

SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems

Receipt and Response Co-ordination

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29 April 2008



**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

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
My experience

- Singapore
 - Marine Consultant
 - Visiting Research Fellow, RSIS Maritime Security Program
- Denmark
 - Baltic & International Maritime Council
 - ScanDutch A/S
- USA
 - Allstate Insurance



Introduction

- Why this study?
- Considering
 - The goal of SSAS – prevent acts of terrorism
 - The use of SSAS - *maritime security*
 - The benefits and shortcomings of SSAS
 - Future opportunities



Acts of terrorism



- 11 September 2001
 - 07:59 AA Flight 11 departs Boston Logan Airport
 - 08:46 AA Flight 11 impacts WTC North Tower;
 - **47 minutes** after takeoff
 - **27 minutes** after first indication of hijacking
- Bali, London Underground – no warning!
- Rapid response is essential



IMO SOLAS SSAS Requirements

- The SSAS must;
 - Transmit a ship-to-shore security alert until reset or deactivated
- Security Alert Received by;
 - A competent Authority designated by the Administration – Flag State
 - Government agency
 - Shipowner or Competent Authority



IMO SOLAS SSAS Requirements

- The SSAS must NOT;
 - Send the alert to any other ships
 - Raise any alarm on-board the ship



IMO SOLAS SSAS Requirements


- On receipt of SSA;
 - Ship's Flag State must notify States in the vicinity of the ship
 - Contracting State must notify Flag State and if appropriate States in the vicinity of the ship



Alert Flow - Direct contact



Alert Flow - in practice



Response management Marshall Islands

- SSA 'real'
- Incident Contingency Plan
 - US Department of State Ops Center
 - USCG HQ Command Centre
 - The ICC/International Maritime Bureau IMB
 - Coastal State Authorities
 - Marshall Islands Ambassador to US
- Agreement with US – US forces will assist
- PSI provisions



Response management United States 1

- SSA 'real' (confirmed by CSO)
- RCC Alameda alerts CG Operational Commander Atlantic or Pacific
- RCC Alameda seeks ship's intentions from CSO, agent or Port Authority
- Contact Coastal State(s)



Response management United States 2

- Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
- USCG
- US Navy
- Possibly other US agencies
- Non-US agencies via Outreach Strategy (National Strategy for Maritime Security)
- Post-incident; Dept. of Justice



Response management The Netherlands

- Dispatch a Dutch Warship to the scene if one is nearby



Response management St. Kitts & Nevis

- Department of Maritime Affairs will;
 - Consult IMO database for coastal authorities
 - Advise them that an SSA has been issued
 - Liaise with
 - CSO,
 - St. Kitts Coast Guard &
 - Coastal States for further action



Response management Denmark

- Assemble Task Force participants including;
 - Foreign Ministry,
 - Department of Defense,
 - Security and Intelligence Service,
 - Maritime Administration,
 - others as needed
- Liaise with Coastal States if required



Response management North Korea

- The Maritime Security Division of the Maritime Administration Bureau in Pyongyang will contact the IMB *



Case studies – mt LIMBURG

- 6 October 2002 off Yemen
- Only recent act of terrorism
- Prior to SSAS requirement



Danica White

- Boarded by pirates on 1 June 2007
205 miles off the Somali coast
- Master activated SSAS
- Danish Navy did not receive SSA
- USS Carter Hall observed activity
and informed the owners in
Denmark
- Ransom paid
- Ship and crew released after 83
days



Dai Hong Dan

- Boarded 29 October 2007
- Crew secure in engine room
- Contacted owners
- Owners contact IMB
- IMB contacted Coalition Forces Central Command Bahrain
- USS James E. Williams responds



USS James E. Williams



Seabourn Spirit 2005



- 5 November 2005
- Pirates fired machine guns and RPGs
- Distress Alert (not SSA) sent to MRCC Stavanger, Norway
- MRCC informed IMB
- IMB contacted coalition forces
- Evasive actions & acoustic defense equipment prevented boarding
- US Navy assisted afterwards



Seabourn Spirit 2007

- Suspicious small craft observed off Omani coast (November)
- United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organisation (UKMTO) received distress call
- United Kingdom's Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) contacts HMS Campeltown
- Helicopter dispatched from HMS Campeltown
- Small boats leave vicinity



HMS Campeltown



False alerts

- Recognised problem at IMO in 2004
- Danish Navy
 - 2004; 25 false SSAs received
 - 2005; 10 false SSAs received
 - 2006; 24 false SSAs received
- US Coast Guard
 - Oct 2005 to September 2006; 60 false SSAs received
 - Oct 2006 to September 2007; 120 false SSAs received
 - Oct & Nov 2007; 24 false SSAs received



Rapid response

- Providers of rapid response;
- In the nearby vicinity
 - Coastal navy, marine police, coalition forces, ReCAAP Focal Points
- Experienced response coordinators
 - International
 - The IMB
 - Regional
 - MARLO Bahrain, NATO, UKMTO



Potential responders and response coordinators

- Regional initiatives
 - Asia
 - Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC)
 - ReCAAP Focal Points (via ReCAAP)
 - Africa
 - US Navy Africom
 - Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA)
African Coast Guard network
 - Americas
 - Canadian & US co-ordination
 - Europe
 - ??? Future Maritime Policy?? EMSA?



Conclusions 1

- The SSAS system today is unreliable and too slow to prevent an act of terrorism
- A distress alert will generate a more rapid response



Conclusions 2

- The SSAS can be useful as a last resort if terrorists have gained control of the ship, but only if;
 - false alerts are eliminated – activation of the SSAS MUST result with a response, just like a fire alarm, and
 - the SSA is received by nearby responders or response coordinators



Recommendations 1

- Address the false alert problem
 - Redesign equipment
 - Enable alert recall function
 - Improve training



Recommendations 2

- Reduce response time
- Streamline response management
- Enable responders to receive alerts directly
 - Naval ships in vicinity
 - Regional coordinators
 - International coordinator(s)



Recommendations 3

- Expand information in SSA
 - Liberia requires 7 data elements
 - Indication of threat would be useful
- Modify SSAS usage strategy
 - Consider SSAS as 'last resort'
- Promote VHF CH16, voice or mail alerts directly to responders or coordinators
 - These to give description of the threat
- Update IMO Piracy Guidelines accordingly



Recommendations 4

- Other areas to consider
 - SUA Convention – incorporate measures to facilitate rapid response to SSAs
 - PSI program - Expand PSI to establish SSA rapid response
 - AIS, LRIT linkages
 - Quality Coastal States – European Commission



Q & A

Open Discussion



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Thanks! Keep in touch!

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