Presentation Abstract

Session 1: Ideology and Agents of Radicalization

Al-Qaida Influence in Muslim Communities in London: Role of Street Leaders by **Robert Lambert,** Research Fellow, University of Exeter**,** United Kingdom

Abstract:
Interviews with and observations of police officers working in partnership with a small number of representatives of Muslim community groups in London are analysed to determine how they conceived the roles of street leaders including Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Abdbullah el Faisal. Described as the London partnerships for research purposes they comprised police officers from the Muslim Contact Unit, a small team of experienced Metropolitan Police Special Branch detectives and experienced Muslim police officers, working separately with Brixton Salafis and Finsbury Park Islamists, two small Muslim community groups in London. During the study period 2002 to 2007 the London partnerships evolved organically to counter al-Qaida influence in local Muslim communities. The role of street leaders is illuminated by asking how participants conceived al-Qaida influence before and during their partnership work and how they conceived policing and community responses to it. The question also arises from academic debates about different notions of the al-Qaida threat that in turn determine different responses to it. Those debates are shown to be linked to explicit and implicit criticism by think-tanks and political commentators who discern serious shortcomings in the London partnerships' legitimacy and effectiveness based largely on a notion that some or all of the Muslim partners are extremist, sectarian and subversive. In contrast, data analysis indicates participants often had strong conscious notions of legitimacy and effectiveness in their work and at other times the same notions were less conscious or explicit. The participants had different but largely compatible notions of civic duty that facilitated a common purpose and helped define what legitimacy and effectiveness meant for them. While motivational differences are observed within and between the partnerships, experience, expertise and civic duty emerge as the defining attributes all participants share. These attributes help explain why they conceived the threat of al-Qaida influence in terms of street leaders, their responses to it and help elucidate their claims to legitimacy and effectiveness in tackling it.

Militant Activities as an Agent of Radicalization by **Martin Harrow,** Research Fellow, Danish Institute for International Studies

Abstract:
A number of approaches to understanding terrorism, focus on traits of the individual terrorist: The upbringing of the terrorist, social status, relative depravation, repression by authorities etc. A thorough study by Marc Sageman, has shown that at least on the individual level these claims are very hard to verify; apart from very general trends regarding age and gender, terrorists appear very different from one another, and very much like everybody else. This corresponds to findings on the societal level in Tilly's studies of historical contentious phenomena. Tilly suggests that contentious performances are the result of opportunity structures in the society and resources available to the contentious actors. The argument here is that a similar argument can be made for contemporary Islamist terrorism: That, terrorism is the contingent outcome of the availability of material and immaterial resources. The argument further goes that some of these resources are reproduced by the acts of terrorism and militancy. This feed back loop is why we see waves of terrorism.

One of the key factors that terrorism depends on is '*software*', the possibility to copy an existing attack, not only type of attack, weapons and target selection, but also ideology, group structure, symbols, communication forms and even clothing. By being able to copy an entire 'terrorist package', the complexity of becoming a terrorist is greatly reduced, thus making it a much more accessible option. One terrorist attack, particularly if it is successful, thus becomes an, 'agent of radicalization'.

This theory is discussed empirically using a dataset of all Islamist terrorist incidents in the West from 1989—2008 and all Islamist terrorist incidents against western targets outside the West in the same period. It is possible to identify a very strong relationship between terrorism outside the West and in the West with a two-year time lag, supporting the theory. Competing explanations like both being affected by wars waged by the West in Muslim countries are discussed; however, no statistically significant relation is found. Conversely, wars waged by the West in Muslim countries have a statistically significant effect on terrorism against western targets outside the West with a one-year time lag.

Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Indoctrination and Radicalisation by **Don Pathan,** Regional News Editor, The Nation, Thailand

Talking points:

Background:

- Patani is half the size of Israel (11,000 square km); 4,000 death since Jan 2004
- Patani Malays have a different set of historical narratives, myth, national heroes, historical consciousness.
- Neither here nor there: stuck between two nations and divided by an artificial border
- Thailand's failed policy of assimilation: unable to find the comfort level with the Patani Malays

- Rome of the past: Negotiating membership with the Thai State and keeping their place in the Malay world
- Betting on the wrong horse: Patani Malay political elites compromised themselves

New Generation, Old Grievances:

- Shifting the theatre of violence: from the jungle to the villages
- Unprecedented brutality but scope remains largely the same
- From sparrow bandits to a new generation of insurgents: the January 4, 2004 raid
- Conventional response for an unconventional challenge
- The Thaksin factor – a convenient scapegoat or a major policy mistake
- Organizational structure: from global trotting freedom fighters to unnamed militants

Indoctrination:

- A very captivating set of historical narratives: The lull before the storm
- Growing up with ustaz and ulema: moral obligation but not quite jihadist
- Historical and cultural narratives: competing myths and identity
- Political context: new generation but same grievances

Thailand's Policy/Approach for the Deep South

- Bt119 billion spent and Bt68 billion more – still no hearts and minds have been won
- Carrots and sticks and yet, nothing seems to work
- The problem with the culture of impunity and the paramilitary
- Winning hearts and minds: good intention is not policy
- Five governments in five years: No continuity and no mandate
- PM Abhisit Vejjajiva: picking up from where Surayud Chulanont left off
- Bringing back civilian supremacy and the unwillingness to confront the military
- Proliferation of peace process: to talk or not to talk

Conclusion:

- Proliferation of Peace Process
- Old Guards reinventing themselves
- The need to reframe the conflict: It's more than just "false Islam and wrong history"
- Negotiating with the people: social mobility, cultural space and a shared destiny

Ideology and Grievance in Violent Radicalisation and Recruitment in Europe by **Peter Neumann,** Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, United Kingdom

Abstract:

The paper draws on the findings of a major study carried out by Peter Neumann and Brooke Rogers for the European Commission. (The full report is available at www.icsr.info). It addresses the popular political debate about 'grievances' or 'ideology' as drivers of violent radicalisation among young European Muslims. Using case studies from a variety of European countries, it will be shown that the dichotomy is false. Rather, it is the interplay between the two variables that policymakers and analysts need to pay attention to. Moreover, there should be greater awareness and knowledge of how grievances are

mobilised and ideologies disseminated. The implications for policymakers are clear: instead of focusing on one or the other variable, counter-radicalisation strategies need to comprise all three elements in order to be successful: counter-grievance; counter-ideology; and counter-mobilisation.

Session 2: Rights and Resilience

Rights and Resilience by **Rachel Briggs**, Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, United Kingdom

Abstract:
The threat to democracies like the UK from Al-Qaeda related terrorism is real and significant. The UK has experienced a number of successful attacks and unsuccessful attempts, including the London bombings of July 2005, the unsuccessful attacks the following week, the London and Glasgow airport bombs, and the transatlantic plot to blow up a number of aeroplanes mid flight. The Security Service currently rates the risk from international terrorism as 'substantial' which means there is a strong possibility of future terrorist attacks.

The UK Government has invested significant time and money in its preventative strategy, which seeks to reduce the likelihood of individuals being drawn into violent extremism through community development, institution building, and work to promote individual and community resilience to extremist narratives and recruitment techniques. The latest iteration of the UK Government's counter-terrorism strategy (known as Contest 2) makes more explicit reference to the role that grievances play, not just in causing terrorism, but in alienating exactly the people that need to be engaged in preventative response efforts – young British Muslims.

There has been a growth in the level and variety of political activism within Muslim communities in the UK in recent years. It takes a variety of forms, from formal political organisation and activism, to volunteering, civic entrepreneurialism and the assertion of politics through personal acts and behaviour. Some of this political activism has been met with fear and trepidation as observers worry it is a sign of subversive behaviour or a desire for separatism. However, in most cases this mobilisation is a welcome development, not just because it enhances the democratic health of the nation, but because it is a necessary component of attempts to counter the threat from violent extremism. If terrorism is partly caused by a sense of injustice, isolation and disempowerment, then our preventative strategies need to encourage more – not less – political activism.

Communication Rights and Democratic Resilience by **Ben O'Loughlin,** Reader, International Relations Royal Holloway, University of London

Abstract:
What creates and engages a democratic public is the failure of leaders and the system to deal with existing problems. As Walter Lippmann and John Dewey argued almost a century ago, the appearance of complex issues does not make democracy impossible – as if citizens would think politics "difficult" and leave it to experts – but actually enables and sparks public involvement. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the war on terror and relations between Muslim minorities and majority populations in Western countries

appear to have marked a crisis for democratic politics. Despite the existence of shared matters of concern such as Iraq and terrorism – things *everybody* has an opinion about – the explanations offered by governments have often been too certain, fixed, and direct, making it difficult for citizens to comprehend or connect to these explanations as meaningful and negotiable. Until recently, the register of urgency trumped that of patience, citizens have been categorised (Muslims are either "moderate" or "radical"), governments have used a discourse of 'radicalisation' that confuses citizens and appears groundless, and those dissenting have been told they 'just don't get it'. But does this situation in fact constitute conditions for a *re*-assembling of democratic publics?

This paper locates the importance of media to citizens trying to deal with this impasse, based on data from five years of research of UK news audiences/citizens. Evidence suggests that despite announcements concerning the proliferation of social media, it is mainstream media and the BBC in particular that remain the primary news source for British citizens, *including* Muslim citizens, for whom engagement with the BBC is felt a civic duty and a way to test the pulse of the presumed non-Muslim mainstream. But mainstream media is also perceived to offer inadequate representation of Islam and the lives of Muslims, and several interviewees have responded by either looking to re-shape mainstream media *or* create their own Islamic media. These trends are analysed in light of Cees Hamelink's call for 'communication rights' as the right to an *enabling environment* not just for individual expression but for the cultivation of long term conversation and listening within and between communities. What would such an enabling environment consist of, and could it provide the condition for a more resilient and engaged democracy?

Human Rights in a Time of Political Radicalization by **Kevin Tan Yew Lee,** Adjunct Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore

Abstract:
Concerns over security threats in a time of political radicalization have caused many governments and peoples to become paranoid about their personal security and well-being. One major repercussion of this has been the passage of laws that have made increasing in-roads into individual freedoms and civil liberties. Unless we become more resilient in the face of a radically changed world, we run the risk of losing control over our personal freedoms and liberties. Draconian legislation can be justified on the grounds of national security, and the jurisdiction of the courts are increasingly being ousted in favour of executive fiat. This presentation examines the phenomenon and argues that the foundations of our legal culture have been detrimentally altered by the rise of political radicalization and terrorism. While the law has long been seen as a bulwark against arbitrariness and capriciousness, it lacks the structural and substantive resilience to handle those who are out to destroy the constitutional framework of civilization.

State's Resilience and Societal Resistance to Terrorist Threats in Malaysia and Indonesia by **Kamarulnizam Abdullah,** Lecturer, Strategic Studies and International Relations Programme, Centre for History, Politics and Strategic Studies, University Kebangsaan Malaysia

Abstract:
In discussing the post-September 11 terrorist threats in Southeast Asian, two countries; Malaysia and Indonesia, appear to share some commonalities. The two countries were parts of Jemaah Islamiyyah's historical development. At the same time, citizens of both countries, were directly involved in a series of bombings that have threaten regional stability and security. Hence, both countries, at the state and societal levels have to respond to the threat. Arguably, the state and society have to be politically and socially strong in responding to the current terrorist threats. Nonetheless, this paper argues that state's resilience is more than a question of strong political system and effective counter terrorist laws. State and society has to work together. The societal involvement is crucial since they are part of counter terrorism strategies. The paper also argues that Malaysia's strong resistance to terrorist threats may be due to historical experience and strong role played by the government and the society, whereas, Indonesia's slow but steady response to the threat has been influenced by the political reformation and democratization process. The efficacy for Malaysia's approach in dealing with terrorist threats however has been in the expense of human rights. Indonesia, on the other hand, offers different picture. Although terrorism has been the major security concern for state and society, human rights aspect is one of crucial elements that have been integrated in the state's strategies to counter the threats.

"Considering Rights and Resilience in the Framework of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategies" by **Marisa L. Porges,** International Affairs Fellow in Residence, Council on Foreign Relations, USA

Abstract:
Since September 11th, U.S. counterterrorism efforts have been widely criticized for their focus on kinetic action and military force. The domestic and international debate surrounding U.S. policy decisions was viewed almost exclusively within this framework, particularly with respect to the effect of its policies on human rights and international resilience to extremist violence. Any debate, whether about Guantanamo, overseas counterterrorism operations, or U.S. intelligence gathering efforts, became defined within this context. And while recent changes in the U.S. political landscape suggest an overall shift in the country's approach to national security and counterterrorism, the framing of the policy debate in the United States remains largely unchanged. The discourse is still defined by right and left extremes.

As policy developments currently underway gain momentum (or, in some instances, stall in the face of strategic roadblocks), it is important to recognize the impact this unmoving framework has on policy makers' ability to shape and implement future counterterrorism strategies. By looking at particularly contentious debates, like those surrounding U.S. detention policy and counter-radicalization efforts, we begin to understand how the nature of the debate can, in itself, effect national security decision making. A closer look can also

provide us with a better sense of what issues will define future U.S. counterterrorism strategies–in other words, how 'rights and resilience' may be considered in the years to come.

Session 3: Counter-and De-Radicalization

Preventing What?: The Impact of Concept on Evidence Based Policy Responses to Violent Radicalisation and Islamically Inspired Terrorism by **Jonathan Githens-Mazer,** Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Exeter, United Kingdom

Abstract:
Politicians, the media, and some social scientists have sought to portray events such as 9/11, 3/11, 7/7 as the result of Islamic 'radicalisation'; a battle of ideas and competing narratives between radical Islam and the liberal West. This indicates a conceptual position which suggests that to counter Islamically inspired political violence it is necessary to change Islamic ideas at their core. This paper examines how ideas of radicalisation are being used in current counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation policies, and the problems with these policies given that there is no clear concept of what this term means or how it should be studied. This paper particularly highlights the methodological weaknesses that plague research on relationship between Islam and political violence – particularly where this is portrayed as Islamic radicalisation or Islamic radicalism, or correlate Islamism as a pre-condition of terrorism. The paper argues that such single causal orientations indicate ideological research design bias, and that 'effects of causes' approaches fail to take into account the inherent causal complexity of collectively defined, but individually held moral obligations to participate in direct action. Until the study of Islam and political behaviour is radically altered to take account of the majority cases where individual Muslims are either peacefully politically engaged, or even politically apathetic, the success of policies which attempt to prevent violence in the name of Islam will be, at best, a matter of luck and intuition, rather than empirically justified and evidence-based.

Research and Radicalisation – the UK Approach by **Sarah Connolly,** Head of the Counter-Terrorism Research Group in the Foreign& Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

Abstract:
This presentation will begin by setting out what we already know about radicalisation and de-radicalisation. It will then go on to share the broad findings of a major FCO funded research study into radicalisation in Pakistan, before explaining how those results have impacted on the UK Government's Counter Terrorism policies. The presentation will then illuminate some of the CT research gaps which have been identified by the Whitehall CT community.

Challenges of De-radicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts in the Philippines: The Case of Filipino Muslim Detainees Accused of Crimes Associated with Terrorism by **Rommel Banlaoi,** Chairman of Board and Executive Director, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

Abstract:
As part of the soft approach to counter terrorism and other forms of political violence, some countries have ventured into de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs. The Philippine government recognizes the importance of these programs as the country continues to face terrorist threats emanating from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the New Peoples' Army and the so-called rouge elements of the Moro Islamic Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The presence of some Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) personalities in the Philippines and the emergence of the shadowy Bangsamoro National Liberation Army (BNLA) as well as the security nuisance emanating from the dormant Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) and the Al Khobar Group (AKG) compound the virulent terrorist threats in the Philippines.
However, existing Philippine government efforts related to de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs have to contend with enormous conceptual and operational challenges particularly in the case of Filipino Muslim detainees accused of crimes associated with terrorism. Most of the Muslim detainees joined "terrorist" groups because of circumstantial and behavioral reasons rather than ideological conviction. Thus, understanding the experiences of Muslim detainees on how they got into their present situation is crucial in convincing them to change their attitudes about political violence and terrorism.

There is no doubt that sustained visitation, counseling, legal assistance, socio-economic support and after care are important processes to turn Muslim detainees away from violent behavior and embrace a more peaceful outlook. But instead of focusing more resources on de-radicalization and rehabilitation efforts, the Philippine government has to pay greater attention on disengagement programs because the social, economic and political situations in the Philippines are compelling some people to become radicals. The Philippines is faced with a much bigger challenge to prevent these radicals to endorse and engage in political violence and terrorism.

De-Radicalization Program in Indonesia by **Tito Karnavian,** Head of Intelligence, Detachment 88, Indonesia National Police

Abstract:
Realizing the complexity of the underlying causes of the problem of terrorism; Indonesia which had employed the "hard power" law-enforcement strategy in countering terrorism since 2000, has adopted a soft approach since 2003. The

successful mindset-change of detainees, such as Nasir Abas – former head of Mantiqi 3 of al Jamaah al Islamiyyah – after being approached by the police has suggested the promising outcome of such efforts. Since then the police have established a specific team to engage with detainees for the purposes of exploiting information and, if possible, to change their mindset to disengage with violence and renounce their violent ideology.

Having engaged with the detainees, the police have developed a set of significant findings. They include the various motives of joining terrorist networks, different level of radicalism from layer to layer of the network, the characteristic of commune with specific norms and cultures shaped mainly by specific ideology and the struggle of being a clandestine community etc. Based on these findings, the police have developed tactics to approach detainees, which included "creeping de-radicalization", "extending practical help rather than ideological debate" and many others.

The outcome has been quite surprising. Out of some 200 individuals approached, some 100 have chosen to be cooperative with the police and government. In fact two detainees have written books on their previous wrongdoings. Some detainees have spoken more frankly to the police, reporters and researchers on their repentance, and many have even provided information of their networks, leading to arrests.

Apart from these successes, however, such efforts have not been systematically conducted. It is very much dependent upon the initiative of the police whose resources and capabilities are limited. Indonesia does not possess a comprehensive strategy on counter and de-radicalization. The development of such an effort is still being discussed at the strategic level, particularly on how to bring all state resources together in implementing counter and de-radicalization. To be more precise, the options are whether to have a synchronized system for coordinating isolated activities of various agencies; or to create an operational institution consisting of representatives of various agencies designated for this program.

Terrorist Rehabilitation: Winning Hearts and Minds Approach by **Mohammad Feisal Hassan,** Secretariat, Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), Singapore

Abstract:
The speaker will share about terrorist rehabilitation through an understanding of the counter-ideological approach. Key to his presentation is the winning hearts and minds approach in terrorist rehabilitation. The speaker will highlight key ideological concepts that have been misinterpreted by radical jihadist groups. He will also present a case study of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore's approach to counter radicalization.

De-Radicalization …To What? by **Bill Durodie,** Senior Fellow and Co-ordinator of the Homeland Defence Programme in the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU, Singapore

Abstract:
Twenty years ago, young radicals were political and secular. Today, those of concern to the authorities are driven more by culture and religion. We need to understand this shift if we are successfully to address so-called 'radicalization'. How did youths of Pakistani descent go from calling themselves 'Asian' a generation ago, to identifying themselves primarily as 'Muslim' today?

In the UK context, the first generation of immigrants from the Indian-subcontinent sought to keep a low profile. It was their children who grew up to fight anti-racist struggles against the discrimination and harassment they encountered. This pushed them into struggles alongside the Left, which also encouraged a rejection of the conservative outlook and belief systems of their parents.

The end of the Cold War however, signaled the political defeat and intellectual exhaustion of the Left, both internationally and domestically. Encouraged by government support to reconnect with their supposedly more authentic pasts, many young Asians now pursued funding instead, often through the conduit of various unrepresentative community and religious leaders.

As political ideologies gave way to cultural identities, so too did the fight against poverty make way for the charge of causing offence. This elevation of personal feeling and emotion is an affront to reason and democracy. Sentiment replaced conviction as the defining feature of politics. Far from being more moderate, this exemplifies how moribund the system has become.

Ironically, part of the appeal of 'Islamism', is precisely its refusal to compromise with others. It has been able to assume the high-ground of belief in an age devoid of principle. In fact, 'Jihadism' is often just the form assumed by those who reject modernity today. And problematically, its real content may be shared by those clerics charged with 'de-radicalizing' people.

What remains to be addressed is not what attracts a few to extreme outlooks, but rather the failure of the mainstream to inspire and integrate bright and energetic individuals, versed in the now universal language of 'victimhood'. It is becoming more evident that whilst political engagement had the potential to unify diverse people, the prioritization of culture merely divided them.

Counter Radicalization and Outreach in Canada by **Phil Gurski,** Senior Analyst at Canadian Department of Public Safety

Abstract:
Canada has long dealt with radical communities who have used violence to effect change. While historically this violence was tied to conflicts abroad, recent cases have targetted Canada directly for its policies. In response to this challenge, the Canadian government has adopted new policies to counter radicalization and is considering further measures.