superpowers possessed a deep-rooted ideological rivalry, but they had no disputed territory between them and no enduring history of armed conflict against each other. Can Cold War binary dynamics therefore apply to the India-Pakistan-China nuclear trio, which do have territorial disputes and have fought wars? For the reasons stated above, it would be a misplaced logic to apply the Cold War binary dynamics to the India-Pakistan-China triad.

India

India’s tryst with the atomic bomb is almost as old as the bomb itself. In 1944, Homi Bhabha submitted a report on nuclear energy, and a year later the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was established. Early Indian leaders after independence understood the dual use of atomic energy. They established the Atomic Energy Act in April 1948 and later created the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1954. In 1956, India’s Apsara was the first nuclear research reactor in Asia to be operationalized. At that stage, India could have opted to build its nuclear weapons program, but its leaders chose to profess nuclear disarmament, little realizing that the nuclear genie was already out of the bottle. The 1962 Sino-Indian War, followed by the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, worried both India and the United States. In 1964, U.S. leaders considered “the possibilities of providing nuclear weapons under U.S. custody” to friendly
Asian countries, including India, and also considered helping India with a peaceful nuclear explosion using a U.S. nuclear device.\(^2\) Neither of these plans came to fruition. Ironically, the United States, having recently re-engaged with China, placed sanctions on India just ten years later, in 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear explosion.

Tellis has rightly described India as an emerging nuclear power with low dependence on nuclear weapons. He has further argued that India views its nuclear arsenal more as a way to avoid nuclear blackmail than as an instrument of active defense.\(^3\) India’s policy of maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent is not country-specific but takes into account the evolving security environment, both regionally and globally. Therefore, the question of spelling out a minimum in precise numbers of weapons does not arise. India’s nuclear weapons are for deterring a WMD attack on India or its troops, and there have never been discussions of substituting nuclear weapons for conventional forces. For a country that professes a “no first use” policy, however, survivability and credibility are essential. Maintaining a secure second-strike capability is thus crucial to stable deterrence. India’s nuclear triad of nuclear-capable aircraft, mobile land-based missiles, and sea-based assets, as well as its pursuit of ballistic missile defense and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities, needs to be seen in this perspective. India, like all other major nuclear weapons states, including the United States and China, will continuously upgrade and modernize its nuclear deterrent so as to be credible.

The evolution of India’s nuclear posture takes into account both the regional and global nuclear dynamics. It has been influenced not just by Cold War rivalries but also by the interactions of other nuclear weapons states, specifically China and Pakistan, which constitute India’s primary security concerns. The tensions between India and China are mainly due to China’s expansionist designs. However, from an Indian perspective, Sino-Indian relations are particularly vexed because of the Chinese “strategic friendship” with Pakistan. Similarly, China will view the growing U.S.-India partnership with caution. Both relationships—between China and Pakistan and the United States and India—have the potential to increase regional mistrust.

In the nuclear domain, each country will decide on how transparent it wants to be, keeping in mind its national interests. Camille Grand has

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\(^3\) Tellis, “No Escape,” 16–17.
very aptly stated that “during most of the nuclear era, secrecy and deception were perceived as essential strategies to protect technological secrets, to protect key assets from pre-emptive strikes and to facilitate the achievement of strategic superiority.”

Pakistan

Pakistan is a country where democracy has not been able to consolidate and grow, where the army plays an active (some would say dominant) role in domestic politics, religious fanaticism thrives, and the economy is in the doldrums. Add in Pakistan’s propensity for military adventurism, which includes nuclear brinkmanship, and it is a toxic mixture. It is difficult for many countries to understand the dynamics India faces in living with such a neighbor.

Pakistan has two major strategic assets: its nuclear weapons and state-sponsored terrorists. Both are controlled by the army, and more specifically by the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Although Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were initially described as a counter to India’s nuclear arsenal, lately—to justify its tactical nuclear weapons—the government also describes them as a counter to India’s conventional superiority. Christopher Clary has stated that “Pakistan remains one of the most likely sources of nuclear risk globally—through theft of Pakistani nuclear material, unauthorized use of weapons during conflict, or intentional use in war.”

Thomas W. Graham makes an interesting point about Pakistan balancing India’s superior conventional forces with nuclear weapons:

Pakistani writings emphasize the need for nuclear weapons to balance India’s superior conventional forces. While this logic was compelling for the U.S. in a Cold War, it is a hollow concept in terms of justifying how many nuclear weapons Pakistan needs to build and deploy to deter only one country, India….. If Pakistan feels it must target India's entire military, industrial and research complex, hold India's major cities at risk, and be prepared to fight using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, it will require at least 300–500 nuclear weapons.


Pakistan currently talks of using its tactical nuclear weapons to neutralize India’s conventional superiority, and many have believed this argument. But the fact is that Pakistan was not deterred by India’s conventional superiority in the past and waged wars against its neighbor in 1947, 1965, and 1971, as well as its misadventure in Kargil in 1999. Pakistan also continues to push terrorists across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and wage a proxy war there. It now appears that Pakistan has taken steps to raise the threshold against any military intervention and is moving away from the strategy of nuclear deterrence to one of nuclear warfighting. This may lead to nuclear brinkmanship and a nuclear crisis.

There are also possible linkages between Pakistan’s ISI and terrorist organizations. After then president Pervez Musharraf declared Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism, he forced a number of senior and junior ISI officers to leave their positions because of ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and he also placed a smaller number of Pakistani nuclear scientists under house arrest. Many worry about the unknown jihadi supporters that “still exist inside the shadows of Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies” and that we still do not know “how close those shadows fall to nuclear weapons storage sites.”

Feroz Hassan Khan has written that Pakistan will continue to rely on China, affecting the larger Asian power balance: “While the China factor in South Asian dynamics cannot be dismissed, its inclusion in the regional construct skews regional dynamics and dims the prospect of a secure nuclear future for the region.” Yet surprisingly we continue to focus on the India-Pakistan dyad and not the India-Pakistan-China triad. Over the long term, China has supported Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. Not only did China transfer nuclear weapon designs, but it allegedly also helped Pakistan test a weapon in Lop Nor well before Pakistan’s 1998 tests. Similarly, the Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 missiles are of Chinese origin, and China has also supplied nuclear power plants at Chasma and Karachi. Analysts in the nuclear and strategic fields need to ask what assistance will follow next: MIRV technology or ballistic missile submarines.

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Pakistan’s history of nuclear proliferation, which was overlooked for decades by the West until AQ Khan’s black-market network was exposed, is now too well documented to ignore. Today, Pakistan is known to have an overcapacity of nuclear fissile material production, which it uses for missile production. Will this not tempt it to proliferate through the clandestine export of nuclear-armed missiles to countries and possibly even to nonstate actors? This is a scary but plausible scenario.

China

China considers itself to be increasingly a peer of the United States and knows that relations will be collaborative but also competitive and—if not managed effectively—even adversarial in certain circumstances. Therefore, China’s nuclear doctrines, capabilities, and strategies will be primarily focused on deterring the United States. Although India’s nuclear posture will not be the primary concern or driver of Chinese nuclear doctrine and capabilities development, the China-India dyad is still significant. India can be targeted from many missile bases in China, as well as by submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air bombers. The only plausible targets for nuclear-capable DF-21 missiles located at China’s Delingha and Kunming bases are in India. China’s large ballistic and cruise missile forces armed with conventional weapons give it a massive break-out potential in terms of nuclear-capable delivery systems, given that some Chinese missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.

Yet while China and India have their differences, there are also some similarities between the two states’ postures on no first use, separating nuclear warheads from delivery systems, and establishing a minimum credible deterrence. Realizing this common ground, India has offered to talk with China on nuclear confidence-building measures, but China has not yet accepted.

Conclusion: The India-Pakistan Dyad and Broader Regional Nuclear Dynamics

Will the emerging nuclear dynamics between the Asia-Pacific powers contribute to the reordering of the international system? It is unlikely that the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad will drive such developments. However, the intertwined and overlapping security relationships of the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan are likely to do so, particularly as these states adapt their nuclear doctrines in response to changing strategic,
security, and technological challenges. At present there are no indications that India, Pakistan, and China are engaged in a nuclear arms race. Such a race, if one occurs, will not be driven by the weaker or smaller nuclear powers. The India-Pakistan nuclear dyad will be more influenced by broader regional and global factors than the other way around. The interlocking of the China-India-Pakistan, U.S.-China-India, and U.S.-Russia-China triads will have a greater impact on both South Asian and global nuclear dynamics than either the India-Pakistan or even the China-India nuclear dyad. For example, traditional hostility between India and Pakistan is far from being the only driver of the shift in Pakistan’s nuclear strategy from minimum deterrence to seeking a second-strike capability. Additionally, the United States and China both have leverage with Pakistan to persuade it to change its destabilizing nuclear strategy. Pakistan is not solely India’s problem, and no amount of persuasion or confidence-building measures from India alone will suffice to change Pakistan’s posture.

Thus, these nuclear dyads do not exist in a vacuum. As Thomas W. Graham wrote,

> There are no technical or institutional controls capable of preventing China, India and Pakistan from developing substantial nuclear forces over the next two decades. Thus, the primary driver will be the direction in which the world moves in terms of the perceived legitimate function of nuclear weapons. If the United States, China and other major powers are able to convince the world that the sole legitimate function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons, then it is plausible nuclear forces among China, India and Pakistan could stabilize around 150–200.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the holding on to over 1,000 nuclear weapons each by the United States and Russia belies this hope that deterrence is sufficient.

Framing the nuclear issues of South Asia as a product of the India-Pakistan dyad is therefore flawed and contestable on two counts. First, this characterization does not take into account the geopolitical realities of the subcontinent in the last six decades, including multiple conflicts and interventions from outside regional actors. Second, this argument is rooted in the bygone Cold War–era binary logic that has been overtaken by nuclear dynamics created by the complex and at times tenuous and unpredictable network of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable states. Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, in describing the U.S.-China-India-Pakistan equation, have stated, “It is the dynamics of this four-way interaction, with

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¹⁰ Graham, “Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21st Century.”
its many overlapping contradictions, that will shape the future stability of South Asia, Asia more generally, and the emerging global order.”\textsuperscript{11} Keeping the geopolitical and strategic realities of South Asia and the broader region in mind, I would venture to suggest that the dynamics of the five-way interaction between the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan is what will shape the stability of the emerging global order.

\textsuperscript{11} Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, “Imbricated Regional Rivalries and Global Order: South Asia, China and the United States,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, July 2010, 1.
The Evolving Nuclear Order: Implications for Proliferation, Arms Racing, and Stability

Aaron L. Friedberg

The 25 years since the end of the Cold War have seen several notable shifts in the global distribution of nuclear capabilities:

- The Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States have slashed their arsenals by roughly 75% from 20,000–30,000 warheads to 7,000–8,000.¹
- France and Britain have also made substantial cuts, reducing their nuclear forces from 500 weapons at their peak to roughly 300 and 200, respectively.
- Of the Cold War “big five” (the United States, Britain, France, Soviet Union, and China), only China has not reduced its stockpile, which is estimated at 250 warheads. Beijing has also made significant investments in modernizing its forces, developing new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
- Three new countries (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the list of acknowledged nuclear weapons states, and one (South Africa) has been removed.
- Finally, in recent years a series of aspirants (Iraq, Libya, and Syria) have seen their nuclear ambitions foiled, while one (Iran) continues to press on toward the finish line.

What are the implications of these developments for the conduct of international relations, and, in particular, how are they likely to shape events in eastern Eurasia, a zone of strategic interaction that extends from the Korean Peninsula, down through the South Asian subcontinent, and into the Persian Gulf region? The essays in this roundtable have helped shed light on three aspects of this question: proliferation, arms racing, and stability.

Proliferation

Regarding the further spread of nuclear weapons, the next chapters of the story in the broader Middle East will depend a great deal on what happens in Iran. If Tehran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, other states may feel compelled to follow suit, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. If it does not, Israel may remain the region’s only nuclear weapons state.

In East Asia, those states most likely to contemplate pursuing nuclear status are also anxious friends and allies of the United States. Japan, South Korea, and (albeit implicitly) Taiwan have until now been content to take shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But they could come to doubt the reliability of U.S. guarantees in the face of North Korea’s new capabilities, China’s nuclear modernization programs, or, especially in the case of Japan, both developments taken together.

While this once-taboo topic has been discussed more openly in both Japan and South Korea in recent years, neither country shows any overt signs of moving to acquire its own nuclear forces. Still, as Noboru Yamaguchi explains in his essay, there is nothing in Japan’s “peace constitution” that absolutely precludes the possibility, should the nation’s leaders deem it necessary for self-defense. Like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has shown an interest in acquiring rocket and cruise missile technology that could someday serve as the basis for an independent deterrent force. For the moment, however, the potential for further proliferation in East Asia remains latent.

Arms Racing

One of the main features of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was the interaction between their respective armaments efforts, including their offensive and defensive nuclear weapons programs. Although there are a number of competitive dyads emerging in Asia, and while the possibility exists for even more complex arrangements, the degree of interaction among the actors to date remains limited. As Benjamin Schreer describes, China’s modernization of its long-range nuclear forces appears to be motivated in large part by a desire to reduce its vulnerability to a possible U.S. conventional precision strike. An increase in the number of weapons deployed, perhaps on multiple warhead delivery systems, could also reflect concern over the possible thickening of the U.S. national missile defenses. For the moment, however, there is no strong evidence to support the view that China aims eventually to
achieve nuclear parity with the United States. Nor are there any indications to suggest that Washington will respond to Beijing’s limited buildup with measures designed to retain (or reacquire) a viable damage-limiting option against China.

According to P.K. Singh, India and Pakistan are following distinct paths in developing their nuclear capacities, with the former seeking a secure second-strike force to deter attack on its troops or territory and the latter attempting to acquire weapons that could be used to offset its inferiority in conventional ground and air forces. Singh asserts that the two states are not currently engaged in a nuclear arms race, but he notes the possibility that their programs could become more closely coupled, especially if China continues to provide nuclear assistance to Pakistan while its own forces expand beyond currently projected levels. This development, in particular, would likely have an impact on the United States, and perhaps on Russia as well, setting in motion a genuinely multisided rivalry, with Pakistan and India responding to one another; China interacting with the United States and Russia, as well as India; and Russia and the United States once again engaged in an active nuclear competition.

Stability

Ultimately the most important question that must be asked about recent developments is whether they will increase or decrease the risk of war, including the possibility of nuclear war. As Rajesh Basrur makes clear, there are plausible theoretical arguments that can be made on either side of this question. On the one hand, it is possible that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons will impose extreme caution on states that might otherwise be prone to conflict. On the other hand, nuclear-armed nations may feel emboldened to engage in provocations or conventional aggression, even against other nuclear powers.

The empirical evidence regarding this issue is sparse and subject to varying interpretations. North Korea has behaved aggressively toward the South on several occasions since conducting its first nuclear tests, but it did so often in the past as well. For the most part, as Kang Choi’s essay suggests, the North Korean regime seems to regard its small arsenal as the ultimate insurance policy rather than a useful new tool with which to fulfill its grandiose self-proclaimed ambitions.

Pakistan’s leaders appear to believe that nuclear weapons reduce the risk of large-scale conventional retaliation and thus provide a backstop for their
continued support of terrorist groups operating against India. But Islamabad has not thrown caution to the winds, and, as Basrur suggests, both Pakistan and India may at times be tempted to manipulate the risk of escalation to get the United States to exert pressure on their behalf.

Even when its own forces were smaller and less secure, Chinese strategists appear to have believed that they were sufficient to discourage the United States from ever using nuclear weapons against their country. Beijing’s modernization programs may be intended simply to bolster that confidence in the face of growing U.S. precision-strike capabilities. Now that China is developing similar conventional capabilities of its own, however, it has options for the use of force that it previously lacked and that it may be more likely to exercise if it believes it can deter the United States from nuclear escalation. This is a possibility about which U.S. and Japanese strategists have begun to worry and to which they will likely devote more attention in the years ahead.

Is the world approaching “critical mass,” a point at which the number and size of nuclear arsenals and the dangers associated with them will grow with explosive speed? The evidence presented here suggests that the answer is mixed. While superpower stockpiles have dwindled, the roster of nuclear weapons states has grown, and further horizontal proliferation is a distinct possibility in both Asia and the Middle East. At least for the moment, the plans and programs of the nuclear powers remain loosely coupled, but this too could change quickly, resulting in a truly multisided arms competition that is more complex and potentially more difficult to control than the Cold War arms race. The acquisition of nuclear weapons (in the case of India, Pakistan, and North Korea) and the development of more secure arsenals (in the case of China) have not resulted in radically increased recklessness. But there are indications that states equipped with such capabilities may assess that they provide a backstop for greater assertiveness. Such beliefs could raise the risk of conventional conflict and bring the world much closer to critical mass than it appears to be at present.
The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy

Bhubhindar Singh

KEYWORDS: Japan; U.S.-Japan Alliance; Regional Security; Northeast Asia
This essay examines the developments in Japanese security policy that have been undertaken by the Abe government since December 2012.

**MAIN ARGUMENT**

Challenging the dominant negative analyses of Japanese security policy under Shinzo Abe, particularly from China and South Korea, the essay makes two key points. First, the security policy developments are not specific to Abe’s administration but instead are part of a long-term trajectory that started at the onset of the post–Cold War period. Second, Japan’s emergence as an active security actor is a source of regional stability, as the measures the country has implemented are arguably a defensive response to the rising instability in Northeast Asia. Japan’s democratic identity, the resilient pacifism within Japanese society, and the continued robustness of the U.S.-Japan alliance support this conclusion.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

- Japan’s long-term trajectory to widen its security policy in the post–Cold War period is best understood beyond the notion of remilitarization. While the escalating tensions in Northeast Asia have motivated Japan to expand its security policy, this process is limited by a range of domestic factors that ensure it pursues a defensive policy.

- It is important for Tokyo to recognize that any development in its security policy inevitably raises concerns among its neighbors. For Japan to be accepted as a responsible actor in security affairs, the leadership must refrain from behavior that escalates bilateral tensions as a result of Japan’s unresolved historical legacies.

- Defense diplomacy is an important way for Japan to engage with its immediate neighbors, namely China and South Korea. Greater interaction between the defense establishments of these three countries at the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral levels will help build trust in the region.
In a speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., in February 2013, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe confidently declared that “Japan is back.”¹ This was in reference to Abe’s goal of reviving Japan’s moribund economy and restoring the country’s place in the international community as a responsible contributor to global affairs. The reactions to Japan’s “return” have been both positive and negative. While Abe’s push to implement a robust economic policy termed “Abenomics” has been relatively positively received, even though doubts about its success have increasingly dominated the debates in Japan and beyond, Abe’s actions in the political and security domains have attracted considerable negative attention.² This essay focuses on this latter area and attempts to unpack the implications of the expansion of Japan’s security policy for the Asia-Pacific. This issue is important because Abe’s victory in the December 2014 elections will certainly result in the continued growth of Japanese security policy despite the uncertain growth of the country’s economy under the Abenomics program.

Since starting his second tenure as prime minister in December 2012, Abe and his team have taken significant steps to expand Japanese security policy. For the first time, a National Security Strategy document was published, and it was introduced together with an updated National Defense Program Guidelines that outlined five- and ten-year targets for Japan’s defense policy.³ The strategy in these documents called for the following: augmenting Japanese naval capability through the expansion of the submarine fleet and destroyer-class ships, including additional Aegis destroyers; strengthening Japanese air patrol and surveillance capabilities through the acquisition of additional early warning aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles; strengthening aerial refueling and transport aircraft; boosting the country’s air force capabilities with the F-35A Joint Strike Fighters; and finally creating an amphibious island defense force. To complement Japan’s force modernization, Japan and the United States decided to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation for the first time since 1997. When passed in 2015, the


² Abenomics refers to a three-pronged economic booster plan—monetary easing, massive fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms to boost Japan’s competitiveness.

defense guidelines will strengthen bilateral defense cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for maritime security around Japan; cyberdefense; missile defense; and United Nations peacekeeping. In addition, the revised guidelines call for an expansion of joint military drills and the sharing of military installations in Japan. As revealed in the documents, these measures will be supported by an increase in the Japanese defense budget, reversing an eleven-year trend of decline.

Trends in Japanese domestic politics further complicated events in the security domain. Most provocatively, Abe and his cabinet moved to eliminate constraints that prevented Japan from pursuing an activist security policy, including through the decision to reinterpret the Japanese constitution to permit collective self-defense roles for the Japanese military and the lifting of restrictions on arms exports. The Abe government also displayed worrying tendencies related to the unresolved historical legacy of Japan’s imperial past. Following attempts by the government to revise the Murayama and Kono statements, many concluded that Abe was questioning Japan’s practice of using sex slaves (so-called comfort women) during World War II and perhaps even reversing Japan’s apology for its behavior in the events leading up to the war. The level of suspicion toward Japan reached its peak in December 2013 when Abe became the first prime minister in seven years to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, despite the lack of domestic pressure for such a visit.

The developments in Japan described above were received negatively by Beijing and Seoul. Both capitals have expressed “anger,” labelled Abe’s actions as “dangerous,” and even likened Japan to the villain Voldemort in the *Harry Potter* series. This negative view is characterized by two interrelated points. First, these developments are attributed to Abe. His prime ministership is seen as momentous in causing a marked expansion in the process of normalizing and remilitarizing Japanese security policy. Second, Beijing and Seoul view the normalization and remilitarization of Japanese security policy as a destabilizing factor in the region. This negative interpretation is reflected in the sharp deterioration of Chinese and South Korean attitudes toward

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Japan under Abe. In a Pew Research Center poll published in July 2013, 85% of Chinese and South Koreans viewed Abe unfavorably.\(^6\)

This essay moves beyond the simplistic understanding offered by the two points highlighted above by making the following two key observations. First, though the dramatic shift in Japanese economic policy can be attributed to the Abe government, this is not the case for Japanese security policy. The developments outlined above are not Abe-specific but continue a long-term trajectory that began in the early 1990s as part of efforts to craft a more visible and active security policy practice for Japan. Second, the expansion of Japanese security policy is not dangerous. Instead, these measures could be characterized as a defensive response to the rising instability in Northeast Asia. Although Japan’s stronger defense posture arguably motivates the country’s neighbors to respond in a similar way (a dynamic known as the security dilemma in international relations literature),\(^7\) I argue here that a strong Japan is actually a source of regional stability. Its democratic identity, the resilient pacifism within Japanese society, and the continued robustness of the U.S.-Japan alliance support this conclusion. The essay proceeds by discussing these two observations in detail.

**JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY: NOT “NEW”**

First, the path toward expanding Japanese security policy was not initiated by Abe and his government. Rather, it is part of a long-term trend in Japanese security policy that began at the onset of the post–Cold War period. After the end of the Cold War, the Japanese leadership became cognizant that its minimalist security policy, which entailed a dominant focus on economics and limited involvement in external security affairs, was inappropriate for the new environment. The security policymaking elite took significant strides to implement measures both within and outside the U.S.-Japan alliance that signaled an expansion of national security policy practice. These measures took place alongside continued efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance, in recognition of the central importance of the alliance to Japanese security policy in the post–Cold War period.


\(^7\) The security dilemma is a phenomenon by which the actions of one state to strengthen its defense are seen as threatening by other states. See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
Outside of the U.S.-Japan alliance, an early measure to expand security policy was the incorporation of humanitarian and disaster relief duties, including peacekeeping, into the mandate of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The foundation was laid with the passage of the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (also known as the International Peace Cooperation Law) in 1992 that authorized the deployment of the SDF to UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. Following a successful experience in Cambodia, the SDF were successfully deployed in various peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions, including in Mozambique, Rwanda, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Nepal, Sudan/South Sudan, and Haiti. These missions have increased in frequency, become more complex in terms of duties, and spanned a widening geographic area. Another key focus of the SDF has been Japan’s contribution to the international antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Since 2009, in coordination with other states concerned about the rise of piracy, Japan deployed Maritime SDF destroyers off the coast of Somalia to guard vessels from Japan and other countries. It is important to note that the authorized activities of the SDF during all overseas deployments were attached with limits. Some of the limits have gradually eased over time: for instance, the prohibition on the use of weapons during overseas deployments was revised to allow for self-defense and the protection of those under SDF control. Nevertheless, all missions still come with strict limits on the terms of overseas deployments in accordance with the constitutional limits and the expectations of Japanese society.

Japan has also deepened and widened the responsibilities of the SDF in the context of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The government formalized an expanded role for the SDF within the alliance from the traditional policy of only using the military for self-defense to one that seeks to contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace and even to the resolution of military crises. Though first outlined in the 1995 National Defense Program Outline, this expanded role for the SDF became the centerpiece of the update of the U.S.-Japan alliance following the signing of the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996. The update called for the institutionalization of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation to address regional security challenges of the post–Cold War period.8 In response to this call, the decision was made to revise

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the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The revised guidelines authorized the SDF to provide active rear-area support to U.S. forces not only during a direct attack on Japan (as stipulated by the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) but also during contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region that have an important impact on Japan’s peace and security. This signaled the incorporation of a regional security element into U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

Japanese responsibilities within U.S.-Japan security defense cooperation broadened from a regional to global focus in the first decade of the 2000s. This mainly occurred in the context of the U.S.-led war on terrorism when Japan showed undivided support for the U.S. objectives and operations in both Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Following the Japanese Diet’s passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, the SDF was deployed to the Indian Ocean for the war in Afghanistan to offer noncombat support to the United States and other militaries. It was again deployed to Iraq to provide noncombat logistical and reconstruction support following passage of the Iraqi Reconstruction Law in 2003. The commitment to augment the capability of the bilateral relationship to address diverse global security challenges expanded following these missions. Both Japan and the United States have since pushed for greater integration between their militaries in a range of areas that include policy and operational coordination during periods of both peace and crisis, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and ballistic missile defense cooperation.9 These efforts laid the foundation for the ongoing negotiations to revise the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation—a decision that was made before Abe became prime minister.

The above discussion illustrates that Japanese security policy has experienced incremental expansion since the onset of the post–Cold War period. The SDF’s mandate has expanded from solely focusing on national defense to incorporate international roles, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief activities, and widened to assist the U.S. military in times of both crisis and peace. Japan has supplemented these roles by diversifying its strategic partnerships beyond the United States to also include Australia (2007), India (2008), Vietnam (2010), and the Philippines (2011). In the context of domestic politics, the SDF was regarded as a legitimate tool in the formulation of security policy, as was exemplified

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by the elevation of the Japan Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense in 2007. These long-term efforts laid the foundation for a shift in the normative context for Japanese security policymaking that facilitated expanding the country’s security policy in the post–Cold War period. Abe and his government have benefitted from this shift rather than having been responsible for it.

**JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY: NOT “DANGEROUS”**

The second observation of this essay is that the developments in Japanese security policy described above are not deliberate attempts to destabilize the regional security environment. Instead, they are defensive measures implemented in response to the rising instability and higher levels of threat perception that Japan faces, namely from North Korea and China.

*Japan’s Strategic Concerns*

For Japan, North Korea’s continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is a serious short-term strategic concern. With each test in 2006, 2009, and 2013 (and possible planning for a fourth test at the time of writing), North Korea has consolidated its status as a nuclear state along with incrementally expanding its nuclear weapons yield and even reportedly miniaturizing the bomb. Complementing its nuclear capability, North Korea has made significant advances in its short- and long-range missile arsenal—a capability demonstrated through regular missile tests since 1993. Strategic planners in Tokyo worry about how these capabilities could be combined. The mounting of a miniaturized nuclear warhead on either a short-range or long-range missile targeted at Japan is a source of constant concern.  

North Korea’s repeated acts of belligerence are another source of concern for Tokyo. Japan experienced this first-hand through the series of abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s. In 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il admitted to the abduction of thirteen citizens. Five of them were allowed to return to Japan, but the rest, according to the North Korea authorities, were no longer living. Unsatisfied with this response, the Japanese authorities have repeatedly pressured North Korea to disclose details on the remaining abductees. Although North Korea recently agreed to set up an internal committee to investigate the whereabouts of the

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remaining abductees in exchange for the lifting of sanctions by Japan,11 the lack of cooperation from Pyongyang over the years has reinforced Japan's high level of mistrust and suspicion toward North Korea. This suspicion is further fueled by North Korea's repeated attempts to destabilize the region. Two incidents stand out to illustrate this point—the Cheonan incident on March 26, 2010, when a South Korean naval corvette was allegedly sunk by a North Korean torpedo, resulting in the deaths of 46 South Korean naval servicemen, and the Yeonpyeong incident on November 23, 2010, which involved an exchange of artillery fire between the North and South, resulting in the deaths of 4 South Koreans.

China's rise is another strategic concern for Japan. For a start, the rapid increase in and the lack of transparency surrounding Chinese defense expenditures is an immediate source of concern. Although China is still a distant second after the United States in the list of top spenders on defense, the Chinese defense budget dwarfs Japan's. Based on figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China's defense budget for 2013 was almost $189 billion, whereas Japan's budget was only $50 billion.12 The disparity is also evident from a comparison of the rates of increase in the two countries' defense budgets for the period 2003–13: while Japan's defense budget increased by 5%, China's rose by a staggering 270%.13 This increase has funded the incremental strengthening of Chinese military capability. Notable developments include the addition of an aircraft carrier to facilitate the Chinese navy's ability to project power,14 the construction of stealth fighter jets (J-20 and J-21) to boost China's air power, and the acquisition of an anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD) capability to destroy or disable another nation's military assets from afar through reliance on modern hardware such as anti-ship missiles, modern submarines, and cyber and antisatellite weapons. Though the impact is as yet unclear, the acquisition of these capabilities has raised serious questions regarding Chinese strategic intent and, as a result, has adversely affected regional security.

China's behavior in the region is another source of concern. Abe has warned that “China is attempting to change the status quo by force, rather
than by rule of law.”\textsuperscript{15} Some examples of its aggressive behavior in the East China Sea include the announcement of an air defense identification zone in November 2013, the repeated intrusions by Chinese ships and planes into Japanese-controlled waters and airspace near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the locking of fire-control radar on Japanese military vessels. In the South China Sea, such behavior includes the announcement of regulations requiring all fishing vessels in disputed water to seek approval from the Chinese authorities, the standoff between China and the Philippines near the disputed Scarborough Shoal in 2012, and, more recently, China’s transfer of an oil rig near the disputed Paracel Islands, escalating tension with Vietnam. These actions by China became the focal points of the speeches delivered by the Japanese and U.S. representatives at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. In his keynote speech, Abe called for all states to respect international law, a remark targeted at Chinese behavior in the East and South China Seas without naming China explicitly.\textsuperscript{16} Chuck Hagel, then U.S. secretary of defense, was more direct in condemning China’s assertive actions in his speech at the meeting.\textsuperscript{17} The Chinese representatives at the meeting—Fu Ying, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, and Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of general staff from the People’s Liberation Army—strongly criticized both speeches and accused them of being provocative.\textsuperscript{18} The sharp exchange has been likened to the Cold War when the United States and Soviet Union exchanged similarly strong words and accused each other of raising tensions through provocative actions.\textsuperscript{19}

In response to the uncertain regional security environment described above, Japan implemented a series of security measures that could be regarded as defensive. Against the threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile capability, Japan has deployed an anti-ballistic missile shield in cooperation with the United States—an area in which bilateral cooperation


\textsuperscript{16} Shinzo Abe, “Peace and Prosperity in Asia, Foreversmore, Japan for the Rule of Law, Asia for the Rule of Law, and the Rule of Law for All of Us” (keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2014).

\textsuperscript{17} Chuck Hagel, “The United States’ Contribution to Regional Stability” (address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2014).


is expected to deepen following the passage of the revised defense guidelines in 2015. Against China’s force modernization and increasing assertiveness in the maritime domain, Japan has revised its defense strategy, shifting the focus from the north to the southwest (Nansei) to counter the challenge by China in the East China Sea, and improved its naval, coast guard, and ISR capabilities. In addition, Japan has developed an amphibious capability to ensure that it is able to resist an invasion by foreign forces and even drive out enemy forces that illegally land on Japanese islands, strengthened its defense cooperation with the United States, and launched an extensive diplomatic strategy. The latter is an important component of the Abe government’s strategy that should not be overlooked. The prime minister has visited approximately 50 countries, including all 10 ASEAN states, and has deepened security ties with Russia, Mongolia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and NATO. Even though these policies point toward Japan’s normalization process, Japan’s strengthening of its defense posture and extensive diplomatic strategy are sources of stability to address the fluid nature of the regional balance of power in cooperation with the United States and other countries in East Asia and beyond.

Japan as a Source of Regional Stability

Several reasons support the conclusion that a strong Japan is a source of stability. First, Japan is a democratic state—an identity that was institutionalized in the 1947 Constitution. This U.S.-inspired constitution not only transferred sovereign power from the emperor to Japanese citizens but also introduced a system of governance based on diversified power among various institutions to serve the critical function of check and balance. What this means is that if Japanese political leaders were seen to be guiding Japan down a path toward becoming an aggressive militarist state, both the citizens and various institutions within the political structure would be able to check this development. Moreover, as a democratic state, political leaders are answerable to the general populace in regularly held national elections.

Second, the conclusion that a “normal” Japan is a source of stability is also supported by the country’s resilient pacifism, which, though somewhat weakened in the post–Cold War period, is still a defining feature of Japanese society. The resounding victories of Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in both the lower house (September 2012) and upper house (July 2013) elections were not based on support of Abe’s nationalist agenda but on the belief in his ability to restore economic growth through
much-needed reforms. Similarly, Abe’s victory in the December 2014 elections was not based on the defense and security policies he has pursued since 2012 but rather on his making the Japanese economy the centerpiece of his campaign message. His pledge to restore sustainable economic growth for Japan is seen as crucial to address a range of domestic problems that resonate with the electorate—for example, stagnant wages, limited job opportunities, high public debt, a rapidly aging population, and increasing pension and healthcare costs.

Abe’s decision to make the Japanese economy the central focus of the election, despite the fact that his victory was all but guaranteed by the weak and fragmented opposition, is arguably indicative of the resilient and strong presence of pacifism in Japanese society. In fact, as revealed by opinion polls, Japanese citizens have repeatedly voiced their opposition to statements that are nationalist in nature and inconsistent with a peace-based agenda. When the popular Osaka mayor Toru Hashimoto made a statement justifying the use of comfort women by the Japanese military during World War II, 70% of those polled saw this statement as inappropriate—leading Hashimoto to backtrack from his comments. Even members of the Abe government distanced themselves from Hashimoto in recognition of the negative reaction of the populace.20 When Abe announced the relaxation of the 1967 ban on arms exports in April 2014, a Kyodo News survey showed that 67% of those polled opposed lifting this ban while 26% supported it.21

The response to the Abe government’s attempt to lift the self-imposed ban on collective self-defense is another illustration of the resilient pacifism within Japanese society. Despite possessing the right under the UN charter, Japan was constrained in pursuing measures that would allow it to assist the United States and other friendly nations under armed attack due to an interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution that prohibits the use of force by Japan to settle international disputes. Following a strong push first to revise and then to reinterpret Article 9, Abe’s cabinet passed a reinterpretation of the constitution on July 1, 2014. Though the details have yet to be finalized, this development is widely regarded as an important milestone for Japanese security policy. In analyzing this issue, it is easy to conclude that the push by Abe and his team to remove the constraints on collective self-defense is leading to the unravelling of pacifism within Japan. However, the opposition to this reinterpretation both from various groups within Japanese society and

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from the LDP’s coalition partner the New Komeito—which is a political party backed by a Buddhist group Soka Gakkai—underscores the constraints that the Abe government still faces.

According to a Kyodo News survey, 48.1% of the public opposed allowing the government to legally exercise Japan’s right to collective self-defense and 39% supported it. On the question of changing the interpretation of the constitution to allow collective self-defense missions, an Asahi Shimbun poll showed that 59% disagreed, while only 27% agreed. Even in polls conducted by the more conservative Yomiuri Shimbun that show the majority favoring reinterpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self-defense, limits are attached to the scenarios and roles for the Japanese military. The negotiations between Abe’s LDP and the New Komeito on the issue revealed that the LDP was forced to compromise due to pacifist constraints. For example, the LDP was compelled to back down from pursuing a revision of the constitution and to instead seek a reinterpretation that would allow the SDF to engage in collective self-defense measures. In addition, Abe and his team were forced to accept limits on the SDF’s roles and missions when they declared that the SDF will not conduct missions alongside its allies in combat zones, with the exception of during humanitarian search-and-rescue missions.

The continued resilience of the U.S.-Japan military alliance is a third reason to support the conclusion that the expansion of Japanese security policy would be a source of stability. The United States has served as a key source of regional stability and provider of security guarantees for Japan through the 1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two states (revised in 1960). Buttressed by strong domestic support in Japan, this alliance became a pillar of Japanese security policy throughout the Cold War, and this continues to be the case today (especially outside Okinawa). A key aspect of the treaty was the stationing of U.S. troops in a network of military bases in Japan in exchange for the United States’ security guarantee. This arrangement has anchored the U.S. military presence in the region and

provided a critical source of regional stability by reassuring allies, deterring adversaries, facilitating the United States’ ability to project force abroad when called on to do so, and guaranteeing the freedom of the global commons.²⁷ Apart from their role in guaranteeing the security of Japan and the region, the U.S. military presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance also serve as an important check against any expansion in Japanese security policy that could destabilize the region. This is especially important for reassuring Japan’s neighbors, who harbor a strong sense of suspicion and mistrust of Japan stemming from their colonial history. The United States is cognizant of this dynamic. Thus, even though Washington supports Japan implementing a more activist security policy, it is also in the U.S. interest to ensure that this development contributes positively to regional and global security.

CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis of the impact of the security policy measures undertaken by Prime Minister Abe and his team aims to offer a balanced understanding of Japan’s security policy against the negative analyses, particularly from China and South Korea, which have dominated headlines. The essay makes two key points: First, the security policy developments under Abe are not new or particular to his administration. Instead, these developments are part of a long-term trajectory of Japanese security policy that began with the onset of the post–Cold War period. Second, although Japan has advanced significantly from the minimalist security policy it practiced in the Cold War, these developments are not destabilizing. Instead, they are a source of stability and in fact can be construed as defensive responses to the rising instability in the region. This conclusion that a strong Japan can be a positive feature of the regional and global balance of power is supported by other factors: Japan’s identity as a democratic state, the continued and resilient pacifism that checks moves by nationalists that could steer Japan into causing instability, and Japan’s continued reliance on the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

Nevertheless, Japan must recognize that its image both regionally and internationally has been hurt by seemingly deliberate attempts to destabilize the region. This damage to Japan’s reputation has largely resulted from

unresolved historical issues and actions by Japanese leaders that demonstrate an insincere attitude toward the country’s past behavior. Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, for example, resulted in not only the expected opposition from China and South Korea but also an official statement by the United States expressing “disappointment” and an official statement from Singapore expressing “regret” about the visit. Abe’s initial attempts to question the official sanctioning of the use of comfort women by Japan during wartime and to retract the Kono and Murayama statements of apology were also criticized by Washington. Following the negative reception, Abe decided to retain those statements as they are.

What is important for Japan is to refrain from behavior that escalates the bilateral tensions resulting from the history problem—for example, by avoiding prime ministerial and ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and denials of atrocities inflicted in the past. Japan needs to consistently maintain an official version of history that is sensitive to its neighbors (not just China and South Korea but also Southeast Asian states), recognizing the hardship it imposed during the colonial period and demonstrating remorse for the past. This would show that Japan is serious about addressing the problems resulting from its unresolved historical legacy and can be a trusted partner in security and political matters. The history problem is not merely a domestic issue, as some in Japan would claim. It is a domestic issue that has external repercussions. Until Japan is able to resolve the history discussion at home, the country’s efforts to proactively contribute to the peace of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond will always be perceived with some suspicion. As a result, Japan will be unable to achieve the status of a responsible state.

Along with addressing the history issue head-on, it is important that Japan continue to push for engagement with its immediate neighbors, namely China and South Korea. The resumption of dialogue between Japan and China in November 2014, which included a meeting between Abe and Chinese president Xi Jinping, is a very positive development following a two-year breakdown of relations. One critical avenue for Japan is defense diplomacy. To complement the interaction between the foreign ministries, it is important that Japan, China, and South Korea strengthen defense diplomacy efforts at the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral levels. This would ensure positive long-term relationships between not only the foreign policy establishments but the defense establishments of these countries.
as well. They also need to maintain regular military contacts, including annual exchanges of military and civilian personnel from the defense establishments, naval ship visits, and annual meetings between the top defense leaders. As new generations of diplomats from the three countries strengthen their network of interactions, relations among defense officials must be expanded as well. Doing so will prove critical for reducing tensions originating from the political sphere and building trust between those who would be deployed when conflicting interests arise.

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Russia’s Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines the origins and conduct of Russia’s Asia pivot, analyzes the role Asia plays in Russia’s economic development plans, and assesses Russia’s efforts to balance its strategic partnership with China and its ambitions to be a more autonomous player in Asia.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Recent tensions between Russia and the West highlight Russia’s growing ties with Asia, particularly China. Before the Ukraine crisis, this pivot to Asia had more to do with Moscow’s assessment that Asia will be the major source of future economic growth. Russia seeks Asian, especially Chinese, investment to open up new sources of oil and gas, which will in turn allow it to play a larger role in regional security and diplomacy. Economic ties are the basis for the deepening Sino-Russian partnership, while Beijing has also provided important diplomatic support as the West has sought Russia’s isolation. Yet to avoid excessive dependence on China, Russia has worked to cultivate relations with other Asian powers, especially India, Vietnam, and Japan. This interest in harnessing Asian economic growth gives Moscow and Washington a common interest in regional stability, but one that is unlikely to be fully realized as long as bilateral relations remain focused on Europe and Eurasia.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• While Russia has been pursuing a more revisionist approach in Europe and Eurasia, in the Asia-Pacific it remains largely a status quo power, whose interests in continued economic growth and stability mostly parallel those of the U.S.

• While China is Russia’s most important partner in Asia, the growing disparity between Russian and Chinese power has encouraged Moscow to hedge. Western efforts to isolate Russia risk undermining this balancing act and pushing Russia closer to China.

• Russia’s efforts to play a larger role in Asia create opportunities for the U.S. to seek deeper engagement on issues of mutual interest, including North Korea, nuclear security, economic development, and trade.
E specially since the United States and Europe imposed sanctions on Russia over the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has emphasized the shift of its political and economic priorities to Asia. The crisis has spawned a narrative in some quarters that Russia is turning to China to compensate for its growing isolation from the West.¹ Many Western analysts see the development of this Sino-Russian partnership as the first step toward the emergence of a new revisionist axis aiming to challenge the West's economic and geopolitical dominance.²

The reality though is more complex. While the Ukraine crisis may have given Russia's turn to Asia greater significance, Russian focus on Asia and the Pacific has been growing for several years. Driven less by geopolitical animus toward the West than by an interest in developing its own resources, taking advantage of Asia's growing dynamism, and limiting the potential for regional conflict to jeopardize these aims, Russia's pivot began as a gradual process of economic and political integration with Asia. Yet as the crisis in relations between Russia and the West over Ukraine has accelerated, Moscow has increasingly fallen back on an old habit of seeing Asia in general, and China in particular, as an alternative to dependence on the West.

The major goal of this shift has long been to attract investment for the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East, where a combination of natural riches and sparse populations imperils Moscow's long-term control. Geographic proximity between Russia's vast reserves of oil and gas and China's huge market creates a natural synergy that has seen China become Russia's largest trading partner in recent years. Like Russia, China is also ambivalent about the existing international security order dominated by the United States. The two countries consequently find themselves on the same side of many international disputes. For many Russian nationalists of a conservative bent, China also offers an attractive model of development without democratization and is a potential superpower whose rise will inevitably come at the expense of the United States.

Yet as Moscow well understands, Russia's great-power aspirations are incompatible with excessive dependence on China. Given the disparities between a rapidly growing China and a stagnant Russia, their partnership is an unequal one, and Russia's freedom of action is compromised by being


overly dependent on China. Moreover, by identifying its interests at the global level with those of China, Russia undermines its ability to become a full-fledged Asian power by sowing distrust among the large number of Asian states that see China as a potential threat to their own interests.

For that reason, an important component of Russia’s Asia pivot has been to cultivate ties with Asian powers such as Vietnam and India, in part to balance its relationship with China. More recently Russia has also begun seeking a rapprochement with Japan. Even as these bilateral relationships develop, the perception of Russia as a proxy for China inhibits Moscow’s influence in the region more broadly, including in the multilateral organizations that Russia seeks to engage.3

Russia’s resulting support for maintaining balance and stability in Asia is largely compatible with U.S. interests in the region, as long as the confrontation over Ukraine does not become the basis for a global stand-off on the model of the Cold War. Even as the United States and Russia continue to spar over European and Eurasian security, Washington has an opportunity to pursue limited engagement with Moscow in the Asia-Pacific. Doing so would allow the United States to maintain a working relationship with Russia at a time when tensions over Ukraine threaten to unleash a protracted confrontation in Europe. Such engagement can also help address some of Asia’s major security challenges, including the nuclear stand-off on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the formation of a new regional security architecture, while minimizing the chances of a Sino-Russian strategic axis emerging. Combining containment of Russia in Europe with any degree of engagement in Asia will present a major challenge for U.S. diplomacy. But given the region’s growing significance for the global economy and the potential for geopolitical tensions to undo the Asian economic miracle, Washington has a strong interest in Russia being a constructive player in Asia, regardless of what happens in Europe and Eurasia.

This article is organized as follows:

~ pp. 69–74 describe Russia’s slow pivot toward Asia resulting from its interest in building trade, investment, diplomatic, and security links with the region.

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3 On Moscow’s interest in Asian multilateral organizations, see Sergey Lavrov, “K miru, stabil’nosti i ustoichivomu ekonomicheskomu razvitiyu v Azia-Tikhookeanskom regione” [Toward Peace, Stability and Stable Economic Development in the Asia-Pacific Region], Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 5, 2013 — http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/3a0108443e964002432569e7004199c0/44257b100055e10444257bfb002574f0!OpenDocument.
pp. 74–78 examine specifically the relationship between Russia and China and discuss the obstacles to a deeper partnership between the two states.

pp. 78–84 analyze Russia’s efforts to develop its relationships with other Asian states, notably South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and India, through closer energy and security ties.

pp. 84–87 assess the implications of Russia’s pivot toward Asia for the United States and consider what Washington can do to encourage positive U.S.-Russian interaction in the Asia-Pacific.

RUSSIA PIVOTS TO ASIA, SLOWLY

Russia’s Asia pivot predates the crisis over Ukraine but remains very much a work in progress. Although Russia’s Pacific coastline extends more than 2,800 miles from the Bering Strait to the Sea of Japan, its center of gravity remains in Europe and the post-Soviet states of Eurasia, while the West remains the main prism through which Russia’s elite views the world.4 For much of its post-Soviet history, Russia’s engagement with Asia was mostly instrumental, with Moscow seeing Asia as an idealized alternative to the moralizing, sometimes hypocritical West. While elements of this instrumental approach remain, and indeed have become more prominent since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Russia began increasingly looking to Asia for its own sake in the years before the crisis over Crimea. Russian attention to Asia has grown in particular since the onset of the West’s financial crisis in 2008–9, which reinforced Moscow’s belief that Asia had become the world’s “fastest-developing geopolitical zone, toward which the center of world economy and politics is gradually shifting.”5

According to its official Foreign Policy Concept, Russia’s major objectives in Asia include establishing itself as a key transit country between Europe and Asia, harnessing Asia’s growth to develop Siberia and the Russian Far East, participating in and shaping regional integration processes, and improving the regional security environment.6 Underlying all these aims is Russia’s quest to remain a global power at a time when Asia and the Pacific are increasingly central to the global economy and international security.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Moscow, February 12, 2013) ~ http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/0f474e63a426b7c344257b2e003c945f!OpenDocument.
6 Ibid.
One clear sign of Russia’s growing focus on Asia is the higher diplomatic profile assigned to the region in recent years. Following his return to the Kremlin in May 2012, President Vladimir Putin made official visits to China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Vietnam. He met with Chinese president Xi Jinping five times and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe four times in 2013; Putin and Xi met five times in 2014 as well. In the span of just three weeks in late 2013, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh visited Moscow, while President Putin traveled to Vietnam and South Korea and Russia’s foreign and defense ministers met with their Japanese counterparts for the first time in the 2+2 format.

Russian leaders have also become more visible in regional forums, especially the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), whose annual summit Russia hosted in 2012 in Vladivostok (at a cost of more than $18 billion), but also the East Asia Summit (EAS), which Russia joined in 2010; the ASEAN Regional Forum; the Asian Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus; and the Asia-Europe Meeting. This multilateral engagement comes as Russia has begun championing a more effective and comprehensive regional architecture.9

Trade with Asia is increasing rapidly as well, growing by a factor of more than fifteen in the decade from 2001 to 2011. China has been Russia’s largest single trade partner since 2010, accounting by itself for more than 10% of Russian trade turnover.10 Both bilaterally and through its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, Moscow is pursuing trade agreements with several Asia-Pacific states, including Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Singapore, and New Zealand.

With the opening of the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline in 2009 and of a second phase in 2012, Russia is now able to export more than 30 million tons of oil per year to Asian markets, thereby positioning itself to become a key transit point for oil going to Japan, China, Korea, and elsewhere. Though slow to recognize how liquefied natural gas (LNG) is reshaping global gas markets, Russia is also moving to expand its LNG production facilities on Sakhalin Island and potentially at Vladivostok, both of which lie close to

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Japan and South Korea, the world’s two largest importers of LNG. A 30-year, $400 billion deal for supplying pipeline gas to China signed in May 2014 will allow Russia to unlock new sources of gas in Eastern Siberia while opening up a channel for sales not only to China but, in time, potentially to other Asian customers as well. This expanded energy production is critical not only for the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East but also for Russia’s ability to expand its economic and hence political weight in Asia.

Of course, Russia’s importance to Asia should be kept in perspective. In 2011, Russian trade with the Asian members of APEC totaled just $136.6 billion, a small fraction of APEC’s $16 trillion total trade turnover.¹¹ These raw numbers also conceal a highly unbalanced trading relationship, with Russia exporting primarily energy and other raw materials, and importing finished goods. Natural resources constitute more than 98% of Russian exports to Japan, for instance.¹²

Though Moscow increasingly demands a seat at the table in Asian security forums, its contributions have been limited here too. Its role in the six-party talks on North Korea has been described as “more nuisance than value.”¹³ Russia’s Foreign Ministry calls the EAS “the main platform for strategic dialogue between leaders on key [Asia-Pacific] security and cooperation issues,” yet the Russian president has skipped four consecutive EAS meetings, to the annoyance of other members.¹⁴ Nor does Russia have a full-time ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁵ These limitations reinforce many regional states’ skepticism and concern that, notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary, Russia still sees Asia mainly as a tool for balancing against the West and checking U.S. leadership at the global

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¹⁵ Russia’s ambassador to Indonesia also represents Moscow at ASEAN’s headquarters in Jakarta.
The incautious rhetoric of Russian commentators only reinforces these fears, particularly since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis.\textsuperscript{16}

**RUSSIA’S ASIA STRATEGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIA AND THE FAR EAST**

Russia’s growing attention to Asia was initially driven in large part by a recognition that the underdevelopment of Siberia and the Russian Far East represents a serious financial and security challenge, and that the only realistic solution is to increase trade and investment ties with the dynamic economies of East Asia, something Putin acknowledged as early as 2006.\textsuperscript{17} The Far Eastern and Siberian Federal Districts constitute more than 72\% of Russia’s territory. Yet the Far East only accounts for 5.6\% of the country’s GDP and 4.4\% of its population, while Siberia’s share is 10.6\% of GDP and 13.5\% of the population.\textsuperscript{18} In an increasingly strained fiscal environment, Moscow fears that these regions will remain a long-term drain on the federal budget. It also worries that the paucity of ties to European Russia will lead them to fall increasingly into the economic and political orbit of China, which already invests far more in the Russian Far East and Siberia than does Moscow and which is eagerly snapping up energy, agricultural land, timber, and other resources.\textsuperscript{19}

Increasing production of energy, especially for sale in Asian markets, is the centerpiece of Moscow’s approach to developing Siberia and the Far East. Russia’s *Energy Strategy for the Period up to 2030* calls for increasing the share of liquid hydrocarbon exports to Asia from 8\% of the total in 2010 to 22\%–25\% by 2030 and for increasing natural gas exports from zero to 19\%–20\% of the total.\textsuperscript{20} Output from Russia’s main oil and gas fields in West Siberia is declining, and maintaining current levels of production—much less reaching the goals set by the Energy Strategy—will require significant

\textsuperscript{16} Lo, *Russia’s Eastern Direction*, 10. See also “Ekspert: ucheniya Rossii i Kitaya pomeshayut SShA ‘vershit’ sud’by mira” [Expert: Russia and China’s Exercises Will Interfere with the USA “Controlling the Fate of the World”], RIA Novosti, May 20, 2014 \texttt{http://ria.ru/world/20140520/1008584261.html}.


\textsuperscript{19} Kitaitsy vkladyvayut v Rossiskie regiony bol’she, chem Moskva” [Chinese Invest More in Russian Regions than Moscow Does], *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, February 9, 2011; and David Stanway, “Insight: For Chinese Farmers, a Rare Welcome in Russia’s Far East,” Reuters, December 22, 2013.

investment to ramp up production from new fields in Eastern Siberia and the Far East.\(^\text{21}\)

Talks that lasted over a decade appeared to finally come to fruition with the May 2014 gas deal with China. Worth a reported $400 billion, the agreement calls for developing new gas fields in Eastern Siberia for sale to China through the planned Power of Siberia pipeline. The deal is important largely because it secures Chinese investment (reportedly $20 billion) for developing reserves from the Chayanda and Kovykta gas fields in Eastern Siberia, as well as Chinese financing for construction of the pipeline.\(^\text{22}\) Moscow and Beijing also signed a memorandum of understanding for a second gas pipeline in November 2014, planned to run from Western Siberia to western China, though the economics of this project are still more questionable than those behind the Power of Siberia pipeline.\(^\text{23}\)

The International Energy Agency estimates that Asia’s natural gas use will increase by a factor of more than 2.6 by 2035 (and that China’s will quadruple), while demand in Russia’s traditional European markets will grow only slightly. There is thus clear synergy between Russia’s search for investment capital and East Asia’s search for new volumes, not to mention Europe’s interest in diversifying away from Russian gas in response to the vulnerabilities highlighted by the Ukraine crisis.\(^\text{24}\)

China is the readiest source of capital for developing Siberia and the Far East, but large-scale Chinese investment also creates a dilemma for Moscow. While 1990s-era concerns about massive Chinese migration have not been borne out, the presence of a dynamic China just across the border promotes fears about the gradual erosion of Moscow’s control and the region’s eventual “Finlandization” between Russia and China.\(^\text{25}\) Chinese banks provided more than $25 billion to finance construction of ESPO’s spur to China, in exchange for highly favorable price terms, and Beijing is the main customer for oil from

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\(^{25}\) Sergey Karaganov, “Xi in Russia,” *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 19, 2013 ~ http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Xi-in-Russia-15898. During the Cold War, Finland followed a policy of enforced neutrality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In exchange for staying out of NATO, Finland enjoyed close political and economic ties with the West. Some Russian analysts have developed an analogy between Finland’s special status during the Cold War and the possible future development of a Siberia and the Far East that would maintain close political and economic ties with Russia but be neutralized in strategic terms.
the ESPO pipeline. Similarly, China agreed to provide $25 billion in advance payments to finance construction of the Power of Siberia. In December 2014, Beijing also announced a willingness to provide what amounted to a bailout as Russia’s economy teetered on the brink of crisis (due to a combination of falling oil prices, Western sanctions, and a perception of rising political risk).

While the Sino-Russian gas deal had been in the works for a decade, the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s fear that Western sanctions would limit its access to European markets made consummating the agreement a higher priority for Moscow. Consequently, Russia was forced to accept a lower price than it had sought, spend money from its own National Welfare Fund to inject capital into Gazprom to pay for the construction, and allow the Chinese a stake in Russian state oil company Rosneft. Even before the May 2014 agreement, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had acquired an equity stake in Rosneft, as well as in a planned LNG plant on the Yamal Peninsula from private Russian energy company Novatek. Chinese companies are thus increasingly prominent in the Russian energy sector, even though they lack the technology possessed by Western firms that is needed to expand production from difficult sites in Eastern Siberia, the Far East, and the Arctic. As Western sanctions continue to target Russia’s energy sector, Chinese investment is likely to become even more important to Russia’s energy future, at the cost of locking Russia increasingly into dependence on the Chinese market as Europe seeks to reduce its exposure to Russian gas.

RUSSIA AND CHINA: WHAT KIND OF PARTNERSHIP?

Since the last days of the Soviet Union, relations between Moscow and Beijing have experienced a profound improvement, which Moscow regards

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as one of the great achievements of its post-Soviet Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{30} This rapprochement has allowed Russia to secure its long land border with China, dramatically boosted trade and investment cooperation, and strengthened Russia’s voice on the international stage—including in the UN Security Council, where Russia and China have pursued a common vision of international order based on the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference.\textsuperscript{31} Trade turnover exceeded $90 billion in 2014, and the two sides have pledged to raise this figure to $200 billion by 2020.\textsuperscript{32} Chinese FDI in Russia totaled a relatively modest $4.08 billion in 2013, though that figure represented an increase from $2.53 billion the previous year.\textsuperscript{33}

Especially for Russian officials and thinkers of a more conservative bent, China has become attractive as both a potential counterweight to the United States and a model of a developing country that achieved rapid growth without political liberalization. Engagement with China, in other words, has often had less to do with Russia’s goals in Asia than with its continued ambivalence about the West and interest in creating a more multipolar world order encapsulated in groups like the Group of Twenty (G-20), the BRICS forum, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).\textsuperscript{34} Of course, Russian interest in a less Western-centric world order has grown since the start of the Ukraine crisis, which among its other effects has empowered precisely those anti-Western voices who have long called for steps such as reducing the role of the U.S. dollar in the global economy.

Nevertheless, the Sino-Russian partnership lacks trust and conceals tensions that complicate the potential emergence of a strategic axis between

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\textsuperscript{31} These principles were reinforced by Chinese leader Xi Jinping during his March 2013 visit to Russia. See “Xi Jinping Calls for the Building of New Type of International Relations with Win-Win Cooperation at the Core in a Speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 23, 2013 ~ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/sxpcf1_665694/t1024781.shtml.


Moscow and Beijing. The potential for Chinese investment to reorient Siberia and the Far East away from Moscow is one significant concern. So too is China's rapid penetration of post-Soviet Central Asia, whose own hydrocarbon riches have allowed Beijing to drive a hard bargain with Moscow over gas sales. While Russia tolerates Central Asian gas going to China (where it does not compete with Russian sales in Europe), the resulting economic and political reorientation of post-Soviet Central Asia is a source of concern. Even with the agreement to build the Power of Siberia pipeline, China continues boosting its supplies of Central Asian gas, which are now planned to reach 65 billion cubic meters as early as 2016. The availability of cheap Central Asian gas was a principal reason Beijing could hold out for a lower price in its gas talks with Moscow.

Russia has also blocked Chinese initiatives to create a development bank and free trade zone under the auspices of the SCO because of fears that Beijing would dominate them—though Moscow has signaled a new openness recently, in part because of Western sanctions. In July 2014, Russia did agree to set up a BRICS development bank, where the capitalization will be equally shared among the five stakeholders. Putin’s plans to develop a Eurasian Union also appeared driven in part by a desire to maintain Russia’s leading role in the post-Soviet space by imposing barriers to economic relations between its post-Soviet neighbors and China, though both Putin and Xi have declared that the Eurasian Union is compatible with China’s vision of a new Silk Road economic belt.

Despite their reluctance to say so publicly, many Russian officials also see China’s growing power and assertiveness as a potential security threat, notwithstanding the growing confrontation between Russia and the West. Partially due to Moscow’s concerns about arming a potential rival, Russian weapons sales to China plummeted from a peak of more than $3 billion in

2005 to less than $700 million in 2012. While the two sides signed new agreements amid the Ukraine crisis, these had been under negotiation for some time and covered only the S-400 system, which China would be unlikely to deploy against Russia, and Su-35 fighter planes, which Beijing regards mostly as a bridge capability until the rollout of its own fifth-generation fighter at the end of the decade.

For several years, some Russian officers have even been speaking of China as a possible military threat. In 2010 and again in 2013, Russia held large-scale maneuvers on its own territory, testing the ability of its military to repel a foe designed to look much like the People’s Liberation Army. Russia’s reluctance to reduce its holdings of nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons or to negotiate another strategic arms reduction agreement with the United States following the ratification of the New START Treaty is also due in part to concerns about China’s military potential.

Similarly, the size and scope of Sino-Russian military exercises has declined for many years even as Russia pursues opportunities to train with militaries from China’s Asia-Pacific rivals. For example, the annual Sino-Russian Peace Mission exercises, held under the auspices of the SCO, have become progressively smaller in recent years. In 2013, for example, only 1,200 troops took part, compared with more than 10,000 eight years earlier. Peace Mission 2014 was larger but primarily reflected Chinese concerns. Held in Inner Mongolia with mostly Chinese forces, the exercise focused on separatist threats along China’s western periphery rather than on the U.S.-backed “color revolutions” that Russia fears.

In addition, Moscow insisted that bilateral naval exercises held with China in July 2013 stay confined to Russian territorial waters. This decision apparently was motivated by alarm at recent Chinese incursions into the Sea...
of Okhotsk, as well as by a desire to improve relations with Northeast and Southeast Asian states that themselves have maritime territorial disputes with China. In 2014, Russia moved these bilateral exercises to the Mediterranean, far away from China’s wary neighbors. Meanwhile, in 2012 Russia participated for the first time in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises with the United States and its partners from both sides of the Pacific, and in late 2013 the Russian navy held search and rescue exercises with Japan. While the Russian and Chinese navies held joint exercises in the East China Sea in May 2014 (near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that are the subject of a Sino-Japanese dispute) following Japan’s decision to participate in group of seven (G-7) sanctions over Crimea, Moscow signaled to Tokyo through diplomatic channels that it had little choice, given the timing and Chinese pressure, but remains eager to improve relations.

To some extent, the Ukraine crisis appears to have encouraged Moscow to swallow its concerns about Chinese power out of a real fear that Western sanctions, coupled with efforts by the European Union to reduce dependence on Russian energy, could deepen Russia’s isolation. The conclusion of the long-stalled Sino-Russian gas deal, agreements to sell China advanced weapons such as the S-400 air defense system, currency swap agreements, and joint naval exercises in the volatile East China Sea are all cases of Moscow overcoming long-standing concerns about its own vulnerability to Chinese power in order to sign off on deals that may prove to be damaging to Russian interests in the longer term. Whether the potential for Russia’s enduring alienation from the West as a result of the Ukraine crisis leads Moscow to more thoroughly embrace Beijing remains to be seen, but such an embrace would have significant costs for Russia, especially in terms of the strategic independence that it has long emphasized as the centerpiece of its foreign policy.

NEW PARTNERS FOR A NEW ERA

Concerns in Moscow that Chinese economic power will pull the Russian Far East out of its orbit have led Russia to prioritize diversifying the

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sources of investment in its energy sector—even as it rushed to complete its gas deal with Beijing. Moscow is also seeking both to deepen security ties with traditional partners such as Vietnam and India and to develop relationships with other Asian powers, including Japan. Notably, all these states have territorial disputes with China and worry about the potential for Chinese hegemony in Asia.

Because of their proximity to the Russian Far East, Japan and South Korea are natural markets for Russian LNG, especially with Japan’s decision to shut down its nuclear power plants following the 2011 Fukushima disaster. Russia’s market share in both countries is currently small—constituting 9.6% of Japan’s total gas consumption and around 6% of South Korea’s—because Russia long prioritized supplying the European market. For now, Russia has only a single operational LNG plant, which is part of the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project. 47

Helped by recent legislation to relax Gazprom’s export monopoly, Moscow, Seoul, and Tokyo would all like to increase production of Russian LNG for sale in Asia, by both expanding Sakhalin-2 and building new LNG plants, though sanctions and the massive gas deal with Beijing complicate these aspirations. Novatek, which owns a majority stake in the Yamal LNG project in Russia’s far north, is looking to bring in Japanese (as well as Indian and South Korean) investment after selling part of its stake to CNPC in 2013. 48 Rosneft agreed in June 2013 to sell Japan 2.5 million tons of LNG from a planned LNG plant at Sakhalin-1, while Gazprom is courting Japanese investment for another new LNG plant at Vladivostok. However, Japan questions the plant’s financial viability, and its participation in the G-7 sanctions has put this project on hold for the time being. 49 Meanwhile, the May 2014 Sino-Russian gas deal could over the longer term facilitate the development of Russia’s LNG capacity, since the promised Chinese investment will help unlock the new fields in Eastern Siberia. If supplies are sufficient and sanctions do not interfere, these fields could eventually supply LNG plants in the Far East. In the short to medium term, though, the

need to fulfill Gazprom’s contracts with China will leave less gas available for conversion to LNG and could scare away potential investors.\(^{50}\)

Perhaps more important for Russia’s role in shaping the regional balance of power is the web of security relationships the country is developing across Asia. Moscow continues expanding military and technical cooperation with other important Asian powers, particularly India and Vietnam, which also view China’s rise as destabilizing. Along with Bangladesh, Vietnam and India are the main Asian customers for Russia’s nuclear power industry. Both are also increasing their already significant purchases of Russian armaments, and Russia is seeking to expand weapons sales to new markets in the region, including Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand, and (to India’s frustration) Pakistan.\(^{51}\)

Already, India accounts for 31% of Russia’s arms exports, and 75% of India’s arms imports come from Russia.\(^{52}\) Not only is the volume of Russian military sales to India rising, but Russia is co-developing advanced systems with India and providing New Delhi with capabilities that Moscow continues to withhold from Beijing. The BrahMos joint venture is producing a new ultrafast cruise missile capable of sea, air, or land launch.\(^{53}\) Russia’s Sukhoi and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) are also collaborating to manufacture the Su-30MKI fighter plane (which is reportedly more advanced than the Su-30MKK model being sold to China) and to design a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.\(^{54}\) These ties leave Moscow tilting toward New Delhi’s camp in its strategic confrontation with Beijing and serve as a platform for the more extensive political and security ties both partners are seeking to build—even if India is dissatisfied with Russia’s decision to begin

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\(^{50}\) See Gilbert Rozman, “The Russian Pivot to Asia,” Asan Forum, December 1, 2014.


selling weapons to Pakistan (likely in response to India's efforts to diversify suppliers). Russia is also seeking to bring India into the SCO, mainly to dilute Chinese influence in the group.

Vietnam is another longtime partner with which Russia is trying to boost relations. Gazprom and Rosneft both have concessions for gas exploration off Vietnam's coast in the South China Sea. These concessions give Russia a de facto stake in the dispute between Vietnam (and by extension, other Southeast Asian states) and China over maritime borders. Despite pressure from Beijing, Russia has refused to pull out of these production agreements. During Putin's November 2013 visit to Hanoi, several Russian firms signed deals for new projects, including Rosneft's expansion of its stake in Vietnam's offshore gas blocks and Gazprom Neft's acquisition of a stake in Vietnam's largest oil refinery, while in 2014 Hanoi agreed to purchase oil from Russia's ESPO pipeline.

Like India, Vietnam is also a major purchaser of Russian weaponry, especially naval platforms that allow it to balance China's growing strength in the South China Sea. In 2009, Hanoi agreed to pay $2 billion for six Kilo-class attack submarines, which feature advanced stealth technology that makes them virtually invisible to sonar. Just since 2012, Vietnam has contracted to purchase advanced frigates and attack boats, as well as additional Su-30 fighter planes and coastal defense missile batteries. In November 2014, Moscow and Hanoi signed an agreement for Russian warships to resume port visits to Cam Ranh Bay naval base, which Russia leased from Vietnam until 2002, while Putin and Vietnamese president Truong Tan Sang signed a


defense cooperation agreement in November 2013 that lays a foundation for joint weapons production.\(^6^0\)

Ties with Vietnam and India are based on relationships dating to the Soviet era, but concern about China is also behind a more significant rapprochement between Russia and Japan—notwithstanding the unresolved territorial dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, which were captured by the Soviet Union in the final days of World War II. Although Russia has long seen Japan as a promising source of investment, as well as a market for hydrocarbon exports, both economic cooperation and security cooperation have lagged. Economic relations have underperformed largely because of Japanese concerns about the Russian investment climate, whereas security cooperation has foundered as a result of the territorial disputes. Japan’s participation in the G-7’s sanctions over the Ukraine conflict has created additional complications. Since Putin’s return to the Kremlin in May 2012, however, Moscow has prioritized improving relations with Tokyo as it seeks trade and investment in the Far East and security on its Asian flank. At the same time, Japan has sought Russian support not only for its search for new energy supplies but also in the context of its strategic rivalry with China.\(^6^1\)

With respect to economic cooperation, during Abe’s April 2013 visit to Moscow, the first by a Japanese leader in a decade, the two sides agreed to channel investment into high-priority sectors of the Russian economy, especially in Siberia and the Far East.\(^6^2\) Abe then traveled to Russia a second time for the opening of the Sochi Winter Olympics in February 2014, even as most Western leaders boycotted the games. Despite Japan’s participation in the G-7’s sanctions, Moscow continues its efforts to cultivate economic ties with Tokyo.\(^6^3\) Speaker of the State Duma and Putin ally Sergey Naryshkin visited Tokyo in early June 2014, and discussions continue about a possible


2015 Putin visit, notwithstanding Japan’s participation in sanctions and Russia’s decision to hold naval maneuvers around the disputed islands.\(^6^4\)

On the security front, Russia and Japan are increasingly concerned about the potential for conflict in East Asia. Both sides have devoted new attention to resolving their territorial dispute, culminating in an agreement reached during Abe’s April 2013 visit to accelerate efforts to reach a peace treaty to settle the Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories dispute and formally end hostilities from World War II.\(^6^5\) These talks have continued notwithstanding the fallout over the Ukraine crisis.\(^6^6\)

While prospects for such a treaty are uncertain, both sides are pursuing enhanced security cooperation even without a treaty. During the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok, for example, Russia and Japan agreed to boost cooperation against maritime poaching and in the Arctic.\(^6^7\) At the 2+2 meeting in November 2013, the two sides reached further agreements on deepening cooperation between their respective maritime staffs on counterterrorism and counterpiracy. Moscow is likewise mulling joint search-and-rescue drills with Japanese naval forces in the Sea of Okhotsk and Arctic Ocean.\(^6^8\) Discussions on more far-reaching security cooperation have also begun, and have raised the possibility of an expanded Russian role in East Asian groupings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the EAS.\(^6^9\) Even without a resolution to the territorial dispute, such Russo-Japanese security cooperation reflects the new alignments developing in East Asia in response to what many states see as a more uncertain strategic landscape, even though Japan’s alliance with the United States represents an obstacle insofar as Russia comes to view its Asia pivot as a means of checking U.S. power.

As its economic footprint in Asia grows, Russia is being forced to confront the range of security challenges that give Asia of the early 21st century an

\(^{6^4}\) “Abe, Putin Agree to Prepare for Japan Visit Next Year,” Japan Times, November 10, 2014.


\(^{6^7}\) “Japan-Russia Summit Meeting on the Occasion of APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Vladivostok (Overview),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), September 8, 2012 ～ http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ffpu/2012/09/0908-03.html. Regarding cooperation in the Arctic, Russia supported Japan’s presence as an observer in the Arctic Council, after trying and failing to prevent China’s inclusion.

\(^{6^8}\) Hyodo, “Japan-Russia Relations.”

uncomfortable resemblance to Europe of the early 20th century. For example, Russia has an obvious interest in limiting instability on the Korean Peninsula, as it both shares a border with North Korea and is actively pursuing greater trade with and investment from South Korea. Much of the oil and gas exported by sea from the Russian Far East, meanwhile, must cross the East China Sea, and energy deals with Vietnam give Russia an interest in the South China Sea as well. Russia is therefore largely a status quo power in Asia, in contrast with Europe and Eurasia, where the Ukraine crisis has highlighted Moscow’s revisionist ambitions. Yet its eagerness to embrace China in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis risks dragging Russia into China’s own efforts at revisionism in Asia, thereby damaging ties with states like Vietnam and Japan while leaving Moscow ever more bound to Beijing. Maintaining this balance between a globally oriented partnership with China and ambitions to maintain a stable security environment in Asia remains the major dilemma for Russian policy in the region.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

As the United States seeks to strengthen regional alliances and ties with emerging partners like Vietnam and India, support effective regional institutions, and boost trade, investment, and growth, it will increasingly need to take account of Russia as a factor in Asian diplomacy. Notwithstanding the crisis in relations precipitated by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, U.S. and Russian interests in Asia continue to coincide more than in other parts of the world. Sustaining any degree of bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation over the longer term will likely require shifting the focus of the relationship away from Europe and Eurasia to areas where the two sides’ interests continue to coincide, including the Asia-Pacific.

What then would U.S. engagement of Russia in Asia look like? First, it would require something of a conceptual leap. Partially owing to the organizational structure of the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council staff, the United States’ Asia strategy is conducted on an almost entirely separate track from its relationship with Russia,

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Apart from the escalating crisis over Ukraine, China will be the biggest obstacle to U.S.-Russian cooperation in Asia. Western efforts to isolate Russia risk undermining Moscow’s balancing act and pushing the country closer to China. To be sure, Moscow wants to avoid finding itself in a position where it is forced to choose between Washington and Beijing.\footnote{“Russia’s Interests in the Context of Asia-Pacific Region Security and Development,” Russian International Affairs Council, Report, no. 1, 2012, 18.} More and more Russian elites, however, have come to believe that the West itself has forced Moscow to choose Beijing by seeking to isolate and contain Russia over the Ukraine crisis. While Sino-Russian energy cooperation is not necessarily problematic from the perspective of the United States, deeper strategic cooperation is potentially troubling—for instance, if increased Russian arms sales boost China’s capacity to deter U.S. intervention in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait.\footnote{For a sober assessment of the risks, see Andrew Small, “Ukraine, Russia, and the China Option: The Geostategic Risks Facing Western Policy,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, Europe Policy Paper, no. 2, 2014.}

The major challenge for the United States will be to segment its efforts to push back against Russian expansionism in Europe and Eurasia while pursuing limited engagement with Russia in Asia. Given the role China plays in Russia’s Asia strategy, the United States would be wise to focus on areas of trilateral interest, which has the benefit of limiting Moscow’s ability to play Washington and Beijing off one another. One obvious area for trilateral cooperation is nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia would like greater transparency about China’s arsenal, and all three powers would benefit from discussions about strategic stability, including U.S. plans for missile defense in Asia. Another area of clear trilateral interest is security in Afghanistan and Central Asia following the drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014.
Trilateral U.S.-Russian-Chinese cooperation also offers the best prospects for coping with the North Korean nuclear challenge. The United States could be open in theory to Russian ideas for trans-Korean infrastructure (railways and pipelines) as a carrot to dangle in front of Pyongyang in the event of a final nuclear deal. Looking to expand its opportunities for transcontinental trade, South Korea has also expressed interest in this prospect.\textsuperscript{75}

The United States should also keep open the possibility of Russia someday joining the nascent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is Washington’s effort to create a deep, high-quality Asia-Pacific trade bloc that rationalizes the existing “spaghetti bowl” of subregional agreements. Although Russia remains far from meeting the TPP’s membership criteria, this possibility is no more far-fetched than Chinese membership, to which the United States has confirmed it is open. Russia in any case is already pursuing trade deals with TPP members New Zealand and Vietnam. Implementing the TPP’s liberalizing criteria, moreover, would help with Moscow’s push to attract foreign investment to Siberia and the Far East, while Russian interest would reinforce Washington’s effort to convince other regional players to throw in their lot with the TPP. Sanctions and Russia’s turn inward make this prospect more remote, but it remains important for Washington to keep the door open to Russia, as well as China, as it seeks to build a more liberal and open Asia-Pacific economic order.

While resolving the lingering dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories will ultimately fall to Moscow and Tokyo, Washington can also help create a conducive environment for negotiations and encourage flexibility on the part of its Japanese ally. At the very least, the United States should be more indulgent of Japan’s efforts to cultivate Moscow as a partner in spite of the press to impose sanctions over Russian actions in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{76} For the United States, a lasting Russo-Japanese rapprochement that contributes to a more fluid Asian strategic balance should be a higher priority than gaining Tokyo’s assent for sanctions.

Russia has been understandably reluctant to wade into either the South China Sea or the East China Sea disputes. Nevertheless, Gazprom’s exploration agreements with Vietnam and Russia’s reliance on maritime transit for energy sales in Asia, along with its interest in expanding trade through the Northern

\textsuperscript{75} Simon Mundy, “Russia–South Korea Pipeline Talks Revived,” \textit{Financial Times}, October 16, 2013. See also “Ye v raziiskaya integratsiya po-koreiski” [Eurasian Integration Korean Style], \textit{Kommersant}, June 23, 2014.

Sea Route in the Arctic, mean that Russia is concerned with protecting freedom of navigation. The United States would be wise to cultivate this shared interest, especially in multilateral settings where tensions over Ukraine are likely to be less prominent.

Thanks in part to Russia’s own historical ambivalence about Asia, Washington is accustomed to seeing Russia primarily as a European and Eurasian state, not as an Asian or, as some Russian strategists have described it, a “Euro-Pacific” power. Since late 2013, Europe and Eurasia have been focal points for a level of U.S.-Russian confrontation unseen since the Cold War. These tensions have spilled over into Asia as well, with Russia looking to China to ease the strategic isolation the United States is thrusting upon it. Once immediate passions cool, though, Russia is likely to recognize the need to adopt a wider view of its interests and role in Asia. When it does, the United States should be ready to pursue limited engagement as a means of shaping Russia’s involvement in Asia and creating a platform for managing the tensions emerging from the Ukraine crisis.

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Indian Foreign Policy Responds to the U.S. Pivot

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Keywords: India; United States; China; U.S. Pivot; Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines India’s foreign policy response to the U.S. pivot toward Asia and investigates New Delhi’s strategy for dealing with the changing balance of power in the region.

MAIN ARGUMENT

India has emerged as an important constituent of the U.S. strategy of pivoting toward the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at balancing China’s growing power. For India, too, China’s growing military and economic prowess poses a strategic challenge. Yet rather than endorse the pivot, Indian foreign policy shows signs of pursuing a hedging strategy in three distinct realms. First, New Delhi is recalibrating its strategic closeness with the U.S., evident in the drift in the U.S.-India defense relationship over the last few years. Second, rather than balancing China through external help, New Delhi has been trying to normalize its relationship with Beijing, without much apparent success. Third, India is encouraging a more localized form of balancing by increasing its defense partnerships with other regional powers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• The U.S. must be consistent in signaling its commitment and strategy in the Indo-Pacific to help regional powers, including India, shed their reluctance to commit to shaping a more stable regional balance of power.

• The U.S. should encourage greater regional cooperation by pushing for a more substantive Indian presence in the economic and security organizations in East and Southeast Asia. A local balance of power would not only decrease the financial and military burden on the U.S. but also allow regional powers to stand up to Beijing without the U.S. being accused of trying to contain China.

• To fully confront the implications of China’s rise and the U.S.’s relative decline in the region, India needs to augment its strategic partnership with the U.S. while increasing its engagement with Asia’s regional powers. In particular, New Delhi needs to rid itself of its continuing ambivalence about strong defense and security cooperation with Washington.
Facing an assertive China in the Asia-Pacific, President Barack Obama announced in late 2011 his strategy of pivoting toward the region. India has emerged as an important constituent of this new policy framework. This article argues that the Indian foreign policy response to U.S. “strategic rebalancing” has taken the form of strategic hedging.

Hedging has made inroads into India’s foreign policy for two main reasons. First, during the early years of Obama’s presidency, Indian foreign policy elites viewed U.S. outreach to Beijing as a grand accommodation. This perception of a possible Washington-Beijing rapprochement made India feel both vulnerable and ignored. Therefore, even after the more robust pivot strategy was announced in late 2011, doubts about its credibility continued to pervade Indian perceptions. Concerns that the United States’ continuing economic woes and military sequestration will render the pivot unsustainable have only reaffirmed India’s reluctance. Reinforcing such skepticism are the multiple crises in the Middle East and Europe that seem to have once again taken the United States’ focus away from Asia, as was evident in Obama’s speech at West Point in January 2014, where uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to Asia was conspicuous by the absence of any mention of the pivot. In a period where the United States is struggling to find resources to support its foreign and military commitments, such distractions are bound to adversely affect the efficiency of the pivot strategy. Second, the Indian sense of vulnerability has also brought to the fore the country’s default foreign policy posture of nonalignment. Strategic confusion in U.S. foreign policy has strengthened the hands of those in India who seek greater distance from the United States, thereby renewing a debate on the nature and depth of the interactions New Delhi desires with Washington given the challenge posed by a rising China. India’s hedging vis-à-vis the U.S. pivot is a reflection of the unsettled nature of this debate.

India’s approach to the new U.S. strategy is therefore punctuated by reluctance and caution, aiming to avoid any entrapment in the great-power tussle between Beijing and Washington. This hedging strategy is manifest in three distinct realms. First, India has been recalibrating its strategic closeness with the United States, which is evident in the drift in the U.S.-India defense relationship over the last few years. Second, rather than balancing China through external help, New Delhi has attempted to normalize its relationship with Beijing by making a substantive change in ground realities. Third, India has pursued a localized form of balancing by increasing defense partnerships with other regional powers.
This article is organized as follows:

〜 pp. 92–96 discuss the U.S. pivot and examine India’s important role in this strategy, highlighting opportunities for Indian foreign policy.

〜 pp. 96–110 explicate India’s hedging strategy by examining the country’s stagnating relationship with the United States, attempts at stabilizing relations with China, and efforts to build regional partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.

〜 pp. 111–14 consider the implications of this hedging strategy and chart out scenarios under which India may opt to be a more active participant in the U.S. rebalancing strategy.

### The Pivot as an Opportunity for India

**The U.S. Pivot and India’s Projected Role**

To arrest China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the Asia-Pacific and the perception of the United States’ relative decline, in November 2011 President Obama announced the U.S. strategy of pivoting toward Asia. This strategy represented “a simultaneous attempt to warn China away from using heavy-handed tactics against its neighbors and provide confidence to other Asia-Pacific countries that want to resist pressure from Beijing now and in the future.” The pivot, in essence, is primarily an effort to address the regional insecurity engendered by China’s rising military power and aggressive intentions.

Two elements define the new U.S. strategy. First is the reallocation of U.S. military resources to Asia. During his visit to Australia in November 2011, Obama announced the formation of a new marine base in North Australia, the first among many steps in the U.S. recalibration of its military resources to the Asia-Pacific. In January 2012 the Pentagon released a vision document, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, reiterating the U.S. military commitment to the region. The Department of Defense subsequently announced that 60% of U.S. naval assets will be shifted to the Pacific Command, a realignment that is still underway. The military transformation continued with U.S. secretary of defense Chuck Hagel

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declaring in June 2013 that 60% of U.S. Air Force assets would also be located in the region. In addition, to satisfy anxieties among its alliance partners, the United States increased its military commitments in South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore. The United States and Japan have also taken steps to strengthen their military alliance. In April 2014, Obama visited a number of key countries in the Asia-Pacific to underscore Washington’s continued commitment to the policy of strategic rebalancing. In Tokyo, for example, Obama categorically stated that the contentious Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) fall under the ambit of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. He also signed a ten-year defense pact in Manila, paving the way for a greater U.S. military presence in the Philippines.

Second, the pivot strategy is premised on the need to cultivate strategic partners in the region in order to minimize the impact of cuts to the defense budget. Owing to its large debt burden, the United States is going through a period of austerity. The impact can be seen in U.S. military spending: 2012 saw the greatest decline in the country’s military budget since the end of the Cold War. Cuts in defense outlays have ranged from $450 billion to $1 trillion over a period of ten years. In fact, the current economic plan of the Obama administration underscores that U.S. spending on defense may see a continuous decrease to a level of only 2.3% by 2020. This trend was evident in the defense cuts announced in February 2014, which included cuts both to force structures, such as littoral combat ships in the navy, and to troop strength in the army. Faced with a parlous economic situation and a growing domestic divide on the United States’ role in the world, the Obama administration has attempted to cultivate strategic partners to help take up the responsibility of maintaining regional stability. As a consequence, India is an important part of the new U.S. strategic posture.

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From the very initiation of the rebalancing strategy, the Obama administration has underscored India’s important role in the framework. In a widely read and disseminated article in *Foreign Policy*, Hillary Clinton emphasized the role that India could play in the new power dynamics.\(^\text{11}\) By rechristening the “Asia-Pacific” as the “Indo-Pacific,” she highlighted the strategic significance of both the Indian Ocean and India in the United States’ new approach to Asia.\(^\text{12}\) India was also the only country in the Asia-Pacific that was explicitly identified as a valuable strategic partner in the January 2012 Pentagon report, which states that “the United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”\(^\text{13}\) During his visit to New Delhi in June 2012, former secretary of defense Leon Panetta described the India-U.S. defense partnership as a linchpin of the United States’ rebalancing strategy and requested that New Delhi play a bigger role in the security of the Asia-Pacific.\(^\text{14}\) For Washington, India is an important strategic choice for several reasons: it is the only state in Asia comparable to China in geography and demography, has demonstrated strong economic growth in the 21st century, and holds democratic and liberal values.\(^\text{15}\)

U.S. expectations for relations have been built on the decade-old strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington. The Indo-U.S. defense relationship, in particular, saw unprecedented progress during the presidency of George W. Bush. When Bush repealed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, India supported U.S. missile defense plans. It even offered military bases to the United States to use in the war in Afghanistan. The Indian Navy escorted U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean, relieving the U.S. Navy from its constabulary services in the region during the initial U.S. campaign in Afghanistan.\(^\text{16}\) After the fall of Saddam Hussein, India considered sending troops to Iraq—not

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\(^\text{12}\) Though the concept of the Indo-Pacific was previously highlighted by Shinzo Abe in his 2007 address to the Indian Parliament, this was the first time the argument was made by a high-level U.S. official. See Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 22, 2007; http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.


under the United Nations but alongside the United States. In 2004, both nations agreed on a new framework for defense cooperation; in 2005, they signed a maritime cooperation agreement; and by 2007, India had started purchasing major defense equipment such as amphibious ships, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and heavy transport aircraft from the United States. This process culminated in the landmark Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear energy pact, helping India achieve a major strategic goal: de facto acceptance of India's status as a nuclear weapons state. With the pivot, the Obama administration's approach toward India appeared to move closer to the position taken by the Bush administration.

**India and the Pivot: Balancing China**

For India, balancing China’s growing economic and military power has been a strategic priority given serious differences between New Delhi and Beijing over a number of issues. The Sino-Indian border dispute continues to fester. Negotiations for the resolution of the border dispute started in 1981, and in 2003 India and China appointed special representatives to speed up the process, but there has been little substantive progress. Recent years have seen border turmoil escalate. In April 2013 a contingent of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) camped inside Indian territory for close to a month, leading to a major diplomatic crisis. In addition, the China-Pakistan “axis” has always been a source of great consternation for New Delhi, and close ties between Islamabad and Beijing have only grown stronger in recent years. Contrary to India's position, China considers Kashmir a disputed territory and has deployed the PLA to build strategic infrastructure in parts of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. Nuclear commerce between Pakistan and China is increasing and so is the military component of their partnership. The United States' relative decline and the prospective withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan has only tightened the strategic embrace between these two “all-weather friends.” India also remains wary of China's intentions in the Indian Ocean region. China's presence in the region has increased dramatically, as is evident in the multiple port facilities it has developed across the region. Since 2009, a PLA Navy flotilla has maintained a constant presence in the Indian Ocean for antipiracy

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operations, indicating that China has both the capacity and will to maintain its presence in the region.

Notwithstanding its intentions, China’s rapid rise and growing military profile have suddenly transformed the threat matrix for India. Though insecurity vis-à-vis China has incentivized India to build up its military, these measures are far from adequate. India’s defense budgets are not even one-third of China’s. From artillery guns for the army to fighter planes for the air force and submarines for the navy, defense procurement in India has made halting progress mainly due to widespread corruption, inter-ministerial wrangling between the Ministries of Defence and Finance, and the lack of accountability on the part of indigenous defense manufacturers. Work on defense infrastructure along the frontier has gained pace in recent years, but India’s border management remains disappointing, especially compared with what China has been able to accomplish in Tibet. With its Agni-V missile, India can now target Beijing, thereby augmenting its deterrence potential. But in the India-China dyad, given New Delhi’s doctrine of no first use, strategic deterrence hardly obviates the threat of a limited conventional war.

Due to its smaller economy and lack of strategy, India’s capability to balance China alone has always been doubtful. In fact, a former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Indian Armed Forces has gone on record suggesting that India is no match for China’s military power. Therefore, in order to manage China’s growing military capability and the threat it poses to India’s territorial integrity as well as to its influence in the Asia-Pacific, external balancing may be the only resort available to New Delhi. Given the United States’ focus on developing a strategic partnership with India to counterbalance China’s rise, the U.S. pivot represents an excellent opportunity for India. Yet India’s response has been far from welcoming.

AS THE UNITED STATES PIVOTS, INDIA HEDGES

India’s Strategic Uncertainty

Rebuffing U.S. overtures, India has declined to be a linchpin of the pivot, signaling a more cautious approach toward the new U.S. strategy. The

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impression of decreasing U.S. influence in the contemporary global order and uncertainty around the pivot are largely responsible for India’s reluctance, as was made clear by former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh:

If you survey the global strategic environment over the past decade, it would not escape your notice that, just as the economic pendulum is shifting inexorably from west to east, so is the strategic focus, as exemplified by the increasing contestation in the seas to our east and related “pivot” or “rebalancing” by the U.S. in this area. This to my mind is a development fraught with uncertainty [emphasis added].

Strategic uncertainty, Singh is suggesting, has left India with few options other than to hedge on both sides of the current power transition in Asia. The impression made by strategic uncertainty on Indian thinking can be gleaned from his comments a few months after the pivot was announced. Speaking to a South Korean newspaper on the eve of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Singh declared that India’s “aim is to have cooperative ties with both China and the USA. It is not zero-sum game. I do not think that large and dynamic countries like China can be contained.” India, in other words, remains averse to getting boxed in any of Asia’s competing power centers. New Delhi prefers to hedge, especially given that India’s cultivation of diversified relations with the major powers would make China more willing to assuage Indian concerns about Chinese intentions.

This understanding is also prevalent in the Indian strategic community. The most prominent articulation of this approach was a report titled “NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century,” authored by a group of Indian strategic thinkers and academics in 2012 with some participation from functionaries of the Indian government. This report argues that China is a “significant foreign policy and security challenge for India.” According to the authors, India’s strategy to counter the China conundrum should be two-pronged: the country should “develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India, while simultaneously avoiding

24 Ibid., 13.
relationships that go beyond conveying a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions.” This need for vigilance against actions that could unnecessarily provoke China is important because if “China perceives India as irrevocably committed to an anti-China containment ring, it may end up adopting overtly hostile and negative policies towards India, rather than making an effort to keep India on a more independent path.” The relative decline of the United States informs this overtly cautious policy toward China: for example, the report acknowledges that “relative decline of the American alliance system is already evident” and that many Asian states that were traditionally dependent on the United States for security guarantees are now “hedging their bets against excessive dependence on one major power.”

Economic theory suggests that uncertainty and volatility in the market drives hedging behavior, which has been explained as “risk shifting” where actors invest in diverse policies to insure against unexpected failures. International relations scholars have suggested that hedging gains prominence among actors during periods of structural transformation, when “leaders…operate under the constraints of the current structure, but act to hedge against the uncertainty that accompanies structural transformation.” Some scholars have argued that hedging is not a strategy; rather, it is a default foreign policy option when clear-cut strategies are unavailable. This seems to be the case with India, which appears to be pursuing multiple foreign policy options in an environment of uncertainty. First, while continuing to cooperate with the United States on regional security, India has recalibrated the pace of this strategic relationship to an extent. This suggests that the country is signaling its reluctance to be a part of any grand containment strategy against China. Second, New Delhi is trying hard to normalize its difficult relationship with Beijing. Last and most important, rather than bandwagoning with the United States to balance China, India seems more keen on collaborating with other regional powers to create a local balance of power.

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 31, 12.
Drifting Indo-U.S. Relations

The Indo-U.S. strategic partnership over the last decade, which reached its high-water mark in the 2008 civilian nuclear energy pact, has been perceived as a containment strategy in Beijing. A hedging strategy, therefore, allows India to adjust the pace of the partnership. Many unforeseen events have also led to a rift between New Delhi and Washington. India’s complex domestic politics created hurdles to the consummation of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, and the nuclear liability bill eliminated any participation by U.S. nuclear vendors in the Indian energy market.31 While domestic politics played a spoilsport on the nuclear deal, India stood against the United States in the UN Security Council regarding interventions in Libya and Syria. The votes on Syria and Libya were surprising since India had earlier sided with the United States in sanctioning Iran, a country much more sensitive for Indian foreign policy than either Libya or Syria.32

New Delhi, for its part, started to view the Obama administration warily after the strategic imperatives of the financial crisis pushed the United States to attempt to reconcile with a rising China. In a stark contrast with the Bush administration, in Obama’s hierarchy of strategic considerations the relationship with China assumed great importance. From the global economy to climate change, the United States preferred talking to China bilaterally. Obama’s first overseas trip was to Beijing, which further strengthened this impulse.33 This strategy of cooperation with China on multiple global and regional issues, as then deputy secretary of state James Steinberg argued, was one of “strategic reassurance,” with the United States explicitly welcoming “China’s arrival” on the global scene.34 For New Delhi, the U.S. effort to bring China’s influence to bear on India-Pakistan relations was particularly alarming. A perception of an informal condominium of power—a group of two, or G-2—between the United States and China gained ground in India as

32 Authors’ personal interviews with U.S. State Department officials in Washington, D.C., September 2014.
a result. In response, New Delhi began to recalibrate its strategic relationship with Washington.

The larger drift in U.S.-India ties has also been felt in their stagnating defense partnership. During the most fruitful years of Indo-U.S. engagement, defense relations prospered substantially. For example, the vision for the Indo-U.S. defense partnership was laid down in 2005 when the two nations signed the New Framework for Defense Cooperation. Under the aegis of this “enabling document,” as then Indian defense minister Pranab Mukherjee characterized it, India and the United States agreed on “collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increasing opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, expanded collaboration on missile defense, and establishment of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group.”\(^{35}\) In subsequent years, defense cooperation intensified, with Indian armed forces conducting the maximum number of military exercises with their U.S. counterparts. Defense sales also increased to unprecedented levels.

But the promise of the 2005 agreement has hardly been fulfilled. Under the 2004 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership agreement, India and the United States had expressed their intention to bolster defense cooperation by agreeing to discuss a logistics-sharing agreement along with two other crucial elements—a communication interoperability and security memorandum of agreement (CISMOA) and a basic exchange and cooperation agreement for geospatial cooperation (BECA). Under U.S. law, some of most sensitive military technologies can only be transferred if the recipient country is signatory to a CISMOA and BECA.\(^{36}\) However, there has been little progress so far on these agreements. During a visit to India in 2010, Robert Gates, then U.S. secretary of defense, categorically stated that Indian reluctance to sign these agreements was “an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.”\(^{37}\) This is all the more surprising when the Indian armed forces seem to be in favor of “developing a certain kind of compatibility in operations” with the United States.\(^ {38}\)

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\(^{36}\) Ibid., 85.


Being in a coalition with the Communist parties at the center, the first United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from 2004 to 2009 had clear reasons for not signing these agreements. UPA-I had spent most of its political capital passing the civilian nuclear deal and could not take on another fight with its allies. But even under UPA-II (2009–14), which did not have to rely on the leftist parties for its majority in the parliament, there was no movement on this issue. By 2013, the United States had put these agreements into cold storage, waiting for a more receptive audience to come to power in New Delhi.

This stagnation in the defense relationship is also visible in the tentative participation of the Indian Navy in the U.S. pivot. While joint exercises with the U.S. Navy continue apace, no qualitative change has accompanied the tenor of Indo-U.S. naval exercises. Whereas the 2012 Malabar series of exercises saw the participation of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines from the U.S. side, the 2013 exercise was initially postponed and was a low-key affair when finally held. Private conversations with Indian naval officials suggest there was foot-dragging from the Indian government on the scope of these exercises. 39 India’s constabulary role in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific has also witnessed no major growth. The Indian Navy has gone on record stating its unwillingness to operate beyond the Strait of Malacca. 40 Given the vastness of the Indo-Pacific waters and the economic sequestration reducing the efficiency and operability of U.S. defense forces, participation from the Indian Navy would help the pivot substantially. 41 New Delhi, however, has remained reluctant.

A.K. Antony, India’s defense minister from 2006 until May 2014, was particularly cagey about the growing Indo-U.S. defense relationship. Under Antony, the Ministry of Defence was instrumental in scuttling Indo-U.S. defense diplomacy even when Washington was keen to resolve outstanding issues. 42 New Delhi remained resistant to upgrading the bilateral defense dialogue to a “2+2” mechanism (defense ministers plus foreign ministers) along the lines of the U.S.-Japan strategic dialogue. In June 2012, the Pentagon delegated responsibility for boosting defense ties and trade to then deputy secretary of defense Ashton Carter. However, the Ministry of Defence refused to appoint a senior-level bureaucrat to engage with Carter. In April 39 Authors’ personal interviews with senior Indian Navy officials in New Delhi, August 2014.


of the same year, it also refused to engage with the U.S. assistant secretary of
state for political affairs, Andrew Shapiro, in reviving the “pol-mil dialogue,”
even though the dialogue had an overtly military component. Antony even
refused to meet Admiral Sam Locklear, commander of the U.S. Pacific
Command, during his visit to New Delhi in June 2013.\(^{43}\) Locklear’s request
for meeting the service chiefs was turned down by the Ministry of Defence
on reasons of protocol. Antony also exhibited little interest in explaining
the ministry’s view on Indian strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Not only did it
remain underrepresented at the annual Shangri-La dialogues under his
stewardship, he also skipped an all-important ASEAN Defence Ministers’
Meeting (ADMM) in Brunei in 2013. Antony’s left-of-center ideological
leanings ensured that India failed to develop a robust defense partnership
with the United States over the last decade.\(^{44}\)

The “most important strategic partnership of the 21st century”—a
description used by Obama to define India-U.S. relations—has thus
been trending downward since the culmination of the Indo-U.S. nuclear
deal. One reason behind this drift has been India’s efforts to recalibrate
its strategic embrace of the United States. This recalibration came in the
wake of domestic concerns over New Delhi’s growing closeness with the
United States, which were manifest in Antony’s residual anti-Americanism.
Even when Singh remained a strong supporter of Indo-U.S. relations,
Antony’s closeness to Sonia Gandhi—the real power center in the UPA
government—translated into his effective influence on policy. The
dysfunction of the UPA-II and the policy paralysis that it engendered had
repercussions on the trajectory of Indo-U.S. ties. Though idiosyncratic
factors such as Antony’s anti-Americanism and the left-leaning ideological
momentum of the Congress Party have been responsible for the drift in
Indo-U.S. relations, these variables became prominent only after 2008. A
perception of the U.S. decline following the 2008 financial crisis and the
Obama administration’s attempts to cozy up to China in its early years
enabled an environment in India where such idiosyncratic and ideological
resistance to the United States could thrive.

\(^{43}\) Ajay Shukla, “U.S. Pacific Command Chief Caught in MoD Protocol for Appointments,” *Business

\(^{44}\) Most Indian defense officials with whom the authors engaged talked about Antony’s almost
personal agenda in scuttling U.S.-India defense ties.
Normalizing Relations with China

If retrenchment from a strategic defense partnership with the United States is one indicator of India’s hedging strategy, its effort to normalize relations with China is another. Since the pivot is widely seen as a containment strategy by Beijing, New Delhi wants to dispel any signals of collusion with Washington. India’s former national security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, for example, categorically rejected the proposition of India as bandwagoning with the United States in order to balance China: “Is it likely that two emerging states like India and China, with old traditions of state-craft, would allow themselves to remain the objects of someone else’s policy, no matter how elegantly expressed? I think not.”45 This was also evident in Antony’s reply to Panetta when the latter urged India to be a linchpin of the pivot strategy. Antony instead asked the U.S. secretary of defense to let other “countries walk at their own comfortable pace.”46 This aversion to joining a balance of power under U.S. leadership has been evident not only in India’s diplomatic tone but also in its policy vis-à-vis Beijing.

Even when tensions along the border have continued to rile the India-China relationship in recent years, New Delhi has gone the extra mile to try to normalize relations with Beijing. After a serious confrontation along the Himalayan border in April 2013, India and China signed a border defense cooperation agreement (BDCA) in October 2013. The BDCA restrains the armed forces of the two countries from using force against each other in case a confrontation occurs over the interpretation of the unmarked border. In agreeing to the BDCA, China heavily pressured India to pull back from its defensive positions on the border and restrict its patrols, even suggesting that New Delhi forgo building military infrastructure in the contested region. Yet even after China signed the agreement, its credibility remains questionable, given China’s track-record of repeated transgressions: the inefficacy of the BDCA was underscored in September 2014 when India faced an incursion into the Chumar area of Ladakh by PLA troops, which led to a tense two-week standoff.47 More importantly, the BDCA does little to resolve the boundary dispute. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), then the main opposition party

in India, openly questioned the government’s wisdom in concluding such a deal.\textsuperscript{48} The fact that the government went ahead with the agreement, even under criticism from the strategic community and national political parties, especially when general elections were due in early 2014, suggests that normalization of relations with China has been high on India’s agenda.

Although China’s eventual designs in the Indian Ocean region are clouded in uncertainty, New Delhi appears to be slowly opening up to cooperation with Beijing. Indian policymakers have questioned the logic of China’s “string of pearls” as an anti-India containment strategy, instead calling it a “pretty ineffective murder weapon.”\textsuperscript{49} India also seems keen on collaborating with China in linking the Indian Ocean with the Pacific, creating a maritime silk road in Asia. Military-to-military interactions with Beijing have also gathered pace.\textsuperscript{50} After reaching a nadir in 2010–11, when China called off the fifteenth round of border talks between the two sides’ special representatives after India refused to cancel an address by the Dalai Lama, relations began to improve when China’s defense minister General Liang Guanglie visited New Delhi in September 2012 and expressed his country’s inclination to resume the defense relationship, including visits from senior defense officials for military exercises. Reciprocating Chinese overtures, India’s defense minister visited Beijing in July 2013, and many roadblocks on defense cooperation were removed thereafter. After a gap of five years, the Indian Army and the PLA conducted their “hand in hand” exercises in November 2013, and Indian naval ships have started making port calls at Chinese harbors.

Thus, against the backdrop of the U.S. pivot, India has been trying hard to mend fences with China. Following Narendra Modi’s assumption of the office of the prime minister with a decisive mandate, there is a sense in New Delhi that India has a strong hand to play vis-à-vis China to resolve difficult bilateral issues. The Modi government has been able to articulate India’s concerns over the delay in resolving the boundary dispute while simultaneously encouraging Chinese investment into India to support the country’s development agenda.\textsuperscript{51} India’s defense preparedness, especially in terms of infrastructure development along the frontier, has also picked up speed.


\textsuperscript{49} Menon, “Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy,” 6–7.


Creating a Local Balance of Power

Even as Indo-U.S. defense cooperation continues, there is an element of recalibration on India’s part aimed at adjusting the pace of the strategic relationship to arrest China’s concerns of encirclement by a quasi-alliance between Washington and New Delhi. At the same time, India is trying to stabilize its relationship with China, at times going to great lengths in negotiating a diplomatic solution to the complex border dispute. However, these strategies do not translate into an abandonment of balancing China per se; rather, they indicate India’s reluctance to balance China through an American agenda. New Delhi, therefore, has been a reluctant participant in the pivot.

India, however, appears keen to form a regional balance of power in Asia that could possibly limit China’s aggressive intentions in the region.52 A local balance of power could help dispel any perceptions of a U.S.-India nexus while simultaneously cautioning Beijing that its assertiveness in the region will not go unanswered. Indeed, since the announcement of the pivot, India’s engagement with nations that share similar anxieties over China’s rise has increased considerably. Notable among these are Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Whereas Tokyo and Hanoi, like India, are involved in bitter territorial conflicts with Beijing, Australia, Singapore, and Indonesia share India’s concerns regarding freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

Japan. Michael Green argues that “the future direction of the burgeoning Japan-India strategic relationship will be one of the important indicators of the degree to which U.S. allies and partners within Asia are prepared to align more closely with each other to maintain a favorable strategic equilibrium in the region.”53 Growing cooperation between two of the region’s largest economies and major military powers suggests that a local balance of power is slowly emerging. In the wake of the ongoing transition of power in the Asia-Pacific and the U.S. pivot, the Indo-Japan security axis is an attempt to provide a bulwark against China’s uncertain intentions and increasing capabilities. Defense and security cooperation has emerged as a key facet of India’s strategic partnership with Japan. In October 2008, India and Japan signed a joint declaration on security cooperation, the “first such document

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52 For an overview of India’s growing outreach in the larger Indo-Pacific, see Harsh V. Pant, “China on the Horizon: India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Gathers Momentum,” Orbis 57, no. 3 (2013): 453–66.
signed by India with any other country.”\(^ {54} \) In 2009, an action plan to implement the 2008 declaration was finalized, establishing an annual 2+2 foreign and defense ministerial dialogue between the two sides. The most significant development has been the maritime cooperation between the Indian and the Japanese navies. In May 2013, addressing a session of the India-Japan Association, Singh stated:

> Maritime security across the linked regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans is essential for regional and global prosperity. We should therefore uphold the principles of freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce in accordance with international law, resolve maritime issues peacefully and work together more purposefully to harness the potential of the seas and address common sea-based challenges such as piracy.\(^ {55} \)

Their mutual concerns regarding China’s increasing naval capabilities and its assertive maritime intentions have led the two countries “to join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian oceans.”\(^ {56} \)

The first-ever Indo-Japanese joint naval exercise took place off the coast of Okinawa in June 2012, with four Indian ships participating. It was here that the Indian Navy observed the capabilities of the US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India now desires to buy from Japan. In December 2013, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted its first bilateral maritime exercise with the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean. In January 2014, during a bilateral consultation, the defense ministers of the two countries exchanged proposals to initiate cooperation between the Indian Air Force and Japanese Air Self-Defense Force through staff-level talks and the exchange of test pilots. The Indian Army and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force are also working toward sharing expertise in counterterrorism and humanitarian and disaster relief.

The level of strategic convergence between the two militaries can be gauged from the fact that India invited the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force to participate in the 2014 Malabar exercises in the Pacific. This was a groundbreaking step in bilateral relations as India had earlier capitulated


\(^ {55} \) “Prime Minister’s Address to Japan-India Association, Japan-India Parliamentary Friendship League and International Friendship Exchange Council,” Ministry of External Affairs (India), May 28, 2013 — http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/21754/Prime+Ministers+address+to+JapanIndia+Association+JapanIndia+Parliamentary+Friendship+League+and+International+Friendship+Exchange+Council.

to China’s reservations. When the naval forces of India, the United States, Australia, Singapore, and Japan conducted joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007, China issued demarches to India and Australia. Since then, India had quietly scuttled efforts to revive this idea, lest it invoke Chinese ire. However, the invitation to Japan in 2014 suggests that India is gearing up to promote a local concert of power irrespective of China’s anxieties. The burgeoning security relationship with Japan may well turn out to be the game changer in the Asia-Pacific security environment, especially given that the Modi government is more eager than its predecessors to elevate Indo-Japanese ties to new heights. Japan was Modi’s first state visit outside South Asia in August 2014, which resulted in Japan promising to invest $35 billion in private- and public-sector projects in India over the next five years and the two nations deciding to strengthen defense ties.

Vietnam. In the South China Sea and the eastern Pacific, India is gradually thinking of Vietnam in a manner similar to how China views Pakistan in South Asia: as regional strategic heft. Indian strategists had long suggested that New Delhi should leverage Vietnam’s conflicts with Beijing to India’s advantage. Ever since the two countries raised their bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership in November 2007, security cooperation has accelerated. The real test of this partnership occurred in 2011 when China questioned the legal status of India’s participation in the joint exploration of oil and natural gas with Vietnam in the South China Sea. Given China’s sovereign claims of a nine-dash line that virtually envelops Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, Beijing issued demarches to New Delhi claiming that its actions were illegal, but India has stood firm. Political signaling notwithstanding, even the otherwise laconic Indian Navy vowed to secure India’s commercial interests in the South China Sea.

Maritime cooperation has emerged as the defining feature of the India-Vietnam strategic relationship. In 2011, Vietnam has given India the right to use its port of Nha Trang, located near the strategically significant Cam Ranh Bay in the South China Sea. Indian naval ships have been making frequent visits to this port since 2008, and Vietnam has asked India for help in developing this naval facility. The fact that even the United States, a close

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57 Harsh V. Pant, “India and Vietnam Add a Punch to Their Ties,” *Japan Times*, November 30, 2013.
supporter of Vietnam in the region, has not been conferred with this privilege underscores the importance Vietnam gives to defense cooperation with India. The Indian Navy is training Vietnamese sailors in comprehensive underwater combat at its submarine facility INS Satavaham, and the Indian Air Force is offering pilot conversion training to its Vietnamese counterpart. But most radical of all is India’s offer of a $100 million line of credit to the Vietnamese navy to purchase four offshore patrol vessels. This is the first time India has ever offered credit to a foreign country for defense purchases.

The Modi government has continued to engage Vietnam strategically. In September 2014, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Hanoi and fast-tracked the line of credit for defense purchases. India is likely to sell four patrol ships to Vietnam that are needed for surveillance off its coast and around its military bases in the Spratly Islands chain in the South China Sea. During a visit to New Delhi by the Vietnamese prime minister in November 2014, Vietnam offered India two more blocks for oil exploration in the South China Sea, and India made its stance clear that these oil blocks fall within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, contrary to China’s claims.

Australia. India-Australia ties have been on an upswing following Canberra’s decision to sell uranium to India in 2011, thereby removing the most important obstacle in bilateral ties. In fact, India had held the entire relationship hostage to this one disagreement. Just after the Australian Labour Party agreed to lift sanctions on nuclear trade with India during the December 2011 National Conference, both nations agreed to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation, especially in the maritime domain. During a visit to New Delhi by the Australian minister of defense in December 2011, the two nations agreed to initiate a track 1.5 defense strategic dialogue. India and Australia also now have a consultative dialogue dedicated to East Asia, a region where both have major stakes. Former Australian prime minister Julia Gillard’s visit to India in October 2012 was significant because not only did Australia formally convey its new policy on trade in nuclear technology and material, but the two countries also indicated their willingness to engage in bilateral defense cooperation with a focus on the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

Indeed, as is evident from the joint declaration during the Indian defense minister’s visit to Australia in June 2013, “stability in Asia and cooperation

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60 Kumar, “We Will Send Force.”
in the Indian Ocean region” has emerged as the focal point of the strategic partnership. Both states are wary of Chinese intent regarding maritime security and freedom of navigation in the region, which has heightened the need for greater maritime cooperation. This has resulted in India and Australia agreeing to conduct joint naval combat exercises in 2015. Their continued mutual interest in building maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region was evident in the joint statements issued when Prime Minister Tony Abbot visited New Delhi in September 2014. The growing depth of this strategic partnership was further underscored by Prime Minister Modi’s reciprocal visit to Australia in November 2014; never in the history of their bilateral relationship had the two heads of state paid reciprocal visits to each other in the same year. Modi’s visit has sped up the implementation of the civil nuclear deal and highlighted the importance of defense cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

Indonesia. India and Australia are also collaborating with Indonesia to jointly manage security concerns in the Indian Ocean. These nations have assumed leadership positions in the regional grouping of littoral states called the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation. Under the aegis of this institution, the three countries began a trilateral dialogue on maritime security in the Indian Ocean in 2012. Even though India has a cultural presence in Indonesia, the bilateral security and defense relationship has gathered pace only recently. Both states are concerned over the freedom of navigation and security of the Indian Ocean’s chokepoints. Indonesia has been a regular participant in the Milan annual regional naval exercises hosted by India. The two nations also have a joint mechanism called the Ind-Indo CORPAT (India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol) to patrol the eastern Indian Ocean against piracy and terrorism. This joint supervision of the ocean’s strategic chokepoints is likely to grow into a full-fledged naval exercise between the two countries.

Singapore. The long-term strategic relationship between India and Singapore is also finally taking into account the changing geopolitical realities of the current power transition in the Indo-Pacific. India and Singapore


have wide-ranging defense exercises that include all three services. Given the geographic position of Singapore close to the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca, the annual Singapore Indian Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) between the two navies is an important component of regional security. As a tool of political signaling, the SIMBEX exercises are being held in the contested waters of the southeastern Pacific. The annual strategic dialogue between India and Singapore has increasingly focused on the threats that China poses to maritime security and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. India has also made its military installations available to Singapore for training its military, which otherwise lacks such facilities.

The advantages of regional balancing. Regional balancing, therefore, forms the third leg of India’s hedging strategy. If India is unable to balance China through internal means and is reluctant to participate in the U.S. pivot, regional balancing allows, in the words of one scholar, “New Delhi to lend its military and economic power to a security order that can enhance stability by presenting Beijing with a series of structural constraints.”

From India’s viewpoint, regional balancing offers some inherent advantages. First, it appears far less threatening to Beijing than a possible alliance between India and the United States. Second, regional balancing allows India to escape questions about its “strategic autonomy,” which has been the cardinal principle guiding the country’s foreign policy decision-making. The U.S. alliance system works through a “hub-and-spoke” format with the United States at the center and its allies and partners as the extended arms. Consequently, this system impinges heavily on the foreign policy autonomy of these states, something India is keen to avoid.

Third, by roping in local players to sort out Asian conflicts, New Delhi can escape the binaries of a great-power competition between the declining superpower and the emerging great power in Asia. Multilateral balances, as balance-of-power theory suggests, provide greater flexibility to balancing states than situations where bilateral balances of power exist. Last, but most important, is the declining credibility of the United States as a guarantor of stability in the region. Most regional powers, including India, are skeptical of the sustainability of U.S. commitments, given the problems confronting the U.S. budget.


66 This issue was raised by most of the senior Indian foreign policy officials in their conversations with the authors.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This article argues that rather than actively participating in the new U.S. rebalancing strategy for the Asia-Pacific, India’s preference is to hedge vis-à-vis the pivot. Hedging suggests a reluctance to choose sides in the competition between the United States and China. This hedging strategy is manifest in (1) India’s attempts at recalibrating its strategic closeness with the United States, evident in the current stagnation in the Indo-U.S. defense relationship, (2) its attempts at normalizing New Delhi’s relationship with Beijing, and (3) its preference for a more localized form of balancing evident in India’s growing defense relations with other regional powers in the Indo-Pacific.

Indian decision-makers have underlined the uncertainty surrounding President Obama’s foreign policy in his initial years in the White House as the driver behind this hedging strategy. Obama’s initial overtures to Beijing cemented a perception in New Delhi that Washington was seeking a grand coalition between the United States and China. It has also been reported that senior Obama administration officials, early in their tenure, told their Indian counterparts that the United States “was not doing balance of power in Asia anymore.” Within two years, however, U.S. policy had shifted to the pivot strategy, but these earlier policies and statements created a sense of vulnerability in Indian strategic circles, bringing back the historical memory of U.S. ignorance regarding Indian concerns. In the face of uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy, many in India started questioning the wisdom of New Delhi’s growing strategic partnership with the United States. China’s aggressiveness in the Asia-Pacific at a time of U.S. economic weakness and Washington’s cutting down of its defense commitments also led many in New Delhi to believe that the superpower had weakened considerably in the wake of two major wars in the last decade. When the United States finally announced the pivot strategy, Indian foreign policy elites found it too provocative; they instead prescribed for India “strategic autonomy.” This debate over the strategic direction of Indian foreign policy, informed by suspicions of U.S. global policy, remains far


from settled. Until this issue is resolved, India will remain more comfortable working with regional security partners than with the United States.

Yet despite the attractions of hedging to Indian policy elites, India may have to re-evaluate this strategy in the future. Even though India would like to augment relations with Beijing, the irritants in the relationship are far too many. Sino-Indian relations are passing through a turbulent phase, and it is not readily evident that an attempt to signal distancing from Washington would be enough to ameliorate these tensions.

If the real issue for India is the gap in strategic capabilities vis-à-vis China in the long term, local balancing can only go so far in addressing New Delhi’s concerns. Military engagement with Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore serves well to signal to China the impending emergence of a concert of power in the region. In real material terms, however, it is not readily evident if local balancing will help India narrow the power differential. Moreover, whether India will be able to carry the burden of its regional partners’ expectations in balancing China is an open question. India’s partnership with the United States, therefore, will remain critical. India will need to recognize that even when local balancing would allow it to bypass the great-power rivalry between the United States and China, the road to deeper defense engagement with local powers in the Indo-Pacific goes through Washington. In fact, the United States has been instrumental in India’s deepening relationships with Asian countries because most of them are U.S. security allies. For the other players in Asia, local balancing is not a substitute for the ultimate strategic backstop provided by the United States. In most cases, this is because these states have either formal alliance relations or at least deep strategic ties with Washington. India has neither. So the questions that Indian policymakers will need to soon answer are whether local balancing suffices to protect India vis-à-vis a rising China and whether this is a stable solution given the uncertainties of the future.

It is due to these concerns that the pivot, like all major foreign policy issues, has been part of a healthy domestic debate in India.69 And even when those advocating strategic autonomy were in the driving seat during the UPA-II, the new government under the BJP may examine this issue afresh. The BJP, with its ideological aversion to nonalignment and a more forceful articulation of national security, may once again change India’s hedging strategy to an active partnership on the issue of pivot.

Some of this change is already evident in the Modi government’s foreign policy. Even as Modi is eager to attract Chinese capital for India’s developmental needs, his government has simultaneously prioritized the defense buildup along the border with China and even admitted that Indian capabilities vis-à-vis China are a real concern. Local balancing behavior, as is evident from the recent developments in India’s relationships with Japan, Vietnam, and Australia, has continued apace under the new leadership. However, the relationship with the United States is where much has happened under the new dispensation.

During Modi’s visit to the United States in September 2014, the two nations issued a joint statement making it evident that peace and security in the Asia-Pacific and China’s increasing assertiveness in the region figured prominently in the dialogue. The joint statement expressed concerns over rising territorial disputes and threats to freedom of navigation and maritime security. Taking aim at China, Modi and Obama also “called upon all parties to avoid the use, or threat of use, of force in advancing their claims.” To achieve these objectives, the statement underlined the need for India and the United States to complement each other’s Asia-Pacific strategies: “Noting India’s ‘Act East’ policy and the United States’ rebalance to Asia, the leaders committed to work more closely with other Asia Pacific countries through consultations, dialogues, and joint exercises.”70 More significantly, the South China Sea was mentioned for the first time in a joint statement between India and the United States, as the statement reiterated India’s position that the maritime territorial disputes there should be resolved in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).71 This is a break from the past caution of India’s diplomatic overtures to the United States. The India-U.S. defense relationship also received a major boost when the 2005 New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship was renewed for another ten years and the two sides decided to “treat each other at the same level as their closest partners” on issues including defense technology transfers, trade, research, co-production, and co-development. It has also been decided at the highest levels that the political-military dialogue, scuttled under the previous government in New Delhi, will be resuscitated. These are strong signals that the Modi government is set to revive the strategic partnership with the United States, but concrete results will only materialize over the long term.

71 Ibid.
Meanwhile, any change will not be drastic. The Modi government will need time to bridge the trust deficit accumulated over the last several years between the United States and India. The domestic political context in India remains divided on the question of the country’s relationship with the United States. New Delhi will therefore hedge its bets for the foreseeable future, even as the geostrategic flux in the Asia-Pacific continues to shape its foreign policy choices in unprecedented ways. However, even though continuity will define Indian foreign policy for now, the Modi government does seem poised to bring about long-term change.

For its part, the United States must clearly and consistently signal its commitment to and strategy in the region. This would help regional powers, including India, shed their reluctance in committing to shaping a more stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The United States also should encourage greater regional cooperation and push for a more substantive Indian presence in East and Southeast Asian economic and security organizations. A local balance of power would not only decrease the burden on the United States but also allow regional powers to stand up to Beijing without blame falling on the United States for trying to contain China.
South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty

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KEYWORDS: SOUTH KOREA; UNITED STATES; NUCLEAR SOVEREIGNTY; NUCLEAR POLICY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article argues that the narrow technical disagreements stalling the renegotiation of the U.S.–South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement mask a far larger and more complicated set of issues and interests that challenge both the future of bilateral nuclear cooperation and the nonproliferation regime.

MAIN ARGUMENT

An oft-stated South Korean objective in bilateral nuclear negotiations with the United States is to achieve “peaceful nuclear sovereignty.” This complex term, reflecting South Korea's desire to decrease U.S. leverage over its nuclear affairs, has multiple connotations, including energy security, industry competitiveness, legitimate rights, status, and autonomy. There are tensions among these competing objectives, which, coupled with the inherent limitations on nuclear independence resulting from international nuclear trade regimes, make the concept of peaceful nuclear sovereignty a chimera. Other states—Iran, Brazil, and Turkey, for instance—are driven by similar sentiments, meaning that Washington must take care to resolve its differences with Seoul in a way that balances nonproliferation and nuclear energy interests.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- The wellspring of South Korea’s likely disappointment is the unattainability of peaceful nuclear sovereignty itself. Negotiating among the bureaucratic and public interests that embody these complex aspirations in Seoul will be a greater challenge for the Park Geun-hye administration than the talks with Washington.

- How the United States and South Korea resolve the enrichment and reprocessing issue will set a precedent for how states should address other non–nuclear weapons states interested in pursuing sensitive nuclear technologies and thus holds implications beyond the Korean Peninsula.

- There is common ground between Seoul and Washington on the need to strengthen global standards for nuclear security and safety, which provides a basis for resolving their differences through deeper collaboration coupled with enhanced monitoring.
Since 2010, negotiators from the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have sought to bridge an impasse holding up the conclusion of a bilateral nuclear cooperation pact. The outdated agreement governing this issue, concluded in the 1970s when South Korea was a nuclear neophyte, was to expire in 2014; the sides agreed on a temporary extension to 2016, giving negotiators more time to work. Seoul and Washington concur on the need to make the new agreement consistent with South Korea’s stature as an advanced nuclear energy state. But South Korea also seeks to win U.S. permission to conduct advanced, proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, such as reprocessing spent fuel, which Washington has refused on nonproliferation grounds. Although this disagreement might seem narrow and technical, the impasse masks a far larger and more complicated set of issues that implicate not just the future of U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation but also the viability of the nonproliferation regime to continue to satisfy the interests of states such as South Korea.

For the United States, nuclear negotiations with South Korea primarily are focused on facilitating commercial nuclear trade and sustaining nonproliferation standards. The latter, however, conflict with South Korea’s nuclear ambitions in two ways. First, Seoul’s desire to conduct the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear materials—activities that can also be used to make fuel for nuclear weapons—contradicts U.S. policy to discourage the spread and use of these technologies. Second, Seoul’s continued adherence to a 1992 joint declaration between North and South Korea, under which both sides agreed not to possess enrichment and reprocessing facilities, represents a central element of U.S. policy toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Although North Korea long ago broke that agreement, South Korean enrichment and reprocessing activities could confound efforts to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. For these reasons, Washington opposes Seoul’s request to enrich or reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material.

But Seoul is not just negotiating for enhanced terms of nuclear trade or permission to conduct enrichment and reprocessing. For South Korea, the negotiations have a strong political impetus, as they symbolize both its global aspirations and complicated relationship with the United States. The deeper motivation behind its negotiating stance, as captured in terminology used by then minister of knowledge economy Choi Kyung-hwan in December 2009, is to achieve *pyeonghwajeok haekjugwon* (peaceful nuclear sovereignty). This term requires some unpacking, both for etymological and political reasons. Peaceful nuclear sovereignty appears to encompass a broad set of potential meanings, all of which have been expressed at some
point by Korean officials, politicians, journalists, or nongovernmental experts. The term borrows from an antecedent with a very different meaning (South Korean nuclear deterrence), but which also has very interesting contemporary global implications.

This article examines South Korea’s pursuit of the goal of nuclear sovereignty and is organized as follows:

~ pp. 118–29 identify the origins of the concept of peaceful nuclear sovereignty and sort through its various connotations, placing them in the context of South Korea’s energy security challenge, its commercial interests, and the politics of the complicated U.S.-ROK relationship.

~ pp. 129–32 then discuss limitations on sovereignty in nuclear affairs.

~ pp. 133–36 analyze the implications of the issue for U.S.-ROK negotiations and for the global nuclear order.

NUCLEAR SOVEREIGNTY BECOMES PEACEFUL

Nuclear sovereignty is not a new term in South Korean discourse, but the concept only became “peaceful” in the context of U.S.-ROK negotiations for a nuclear cooperation agreement. Proponents of a nuclear power program unfettered by U.S. restrictions adopted “peaceful nuclear sovereignty” as a slogan representative of their ambitions. Though used by some officials in the previous administration of President Lee Myung-bak, the term is most often wielded by conservative commentators and politicians.1 The need to add “peaceful” as a qualifier tells much about the term’s origins: in the 1970s “nuclear sovereignty” was code in South Korea for the development of nuclear weapons.

President Richard Nixon’s announcement in 1969 that U.S. allies in Asia would have to bear more of their own defense burden (the Nixon Doctrine), coupled with the United States’ unilateral withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division from the ROK in 1971, raised significant fears in Seoul about the reliability of the U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense. That these moves followed several serious North Korean provocations (including the attack on

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the Blue House and capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968) only compounded such fears and led then president Park Chung-hee to initiate a secret nuclear weapons initiative parallel to the U.S.-supplied nuclear power program. In the context of South Korea’s security concerns, some politicians and commentators began to argue that only through nuclear sovereignty—that is, an independent nuclear weapons capability—would South Korea be able to guarantee its defense. U.S. pressure, however, had stopped the secret program by the late 1970s.

The political idea behind the movement for nuclear sovereignty grew out of South Korea’s frustration with its lack of control over its security circumstances. This sentiment derived from the country’s long history of occupation, beginning with the invasion by imperial Japan in 1910 and continuing beyond the Korean War. Proponents of nuclear sovereignty seemed to desire freedom from the constraints of major powers, in particular the United States, given the uncertainty of its commitment to the ROK’s security, though the extent to which this sentiment was shared among the elite or broader population is unclear. This discourse also borrowed ideas from the broader North-South dynamic of the time, when the movement for self-determination by many states (mainly in Africa) gained steam amid calls for the redistribution of global power in the United Nations. But South Korean concerns were very much regional and bilateral (with the United States) in nature, driven by a complicated mix of nationalism, need for protection against a better-armed and revisionist North Korea, and frustration with Washington.

If U.S.-ROK security tensions were the original catalyst for Seoul’s desire for nuclear sovereignty, recent differences over the scope and direction of the ROK’s nuclear power program provided the impetus for some officials and politicians to state that South Korea should seek peaceful nuclear sovereignty in its negotiations with the United States. By affixing “peaceful” (pyeonghwajeok) to the term, proponents of nuclear sovereignty sought to delineate the new concept from the old by clarifying that it had no relation to nuclear weapons. Yet the same basic idea attached to the original concept of nuclear sovereignty appears to also apply to its peaceful variant—namely South Korea’s desire to exercise more control over the scope of its nuclear energy activities and shed what is seen as an unwelcome level of U.S. control.

Calls for peaceful nuclear sovereignty surfaced in 2009 among conservative members of the National Assembly hailing from President Lee’s Grand National Party. In June 2009, for example, Kim Sung-jo, then chair of
the party’s policy committee, called for peaceful nuclear sovereignty in order to secure permission for South Korea to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel.\textsuperscript{2} This refrain was given more prominence in December 2009 when then minister for knowledge economy Choi Kyung-hwan, speaking at a party meeting, reportedly argued for peaceful nuclear sovereignty in order for South Korea to emancipate itself from “excessive” U.S. restrictions on its nuclear activities. Choi stated that “Korea’s current know-how of nuclear processes is incomplete and that should improve in the future.”\textsuperscript{3}

The re-emergence of the “sovereignty” narrative is quite interesting, for it situates the ROK’s nuclear aspirations in a broader “have vs. have-not” dynamic that represents one of the fundamental tensions in the global nuclear order. Many developing states that aspire to use nuclear energy charge that the predominantly Western, advanced nuclear states, which control most nuclear technologies, are denying developing states “inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” guaranteed under Article 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As discussed further below, exercising legitimate rights is one aspect of the peaceful nuclear sovereignty narrative. (South Korea does not seem to identify with other states making similar arguments, such as those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement.)

Yet analysis of South Korean discourse over the last five years is complicated by the fact that predominantly conservative politicians and commentators in Seoul continue to discuss both nuclear sovereignty and peaceful nuclear sovereignty, as well as the distinct ideas behind them.\textsuperscript{4} In particular, following a serious escalation of tensions with North Korea in spring 2013, several politicians and media figures openly called for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons on the assessment that outside powers could no longer assure security against North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{5} Some advocates of nuclear sovereignty likely also support connotations of peaceful nuclear sovereignty, for both concepts derive in part from a sense that the

\textsuperscript{2} Yoo, “‘Pyeonghwajeok haekjugwong pillyo’ Hannaradang yeonil jujang.”
\textsuperscript{5} Toby Dalton and Yoon Ho Jin, “Reading into South Korea’s Nuclear Debate,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 18, 2013 \textendash; http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/18/reading-into-south-korea-s-nuclear-debate/frdc.
United States is an undependable partner whose interests are not necessarily shared by policymakers in Seoul. There seems to be considerable, albeit uninformed, public support for these ideas. Polling by a number of firms since 2012 suggests that approximately 60% of South Koreans consistently support the ROK’s development of nuclear weapons to counter North Korea. Similarly, one poll found that 68% believe that South Korea should have nuclear sovereignty under a newly negotiated cooperation agreement with the United States; but another survey revealed that less than 20% of South Koreans describe themselves as knowledgeable about that agreement.

Korean officials appear mindful of the potentially confusing connotations of peaceful nuclear sovereignty, given the similarity in terminology and political desires to nuclear sovereignty. Seoul is probably wary of giving additional ammunition to a U.S. administration already predisposed to reject South Korea’s proposals to conduct sensitive work on the nuclear fuel cycle. Since 2010, ROK officials have backed away from describing their objectives in terms of peaceful nuclear sovereignty. For instance, in an October 2012 speech, Chun Yung-woo, then presidential secretary for foreign affairs and a top adviser to President Lee Myung-bak, asserted that “there is no basis for the United States to prohibit our right to use nuclear energy peacefully under NPT Article 4.” He cautioned, however, that people arguing for nuclear sovereignty may actually inhibit the achievement of this goal: “Populism like this plays a big role in weakening international belief in Korea’s commitment to nonproliferation.” With President Park Geun-hye’s arrival at the Blue House in 2013, the concept of peaceful nuclear sovereignty receded further from view in favor of a quieter approach to negotiating the nuclear cooperation agreement. Instead of arguing publicly for the right to conduct sensitive nuclear activities, Park advanced a more nuanced set of nuclear

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7 “Kookmin 68.5%, Han-mi wonjaryukhyupjeong gaejeong chanseong” [68.5% of Koreans Agree on Revision of ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement], Realmeter, July 14, 2009 ~ http://www.realmeter.net/issue/view.asp?Table_Name=s_news2&N_Num=581&file_name=20090720095907.htm&Cpage=1; and “Asan Daily Poll, August 15–17, 2013,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

objectives: develop a near-term approach to address the problem of spent fuel management, guarantee the reliable supply of low-enriched uranium fuel for South Korea’s nuclear power reactors, and enhance the competitiveness of the Korean nuclear industry in export markets. Even if the terminology has changed, however, many of the sentiments of the peaceful nuclear sovereignty discourse remain rooted in President Park’s three objectives.

UNPACKING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR SOVEREIGNTY

South Korea’s economic, demographic, and resource endowments have encouraged the development of its nuclear energy program over the last three decades. As the country’s population and economy expanded rapidly beginning in the 1980s, so too did the national demand for energy. Indeed, between 1980 and 2011, electricity consumption increased fifteenfold.9 South Korea addressed this rising demand for energy by increasing its reliance on nuclear energy to the point that the nuclear program now constitutes an important pillar of the country’s future economic growth and modernization. While South Korea boasts the fifteenth-largest economy in the world, it ranks as the fifth-largest producer of nuclear power. This ranking reflects technological maturity as well as Seoul’s prioritization of nuclear power—both to address the scarcity of domestic energy resources and, in recent years, to provide an environmentally responsible source of energy.

However, this heavy reliance on nuclear energy has exacerbated a dilemma that all nuclear power-consuming states face: how to manage highly radioactive spent fuel. As a geographically small nation with a high population density and rapidly increasing energy demand, South Korea confronts a severe constraint on spent nuclear fuel storage. Currently, the country stores all of its spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites and does not have a central facility or repository. But storage space at reactor sites is running out. Under current regulations, which require that spent fuel be stored at the site of the reactor in which it was irradiated, South Korea is projected to begin

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exhausting available storage by 2016.\textsuperscript{10} Although experts note that a change in regulations could enable South Korea to move some spent fuel to newer reactor sites, this solution would only delay the crisis until 2030. The ROK clearly needs a viable, long-term pathway for disposing spent fuel.\textsuperscript{11}

Scientists at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) have argued that South Korea ought to build spent fuel reprocessing facilities based on pyroprocessing, a technology still undergoing lab testing, in order to reduce the volume of nuclear waste.\textsuperscript{12} This technology would separate uranium, which could be recycled into fresh reactor fuel, from plutonium and other highly radioactive elements. The resulting mix of radioactive waste would be smaller in volume and could be immobilized and stored or, alternatively, used in a second-stage fast neutron reactor that South Korea would build. As with other methods of reprocessing or recycling spent fuel, however, there are controversial proliferation risks associated with this technology. With additional technical adjustments to the process, pyroprocessing apparently could yield plutonium useable for nuclear weapons. As noted above, the United States opposes the spread of such technology, and South Korea’s use of the process would contravene the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

For the South Korean scientific community, the interest in pyroprocessing is not merely a passing fancy. KAERI has invested significant time, resources, and personnel over the last decade in building a scientific enterprise in support of pyroprocessing. The career fortunes of influential scientists within South Korea’s nuclear community are tied directly to the future of this technology. If Washington refuses further cooperation on pyroprocessing or any spent fuel reprocessing, these scientists and others will be forced to begin anew, their investments rendered a sunk cost. Such a prospect is deeply troubling to this community and would constitute a severe loss of face. It is unsurprising, therefore, that KAERI is among the strongest lobbyists for pyroprocessing in both Seoul and Washington.


\textsuperscript{11} Hecker et al., “Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security in the Republic of Korea.”

\textsuperscript{12} Park, “Why South Korea Needs Pyroprocessing.”
These factors—nuclear energy as a major underpinning of the ROK economic miracle, serious constraints on long-term waste management, and the desire of the South Korean nuclear research community to address this problem with advanced nuclear technologies—provide important context for the discourse on peaceful nuclear sovereignty. But the concept remains amorphous, encapsulating several different policy sentiments and objectives as expressed by South Korean officials, lawmakers, journalists, academics, and political commentators. A survey of the usage of this terminology over the past five years in political and academic discourse in South Korea reveals that peaceful nuclear sovereignty connotes the following five objectives: strengthening energy security, improving the competitiveness of the nuclear industry, exercising legitimate rights, achieving the status of an advanced nuclear state, and increasing autonomy.

**Energy Security**

For many proponents of peaceful nuclear security, the objective is to strengthen the ROK’s energy security. (Indeed, a variant term is “energy sovereignty,” a sort of conflation of nuclear sovereignty and energy security.) South Korea is resource-poor, importing 97% of its energy inputs (oil, gas, coal, and uranium). Currently, 23 nuclear reactors generate 29% of the country’s electricity supply. With potential volatility in fossil fuel markets but reasonably stable and cheap pricing for nuclear energy, South Korea seeks to maintain and potentially even expand the portion of nuclear energy in its total generating capacity as a means to secure its energy supply. The Lee Myung-bak government set in its 2008 National Energy Master Plan the goal of increasing nuclear power to 41% of the installed capacity by 2030; however, reflecting global public concern about the safety of nuclear power after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, the Park government lowered the target to 29% of installed capacity by 2035. According to South Korea’s Sixth Power Supply Master Plan released in 2013, construction of eleven additional nuclear reactors would raise installed nuclear power capacity from the current level of 20.7 gigawatts-electric (GWe) to 35.9 GWe by 2025, but the share of nuclear

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14 Ibid.

power in the energy mix would remain relatively constant at between 22% and 25%.\(^\text{16}\)

However, as discussed above, the problem of spent fuel accumulation hangs over this nuclear future. In the next decade, South Korea must establish more spent fuel storage, whether as an interim step until a pyroprocessing facility comes online (projected for 2026), as a medium-term measure pending new technologies to transmute radioactive waste, or as a long-term spent fuel repository. Koreans chafe at what they perceive as undue U.S. influence on this decision. In their view, South Korea ought to be able to establish a national nuclear strategy free of diktat from Washington, using all available technology to allow the country to continue relying on nuclear energy in the decades ahead.

Industry Competitiveness

South Korea rapidly transitioned from an importer of nuclear equipment and technology beginning in the 1970s to a designer and operator of a standardized reactor and producer of most major components by the late 1990s to an exporter and prime contractor for a major reactor construction project in the United Arab Emirates in the late 2000s. ROK officials have stated extremely ambitious plans to compete for global market share against other major reactor vendors, thereby seeking to make nuclear energy a major export sector alongside automobiles and electronics. According to this vision, announced by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy in 2010, the $20 billion agreement to build four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates would be followed by sales of up to 80 reactors by 2030, equivalent to some 20% of the projected global nuclear energy market (as of 2010, before the Fukushima accident) and valued at approximately $400 billion.\(^\text{17}\) Some Korean nuclear experts have argued additionally that after Fukushima, the Japanese nuclear industry is effectively moribund and U.S. nuclear firms should team up with Korean entities to fill this gap. The firms and utilities that make up South Korea’s nuclear industry—for example, the Korea Electric Power Corporation, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power, and Doosan Heavy Industries


and Construction—have considerable interest at stake in this ambitious nuclear future.

In this context, peaceful nuclear sovereignty entails reducing U.S. influence over South Korea’s nuclear export aspirations. ROK officials have claimed that in order to compete with other vendors effectively, South Korea must be able to offer fuel services to foreign clients: specifically, provision of low-enriched fresh fuel and potentially the takeback of spent fuel for reprocessing. Only Russia, and in some cases France, currently offer these services. Korean nuclear industry officials also believe there is a business case for conducting uranium enrichment in South Korea, given the scale of domestic nuclear power production and associated demand for low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. The development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would permit Seoul to offer more comprehensive terms when competing for future reactor construction projects.

**Legitimate Rights**

South Korea is an advanced nuclear state, the fifth-largest consumer of nuclear energy in the world, and a participant in several multinational nuclear research consortia, such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor nuclear fusion project and the Generation IV International Forum. The ROK government plans significant nuclear energy expansion in the future and desires to become a major vendor for nuclear exports. At the same time, South Korea has strengthened its nonproliferation credentials over the last decade and fully engaged in a range of nonproliferation initiatives, including hosting the second Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. South Korean officials and experts argue that strong nonproliferation credentials qualify the country for cooperation on sensitive nuclear technology. Seongho Sheen, for example, writes, “South Korea feels it has a legitimate right for advanced nuclear

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19 South Korea worked assiduously to overcome the reputational damage of past transgressions, including from its secret nuclear weapons initiative in the 1970s and from safeguards violations for unreported plutonium separation in the 1980s and uranium enrichment experiments in 2000.
technology considering its commitment to non-proliferation efforts and its growing nuclear power generation capacity.”

The “legitimate rights” that South Korea wishes to exercise are contained in NPT Article 4, cited above. There is an ongoing debate about whether those rights are conditioned by language in that article stipulating conformity with Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, which commit states not to develop or transfer nuclear weapons. Some states, such as Iran, argue that the treaty frames these rights as “inalienable” and that therefore no basis exists for proscribing them. Many Western states argue, on the other hand, that compliance with nonproliferation obligations is a condition of nuclear cooperation. ROK officials assert that South Korea meets all nonproliferation requirements and has an advanced nuclear trajectory that warrants the technology; thus, it should be able to pursue any technology within the scope of its rights. From this perspective, efforts by the United States to restrict South Korea’s nuclear activities are an infringement of its sovereignty.

Status

Another aspect of peaceful nuclear sovereignty is South Korea’s desire to be recognized as an advanced nuclear state. In this regard, Korean experts often cite examples of U.S. cooperation with other advanced nuclear states, in particular Japan, to bolster their case for enrichment and reprocessing. Currently, Japan is the only non–nuclear weapons state that has both the technical capability and international permission to operate a commercial spent fuel reprocessing program. Despite international concern about the proliferation risks of reprocessing, in 1987 the United States granted Japan permission to reprocess U.S.-obligated material (material that was transferred by the United States, has been processed in the United States, or has passed through U.S.-supplied nuclear equipment). That concession reflected the closeness of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan’s nonproliferation commitments,

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21 For contending arguments, see, for example, Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Christopher A. Ford, “Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The NPT, Article IV, and Nonproliferation,” in Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).

22 “Gugik kkomkkomhi chekeu hohyejeok wonjaryeok hyeopjeong ikkeureonaeya.” See also Sheen, “Nuclear Sovereignty versus Nuclear Security.”

23 See, for example, Sheen, “Nuclear Sovereignty versus Nuclear Security.”
and the very advanced capabilities of its nuclear program. Indeed, some South Koreans have held up Japan’s nuclear program as the model to which they aspire. This comparison, given ongoing troubled political relations between South Korea and Japan and the potential for perceptions of U.S. favoritism, is particularly vexing for Washington.

It is worth noting, however, that to mitigate the sensitivity of reprocessing by Japan, the United States demanded highly intrusive safeguards for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in order to enhance international confidence that Japan would not use the plant to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.° Since then, the United States has not granted another non–nuclear weapons state permission to reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material. (Washington has granted such permission to states possessing nuclear weapons, including most recently India, even though it is not a member of the NPT.) South Koreans cite the close U.S.-ROK alliance, the country’s nonproliferation credentials, and its advanced nuclear research program as reasons that it deserves a status equivalent to that of Japan. Korean scientists and officials in various ministries with nuclear responsibilities—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; and the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning—have a strong bureaucratic and international interest in such status, but to achieve it South Korea must be able to undertake the same range of sensitive activities.

**Autonomy**

A final aspect of peaceful nuclear sovereignty is South Korea’s basic desire for greater autonomy in making decisions regarding its nuclear future. As with many other states in search of modernity and sources of energy, the ROK began its foray into nuclear research in the 1950s. Since then, it has invested considerable sums into research and development and retains substantial public support for advanced nuclear initiatives. In recent years, as many developed states have backed away from nuclear energy programs (often following major nuclear accidents), Korean leaders have remained consistent in their desire to move forward with South Korea’s nuclear energy

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program, including the development of pyroprocessing and fast reactors.\textsuperscript{26} This plan appears to be a matter of consensus among the relevant communities involved, spanning not just the nuclear scientific community but also the Korean nuclear industry, several government ministries, and the mainstream political parties.

Such decisions are not purely national ones, however; there are international and bilateral treaties and agreements that establish conditions, especially regarding sensitive nuclear activities such as enrichment and reprocessing. In this instance, because a majority of South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel carries U.S. nonproliferation obligations, by agreement Seoul must seek U.S. permission to reprocess that fuel, permission that Washington has thus far refused to grant. This creates a sense among South Korean nuclear experts that the United States possesses far too much leverage over the ROK’s nuclear research program and, ultimately, its nuclear future. Thus, for political and commercial reasons, as well as for pride presumably, South Koreans desire much greater autonomy in decision-making, freed from the thumb of U.S. nonproliferation policies.

\textbf{CAN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES BE SOVEREIGN?}

South Korea’s desire for peaceful nuclear sovereignty, given the context described above, is understandable. Nuclear power represents a major aspect of the ROK’s history, politics, and economy and remains central to its emergence as an advanced economy with robust technology and industry. But South Korea’s aspirations for greater autonomy in its nuclear program collide with established international regulations and practices for nuclear trade. National decisions on nuclear activities may be shaped in part by available resources, but more by constraints that have evolved from international negotiations since control of the atom arose on the international agenda in the late 1940s. Several different kinds of constraints exist, all of which bear on the extent to which states can exercise sovereignty over nuclear policy.

Resources

There is a well-developed and functioning international market for uranium in various forms, from the uranium ore concentrate known as “yellow cake” to fabricated reactor fuel. South Korea does not have recoverable domestic uranium and thus relies on this international market—mainly Russia, Kazakhstan, Niger, Australia, and Canada—for the uranium product it converts and fabricates into reactor fuel. However, relatively few constraints built into the uranium market impinge on sovereignty; supply disruptions are virtually unknown except in extremis. Even so, without a domestic supply, South Korea must negotiate international contracts subject to conditions required by the exporting state.

Technology

South Korea does not currently possess the technology for commercial uranium enrichment. Transfers of these technologies from holders are relatively rare in modern nuclear commerce. In recent years, some states have evolved a practice to build “black box” enrichment facilities in third states. Under such arrangements, host states receive the enriched uranium product from the facility, but the underlying technology is shrouded and off limits to all but those authorized by the exporting state. Until now, however, these facilities have only been built in states that already have enrichment capability. South Korea possesses the industrial base to develop indigenous enrichment technology, but this path would be time-consuming and very costly. With a smoothly functioning market for enriched uranium, there is not a strong business case for indigenous development of enrichment technology, although there may be an economic justification if Seoul were able to convince an enrichment services provider to build a black box plant in South Korea.

Reprocessing, on the other hand, is a matter of simple chemical extraction using solvents. There is no doubt that South Korea could build a functional small-scale reprocessing plant; however, building an industrial-scale plant equivalent to the size of Japan’s is a far more difficult feat of engineering. Instead, Seoul has chosen to pursue a more advanced but less proven process (pyroprocessing) that yields a product not immediately usable in nuclear weapons. The choice of this technology was driven mainly by U.S. proliferation concerns at a time when U.S. technical experts believed that this process could not be used to separate weapons usable plutonium. However, a subsequent review by the U.S. Department of Energy determined that pyroprocessing is in fact a form of reprocessing and therefore falls
under enhanced restrictions in the U.S.-ROK nuclear agreement. Unlike with enrichment, no international market exists for reprocessing services. Constraints on developing this capability are therefore less technological and more based on conditions imposed by nuclear trading partners through bilateral cooperation agreements.

**Bilateral Agreements**

Probably the heaviest constraints on sovereignty in nuclear affairs derive from commitments made in bilateral agreements, which levy a range of nonproliferation and other obligations on the use of nuclear material, technology, and equipment transferred under the agreements. Some of these assurances are simple, such as declaring that any nuclear material or equipment will only be used for peaceful purposes or agreeing that such items cannot be retransferred to another country without prior consent. Other conditions are more onerous. One restriction required by law in standard U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements is that recipient states must seek permission before they “alter in form or content” U.S.-obligated nuclear materials. In the case of South Korea, this leverage concentrates primarily on what the country may and may not do to spent fuel irradiated in reactors that contain U.S. technology or components. Before sending U.S.-obligated fuel through a pyroprocessing facility, Seoul would be required to secure advance consent from Washington, which is among the key sticking points in the ongoing negotiations.

As a nuclear supplier itself, South Korea also retains leverage over how its technology and components may be used by recipient states. For example, it is one of a few countries that possess an industrial capability to forge the very large and precise steel components that make up reactor pressure vessels. When supplying these components to reactors being built in other countries, South Korea stipulates conditions on the disposition of materials that pass through those reactors. A case in point is that South Korea manufactures some components for U.S. nuclear reactors currently under construction, meaning the United States can only use those reactors and Korean-obligated spent fuel per the terms of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement and not for any purpose related to the U.S. nuclear weapons program. These

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two-way commitments are a fact of life in the international nuclear market and are indeed an impingement on sovereignty. Although for South Korea these constraints do not stem solely from the United States, but rather from every country with which Seoul engages in nuclear trade, U.S. restrictions at this point appear to be most pressing.

The International Regime

Bilateral cooperation agreements between states mandate certain nonproliferation practices and conditions, most of which are satisfied through adherence to various instruments of the international nonproliferation regime. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards provide the primary means of monitoring that a state’s nuclear activities remain peaceful as mandated by NPT Article 3. By and large such safeguards agreements are standard, but in cases involving sensitive technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing, the IAEA tends to require a much more careful and intrusive approach to monitoring compliance, such as at Japan’s reprocessing facility, as noted above. Given the scope of Japanese nuclear activities and the requirement for enhanced transparency, the implementation of safeguards in Japan consumes some 16%, or roughly $27 million, of the total IAEA safeguards budget, second only to IAEA activities in Iran.28 Should South Korea eventually pursue such capabilities with permission from the United States and other foreign partners, it should expect to face similarly intrusive requirements to ensure transparency.

Between these four aspects of international nuclear commerce (resources, technology, bilateral agreements, and the international regime), states operate in a heavily regulated and constrained environment. Unlike other sources of energy, which may be produced and consumed with minimal international and even domestic regulation, use of nuclear energy is an inherently multinational enterprise. And given the implications of its potential misuse, including through accidents, terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there remains a strong international impetus to preserve stringent conditions on both how and by whom nuclear power may be utilized. In this sense, the peaceful nuclear sovereignty that South Korea seeks is a chimera.

Peaceful nuclear sovereignty is unattainable given the current realities of international nuclear commerce, a reality that many South Korean officials and experts understand. Thus, their appeals for peaceful nuclear sovereignty are better interpreted through a political lens, as a measure of national frustration over what many Koreans perceive as an unfair and unbalanced relationship with the United States. To be sure, the U.S.-ROK relationship remains complicated. For example, opinions in Seoul are strongly divided on the issue of the continued need for U.S. troops to be stationed in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. Recent mass public protests over the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the importation of U.S. beef reflect a sense that South Korea needs to become more independent of Washington’s interests. Discord over the terms of future nuclear cooperation is just the latest in a series of issues on which Koreans seek to emerge from the United States’ shadow.

These sentiments, if not appreciated and handled carefully in Washington, portend a difficult immediate road ahead in nuclear negotiations and beyond. Reconciling divergent U.S. and South Korean objectives is tough enough, but it is impossible for the United States to satisfy the ROK’s desire for peaceful nuclear sovereignty because of the inherent tension between autonomy and the intrusive safeguards that accompany the use of sensitive nuclear technologies. Specifically, when non–nuclear weapons states such as South Korea seek to develop enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, the international community demands greater transparency and monitoring, not less.

The politicization of U.S.-ROK nuclear negotiations by officials and commentators in Seoul and the binding together of multiple complex aspirations in slogans such as “peaceful nuclear sovereignty” have set South Korea up for disappointment. These aspirations are not attainable, for Seoul’s multiple objectives hold inherent contradictions. Thus, the wellspring of likely disappointment is the concept of peaceful nuclear sovereignty itself, not efforts by the United States or others to thwart South Korea’s ambition to realize sovereignty over its nuclear affairs.

South Korea may be able to enhance the competitiveness of its nuclear industry and secure, to an extent, greater autonomy and energy security without pursuing enrichment and reprocessing. But this will come at the expense of its desire to be perceived as among the most advanced nuclear states and to exercise its legitimate nuclear rights. Conversely, should South Korea gain U.S. permission for enrichment and reprocessing, the country could achieve both status and rights, but at the expense of autonomy insofar as
such capabilities would require far more intrusive safeguards without offering a clear competitive benefit or increasing energy security. In this respect, the greater challenge for the Park Geun-hye administration may be negotiating among the bureaucratic and political interests that embody these aspirations in Seoul rather than negotiating with Washington.

Yet the peaceful nuclear sovereignty narrative in South Korea, which prioritizes the symbolism of the U.S.-ROK negotiations over the technical details, poses a major political problem for Washington. At a time when many South Koreans question the strength of the U.S. commitment to the ROK’s security, Washington’s rejection of Seoul’s proposed terms could represent a major blow to the alliance. It would augur poorly for future relations if a greater number of South Koreans perceive the United States as an impediment to both security and nuclear progress. Thus, U.S. negotiators need to understand the breadth of Korean interests and aspirations. Unfortunately, the narrow nuclear cooperation agreement is not the right instrument to address all of these issues, but there may be ways to wrap the agreement in the framework of, for example, a broader energy security pact that would avoid setting up the nuclear negotiation as a litmus test of the alliance.

How Washington and Seoul resolve this issue has significant implications beyond the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the manner in which the United States and South Korea handle their negotiations over enrichment and reprocessing will likely be seen as a precedent for addressing the interests of non–nuclear weapons states that would like to pursue sensitive technologies as part of their nuclear programs. In this sense, peaceful nuclear sovereignty describes not just South Korean interests, but probably also those of Brazil, Vietnam, Turkey, and Iran, among others. Like South Korea, states such as these chafe at being denied cooperation in developing sensitive nuclear technologies, and some have pursued enrichment and reprocessing programs through clandestine means. Unlike South Korea, however, most of these states face constraints deriving from international technology control regimes rather than from terms imposed by a close ally. On this score, South Koreans watched very closely the United States’ negotiation of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Vietnam, as well as the ongoing multilateral diplomacy toward Iran over its nuclear program. Seoul will be particularly incensed if it perceives Washington as agreeing to more permissive terms with Iran than the United States is prepared to offer South Korea.

Treating these cases in an *ad hoc* way is problematic. Not only would a Korea-specific approach create more exceptions, but it also would further undermine the pursuit of universal adherence to nonproliferation
instruments. Interpretations of sovereignty in one case are likely to spill over to other cases, creating further tension between the growth of nuclear energy and nonproliferation efforts. For example, a nuclear agreement with Iran that satisfies Tehran’s self-declared right to operate enrichment facilities, regardless of the procurement methods of those facilities and Iran’s serial noncompliance with international rules, makes it much harder to argue to South Korea that it should not be able to operate enrichment or reprocessing facilities, whether purchased, transferred legally, or developed indigenously. Similarly, a U.S.-ROK agreement that permits reprocessing by South Korea will complicate efforts to prevent the spread and accumulation of stocks of plutonium around the world. Such a precedent opens unwelcome doors to potential nuclear hedging by a far greater number of states than simply those operating nuclear power plants today.

Yet the reality is that more universal approaches to strengthening nonproliferation standards—such as U.S. efforts to prohibit the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies—have failed. A majority of states, including many that are party to existing technology control mechanisms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, perceive such efforts as illegitimate. (No doubt, the U.S. push to exempt India from international nuclear trade restrictions at the same time that Washington advocated a ban on further transfers of enrichment and reprocessing was seen by many states as a double standard.) Furthermore, Iran’s argument that its uranium enrichment program is a legitimate exercise of its NPT rights has the support of many states that do not want to see their rights to peaceful nuclear energy abridged. Thus, managing the peaceful nuclear sovereignty aspirations of states like South Korea, and even Iran, necessarily requires creative approaches that reinforce existing rules and norms, rather than carve out new exceptions, and at the same time demand stronger practices for implementing the rules. In return, states wishing to utilize the most sensitive nuclear technologies for peaceful applications must be prepared to implement the best practices for transparency, security, and safety.

CONCLUSION

U.S. and South Korean negotiators will muddle through as they seek to agree to terms for long-term peaceful nuclear cooperation, but both parties must be willing to compromise. It is clear that Washington will be unable to satisfy all of Seoul’s demands, given the complex and conflicting motivations wrapped up in South Korean desires for peaceful nuclear sovereignty. In this
respect, President Park has the more difficult job of managing the complex interests of scientists at KAERI, bureaucrats in various ministries, nuclear industry executives, skeptical journalists, and fractious politicians, while explaining the agreement to the Korean public in terms that satisfy concerns about undue U.S. influence on South Korea’s energy future. By the same token, Washington most likely will not hold at bay indefinitely South Korea’s interest in reprocessing, even if pyroprocessing is not ultimately the solution to the country’s spent fuel problem.

The common ground on which Washington and Seoul can build consensus, perhaps ironically, is in their mutual and consistent support for a strong nonproliferation regime. Both sides have an interest in managing future nuclear cooperation in a manner that raises the bar for the security and safety of international peaceful nuclear energy practices, especially as related to potential sensitive fuel-cycle activities. In particular, they can conduct bilateral cooperation in a way that promotes stronger international norms in order to demonstrate that enhanced transparency and intrusiveness are necessary and legitimate handmaidens of work on technologies that carry proliferation risks. Bilateral cooperation on advanced monitoring and verification technologies applied to facilities in South Korea thus may not only raise confidence in the ROK’s nonproliferation bona fides but also contribute to stronger international practices. Although South Korea’s search for sovereignty in its nuclear activities conflicts with the realities of international nuclear commerce, a partnership with the United States along these lines can facilitate the country’s desire to be a leader in nuclear energy and nonproliferation. ◊
BOOK REVIEW ROUNDTABLE

Recent Books on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Aqil Shah’s
The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014
ISBN: 978-0-67-472893-6 (hardcover)

T.V. Paul’s
The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014
ISBN: 978-0-19-932223-7 (hardcover)

C. Christine Fair’s
Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014

John H. Gill
Marvin G. Weinbaum
Hasan Askari Rizvi
Aqil Shah
T.V. Paul
C. Christine Fair
Getting beyond Opacity: New Light on Pakistan’s Enigmatic Army

John H. Gill

The Pakistan Army is one of the largest ground forces in the contemporary world. It is also arguably one of the most important military institutions in Asia and the neighboring Persian Gulf region. Factors contributing to the Pakistan Army’s significance include its role in the near-term future of Afghanistan and in the stability of Pakistan itself, its long history of conflict with India, its predominant position in Pakistan’s premier national intelligence agency, and its management of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan Army has also been the deciding voice in the country’s most sensitive foreign relations, has ruled Pakistan for more than half of the country’s existence, and has been the most powerful actor on the domestic political scene even when a general has not been serving as president. Yet despite its importance, this army remains largely opaque, little studied, and poorly understood, even within Pakistan.

A key reason for our limited knowledge is the wall of secrecy that the army assiduously maintains to protect its image. The near-total absence of archival material is one result of the army’s information policies. Hard data is rare and researchers are left to sift through interviews, personal experiences, and the military’s limited range of publications in search of deeper understanding. Despite these daunting research challenges, a growing number of scholars have attempted to penetrate the army’s armor in recent years. The three works under consideration here are valuable additions to this encouraging trend at both the theoretical and empirical levels.¹

Although all three draw heavily on Pakistan’s history, these are not military histories per se. Rather they are analyses of the army as an institution and its interaction with the Pakistani state, society, and foreign policy, especially with regard to India, Afghanistan, the United States, and, to a lesser degree, China. Several key features are worth noting at the outset. First, all three authors place their analyses in helpfully explanatory

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¹ For a review essay of other books on the Pakistan Army, see my article “Glimpses Inside Pakistan’s Elusive Army,” Journal of Military History 77, no. 1 (2013): 294–98.
Theoretical frameworks. T.V. Paul takes an international relations approach to examine Pakistan as a “warrior state” with a “Hobbesian, hyper-realpolitik” worldview and suffering a “geographic curse” analogous to the “resource curse” that distorts development in other parts of the world. He contrasts Pakistan’s status with that of “war-making” European countries and erstwhile military-ruled Asian and African states that he sees as benefiting from the global economy and moving toward democracy or at least some form of greater political inclusion. While Paul asks why Pakistan has remained on a garrison state trajectory when other states have changed course, C. Christine Fair interrogates the Pakistan Army’s publications to explicate the state’s persistently “revisionist” behavior. “Revisionism,” in her terminology, goes well beyond the territorial dispute over Kashmir to embrace a far more ambitious goal of “holding India back” to maintain some kind of permanent parity with its much larger neighbor. She thus argues that Pakistan’s “revisionism” is driven more by ideology than security and asks why Pakistan has continued on this path when its efforts over the past six decades have yielded only negative consequences for its own fortunes. Aqil Shah’s analysis is more focused on Pakistan’s domestic political structure, probing the army’s tenacious dominance of state power when many other countries have moved away from authoritarian military regimes over the past two decades.

The theoretical frameworks these authors have selected allow them to offer comprehensive and fresh assessments of Pakistan and its armed forces. Their analyses are buttressed by utilization of untapped source material. All three draw on interviews and standard secondary works, but Fair and Shah in particular exploit essays, monographs, and magazines published by the Pakistani military. Fully cognizant of the limitations of these writings, both authors are judicious in using this body of literature to extract new insights and describe the army’s institutional attitudes and preferences. Theirs is thus a new and most welcome avenue of approach to penetrating the obscurity surrounding Pakistan’s military.

The individual virtues of these books are too numerous to detail in a brief review, but a number of policy-relevant commonalities emerge when we consider these fine works in the aggregate. The importance of the ideological component that is central to Fair’s analysis, for instance, also features in Paul’s book. While Paul observes that states with “extreme ideological or realpolitik goals have not fared well” (p. 3), Fair contends that the Pakistani military, and thus the state, is not a traditional “security-seeking” international actor as is usually assumed. Rather, its policies are propelled
by an ideology founded on an existential, civilizational, and apparently interminable struggle with India (pp. 4–7). Frustrating India can thus become a goal in and of itself. Viewed through this lens, more or better weapons from outside sources or explicit external security guarantees will not satisfy Pakistan; indeed, such actions by other powers only contribute to sustaining dangerous Pakistani behavior. This concern is closely related to another commonality between Fair and Paul: what they see as Pakistan’s enduring quest for strategic parity with India. “Parity,” in this case, is not confined to military terms of tanks, ships, planes, and warheads but embraces a larger spectrum of status on the international stage and “nondiscriminatory” treatment by outside actors, among other objectives. Indeed, Fair argues that the Pakistan Army defines success or victory as the ability to preclude India’s “regional ascendancy” (p. 279), while Paul points to the obvious discrepancy between ends and means in this quest (p. 157).

There are also important commonalities among these books on the domestic front. Both Shah and Fair, for example, stress the development and consequences of the army’s dominance of civilian institutions. Shah cites what he calls the army’s tutelary beliefs and norms, its paternalistic attitudes, and the lingering drag of the inherited viceregal system as “democratically corrosive” (p. 49), underwriting the prevalence of authoritarian rule and the steady erosion of civilian institutions. On a related note, Shah, Paul, and Fair all comment on the persistence of British-era notions of “martial races” in the Pakistan Army. These residual assumptions not only color the military’s views of its own population as a source of recruits; they also often function as a filter for interpreting the outside world, especially by applying a negative tint to India and Afghanistan as possible foes.

Finally, all three authors agree on two broad points. First, they are sharply critical of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. All see U.S. policies as tolerating or permitting dangerous and self-destructive behavior by Pakistan and its armed forces. In Fair’s view, for example, U.S. largesse or naïveté not only enables but encourages Pakistan to avoid confronting its multiple domestic problems (e.g., the dismal economy) and to play a destabilizing spoiler role regionally (p. 281). Second, all three grimly conclude that the prospects for favorable changes in the trajectory of Pakistan’s internal development or external behavior are small. Shah is especially detailed in his discussion of what would need to change to induce a significant shift in

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2 See also Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
Pakistan’s future evolution, but none of the authors express any hope that such dramatic changes are likely in the near to medium term.

There are, of course, several areas that would have benefited from somewhat more explicit investigation. The army’s obsession with image is one. In what ways does this influence its domestic and international behavior? Fair alludes to this phenomenon in her work, but more specific analysis would have been illuminating. Similarly, Paul mentions the value the Pakistan Army attaches to “tying down India,” but this notion could be expanded with additional analysis. The argument could be made, for example, that Kashmir is an issue not only for emotive and historical reasons, but also because it serves what one might term “instrumental” purposes. That is, if Pakistani leaders are genuinely convinced that India is intent on Pakistan’s destruction (as Fair argues), and if they truly believe that India has committed up to 800,000 “troops” in the disputed region (as stated in an October 2014 newspaper editorial), then the outside observer could conclude that militancy and terrorism in Kashmir serve an instrumental purpose in nailing the Indian Army in place. An otherwise supposedly inevitable attack is thus forestalled.

As for the individual books, it would have been interesting to see Fair and Paul examine how the Pakistan Army defines concepts such as “friends” and “interests” in the international context. Fair approaches this in her review of the army’s hagiographic treatment of China as compared with the generally vitriolic rhetoric reserved for the United States, and Paul touches on this issue when he depicts Pakistan as viewing the world through a Hobbesian prism. But it would have been enlightening if they had carried this line of thinking a few steps further. Shah, on the other hand, may be too critical of the army in some of its recent interactions with the civilian elements of the state. The former chief of staff of the Pakistan army, General Ashfaq Kayani, for one, allegedly tried but failed to elicit strategic guidance from the civilian leadership. Having cleared and held zones of militancy such as Swat, the army may also legitimately complain that civilian authorities are conspicuous by their absence when the time comes for the military to withdraw. Furthermore, the army is the object of

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4 For instance, citing the former chief of the Pakistan Army, General Aslam Beg, Paul touches on the notion of the Indian Army being overcommitted in Kashmir (p. 111), but he does not elaborate on this important nuance.
5 “The Million March,” News International (Pakistan), October 28, 2014. In addition to exaggerating overall numbers, such figures conflate police and paramilitary forces with regular army units and thus misrepresent the Indian Army’s involvement.
urgent importunities by groups across the political spectrum whenever a domestic crisis arises. For example, Shah might have explicitly addressed the thorny issues associated with the army’s role—if any—when elected officials undermine the political system through corruption, ineptitude, or megalomaniac behavior. Breaking out of this destructive cycle requires civil as well as military vision and steadfastness.

These lacunae and desiderata notwithstanding, all three works are excellent additions to the growing scholarship on Pakistan and its army. Policy-relevant and academically rigorous, thoughtful and readable, they can be recommended highly for decision-makers, staffers, and analysts in the policy, security, and intelligence communities. They will be especially valuable for diplomats and military officers assigned to serve in Pakistan or with Pakistani armed forces.
The number of books devoted to the study of Pakistan’s military continues to grow, and with good reason. Any understanding of Pakistan’s foreign and security policy begins with an appreciation of the role played by the country’s premier political institution, the army. The volumes by C. Christine Fair, T.V. Paul, and Aqil Shah add richly to the literature on the army and militarism in Pakistan. As in other studies, the preoccupation of Pakistan’s military with the perceived threat of India looms large in the authors’ analyses. The adversarial nature of civil-military relations and the military’s mercurial relations with the United States are also familiar themes. These three books stand apart, however, in the weight given to strategic culture in forming attitudes and behavior within Pakistan’s military. Fair finds the army’s ideology and mentality necessary for explaining the biases in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Shah focuses on those beliefs and mindsets in the army that lead to its repeated interventions against civilian authority. Paul shows how the military’s thinking, particularly about India, has prevented the country from emerging as a development-oriented state and has instead turned it into a garrison state.

While employing a similar normative approach, the books frame their analyses around different leading questions. Fair asks why after almost seven decades Pakistan has been unable to accommodate itself to India’s regional preeminence and has stayed committed to a revisionist foreign policy regarding Kashmir, despite the detrimental consequences. She finds the answer in Pakistan’s apprehensions about its larger neighbor that are driven more by ideology than security. It is a military fixed on an image of India as an aggressive power whose aim is to dominate Pakistan and the South Asian region. Fair describes a military that uses Pakistan’s founding national ideology, Islam, to unify the country against India’s supposed existential threat.

Paul is most concerned about why Pakistan has remained a security state and has failed to move toward becoming a sustainable democracy. After explaining the historical and sociological reasons behind this failure, he argues that in large part what perpetuates military dominance

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is war preparation that has siphoned off the country’s scarce resources and distracted its citizens from demanding economic and social reforms. Paul points to the state’s execution of U.S. regional strategic objectives in return for aid as having disincentivized the political elite from taking the route to sustainable economic growth and political reform.

Shah explores why the military has repeatedly intervened in the country’s political affairs. Drawing on historical evidence, he traces the expansion of authoritarianism to nation-building problems and the conception of members of the army’s higher officer corps about the appropriate institutional role of the military in national security, governance, and democracy. Shah finds that the perceived security threat from India, coupled with ethnic and linguistic cleavages during Pakistan’s formative years, led to the military’s rapid modernization and development at the cost of economic growth and civil-institution building. Periods of instability under civilian rule strengthened the army’s belief in itself as the protector of the state against external threats, ethnic fragmentation, and incompetent and corrupt politicians.

In the best sense, these are academic books. They ground their analyses solidly within the political science literature and international relations theory. All three books provide deep historical context and single out the importance of political events in the shaping of the military’s frame of mind. Largely free of jargon, they are written for both a well-informed and general readership. Methodologically, there are commonalities. Fair and Shah are particularly interested in what the military says about itself as recorded in its own publications and through interviews. Both authors use these materials effectively to illustrate their conclusions. Shah and particularly Paul draw instructive comparisons with other states that have had greater success in the transition away from military supremacy toward the consolidation of democracy.

The three authors describe the frequently close collaboration of the military with Islamic extremist groups. Paul discusses the role of Islam in shaping the Pakistani elites’ mindsets and identifies the attachment to radical Islamic thinking among many military officers. Fair notes the infiltration of the army by Islamic militants and discusses how the army has sought to use Islam to create unity both within its ranks and within society. In Shah’s concern with the proper balance between the military and civil authority, he observes that their relationship affects not only Pakistan’s custodial responsibilities for nuclear weapons but also how it addresses extremist groups.
Yet none of the books cast much light on the interactions between the military and extremist groups. Curiously missing is any discussion about how those values and beliefs associated with Islamic groups may have contributed to forming the military’s thinking, including policies toward India, Afghanistan, and the West. Nor do any of the authors examine closely how the normative biases of the military may help explain its differential policies toward these extremist groups, both those that collaborate with the state and those that oppose it.

In other areas, much of the time Paul conflates the military and political-bureaucratic elites and thus fails to recognize the divergence of their interests. Elsewhere he asserts that U.S. policymakers have never seen a democratic Pakistan as feasible or desirable, when it would be more accurate to say that the United States’ security interests during the Cold War and since September 11 have dictated that it work with the military and not prioritize democracy. Also, Paul vastly overstates the aspirations of Pakistan’s Pashtuns for the creation of an independent state. And his assertions that the Pakistani Taliban have at one point held 30% of the country (p. 63) or that Barelvis constitute only 15% of the population (p. 130) are open to challenge.

Fair highlights the military’s acting as a revisionist institution. But while that may accurately portray its foreign-policy agenda, domestically it is very much a status quo institution. More attention might have been devoted to how the two orientations directly reinforce each other. Fair also might have given greater consideration to how the military’s strategic thinking in an era of numerous media outlets and social media is influenced by the very public attitudes it has contributed to forming. Although Fair provides an extended discussion of Pakistan’s pursuit of strategic depth, she too readily dismisses Shuja Nawaz’s contention that Pakistan’s policy elite’s views on strategic depth have evolved (see p. 134). The military’s years of trying to manage the Afghan Taliban and before them the mujahideen parties have made it far more aware of the limits of its ability to shape outcomes in Afghanistan. Military planners cannot view the prospect of a victorious Taliban in the same way as in the 1990s, when Pakistan did not have an Islamic insurgency of its own to worry about. While there are undoubtedly elements of Pakistan’s intelligence services still intent on trying to implant a compliant Afghanistan regime, the strategic thinking among most policymakers seems mainly to ensure that future regimes in Kabul will not be unfriendly and deeply dependent on India.
All the authors discuss the potential for reform. They describe a state that in its struggle to achieve national unity and security has from the outset subordinated society’s needs to security and retarded economic and political development. Each recognizes how the army through repeated coups and periods of rule is responsible for deepening Pakistan’s structural problems and has impeded efforts to reach solutions through political and especially democratic processes. None of the authors foresee a sharp break from those underlying norms, particularly regarding India, that form so much of Pakistan’s strategic culture and that create, in Paul’s terms, a warrior state. Nor do any expect to witness far-reaching domestic reforms or an improved view within the military of Pakistan’s political class anytime soon.

Yet Paul does not entirely rule out progress toward reform. Looking comparatively, he points out that some states have managed to maintain a high but not excessive level of military preparation while also providing increased public goods for their citizens. Shah recognizes the possibility that an elected government through performance that meets public expectations might in time weaken the military’s ascendance. He alone among the authors has specific recommendations for reforms in civil-military relations that would strengthen civilian control over the armed forces. Fair, clearly the least optimistic, sees no way to escape the military’s grip.

These are outstanding books that complement one another. Taken together, they offer an exceptional in-depth look into the psyche of Pakistan’s military. The three authors provide a fuller understanding of those values and beliefs that contribute to explaining the military’s obsession with India, its long ambivalence about political extremism, and its regular interventions in civilian affairs. Above all, the authors have demonstrated the pervasive influence of the military’s strategic culture in the formation of so many of contemporary Pakistan’s aspirations as well as problems.
The Military and Pakistan’s Political and Security Disposition

Hasan Askari Rizvi

The military is the most formidable political player in Pakistan. The long years of direct and indirect rule have given enough experience and confidence to the military to overshadow core political institutions and processes even when it stays in the barracks. It retains professional skills, organizational capacity, discipline, and determination to set aside civilian processes through direct intervention. However, the military’s preference since 2008 is for exercising political clout from the sidelines for reasons beyond the scope of this review essay. This has given some space to civilian leadership to function in a relatively autonomous manner. The military periodically builds pressure on the civilian government by publicly disagreeing on policy matters, encouraging the political opposition to become more active, forcing a change in civilian political power arrangements, or exercising strong influence in the policy areas of its choice.

Pakistan’s drift from a civilian political system to a military-dominated political order and the implications of this change for the Pakistani state and society, as well as for the country’s foreign and security policies, have drawn the attention of academics and political analysts. Four factors explain this interest: Pakistan’s perennial conflicts with India, its active cooperation with the United States and conservative Arab states to build up Afghan-Islamic resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–89), Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-led war against terrorism, and its use of Islamic militant groups as an instrument of foreign policy.

The three books under review—The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan by Aqil Shah, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War by C. Christine Fair, and The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World by T.V. Paul—are the latest additions to the literature on Pakistan. All three books show a strong focus on the Pakistani military as a state institution, its ascendancy to power, its dominance of internal political and societal processes, and the formulation of Pakistan’s security and foreign policy profile.

Aqil Shah has contributed the most current and comprehensive study to the literature on civil-military relations in Pakistan. The Army and Democracy combines an analysis of hard historical data with a consideration...
of the major theoretical formulations about different facets of civil-military relations and the experiences of several developing countries. This approach enables Shah to assess the dynamics of the Pakistani military’s ascendancy to power, the problems of different military regimes, the means by which these regimes seek to craft political systems that ensure the continuity of the military’s tutelary role, and the impact of military dominance on Pakistan’s internal political choices, foreign policy, and security disposition over the years.

Shah also examines the gradual degeneration and decay of political and societal processes in Pakistan. He identifies the country’s perceived security threats, the inability of civilian and military regimes to ensure meaningful political participation and socioeconomic equity for different ethnic and regional groups, and the unnecessary delay in the framing of a democratic constitutional political order as the main causes of this downward trend. Shah discusses how the Zia and Musharraf regimes strengthened the military’s tutelary role and also analyzes the interaction between various civilian rulers and the top military brass.

While acknowledging the explanations given by other writers for the Pakistani military’s rise to power and expanded role in civilian sectors, Shah focuses on the mindset, orientations, and disposition of the military officers as the principal causes. The critical factor in his view is how the officers articulate their role and self-image as well as their perception of civilian leaders and political processes. According to Shah, officers learn all this through their education, training, and service socialization. He argues that the key issue is whether “they perceive democratic institutions as inherently or as conditionally legitimate” (p. 8). His response is that the training curricula, professional journals, and socialization of the military in Pakistan reinforce the guardian and tutelary role of the officers and create a negative view of civilian politics.

In order to understand the critical role of the military’s mindset, it would have been helpful for Shah to compare the formation of the Pakistani military’s mentality with similar processes in the countries where the military accepts the primacy of democratic politics. A comparison with India, for example, would have been especially useful. The military has a strong tendency to sustain its privileged position once it tastes political power and entrenches itself in civilian sectors. There is hardly any chance of the military voluntarily accepting civilian primacy unless the political and societal dynamics and security considerations force military leaders to
review their disposition or change their strategies for holding on to their expanded role.

C. Christine Fair’s *Fighting to the End* is another comprehensive study of the Pakistani army. It breaks new ground in its analysis of how the army constructs and sustains Pakistan’s security profile and marginalizes the civilian political leadership. No writer has so far made such an extensive use of Pakistani military publications like the *Army Journal*, *Hilal*, and various issues of the *Green Book*, in addition to the courses of study and reports on security issues prepared by officers at the military training institutions. *Fighting to the End* draws on these articles and commentaries to understand the army’s worldview, especially its perceptions of security challenges and how to cope with them. A number of security notions entertained by the military have also been traced back to these publications. These include Pakistan’s strategic culture, threats from India and Afghanistan, the use of nonstate Islamic militants as an instrument of foreign and security policies, and strategic depth, which has multiple meanings and is often raised in the context of Pakistan’s security interaction with Afghanistan. All this is discussed against the backdrop of an overview of Pakistan’s independence movement, the partition of British India in 1947, the division of the British Indian military between the independent states of India and Pakistan, and the Kashmir issue. Fair’s basic argument is that Pakistan’s worldview and strategic culture impel the army to threaten India, adopt an interventionist approach in Afghanistan, and pursue a dual-track policy toward the United States. She maintains that Pakistan’s confrontation with India is “more ideological than security driven” and that Pakistan does not simply want to grab Kashmir but also wants to “undermine India’s position in the region and beyond” (p. 4). As a result, Fair advises the international community, especially the United States, not to adopt a policy of appeasement toward Pakistan because this would not stop the army from its “revisionist pursuits.”

Whether Pakistan is a “persistent revisionist,” as argued by Fair, or a country seeking autonomy of action in India-dominated South Asia is a matter of interpretation. Further, with the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia in 1998, one wonders if the notion of strategic depth is relevant for Pakistan’s security today.

The Pakistani state and its military identified with Islam from the beginning because Pakistan’s establishment was a product of a new nationalism that challenged the secular, one-nation nationalism of the Congress Party. As an alternative nationalism, Pakistan’s founders argued
that the Muslims of British India were a separate nation. It is thus not surprising that Pakistan’s civilian and military institutions invoked Islam in the post-independence period. Islam and Islamic history and wars have been integral to the military’s educational system from the beginning. However, it was only during General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977–88) that the military in general and the army in particular employed Islamic orthodoxy and adopted militancy as an instrument of foreign and security policy. The legacy of these years spilled over to the later period.

T.V. Paul’s *The Warrior State* is another scholarly study of Pakistan that will evoke much academic interest. It describes the army and the military-dominated intelligence agencies as the main culprits for Pakistan’s domestic failures and its aggressive profile at the regional and global levels. Paul maintains that Pakistan engages in a conflictual relationship and war with India, attempts to bring Afghanistan under its orbit, and misleads the United States on countering terrorism.

Focusing primarily on Pakistan’s foreign policy and security disposition, the book can be described as belonging to the academic discourse on the present and the future of Pakistan. Some academics and political analysts, though recognizing the pitfalls in the country’s handling of foreign policy and security affairs, maintain that Pakistan continues to be a resilient state and has an inherent capacity to bounce back. Others describe Pakistan as a failed or failing state that is not likely to overcome its internal and external problems. Paul’s analysis in *The Warrior State* falls in the latter category. He appears to have adopted the position that Pakistan is a case of conspicuous failure with little or no hope for salvaging itself, even if the international community continues to provide economic assistance or some of the problems with India are resolved. Paul describes Pakistan in variously negative terms, including as a garrison state, a warrior state, and a paranoid and dysfunctional state that is at war with itself in its domestic context and engages in territorial conflicts and wars with other states, especially its neighbors. With respect to the latter description, he notes that Pakistan fields nonstate militant Islamic warriors as an instrument to advance its foreign policy agenda.

Paul uses political theory, historical data going back to the establishment of Pakistan and the post-independence security developments, and comparative data for several Asian and African countries to strengthen his argument that Pakistan is incapable of transforming itself into a proper democracy and development-oriented state. In this regard, *The Warrior*
State projects an alarmist view, creating a strong impression that the author has a predetermined view of Pakistan and interprets the data and history to provide an intellectual basis to his argument. The book hardly discusses any factor in the context of bilateral India-Pakistan relations, regional politics, or global affairs that could cause insecurity in Pakistan or adversely affect its interests.

Fair and Paul both describe Pakistan’s revisionism and warrior disposition as threats to peace and stability at the regional and global levels. A diametrically opposite perspective, however, is articulated by a number of Pakistani political leaders and analysts with strong politically far-right and Islamist orientations. They argue that India and the United States want to undermine Pakistan because it is an Islamic state that possesses nuclear weapons, and they blame Pakistan’s current problems on external factors. Perhaps the reality lies somewhere between these two extreme views.
The Greedy Warrior State

Aqil Shah

There has been a spate of books on Pakistan and its military in recent years. Of these, T.V. Paul’s *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* and C. Christine Fair’s *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War* stand out for their originality, theoretical elegance, and, especially in the latter case, empirical depth. Both authors deal with different, if related, aspects of the Pakistani state’s anachronistic national security policies, which are defined by a gross mismatch between its capabilities and revisionist strategic goals vis-à-vis archrival India. Similarly, both stress the important role of elite strategic ideas or culture in shaping state security preferences. But whereas Paul locates the structural source of the country’s maladies in its geopolitical location, Fair casts her analytical gaze at the military institutional level.

In the persuasive *Warrior State*, Paul seeks to explain why Pakistan remains an economically underdeveloped garrison state when former military-ruled states in Asia and Africa have embraced democracy and reaped the dividends of free trade and globalization (p. 2). The main culprits in his story are Pakistan’s civilian and military elites. According to Paul, the ruling elite had both the motive (or what he calls a “hyper-realistpolitik” ideology with a religious bent) and the opportunity (the territorial rivalry with India) to pursue a ruinous military-first approach to security at the cost of social and economic development, enabled by U.S. geostrategic rents that obviated the Pakistani military’s need to pursue democracy or development (pp. 3, 5, 18, 28).

While these factors are well-known, Paul’s key contribution lies in his thoughtful application of important social science theories to the Pakistani case. First, he draws on Charles Tilly’s “war-making as state-making” thesis, namely the argument that the needs of warfighting forced Western European elites in the seventeenth century to strengthen the state’s extractive capacity to raise standing armies. Hence, fighting other states should spur domestic development in other contexts as well. But when applied to the Pakistani context, warfare and national consolidation have been conflicting rather
than complementary logics. As Paul rightly observes, the country’s heavy investment in the military for over six decades has brought neither security nor prosperity. This paradoxical outcome leads him to infer that excessive war-making efforts can induce political and economic stagnation in developing contexts by diverting scarce resources from social welfare to defense (p. 2, 15, 157, 188–89). Citing the examples of the East Asian tigers South Korea and Taiwan, Paul contends that states can still harness the salutary effects of war on national development only if elites can “control or compartmentalize” it to achieve rapid economic growth (pp. 15, 175–80). Ultimately, and given the right strategic environment and resources, what matters most is whether elites are pragmatic or dogmatic. Unfortunately, in Paul’s view, Pakistan’s elites have been “devoid of prudence” (p. 3) and a “developmental outlook” (p. 5). Hence, they have opted for the unrestrained pursuit of narrow militarized security resulting in state weakness and economic decay (p. 15).

The book dismisses the conventional wisdom that the threat from India independently explains Pakistan’s evolution into a garrison state. Instead, the author claims that the “policy choice to respond militarily was largely Pakistan’s own” (p. 4). After all, as he reminds us, countries like Taiwan and South Korea faced “similar conflict situations,” but they never became obsessed with security and their elite adopted developmental state policies. Similarly, from his comparison of Pakistan with Turkey, Indonesia, and Egypt, Paul concludes that even Muslim-majority “national security” states have overcome the warrior urge because of smart choices by elites (pp. 152–75).

Here, claims in The Warrior State are contestable on several grounds. One, both South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed varying degrees of external security guarantees from the United States, so they had a better chance of prioritizing economics over warfare. Two, and unlike ethnically divided Pakistan, both South Korea and Taiwan were also homogenous societies, which ultimately facilitated their transitions to democracy by insulating them from the potential challenge of peacefully accommodating ethnic diversity. Finally, neither Turkey nor Indonesia was even half as insecure as Pakistan, and their main security threats were internal. Hence, as Paul himself concedes, neither had the need to overspend on defense or develop the tools, such as the use of nonstate actors, needed to fight a much stronger external enemy (p. 165).

Second, he attributes Pakistan’s thwarted development to its geographic location, which has put a “geostrategic curse” on the country (pp. 3, 15, 21–22, 33). According to the book, this strategic curse works much like
the well-known curse of natural resources. In return for serving (and at times undermining) U.S. security interests, Pakistan’s elites have enjoyed access to strategic rents, which has discouraged them from expanding the state’s extractive capacity to achieve the economic strength required for maintaining the security competition with India (pp. 18–23).

This “rentier” thesis has much going for it but leaves one question unanswered: why did Pakistan not reform itself when the strategic rents dried up—for example, in 1965–80 and 1990–2001? Paul alludes to the path-dependent nature of ideas (p. 23), so it is reasonable to infer that even in the absence of U.S. military aid, Pakistani elites continued to harbor their hyper-realpolitik strategic assumptions. However, it is not clear where these assumptions come from, or how they stick. On closer analysis, it appears more plausible that once Pakistan’s founding fathers adopted a warrior state strategy in response to structural insecurity at the outset of independence, these Hobbesian beliefs developed a life of their own, especially because the powerful military institution internalized them.

Military beliefs and culture are where Fair also focuses her compelling argument in Fighting to the End. She is puzzled by Pakistan’s persistent attempts to overturn the territorial status quo in Kashmir despite repeated failure in 1948, 1965, and 1999. No less baffling is the military’s continuing reliance on violent nonstate actors (under the cover of nuclear weapons) to sustain the rivalry with India, a strategy that has eroded Pakistan’s international standing, left it diplomatically isolated, and even posed a threat to its own survival as a state (pp. 227–32, 243–51).

This enduring revisionism leads Fair to wonder whether Pakistan really is a normal, security-seeking state. Realist international relations theory posits that all modern states are rational actors primarily concerned with achieving physical security. Rationality demands that states abandon or change policies that fail to achieve their objectives. Hence, the book argues that Pakistan may be what Charles Glaser calls a “purely greedy state,” which can never be satisfied with the status quo and will always try to aggrandize more territory or spread its ideology (pp. 4–5, 282). According to Fair, this greedy behavior endures primarily because the Pakistani military sees the conflict with India in “civilizational” terms and thus has never interpreted losing a war as defeat. Instead, victory means the ability to continue “fighting to the end” (p. 7).

What are the organizational sources of this strategy? Fair painstakingly combs through the Pakistani military’s underutilized professional journals and publications over the last six decades to argue that its main driver is
military strategic culture—or taken-for-granted and shared conceptions of Pakistan’s external environment—which influences how the organization interprets the threats from India and Afghanistan and the instruments it has developed to tackle them (pp. 5–7, 34–38, 243). She convincingly traces the origins of this culture to the military’s formative experience and accumulated memory of perceived Indian perfidy during and after the partition of British India (pp. 40–65), and tracks its evolution and transmission over time. What emerges is a professional discourse replete with self-serving falsehoods and historical distortions, in which “Hindu” India is depicted as an implacable enemy and the army as the sole bulwark for protecting Pakistan’s physical and ideological frontiers (pp. 88–102; on the army’s perceptions of India as the malicious foe, see pp. 154–86). The Pakistani military’s recalcitrant conflict behavior is a damning confirmation of Fair’s thesis and provides strong evidence that norms are path dependent and difficult to change once they become ingrained in institutional structures.

What does this mean for the United States, India, and the international community? Fighting to the End contends that appeasing Pakistan by giving it security guarantees or other concessions is unlikely to work because the Pakistani military’s revisionism is driven by ideology rather than material insecurity (p. 282). Hence, the best the United States and its allies can do is to decide how to contain the threat of Islamist militancy and terrorism emanating from Pakistan (pp. 281–82).

How might Pakistan’s sticky strategic culture change? Fair is pessimistic about the prospects of any significant alterations as long as the military continues to view the conflict with India through a strictly ideological lens. She does consider several potential endogenous and exogenous game changers in the book’s penultimate chapter. For example, drawing on her earlier work with Shuja Nawaz, Fair argues that changes in the geographic distribution of the officer corps mean that the army is now recruiting officers with a different worldview from that of their seniors who came from select districts of the Punjab province (pp. 269–74). The salutary effect of broad-based recruitment on military attitudes faces one formidable obstacle, though: the military’s capacity to socialize recruits into institutionally sanctioned norms and ideas by creating a break with the past.

Fair is even less hopeful that political change, such as a successful democratization, can make a difference. In her view, an ossified strategic culture, based on erroneous assumptions, permeates the national narrative, is inserted into the education system and civil society, is not rational or
empirical, and remains resistant to amelioration (see p. 11 and p. 21). The implication is that even if the military were weaned away from dominating politics and strategic policy, civilian politicians would be unlikely to challenge the generals’ strategic assumptions because they have “thoroughly acquiesced to this reality” (p. 21; see also p. 265).

However, Fair seems to discount the role of political learning on elite attitudes and behavior. As the case of Brazil and other Latin American countries demonstrates, the experience of authoritarian government can unite political elite against military praetorianism and electoral competition can create incentives for them to erode the military’s undue political and strategic influence. Pakistan’s most recent transition from authoritarian rule in 2007–8 has revealed that major political parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) have learned their lessons from exile, incarceration, and repression under authoritarian rule and appear strongly committed to the democratic process. In May 2013, Pakistan broke its seemingly permanent curse of zero democratic turnover of power from one full-term elected government to another when the PPP government completed its five-year tenure and Nawaz Sharif’s opposition PML-N won the parliamentary elections to form a new government. As Fair herself admits, this successful transition was made possible in good part by Sharif’s ability to resist the temptation of knocking on the garrison’s door to unseat the PPP government (p. 265). In addition, his decision to allow and pursue the trial of former president General Pervez Musharraf for treason under Article 6 of Pakistan’s constitution will likely act as a further deterrent to military coups.

On the India front, Pakistan’s politicians do not necessarily share the military’s pessimistic view of India as a source of unremitting hostility. In fact, Sharif and Benazir Bhutto (especially in her first term from 1988 to 1990) sought to mend fences with New Delhi at significant political risk. For instance, Sharif’s peace overture to India in 1999 irked Musharraf, then the army chief, who tried to scuttle it by sending troops into the Kargil sector of Indian Kashmir and ultimately overthrew Sharif in October of that year. To the military’s chagrin, Sharif has sought to normalize trade with India since assuming power in 2013. Moreover, in three of Pakistan’s four provinces—Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Baluchistan—the Kashmir issue is hardly a vote winner. And the fact that the PML-N’s main base of support is in Punjab, Pakistan’s largest and electorally most significant province, shows clearly that resolving the conflict with India has a sizable domestic constituency. The military still has influential allies.
among political parties (e.g., Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf) and civil society (e.g., the media), which it can use to browbeat governments that it considers soft on India. But if the PPP, the PML-N, and other parties remain united around the goal of maintaining democracy, Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance could shift in favor of the civilians, thereby increasing the likelihood that the country may forgo its revisionism and learn to live peacefully with India.

These minor flaws and disagreements aside, both *The Warrior State* and *Fighting to the End* are compelling in their own right. Both books should be standard reading for scholars and policymakers interested in understanding the India-Pakistan rivalry and the Pakistani military, as well as political development, terrorism, and security studies more broadly.
Culture or Structure? Understanding the Complexities of Pakistan

T.V. Paul

In recent years, Pakistan has received a fair amount of attention largely from journalists, think tank analysts, and a handful of writers from the scholarly community. After neglecting the paradoxes of this country for several decades, Western scholars have finally started to look at it more seriously. I suspect the reluctance to do hard-nosed analysis of Pakistan was probably due to its pivotal role for the United States during the Cold War and, since September 11, in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Despite academic freedom, Western scholars often implicitly follow the lead of their governments on such countries of strategic value. Liberal scholars also often tend to see Pakistan’s struggles as imposed on it, blaming the lack of a solution to the Kashmir problem as the number one impediment to Pakistan’s proper democratic transformation. Political correctness is a big challenge here. Pakistan’s military and diplomatic communities have shown extraordinary dexterity in covering up their pet geopolitical projects in order to bargain for continued military and economic aid from the West and international financial institutions without undertaking necessary reforms. However, as U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan underwent some major changes in recent years, it now is easier to publish critical work on Pakistan. Washington no longer hyphenates the two and has started to give India the status of a rising major power. The “double games” that the Pakistani military has been playing in the war on terrorism have also created a sense in Washington that “enough is enough” in propping up Pakistan’s military elite.

_Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War_ by C. Christine Fair and _The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan_ by Aqil Shah offer useful pathways to understanding the Pakistani army’s societal dominance and its persistent organizational and cultural pathologies. They follow works by Stephen Cohen (The Idea of Pakistan, 2004), Husain Haqqani (Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 2005), and Shuja Nawaz (Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, 2008). Fair is more direct and critical of the Pakistani army, using the lens of a strategic culture approach. The key to understanding Pakistan’s behavior, her book claims, lies in strategic culture, which encompasses “the collectivity of its corporate

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beliefs, values, and norms as well as the accumulating weight of its historical experiences” (p. 5). Fair argues that Pakistan’s apprehensions about India are driven more by ideology than security. This ideology is founded on an idea of undermining India’s dominant position within South Asia and beyond. Such behavior exhibits the traits of a “greedy state,” to paraphrase Charles Glaser, and it is unlikely to be placated by territorial revisions alone. The Pakistani army is defending not just territory but an ideological frontier founded on Islam. And this strategic culture is the basis for understanding the behavior of Pakistan toward India and Afghanistan, as well as its domestic politics, including the army’s domination over civilians on matters of foreign and defense policy.

*Fighting to the End* argues that Pakistan’s revisionism toward India needs to be understood beyond Kashmir. I agree with Fair on this point. It is naive to believe that somehow solving the Kashmir problem according to the established position of Pakistan will reduce the army’s role in the country. Let us look at the two solutions Pakistanis and Pakistan sympathizers talk about for Kashmir: independence and India ceding Kashmir to Pakistan. In the first instance, an independent Kashmir is likely to become a theater of intense violence (similar to Afghanistan) between Pakistan and India, and perhaps China, because of its strategic location. Over time, the Kashmiri liberation movements have become theocratic, and therein lies the problem. The substantial Hindu and Buddhist minorities are unlikely to be accommodated in such a new country. The jihadists waiting on Pakistan’s side will not let this hypothetically independent country become democratic, secular, or tolerant of minority groups. If India’s border post moves down to the precarious Punjab terrain, India will have to actively defend this border, preemptively or preventively. An emboldened Pakistani army will claim that it needs, more than ever, to strengthen its position vis-à-vis India and protect its ally, Kashmir. The option of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan is likely to play out in a similar fashion. India will find the Pakistani army on the border some four hundred miles from New Delhi, the traditional invasion route for the conquerors of the subcontinent for several millennia. The Pakistani army’s grand ambitions vis-à-vis India will increase, and there is no guarantee that its societal role will diminish in such a scenario. None of this is to sympathize with India’s often high-handed policy in Kashmir or Pakistan’s continuous policy of fomenting troubles with insurgents. The focus here is on the likely persistence of the Pakistani army’s dominant societal status even if the Kashmir problem were solved in Pakistan’s favor.
Fair is correct in arguing that the struggle by Pakistan is not about territory per se but about strategic parity with India. She does not use the term “status competition,” but that is the correct problem here. Because of cultural myths inherited over the years, the Pakistani army sees India now as a status-equivalent power, and earlier as a status-inferior state. The propping up of Pakistan by the great powers, especially the United States and China, has encouraged this exaggerated view. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to develop this equal status. Now that the great powers are changing their tune, the Pakistani military is in a very difficult situation. Its revisionist behavioral pathologies are likely to persist because it sees no end in sight for India’s increasing global and regional status.

Fair’s book has many strengths. Its detailed citations, interview materials, and references to internal army publications are all useful. However, often one gets a sense that Fair is more interested in the trees than the forest. Fighting to the End bogs down in details without linking them properly to the larger argument it advances in the first few chapters. The book discusses international relations theory occasionally, but some concepts, such as “reckless realism,” are not explicated sufficiently. What is laudable, however, is Fair’s willingness, as someone who used to be sympathetic to many of the activities of the Pakistani military, to reconsider her views upon seeing the facts differently. More such daring works are needed if Pakistan is to ever get out of the rut that it has been stuck in for so long.

Shah’s The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan offers a rich and comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Pakistan’s military and its continued control over the body politic, making it impossible for the country to emerge as a proper democracy. Shah presents some new materials by locating Pakistani military writings and conducting interviews with generals, which offer insight into their worldviews. Over nine chapters, he narrates the story of how the army became the most important societal actor in Pakistan and exposes the reasons for this continued dominance, contrasting this history with that of neighboring India and a large number of erstwhile military-ruled states that became proper democracies in the past three decades. The book provides detailed analysis of pivotal moments when the military strengthened its position.

While I see much merit in The Army and Democracy, a few drawbacks need to be addressed. The book is more in the category of a rich narrative than a theoretical study of why Pakistan is the way it is. Shah does not offer a compelling causal mechanism for Pakistan’s predicament other than highlighting the India threat and the original sin of the unfulfilled promises
of partition. He needed to explain how accurate this threat perception has been rather than accepting at face value the almost paranoid assessments that Pakistani generals make of the India threat (many of which he quotes). From the discussion, it appears that the India threat is a convenient excuse for some larger reasons for a military to behave this way, as many countries facing existential threats from their neighbors have become developmental states and proper democracies after periods of military rule. South Korea and Taiwan are good examples.

The book also neglects the strategic and civilizational parity that the military elite has been seeking with India, a neighbor some seven to eight times as large according to most measures of material power. If the threat perception is largely based on size, then India’s disintegration or complete weakening is the only condition that will make Pakistan secure. All the other factors the military talks about—such as India fomenting internal conflict in Pakistan or supporting Afghanistan’s development—are exaggerated arguments often mirroring what Pakistan does toward India. All major wars, except partially the war of 1971, and a majority of crises in this dyad have been initiated by Pakistan, and this itself shows who the revisionist party is here. India’s strategy (arguably even with the Cold Start doctrine of faster and concentrated mobilization in the event of a major terrorist attack by Islamist groups supported by Pakistan) is reactive and defensive inasmuch as the onus of first strike often rests with Pakistan.

Shah also dismisses class structure as an explanation for the military’s dominance of Pakistani society. Most works on democratic development treat the class structure of a country as key to democratic transition and consolidation. Pakistan’s main challenge has been the absence of a powerful and progressive middle, or labor, class willing to defend democracy and push for change. The collaboration between the landed aristocracy and the military has created the worst form of hybrid governance and economic organization for a country in the modern world. Without land reforms, Pakistan is unlikely to generate a viable middle class. Without proper education, especially liberal education, the middle class is unlikely to become progressive. The military keeps playing double games to extract as much money as possible from the great powers and friendly states, and its dependence on these resources to satisfy its own corporatist interests has generated a geostrategic curse on Pakistan (which I describe in my book The Warrior State). Egypt is the closest parallel to Pakistan one can find in the contemporary world, although Cairo has not used terrorism as a weapon to achieve its goals.
Finally, both books are long and could have been limited to two hundred pages. *The Army and Democracy* is at times repetitive, and the last few chapters provide narrations that are common knowledge by now. The book would have benefited from introducing theories of development in comparative politics, international relations literature, and especially political psychology to offer a more comprehensive explanation. Yet despite those limitations, both *The Army and Democracy* and *Fighting to the End* add to our understanding of a highly complex country and are welcome additions to the growing literature on the multifaceted challenges confronting Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Army: Running and Ruining a Country

*C. Christine Fair*

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V. Paul, a professor of international relations at McGill university, and Aqil Shah, a long-time scholar of democratization in Pakistan, have written two very different but ultimately complementary accounts of the Pakistan Army—*The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* and *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, respectively. Both books describe Pakistan’s long-standing security competition with India and expost the primary means through which Pakistan has sought to impose its will on India: a reliance on Islamist proxies, an ever-expanding nuclear arsenal, and alliances with countries like the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Whereas Paul focuses on the policies pursued by the military and their sequelae, Shah focuses on how the institution of the army came to dominate the Pakistani state. Whereas Paul places the blame for Pakistan’s development largely on the United States, Shah holds the army accountable for its ruinous role in the troubled state.

*The Warrior State* examines the roles of war and war-making in the development of Pakistan in particular and several other historical and contemporary nation-states in Europe and Asia. Paul finds that although the experiences of many countries suggest that war-making helped spur national development and consolidation, Pakistan’s own trajectory has been an outlier. Despite pursuing militarized security for some six decades, Pakistan is insecure and politically fragmented. The book describes how Pakistan’s political elite pursued militarized security at the expense of the country’s political, human, and economic development. Oddly, for the most part, Pakistan’s citizenry has supported these policies and has rallied around the army’s incessant warmongering and selfish claims on the state’s budget.

Paul argues that great-power patrons such as the United States—and to a lesser degree China—have played a preeminent role in undermining Pakistan’s development, security, and ultimately stability. These patrons discouraged the Pakistani elite from forging state policies that would enhance social, economic, and political development and incentivized

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them to instead pursue geopolitical goals and a narrow strategy of military security based on hyper-realpolitik assumptions. In doing so, these elites have neglected other potential national goals and, in turn, have undermined the state’s very viability. In summary, Paul contends that because of the interests of great powers, Pakistan’s political elites have “had both the motive and the opportunity to pursue such policies” (p. 3). Like Ayesha Siddiqa and Husain Haqqani before him, Paul puts forward the argument that Pakistan is a rentier state that has lived “off the rents provided by its external benefactors for supporting their particular geostrategic goals” (p. 18). He further argues that Pakistan’s alliance with the United States through the Mutual Defense Pact of 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was “the beginning of the geostrategic curse” (p. 117). The Warrior State’s overarching argument is important and compelling. The book’s logical conclusion is that the United States and China are responsible for a large share of the burden for enabling the recklessness of this crisis-prone state.

Yet this argument is not without some important problems. First, Paul implies that the United States sucked Pakistan into its alliance strategy. With India being unwilling to join hands with the United States, the latter was “desperately looking for strategic partners in Asia-Pacific…. Sensing a major opportunity, the Pakistani elite began discussions with Washington and in 1954 they struck an alliance” (pp. 116–17). At times, the book implies that the United States was predatory in its approach to cultivate Pakistan as a partner. However, until the mid-1950s, Washington was disinterested in South Asia and was generally content to let the United Kingdom take the lead in the region. In the early years after Pakistan’s independence, General Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly made overtures to the United States to ally with Pakistan, noting Pakistan’s strategic utility, yet their appeals were rebuffed by Washington. Only after the onset of the Korean War did Washington become interested in the “northern tier” defense concept discussed by Paul.1

In fact, Pakistan was very keen to offer its strategic utility to Washington, which is illustrated by its extensive lobbying efforts to join

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1 The northern tier defense concept, which gave rise to CENTO, was modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). CENTO was formed in 1955 and included Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The United States was not a member but had observer status. (Iraq withdrew from the organization in 1958.) SEATO was formed in 1955 and included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These three treaty organizations together formed a band of countries to prevent Soviet expansion. The eastern-most partner of NATO was Turkey, which was also included in CENTO. Pakistan in turn linked SEATO to the alliance system.
SEATO. Contrary to Paul’s account, the U.S. Department of Defense initially opposed Pakistani membership in SEATO, correctly assessing that Pakistan’s inclusion would drive away other Asian states. Washington’s apprehensions were justified: ultimately Thailand and the Philippines were the only other Asian states willing to join. Pakistan was adamant in joining in the hopes that membership would provide some protection to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In fact, Pakistan’s foreign secretary Zafarullah Khan attended the SEATO organizational meeting in Manila in 1954 with the aim of obtaining a security guarantee against all acts of aggression, even though SEATO—like CENTO—specifically addressed threats from Communist states. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, fearing that the United States or SEATO would become enmeshed in Pakistan’s security competition with India, outright refused Khan’s overtures and further explicitly declared that SEATO defense guarantees would apply only to Communist aggression.² Failing to secure absolute security guarantees, Khan was supposed to seek further instruction from his ministry. However, he signed the treaty without consultation, contending that Pakistan’s interests would not be served by backing out after lobbying vigorously to be included. Pakistan’s cabinet ratified the treaty in early 1955.

*The Warrior State* makes a similarly misleading claim with regard to the Soviet-Afghan conflict when it states the “United States played the most significant role in turning Pakistan into a pivotal front-line state in the war against the Soviet Union” (p. 119). Pakistan had in fact formulated its *jihad* strategy in Afghanistan as early as 1974 under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The targets of its complaints with Afghanistan were numerous: Afghanistan’s initial vote against Pakistan’s inclusion in the United Nations, enduring irredentist claims on significant swathes of land in Baluchistan, refusal to recognize the Durand Line as the border between the countries, and episodic military assaults on Pakistan’s border. When Mohammad Daoud Khan ousted the Afghan king, Zahir Shah, and began a Moscow-supported policy of modernization, Afghanistan’s Islamists resisted. As Daoud began a campaign of repression, they began to flee into Pakistan and Iran. Bhutto directed the Inter-Services Intelligence’s Afghan cell to begin organizing the Islamist resistance. By the time the Russians crossed the Amu Darya river on

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Christmas Day in 1979, Pakistan had already formed the major mujahideen groups. The Soviet invasion afforded previously rebuffed Pakistan the opportunity to draw the United States—along with Saudi Arabia—into its policy of manipulating affairs in Afghanistan.

Overall, however, Paul’s account is compelling, these largely historical quibbles notwithstanding, and should provoke the United States to reflect more closely on the negative consequences of its engagements with Pakistan.

In a different vein, Shah’s book, *The Army and Democracy*, focuses on successive institutional decisions by the Pakistan Army itself. If in Paul’s account, the army is an object of great-power maneuvers, in Shah’s account it is the agent of its own evolution. Whereas Paul wants to inform a larger discussion about the conditions under which war-making contributes to state development, Shah aims to contribute the expansive literature on civil-military relations. Taking Pakistan as his primary case, Shah focuses on the senior officer corps of the Pakistan Army and their “shared ideological framework about the military’s role, status, and behavior in relation to a state and society” (p. 9). He contends that these “shared values affect how these officers perceive and respond to civilian governmental decisions, policies, and political crises” (p. 9). Shah hopes that by understanding better these shared values, we can better “assess how the military’s particular conceptions of professionalism shape its involvement in politics” (p. 9).

Both authors agree that Pakistan’s rivalry with India profoundly shaped the worldview of the Pakistan Army, informed its approach to securing Pakistan, and influenced the trajectory of civil-military relations. Shah notes that this rivalry “spurred the militarization of the Pakistani state in the early years and thus provided the context in which the generals could increase their influence in domestic politics and national security policy” (p. 13). Civilians acquiesced and diverted resources to the military, while abdicating oversight, as the twin efforts of state-building and survival appeared ever more synonymous with the war effort. *The Army and Democracy* traces out the opportunity structures that Pakistan’s army created and exploited to foist itself increasingly to the center of the state.

Shah’s inquiry complements that of Paul. Both scholars seek to explain why Pakistan remains insecure despite pursuing security-oriented policies. Shah, like Paul, identifies puzzles in the extant literature. For example, conventional wisdom and recent political science scholarship suggest that that “external security threats result in civilian supremacy over the military” (p. 9). By that logic, Pakistan’s long-standing enmities with India and even Afghanistan should have ensured civilian dominance over the army. Shah
argues that these threat-based understandings of the relationship between the soldier and the state omit a critical intervening variable: national unity. He concludes that external threats will produce civilian dominance over the military only when there is domestic cohesion—something which has long eluded Pakistan.

The Army and Democracy concludes by putting forward a series of policies that, over time, may help Pakistan’s civilians “guard the guardians.” Shah envisions this process encompassing two phases: transition and consolidation. In the former phase, the primary objective is “to reduce the military’s capacity to intervene in politics and keep the democratic process functioning” (p. 263). The latter is accomplished by “consolidating democratic supremacy through strengthening the administrative capacity of the [Ministry of Defence], parliamentary oversight...and the redefinition of military missions and professionalism” to render them compatible with democratic governance (p. 263). Transitioning Pakistan from authoritarianism to democracy has potential implications for the state’s belligerence toward India; after all, the scholarly literature suggests that two democratic states rarely wage war against each other. Shah, however, is realistic about the prospects for such a transition in any near-term time horizon.

Policymakers, particularly in the United States, would do well to contemplate Shah’s suggestions and consider how U.S. policies may support a democratic transition in Pakistan. At the same time, U.S. policymakers must evaluate the significant challenges posed by Paul, who is surely correct when he alleges that the United States—perhaps more than any other state—has aided and abetted the most pernicious policies of the Pakistan Army, even while spending enormous resources to contain the same. In short, South Asian security analysts should take on board the largely complementary arguments marshalled by both of these authors.
Author’s Response: 
Military Influence and the Reality of Politics in Pakistan

Aqil Shah

I am thankful to all the reviewers for their incisive and helpful comments on my book The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. Most have raised intriguing questions and issues for me to ponder in future research on the topic. Let me respond to some important points raised by the reviewers.

In their thoughtful reviews, Christine Fair and Marvin Weinbaum illuminate the theoretical, empirical, and policy angles of my research. On the policy front, I second Fair’s conclusion that the United States would do well to consistently support a democratic transition in Pakistan rather than putting all of its eggs in the basket of the military, which has been the default and misguided U.S. policy since the early 1950s. By enabling and empowering the generals vis-à-vis the political parties and civil society, this policy has had negative consequences (to put it mildly) both for Pakistan’s internal politics and, as Fair ably documents in her book, for regional and international security.

Weinbaum points to an important omission in my work that is also common to the other two books under review: namely the lack of discussion of the interaction between the military and extremists and of its consequences for shaping the ideological beliefs that may underlie Pakistan’s national security policies toward India, Afghanistan, and the United States. In defense, I would like to note that the primary focus of my book is the domestic political impact of the military’s tutelary organizational beliefs, even though these are linked to and often rationalized in the context of perceived external insecurity.

In his review, John Gill suggests that my book does not pay sufficient attention to the role of “civilian” actors in civil-military relations. He correctly notes that politicians share the blame for the military’s intervention in politics because of their incompetence, corruption, or complicity. I also accept his point that Pakistan’s chances of breaking out of its authoritarian trap are contingent on both civilian and military choices. However, in

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my humble opinion, analyzing the weakness of democratic institutions, norms, and practices in Pakistan as a product of politicians’ ostensible venality is an equally inadequate approach because it fails to account for the real possibility that these nonmilitary factors are endogenous to military influence. Moreover, I wrote my book precisely with the goal of understanding the role of the military in politics from the perspective of the officer corps, an aspect largely ignored in the literature on civil-military relations in Pakistan and even beyond (with a few notable exceptions). To be convincing, any story of military politics has to take into account the military’s characteristic institutional features that shape its responses to specific political and security stimuli. In particular, its members’ shared interpretations of their appropriate role in the polity do this by making some choices appear more plausible than others in a given situation.

Gill also suggests that I am too critical of the army’s relationship with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government. He cites two examples to prove civilian dereliction of duty: the PPP leadership’s alleged inability to provide General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani with “strategic advice” and civilian failure in taking over the reins of administration from the army once it had cleared Swat of militants. For one, I find it hard to believe that Kayani ever seriously solicited the PPP leadership’s advice on strategic issues, given that he and his fellow generals believed that civilian politicians were ill-educated, that they had the “wrong attitude,” that they “had not read basic defense policy documents,” that they lacked a “reading culture,” and that “even [their] thought process was non-existent.” Besides, the militarized nature of Pakistani foreign policy, which typically excludes or ignores politicians’ input or direction, has led to these politicians’ pragmatic accommodation of the military’s views to avoid conflict or the loss of power. Second, sections of the civilian leadership have been shortsighted, self-interested, and often negligent in performing their basic job of providing a semblance of public order in places like Swat. However, it is important to acknowledge that Pakistan’s civilian administrations do not have the requisite capacity to carry out this task. This is in part because the military has steadily

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encroached on civilian functions such as law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and in some cases (such as Benazir Bhutto’s assassination) even criminal investigations and has impaired the development of administrative capacity and autonomy. In this situation, the default, if democratically corrosive, response of an insecure and weak civilian government is again to pass the buck to the army (as is evident in the recent institution of special military courts to try terrorism cases).

I am humbled by the praise from Hasan Askari Rizvi, the author of the first authoritative social science monograph on the Pakistan military’s political role, of my book as the “most current and comprehensive study” of civil-military relations in Pakistan based on hard data and “major theoretical formulations about different facets of civil-military relations in developing countries.” I concur with his suggestion that my analysis would have been richer if I had compared the formation and persistence of Pakistani military attitudes with those in civilian-dominated states like India. Hopefully, I can in time carry out a comparative study of military attitudes in both consolidated democratic and authoritarian contexts.

T.V. Paul’s review of my book makes three main points. First, he dismissively claims that my work is not theoretical but merely historical. Leaving aside the hubris inherent in the outright rejection of historical narrative as inferior to deductive theory, my book does in fact take a theoretically driven approach to explain military politics in Pakistan. In tracing the origins, evolution, and persistence of the Pakistan military’s political interventions and dominance, I draw on insights from the literature on military politics and sociological institutionalism and use social science concepts such as organizational norms and path dependency. As acknowledged by one of the leading scholars of comparative civil-military relations, Zoltan Barany at the University of Texas–Austin, my book also makes a vital theoretical contribution by highlighting a missing variable—national unity—that links divergent threat-based theories of civilian control (namely, the Lasswellian proposition that threats empower and politicize the military and the Andreskian argument that threats depoliticize the soldiers by creating national unity and focusing the military on external warfighting). Using the case of Pakistan, I show that the prior

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3 See Barany’s endorsement on the dust jacket of my book.

level of national cohesion and consensus on the enemy mediates the “rally around the flag effect” of military threats. Hence, external threats can either unify or fracture polities, depending on the existing level of “we-ness.”

Second, and surprisingly, Paul contends that my argument lacks a causal mechanism connecting the perceived security threat from India to the military’s behavior. Yet I clearly demonstrate that the primary causal mechanism at work in my explanation is the “logic of appropriateness” (see pp. 7–9). Simply put, military organizations make sense of their external environment and respond to perceived threats in the ways they consider most appropriate. Paul’s review goes on to claim that I accept the Pakistan military’s “paranoid” threat assessments at face value. Any social science researcher’s job is to interpret evidence, not impute intentions to political actors. My assessment of Pakistani threat perceptions in the formative decade following independence is based on declassified government documents that show clearly that the country’s civilian and military elite (which as Weinbaum points out, Paul lumps together) importantly perceived an existential threat from India and their response was to prepare for imminent war (see pp. 61–63 of The Army and Democracy). As sociologist Lewis Coser put it, “If men define a threat as real, although there may be little or nothing in reality to justify this belief, the threat is real in its consequences.”

Hence, whether these leaders were paranoid is beside the point. What matters is that this perception shaped their choices at the time, which affected Pakistan’s political trajectory. As I argue and show in my book, Pakistani elite beliefs were products of the military’s formative institutional experience under conditions of external insecurity and internal divisions. These beliefs have since proved durable because they have become embedded over time in the military’s socialization processes. (Fair makes a similar path-dependent argument to show the origins and ossification of the military’s strategic culture.)

Finally, Paul faults my book for “dismissing” the role of class structure in explaining military coups and rule in Pakistan. In particular, he appears to view the landed elite’s collaboration with the military as a key obstacle to the country’s democratic development, albeit without providing any evidence in either his review or his book. The balance of class power in a society or social coalitions is of course important in shaping political outcomes. However, the military institution, which typically controls the most lethal coercive resources of the state, has the capacity and often the

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inclination to advance its corporate interests with relative autonomy from social groups. As Pakistan’s history shows, the military has been quite promiscuous in its choice of political partners, partnering with or disposing of leaders, parties, and other weighty allies in accordance with the military’s view of its interests at the time. For example, it ousted prominent Punjabi landlords such as Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon in 1958, Sindhi landed elites such as Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto in 1977, and even Punjabi industrialists such as Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s when they challenged the military’s definition of the “supreme national interest.”

No doubt drawing on Barrington Moore’s famous dictum “no bourgeoisie, no democracy,” Paul also claims in his review essay that the main challenge of democratization in Pakistan is the “absence of a powerful and progressive middle class.” There are at least two fundamental problems with this argument. First, if the vast social science literature on democratization has taught us anything, it is that there is no single, universal route to democracy; different countries often traversed different paths of democratization. Second, the link between the middle class and democracy is in itself problematic. Even in Western Europe, the bourgeoisie was rarely ever the heroic vanguard of modernity and democracy. The view of the bourgeoisie as a distinct and self-confident class striving for liberal democracy is misleading because it eliminates the real possibility of political divisions within the middle class. From Thailand to Turkey, different middle class groups have supported authoritarian regimes, not because of these groups’ weakness but as a consequence of their calculating the danger democratic politics posed to their political and economic interests.

Regardless of these disagreements, I have greatly benefitted from this engaging exchange of ideas with a group of highly seasoned political scientists and scholars of Pakistan.
Author’s Response: The Paradoxes of Pakistan

T.V. Paul

The reviews of my book *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* by five leading scholars of Pakistan are gratifying, and I appreciate the positive comments they made on the strengths of the book along with the two other books under review. The discussions by the reviewers are both rich and in-depth, and the reviews substantially enhance the debate on a crucial country whose policies impinge on regional and global security in areas such as transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Since none of the reviewers frontally question my central argument, I will respond to the qualms they have expressed on specific details. I want to emphasize that my effort in this book is to offer an honest analysis on Pakistan’s predicament rather than a narrative history or a politically correct assessment.

As a social scientist, I am interested in intellectual puzzles in world politics, and almost all my previous single-authored books are puzzle-driven. My objective is to explore a paradoxical outcome with the aid of established theories or variables in an eclectic fashion as rigorously as possible. Any methodologically oriented scholar of social science recognizes that the aim of a researcher should be to systematically explain the greatest number of effects with the least number of variables. If the argument or hypothesis, drawing on a critical variable or set of variables, can satisfactorily account for a phenomenon, it is attractive. One hundred percent accuracy is not feasible. Thus, the measure of success for a work is not that it captures all the different nuances but that it explains the core central issue or puzzle and then applies these findings to larger theoretical or policy questions. If the theory is able to account for subsequent events, it is all the more useful. Events in Pakistan since the publication of the book in January 2014 support my claims fairly well. The hybrid system continues, with the military pushing the civilian government out of foreign and defense policy, and internal violence has increased to higher levels during the past year. The core warrior state of Pakistan shows no signs of losing its strength.

I believe we need more easy-to-follow theoretical works on Pakistan rather than rich descriptive narratives. There are too many bestsellers.

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*Author’s Response: The Paradoxes of Pakistan*
cashing in on this country’s sad state of affairs without explaining why Pakistan is the way it is. We need more diagnostic works so that scholars can offer ideas for change. In this spirit, let me address each criticism from the reviewers. Because John Gill does not make many criticisms, I focus on the other reviewers’ comments.

Marvin Weinbaum takes issue with my lack of discussion on the interactions between the jihadists and the military. I agree with his call for a book (or books) on this subject, as these two-way interactions need to be explained further to understand Pakistan’s strategic choices. The big challenge here is the lack of reliable data. Weinbaum’s second main point concerns the extent of Taliban control of the country. I have cited scholarly works or reports on the extent of Taliban control in 2009, and one can quibble over the difference between mere control of territory and active presence. I concur that a better term would have been “active presence.” Recent school shootings in Peshawar suggest that the Taliban, largely a Pashtun group, can wreak havoc on Pakistan if it wants to do so. So the Taliban’s impact on Pakistan’s domestic and external security and policies is a matter of interpretation.

Hasan Askari Rizvi’s works have influenced my thinking on Pakistan’s early years, and this influence is reflected in the book. His criticism that I do not focus comprehensively on India-Pakistan relations, regional politics, global affairs, and so forth could have been avoided only if the book were to provide a larger historical account of the country. As I mentioned, my intention was to focus intensively on the critical phenomena of war and state-making and the obverse outcome in Pakistan. I also wanted to write a short book because a voluminous work would not have done justice to my goal. Within these parameters, I discuss these elements as much as I can.

I also wanted to challenge the defensive nationalist narrative in Pakistan that is dominant among the elite and intellectuals who blame the rest of the world for the country’s predicament. As such, I attempt to show that the outcome is largely the result of choices the Pakistani elite made and how they used or misused geostrategic opportunities and constraints. No amount of defensive nationalism will rectify the situation, and it is in the interest of Pakistan that Pakistanis start correcting their national narratives and seek a peaceful social revolution regarding national ideology, strategies, and goals.

Aqil Shah raises a number of issues with my argument to which I would like to respond. First, he argues that both South Korea and Taiwan had direct security guarantees and hence were free to pursue developmental
economic policies. The big challenge here is to prove counterfactually what would have happened if Pakistan had direct protection from the United States or China. What guarantee is there that Pakistan would not have been emboldened to carry out more wars, crises, and revisionist agendas? In fact, during all the wars Pakistan initiated or participated in, there was an expectation of military or political support from the United States and China, in particular in 1965, 1971, and 1999. So there is no guarantee that an elite driven by a highly ambitious revisionist strategy would have mollified its policies just because it had a security guarantee from the great-power patron. If the security challenge is largely self-generated, it is very unlikely that a great-power alliance would have tempered that revisionism.

A second critique is that South Korea and Taiwan are homogeneous societies, which therefore facilitated their transition to democracy. This is a very contentious argument. Going by this logic, China would have seen democracy, while multi-ethnic India and Indonesia would have become authoritarian. What is surprising is that ethnic homogeneity is not necessarily correlated with higher degrees of democracy. In fact, some of the most illiberal democracies have been those where a single ethnic group dominated. Take the case of Sri Lanka, for example, where the dominant Sinhalese (constituting nearly 75% of the population) have suppressed minority rights. Pakistan also has a dominant ethnic group in the form of Punjabi Sunni Muslims, who instead of integrating minorities have engaged in repressive policies and alienated minorities such as Shias, Ahmadis, and the small Christian and Hindu groups, as well as the populations of provinces like Baluchistan. We should also not forget that fascism thrived under ethnic homogeneity in Germany, Italy, and Japan.

A dominant argument that I make in the book is that countries facing intense security threats confront them with different strategies. The elite needs good ideas and strategies to achieve successful results. The challenge here is that the Pakistani elite’s main reference points are not progressive but top-down, and thus their ideas are unlikely to make much improvement in the state’s policies. Further, continuous pressure from progressive civil society is needed to change policies, and that is also missing in Pakistan.

Shah considers that if the geostrategic curse were the issue, why did Pakistan not change during periods when it received little or no U.S. help. This generates questions about the larger argument. Did Pakistan experience a major economic crisis, and did its elite face the need for reforms during those periods, as did India, for example, in 1991? Was U.S. aid supplanted by aid from other states, such as Saudi Arabia or China? Did international
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank pump money into Pakistan whenever it faced a crisis? The answer to all these questions is in the affirmative, and therein lies the problem. Given the low amount of taxes collected, Pakistan compensated for its budget deficits through other sources. It was never allowed to default and face a financial crisis, which would have fomented reforms. Someone was always there to rescue it for geopolitical reasons. Countries change only when the elite are forced to do so, facing intense crises. The impact of geostrategic curse is a long-term one, and episodic breaks in U.S. aid will not make a big difference unless alternative sources of aid from other geopolitical allies dry up.

Shah also offers an argument based on the original sin—that is, the way the partition of British India occurred for Pakistan's later troubles. Then the founding leaders’ policies took a life of their own. This is not fully discounted in my analysis, but I point out that the argument assumes that countries with initial challenges do not change. My central claim, by contrast, is that during critical turning points a country can change (as is evident in several previously authoritarian states, some of which emerged from even worse original situations than Pakistan, such as South Korea).

Christine Fair claims that I focus the blame for Pakistan's situation almost exclusively on the United States. However, this reading of my argument is selective. The central theme of the book is that the Pakistani elite used the U.S. alliance differently from their South Korean or Taiwanese counterparts. My criticism takes aim at peculiar, short-sighted policies of the United States that focus on transactional aid rather than trade (unlike in South Korea and Taiwan) and thus miss every opportunity to force change in a positive direction. The success of Pakistan's asymmetrical bargaining strategy shows that the United States either underestimated or did not care about the long-term effects of its policies, a lingering problem even today.¹

Fair also asserts that it was Pakistan that took the initiative to form an alliance with the United States. My book acknowledges that Pakistan moved to become a U.S. ally at the first opportunity in the 1950s. But everything I have read suggests that this was a two-way process and that the Eisenhower administration, especially John Foster Dulles with his intense hostility toward Nehru's nonaligned India, found Pakistan martial and trustworthy. There is compelling evidence that the United States played a key role in the

¹ For powerful examples of this narrative, see Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011); and Husain Haqqani Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013).
installation of Ayub Khan in 1958 and in the successive removal of prime ministers even before that. By the early 1960s, nearly a decade of U.S. interactions ended up with the three A’s—Allah, army, and America—as the key players in Pakistani politics.

I am also not persuaded by Fair’s exoneration of the United States in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. She claims that Pakistan already had a jihadist strategy to fight in Afghanistan. But the extent of the country’s involvement would have been minimal until and unless the United States, through the CIA, participated in the war and elevated the Inter-Services Intelligence’s role as the conduit for the money and weapons that eventually propelled the withdrawal of the Soviet Union.²

None of this is to absolve Pakistan or its strategic choices. In the book, I discuss the Pakistani elite’s exploitation of geostrategic opportunities to achieve their narrow goals at every turn of the relationship. The big question is why the elite did not turn the country’s alliance with the United States into a blessing. To me, the answer lies in the peculiar policies that Pakistan, on the one side, and the United States, its Western allies, and international financial institutions, on the other, adopted toward each other. Warrior State does not engage in a blame game but attempts a social science diagnosis. Overall, my aim was to explain larger processes rather than to fill in minor details. Whether or not one agrees with my analysis, we need more diagnosis than narrative or description to understand Pakistan.

First, I would like to extend my appreciation for all the thoughtful constructive criticism offered by my colleagues in this roundtable. This is truly an opportunity for learning from some of the finest thinkers on this complex subject, and I hope to incorporate these suggestions and challenges in future work on this topic. In this essay, I would like to address a few suggestions that deserve special attention or response.

John Gill is most certainly spot on when he suggests that scholars need to better understand how the Pakistan Army manages its image and how its obsession with this influences the army’s domestic and international behavior. As Gill noted, I made some efforts to contend with this complex puzzle. However, obtaining relevant data is extremely challenging. Given that I am blacklisted by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, I have little expectation of ever being able to return to the country to take on this puzzle more robustly. Hopefully, other scholars who are better positioned to do so may answer Gill’s important call.

Marvin Weinbaum, in his review, is absolutely correct to note that none of our books “cast much light on the interactions between the military and extremist groups.” He finds missing “discussion about how those values and beliefs associated with Islamic groups may have contributed to forming the military’s thinking, including policies toward India, Afghanistan, and the West.” I do spend considerable space discussing aspects of this complex set of relations, but the data sources that I used for the book do not illuminate this issue to his or my satisfaction. My current work in progress, which focuses on the writings of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), will in some measure elucidate the vast similarities between official army publications and those of this proscribed terrorist organization. However, LeT is only one of numerous militant groups employed by Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies to prosecute Pakistan’s policies at home and abroad. Weinbaum and I will likely not be able to resolve our differences in opinion regarding the degree to which the Pakistan Army’s thinking has evolved either about the need for strategic depth or about the utility of the zoo of militants that the army and intelligence agencies have cultivated. Weinbaum is much more optimistic than I am, and

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only time will tell which view is more accurate. I would argue that it is less injurious to U.S. interests to err on the side of skepticism. In the past, the United States’ cupidity and propensity to see the best in Pakistani intentions only rewarded Islamabad for its perfidy while undermining Washington’s interests at the expense of the American taxpayer.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, like Weinbaum, is also skeptical about the durability of “strategic depth” in the army’s thinking. He specifically argues that the introduction of nuclear weapons obviates such a requirement. However, the facts belie this claim. As I note in my book, we now know that Pakistan had a crude nuclear device from about 1980. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, there is wide scholarly consensus that Pakistan continued to view Afghanistan through this lens of strategic depth. Moreover, only one general—Mirza Aslam Beg—understood strategic depth as affording Pakistan with a physical space. As chief of the Pakistan Army between 1988 and 1991, Beg was a fierce proponent of strategic depth in the physical sense, and his tenure was marked by considerable nuclear proliferation. More generally, the cultivation of strategic depth in Afghanistan has not been viewed as a strategy for developing a physical sanctuary for Pakistan’s forces and war materiel; rather, it has been understood in zero-sum terms as opening up a political space in which Pakistan can compete with India for access. I see no evidence that suggests that Pakistan has abandoned this view of Afghanistan as a space to be politically cultivated.

Aqil Shah is correct in his assessment that I “discount the role of political learning on elite attitudes and behavior.” He argues that “as the case of Brazil and other Latin American countries demonstrates, the experience of authoritarian government can unite political elite against military praetorianism, and electoral competition can create incentives for them to erode the military’s undue political and strategic influence.” Shah is infinitely better positioned than am I to draw from these other cases given his broader training and engagement of important examples outside South Asia. Indeed, he makes this case in his own superb book. I do hope that Shah is correct in his optimism. I also share his assessment that “Pakistan’s most recent transition from authoritarian rule in 2007–8 has revealed that major political parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) have learned their lessons from exile, incarceration, and repression under authoritarian rule and appear strongly committed to the democratic process.” However, the army has also forged tools to manage these new developments and sustain core military interests such as control over Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies.
Turning to T.V. Paul’s review, he is correct to note that my volume does not engage international relations (IR) theory; rather, I use the literature of strategic culture more as a heuristic tool. Of course, I am very upfront about this in the volume. After all, my training is in the humanities and my PhD is in South Asian languages and civilizations. In my research, I aim to be an empirically grounded scholar of South Asian political military affairs with a firm rooting in the languages, cultures, and societies of the countries in which I work. In writing my book, I precisely sought to engage the various audiences who are devoted to understanding Pakistan specifically and South Asia generally. If scholars of IR or other disciplines find my book useful, I will be grateful and humbled. One of my objectives is to inform the U.S. government and other nations that are aiding and abetting the worst of Pakistan’s behaviors. Even if adopting policies that treat Pakistan like a greedy state does not change its behavior, at least Islamabad will not be cultivating jihadis and nuclear weapons on the U.S. dime. However, my main goal is to communicate to Pakistanis. If Pakistan’s army is ever to be ousted from power, and if Pakistan is ever to be anything but a source of regional insecurity, Pakistanis need to understand what their military and its civilian accomplices have done and then demand change.

I was not surprised that Paul opined that in my book one often “gets a sense that Fair is more interested in the trees than the forest.” He is surely correct. After all, if one does not understand the “trees” thoroughly, how can one accurately depict the “forest” that they collectively form? As some of the reviewers pointed out, Paul could have benefited from a closer examination of these varied trees, particularly the various important distinctions in Islam’s interpretative traditions and among militant groups. With respect to Islamist terrorist actors, for example, Paul regretfully conflates the Jamaat-e-Islami–based so-called mujahideen of the 1980s with the Deobandi Taliban organization of the mid-1990s onward. He also conflates all the militant groups operating in and from Pakistan and Afghanistan with “Wahabbis.” Paul could have paid more attention to the domestic political issues along the lines of Shah. And as I noted in my own review, his recounting of the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations dangerously repeats Pakistani fictions that place the onus of Pakistan’s problems on the United States rather than on the country’s military and civilian leadership who sought to render Pakistan a rentier state.

Yet most the disquieting assertion in his review is a statement that is ostensibly a compliment. Paul writes that “what is laudable…is Fair’s willingness, as someone who used to be sympathetic to many of the
activities of the Pakistani military, to reconsider her views upon seeing the facts differently.” His contention that I have been “sympathetic” to Pakistan’s activities is unfounded. Notably, he provides no example of such positions I have taken to buttress this contention. In fact, my track record as a scholar and policy analyst undermines this assertion. In 2004, for example, I detailed the various Islamist militant groups and the state support they enjoy in Pakistan. In 2007, I argued that the focus on madrasahs (religious seminaries) as a source of terrorist labor is misplaced because the real problem is the state’s dedication to using terrorists as tools of foreign policy. In 2009, I was the first scholar of Pakistan to openly call for containing Pakistan because of the state’s refusal to abandon jihad under a nuclear umbrella as a principal tool of foreign policy. I have insisted on this position since then even though it has had few takers in Washington. Over the last decade, I have testified before various U.S. congressional subcommittees and have been unsparing and unflinching in my criticism of the Pakistan Army, the Inter-Services Intelligence, and the flotilla of terrorist organizations Pakistan employs and the impunity it enjoys in doing so. And I have paid for this position personally—by being threatened by Pakistani intelligence—and professionally by being

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unable to continue doing research in Pakistan. Thus, this accusation is as indecorous as it is baseless.

In conclusion, notwithstanding some of the significant and irresolvable differences of opinion on important matters, participating in this roundtable has been a remarkably rewarding process. I am appreciative to all who have made it possible.
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BOOK REVIEW ROUNDTABLE

Recent Books on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan