



## **CENS Distinguished Visitors Programme – Seminar Series**

**Dr Thomas Fingar**

- \* Seminar on Geopolitical Challenges Facing the United States  
(12 August 2011)**
- \* Seminar on Challenges to Global Governance and the Ability of Nation States to  
Manage the Consequences of Prosperity and Interdependence  
(15 August 2011)**
- \* Seminar on Intelligence Challenges and Lessons from the Iraq WMD Estimate  
(17 August 2011)**
- \* Seminar on Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation  
(19 August 2011)**

*\* Disclaimer: This report summarises the public lecture(s) as interpreted by the assigned rapporteur(s) and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The speaker neither reviewed nor approved this report.*

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**The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)** is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Address: Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. Tel No: 67906982. Email: [cens@ntu.edu.sg](mailto:cens@ntu.edu.sg)  
Website: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/>



## **About Thomas Fingar**

Dr Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford during January-December 2009. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and, concurrently, as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Dr Fingar served previously as Assistant Secretary of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (2001-2003), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis (1994-2000), Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-1994), and Chief of the China Division (1986-1989). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including Senior Research Associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control. Dr Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in Political Science).



## **Geopolitical Challenges Facing the US<sup>1</sup>**

**12 August 2011 (Friday)**

**Vanda 5, Level 6, Marina Mandarin Hotel**

Dr Thomas Fingar began his first seminar in this series by describing the dramatic economic, political and technological changes the world has seen in the last few decades. As the pace of change continues to accelerate, he pointed out that many dimensions of the process of change were in fact traceable to US policies of one kind or another. As more countries with increasingly larger stakes in the international system felt more entitled to play a role in shaping their own destinies, such changes were fashioned more actively in recent years by an increasing number of players.

In a world that is becoming ever more interconnected and complicated, the biggest geopolitical challenge for the international community was reengineering the international system. The system at hand had evolved at the end of the Second World War and during the subsequent Cold War. It had served the world well because the institutions set up then had not only helped preserve a high degree of peace but it had also enabled more people in more places to become more prosperous than at any time prior. But Fingar cautioned that the system was becoming a victim of its own success because what had been designed for fewer countries that were less interconnected was no longer appropriate for the twenty-first century.

Fingar then argued that a foremost concern was to conceptualise and negotiate the transition of the existing global system. Such an endeavour was going to be difficult because there was neither clear understanding of nor consensus on what the future global system should look like. Several urgent questions needed to be grappled with, including those regarding the requirements of the new system and the kinds of institutions and norms that needed to be established. It was equally important to figure out leadership selection and appropriate decision-making processes. Further, a new security agenda concerning issues such as energy, health and climate change apart from and on top of new international relationships were essential.

But to even begin to develop this new system, Fingar said the US – considering the current leadership role it holds by design and by default – would have to wrestle with how to convince other players to act before serious international crises could emerge due to a gradually outmoded system. He posited that because the US could see a little further beyond the horizon than others, in part because it had been playing a role in building and maintaining the extant system, it was ironically the most eager to change the status quo.

However, there was great reluctance within the international community to tamper with the current system because it still worked and it was still bringing benefits to many. Importantly, it was a world that everybody understood. While the existing system might well be failing, it

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had not failed yet, which made it a comparatively better reality when contrasted with a novel system that would be problematic simply by virtue of being new. Fingar also recognised the magnitude of global participation needed to change the existing system. Nevertheless, despite the apprehension, it remained an inescapable geopolitical reality that we were living in a single, increasingly integrated and interdependent global system that was likely to become even more inclusive. Fingar compared it to a fishing net: if pulled at any one spot, the whole net rearranges.

Fingar then looked back in political history to appreciate how the world got to where it is today. He explained that today's interconnected and interdependent world emerged out of what had once been known as the "free world" camp, a US-led collective of nations based on a free trade market, rule-based exchanges and protection, in what had been an existential struggle against the communist bloc. A characteristic ethos of the "free world" was of winning together as a unit. Also an element of that period had been the ability and willingness of the US to bear disproportionate costs in delivering public goods. But such capabilities and assumptions no longer applied; it was no longer necessary or made sense to the American people to bear higher costs largely because there were more equal partners to face global challenges today.

Considering Fareed Zakaria's notion of the "rise of the rest" a positive development, Fingar explained that with more numerous and more capable partners, the international system could better deal with the issues and problems of the twenty-first century. Yet, many others outside the US saw the rise of the rest to mean the inevitable decline of the US. These different perceptions necessarily led to very different expectations regarding American policies because in the former scenario, the understanding was that the US wants to establish a global system in which everybody wins. But in the latter scenario, the US is seen as desperately trying to maintain its hegemony in the world. Fingar argued that such diverse expectations were consequently to lead to very different possibilities. In consequence, much less effort could be put into engineering a new global system when the standing hypothesis is not viewed favourably.

Fingar then proceeded to examine four specific geopolitical challenges for the US posed by North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak), and China, bringing to light the kinds of challenges and dilemmas inherent in building a global level institutional system.

He assessed that North Korea had the potential to destabilise Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic and heavily armed regions of the world. Among other things, the flailing Kim Jong-Il regime, with its porcupine-like approach to national security and deterrence strategy based on nuclear weapons, posed grave challenges to the security of South Korea and Japan. Fingar particularly highlighted the impact of the regional security dilemma on global non-proliferation arrangements, recognising that the two countries which had had willingly forgone producing nuclear weapons, South Korea and Japan, could well reconsider building nuclear weapons largely because of the unpredictable character of the North Korean regime. Fingar pointed out that China too, despite being North Korea's only ally, was continually threatened by its probable implosion and provocation of conflict.



Fingar strongly believed that Iran had the potential to be one of the most pivotal countries of the world because of its size, location and natural gas resources. While it was an important country with regional influence, it faced daunting security challenges and had no friends in a Sunni Arab-dominated neighbourhood, except for Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah. Tellingly, the Middle East has registered their firm opposition to live with a nuclear-capable Iran despite having lived, however uncomfortably, with a nuclear-capable Israel for over three decades.

Moving on to the AfPak region, Fingar highlighted the current debates over the planned US military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Reactions to US troops leaving the country by 2014 were varied, ranging from precipitous to not soon enough. He deduced that there was ambivalence over wanting Americans in the lead while wanting them out.

Finally, on China, Fingar claimed it was fallacious to believe that China was rising at the expense of the US. He argued that China's rise had in actuality been made possible by the US. When China had started to emerge as an economic power in 1979, the US with 5% of world population made for 26% of the global economy. Thirty years later, it seemed that the US had fallen considering it accounted for 24% of the global economy. But the US in fact had a larger piece of the economy (controlling for population which came down to 4%) than before China's phenomenal rise that coincided with the concurrent rise of India, Brazil and Indonesia.

In conclusion, Fingar advised the audience not to be taken in by media-led notions of geopolitical rises and declines leading to conflicts. He argued that the patterns of behaviour within the system that brought us to where we are today would lead one to expect something quite apart and different from conflicts. The dangers of hedging could become self-fulfilling and we could lose track of the fact that the preparations toward a new global system were not for war, but rather, in order to avoid conflict.

## **Discussion**

A participant asked what Fingar thought could be the kinds of crises that could come out of the inefficiencies of the current system. Fingar said he was hopeful that crises could be avoided, but cautioned that due to the interconnectedness of the world financial crises and global health epidemics were possible. He also pointed out that escalating localised conflicts were more likely than a major war. He was also concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons and loose nukes.

Another participant wondered if there were some leading indicators of a global system transitioning the way Fingar hoped it would. Fingar responded that prosperity was a big indicator of change in the right direction. As a country reaches a certain level of economic development and prosperity, a newly created middle class could demand accountability from the government which could drive the polity to assume a democratic system in all its variants.



Prosperity usually entails more complex economies that reflect different competing interests which would be best dealt with through the political system and not just left to free market forces. So with prosperity rising, he said second wave democracy states were becoming more firmly established. He remarked he was optimistic about where the global system is heading.

Another participant shared Fingar's view that something needed to be done about global governance but he wondered who was going to foot the bill. Fingar agreed that was a real challenge for the system; it had become very hard for the US government to justify spending enormous amounts of money to deliver public good in terms of security and stability largely because of a lack of an actual enemy. This would be reflected in the scaling back on resources devoted to security and he anticipated a fairly early drop off in US military expenditures, presence and facilities overseas. But Fingar believed the US would continue to expand capacity building and rent out its expertise.

A participant enquired how the US should adapt in an increasingly complex world and how the changes could be enacted in a country like the US where constituents were dissatisfied and disinclined to read political and global news. Fingar responded that getting the public to be well-informed was the key issue. He believed that the embarrassing follies in Washington in the last months had helped because Americans had started paying attention when things went awry. Fingar also lamented the state of the media today and said that there was a need for a revolutionary transformation to get journalism to be reasonably competent again, particularly with the advent of social media. The blogging world could be a good source of mobilisation, but it may not always be reliable.



**Seminar on Challenges to Global Governance and the Ability of Nation States to Manage the Consequences of Prosperity and Interdependence<sup>2</sup>**

**15 August 2011 (Monday)  
Vanda 5, Level 6, Marina Mandarin Hotel**

In his second lecture, Dr Thomas Fingar talked about developing global governance structures to address the escalating demands from increasingly attentive and well-informed citizens, as well as the growing interconnectedness and interdependence in a globalised world. Both had a major influence on decisions and options available for governments. While pointing out that the world had generally become a more peaceful and prosperous place compared to the past, he noted that the gap between the rich and the poor had also become wider.

Before moving on to the specific discussion of how to form global governance structures, Fingar mentioned three requisites for globalisation. First, he stated security and internal stability and added that they had high priority. The second requisite was transparency, which meant that people had to have access to information about governments' actions and plans. In this context, Fingar mentioned the importance of social media and its contribution to increased awareness of the social and political environment among average citizens. The third requisite for globalization was interdependence and interconnectedness.

Moving on to the issue of establishing global governance, Fingar reiterated that it was becoming extremely difficult for governments at all levels, local, regional and national, to meet the rising complex expansive demands coming from citizens. This was especially so as governments constantly sought help from those of higher levels, as they considered the issues and problems as being overwhelming to be handled within their own capacity. This resulted in the never-ending cycle of passing on issues to higher levels while the problems were not being solved. Fingar opined that this was especially problematic as governments which were closest to the existing problems were at the lowest level and did not possess adequate resources to meet those challenges while the bureaucracy at the top often lacked the legitimacy to tackle the issues.

Fingar enumerated three large challenges to current global governance structures. The first he mentioned was demographic challenges. Putting population growth and its entailing growing demands aside, different kinds of demographic transformations in different countries could significantly hinder the process of establishing global governance. For example, while some countries' populations were getting older, other countries' populations were getting younger. Likewise, the economic gap was expected to continue widening in the future. To illustrate this, Fingar said that by 2025, the world was to see 11 billion people of which only 3 percent

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were to be from OECD countries. He also mentioned the “ark of instability” to point out that less developed countries were the ones which often possessed abundant resources but also had high degrees of instability emanating from extremist groups or poor governance. In terms of age demographics, Fingar opined that youth today tended to be more impatient, more mobilized, had fewer things at stake, and thus tended to be bolder in carrying out activist campaigns. The second challenge in establishing global governance was the issue of accountability. Globalization had facilitated travelling across borders and once people realized that greater opportunities existed outside their countries, they either demanded more from their own government or simply migrated to another country. In addition, those who wished to leave were often those who were highly capable which could result in a brain drain. In this regard, Fingar said that providing high-quality education was crucial in maintaining competency in the countries of origin. The last challenge was the unequal distribution of resources in the form of expertise. Fingar said that although those people at the bottom level of governance were the closest to the problem and thus possessed the expertise, it was often difficult for them to advance their careers. The most qualified people had to be given the chance to move up to higher levels or be rewarded for their achievements in a different way. Lastly, he said that it could prove extremely challenging to weave different interests and stakes of different countries around the world together to come to terms on a new global system.

Lastly, Fingar listed the kind of problems which were either inadequately addressed or were to be addressed in order to support global governance. He mentioned the inadequate security architecture as the first problem and said that the current security architecture was in essence composed of leftover institutions from the Cold War. Therefore, it was not suitable to flexibly deal with diverse rising global issues. In this context, he introduced the term “ad-hoc partnership” which referred to the movement away from fixed alliances which assumed high degree of information sharing into win-win partnerships forged for specific purposes. Another problem Fingar mentioned was less clarity in “collective security”, referring to a lack of mechanism which promoted collective security among global community. Different nation-states still held on to their own security concerns which led to a sense of distrust among each other. Control regime aspects of security were suggested as another problem which needed to be corrected or updated. While control regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty worked well during the bipolar world of the Cold War, this was not applicable to today’s interconnected world.

In sum, Fingar concluded that his presentation was aimed at illustrating the need for more attention to global governance. He said that it is important to acknowledge the existing problems and work in collaboration towards solutions.

## **Discussion**

One participant pointed out that while he acknowledged that there were common global issues which had to be tackled under global governance, he also mentioned that different countries had different interests and timeframes according to their needs and environments.



Given this situation, the participant took a more pessimistic stance stating that while there might be global issues which could be managed through cooperation, there were also issues which were impossible to embark on a common solution among different countries involved. Fingar pointed out that it had been mainly the US which played a central role in the maintenance of the international system while other countries simply followed US leadership. However, the US was now taking a significantly less prominent role due to the shift of power in today's world. Regardless of this, Fingar said he was optimistic in global governance based on a sense of self-interest among countries. More specifically, he said that most developed countries often had the biggest stakes and they were more likely to be motivated in solving global issues in terms of securing their own interests. He also added that it was not advisable to wait for a particular leader to devise a master plan but rather, ad-hoc arrangements could be more suitable to tackle different issues.

Another participant asked whether Fingar foresaw the demise of the nation-state. Fingar answered that the concept of the nation-state would stay for a long period of time and gave the following reasons. First, the world was too big to work as a central globalised system. Fingar mentioned the case of China to illustrate how it was difficult for even a single country to incorporate all its citizens into a unified structure. Second, single globalized government lacked legitimacy and people in different countries were not able to connect themselves to this system. Third, it was extremely difficult to incorporate people with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds into a unified globalized community. Therefore, Fingar opined that sustaining the concept of nation-states made more sense, at least for the near future.



## **Seminar on Intelligence Challenges and Lessons from the Iraq WMD Estimate<sup>3</sup>**

**17 August 2011 (Wednesday)  
Vanda 5, Level 6, Marina Mandarin Hotel**

Dr Thomas Fingar began this third talk in the series by sharing with the audience that his department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), was one of the principal dissenters of the 2002 Iraq WMD Estimate. This was because the INR felt that the evidence presented in the Estimate was either non-existent or insights were open to different interpretations. The INR did, however, concur with the Estimate that Saddam was anxious to obtain WMDs. Fingar believes that his unwillingness to toe the line had adverse ramifications on his career, but did not regret his decision as his position was based on objective intelligence analysis. Fingar's anecdote highlighted the perennial challenge confronting intelligence practitioners – the production of sound and objective intelligence analysis.

Fingar argued that the basic premise of intelligence analysis is to decipher ambiguous and incomplete data to enable policy/decision-makers to make better-informed decisions. However, he cautioned that better-informed decisions do not necessarily translate into better decisions. Fingar believes that while intelligence activities are becoming increasingly complex and challenging, the basic functions of intelligence had not changed: (a) to provide warning; (b) to reduce uncertainty; (c) to identify opportunities. Some countries, he added, had a fourth function: internal control.

Fingar then identified several issues affecting intelligence practice in contemporary times. He named the changing nature of expectations and demands of intelligence agencies that are expected to produce quick, precise and actionable output. Furthermore, there were trade-offs between protecting citizen rights and preventing security threats. The tradecraft had also changed in a way that the focus is now on solving intelligence puzzles rather than discovering state secrets. The scope of intelligence gathering had increased, too, due to the interconnected and globalised environment. All of this made forming professional and expert networks before an event or crisis necessary and called for solving the difficulties of inter-agency collaboration and information-sharing.

With regards to the Iraq WMD Estimate, Fingar argued that its major flaw was that it had been based on insufficient and incomplete information. Also, it reflected a single agency's, namely the CIA's, assessment of the information obtained. The analysis was incomplete due to time constraints and most importantly, the Estimate had been compromised by war fervour. According to Fingar, analysts in this instance had behaved more like lawyers attempting to make a case for the Bush administration to go to war rather than providing an unbiased appraisal of the information as they should have done. A case in point was the CIA's interpretation, despite evidence to the contrary, that aluminium tubes purchased by the Iraqi

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government were gas centrifuges for enriching uranium. Fingar stressed that effective intelligence analysis was premised on the assessment of alternative data sources to determine fact rather than coming up with a pre-determined outcome and then selecting data sources to support that objective. To avoid the pitfalls mentioned above, Fingar urged analysts to always seek answers that would provide the most insights into understanding a problem. Analysts also needed to corroborate the evidence gathered with other reliable sources and develop a network of external experts and leverage their expertise to enhance the quality of intelligence outputs.

## Discussion

In response to the question of whether it was possible that individual analysts could be co-opted and politicised, Fingar replied that it is highly unlikely as there was a high degree of professionalism and self-integrity within the intelligence community. He pointed out that as an analyst's reputation was integral to his/her career advancement, it was in the interest of the analyst to remain de-politicised in order to maintain his/her credibility. Fingar suggested that analysts should foster closer ties with decision and policy-makers to better understand their needs, while acting professionally and maintaining sufficient distance to retain objectivity. He stressed that the responsibility of an analyst was to make analytic arguments which are clear, comprehensive and unbiased, and therefore, they should not attempt to direct or influence policy-makers towards a particular policy direction or outcome.

The second question pertained to the reasons for the US Intelligence community's seeming disregard for the field of area studies. Fingar responded that the main reason was the post-cold war creation of a national security structure in the US that was geographically-based, which resulted in competition between transnational studies and area studies. In the wake of 9/11, the transnational view became more dominant, so that less resources and attention were devoted to area studies. However, this did not imply that area studies had become completely redundant.

The third question sought Fingar's opinion on whether ethnic considerations were still significant in the recruitment policies of the US Intelligence agencies. Fingar replied that agencies are interested primarily on the quality of the candidate rather than his/her ethnic background. He added that as the quality (education, as well as life and professional experience) of candidates in recent times was not limited to a particular ethnic group, it was easier for agencies to recruit individuals from diverse ethnic backgrounds. He added that a major consideration for recruiters was whether an individual's familial ties (particularly if his/her family was not in the country) would affect his/her ability to perform his/her duties. Fingar opined that the most significant recruitment challenge for agencies was retaining talent.



## **Seminar on Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation<sup>4</sup>**

**19 August 2011 (Friday)  
Vanda 5, Level 6, Marina Mandarin Hotel**

Dr Thomas Fingar's fourth and last lecture in this series was on the challenges surrounding nuclear proliferation. Fingar noted that proliferation was generally thought of as a "niche problem" involving a small number of existing or aspiring nuclear powers. Past projections made in the 1960s had placed the number of nuclear capable countries by the end of the century to be around 30-32 countries; in reality the number at the end of the century proved much smaller and other than the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the remaining nuclear powers were Israel, Pakistan and India. So far in this century, only North Korea had been added to this exclusive list.

The fact remained that most countries lack the range of technical, industrial and financial capabilities to acquire nuclear capabilities; as such, the problem of proliferation was managed in part by prohibitive costs and the technological requirements necessary. With globalization and the ensuing increase in prosperity however, these issues were becoming less of an obstacle. There had been countries who had given up their nuclear weapons. Fingar explained that one of the reasons why nuclear proliferation remained of concern was the renewed interest in nuclear energy. Despite the threats of accidents and the ensuing lack of transparency and misleading corporate statements such as what was now happening in Fukushima, Japan, the interest in nuclear power remained high. Increased prosperity translated to more economies and more people needing electricity. The alternative for most countries was to depend on imported oil or coal. Not only did this leave a large carbon footprint, coal fire power released more radioactive material into the atmosphere in comparison to nuclear plants.

There were however challenges to the use of nuclear energy. This included (i) operation safety, with Fukushima and Three Mile Island in the United States being examples of what can go wrong; and (ii) handling spent fuel from nuclear plants. There were still no solutions on what to do with spent fuel from nuclear power plants; the United States had had a long running argument on what to do with spent fuel. Japan had the world's third largest stockpile of plutonium in the world as it bought spent fuel to be reprocessed for power plants. The increase in nuclear power plants brought another dimension to the problem of nuclear proliferation as many of the skills needed for handling nuclear power were transferable to producing fissile material. This had been a major concern during the collapse of the Soviet Union; hence there had been programs put in place to guarantee employment of a number of staff operating under the Soviet Union nuclear programmes to prevent them from selling their skills to other countries. Projections of the number of nuclear power plants to be completed in the next few decades were very high. There was therefore no question that control regimes

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needed to be modernized and strengthened. Countries that were implementing their own nuclear programs were unlikely to agree to new, more stringent terms. As such, diplomatic attempts in this area had to be more adept at handling such issues; the inability to handle this meant that countries would then move ahead under the old rules which were known to be problematic.

Another interesting development was the drive to have the world free of nuclear weapons put forward by a group of senior United States officials, namely George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn. Referred to as the “Gang of Four”, they had determined that the existence of nuclear weapons was just too dangerous and the numbers had to be reduced dramatically. There had been dramatic reductions of the number of Russian and American warheads already under the Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact. This however raised other questions. Firstly, what did this reduction mean for strategies of deterrence and extended deterrence? Were such strategies still credible given the lower number of nuclear weapons? Of note was the fact that there was a greater reliance on missile defence to make the smaller number of nuclear weapons a viable choice. This was however a worrisome development for countries such as China – there was a perception that the United States was unconcerned with reducing their nuclear arsenal as the superiority of their conventional weapons far outrivals any other country at this point in time.

In conclusion, Fingar stated that ultimately, the challenges of nuclear proliferation were intimately connected with the issue of national security – the question to be asked is what can be done to make everybody feel more secure as the world moves away from a bipolar era. A viable replacement to previous solutions had yet to emerge.

## **Discussion**

Fingar was asked to comment on the threat of nuclear terrorism. He explained that this concern had first come up during the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there had been the worry of an unknown number of tactical weapons falling into the wrong hands. This worry had been transferred to states like Pakistan – and the fact that a small amount of fissile material or medical waste could be stolen and used. The result could be widespread panic and overreaction. Fingar noted that conventional nuclear deterrence – under the mutual assured destruction model – would not work with a non-conventional, non-state terrorist group. He brought up the study by Graham Allison of Harvard University’s Belfer Centre and concurred that it is not a question of whether, but rather when, a dirty bomb would be exploded.

A question was posed on the effect of United States’ foreign policy in affecting Iran’s nuclear ambitions and whether there was any basis behind the realist notion that more nuclear weapons would lead to a safer world. Fingar was of the opinion that the United State’s act of removing Iran’s biggest security concern – Iraq’s Saddam regime – in all likelihood led to them halting their nuclear program, either because the Iraqi threat had been removed or because they had been afraid that they may be next on the US’ list. On the latter question,



Fingar noted that although the concept had worked in the case of the Soviet Union and the United States, he did not find it convincing as more nuclear weapons would put more fissile material into the hands of more people. In such a situation, one mistake made could have dire consequences for the global community.

Fingar was asked on how he would design nuclear detection architecture. He was of the opinion that the problem with such architecture was a question of physics: that the technology involved did not as yet allow for the detection of nuclear materials from a distance.

The final question raised was if it was a matter of when and not whether a dirty bomb would be exploded, were there adequate efforts made to ensure that there are procedures to contain such a disaster. Fingar explained that a vital step was the pooling of expertise. Citing the example of what happened on Three Mile Island in the United States, he stated that procedures had now been put in place which would ensure that if a problem developed in any nuclear facility in the United States, any plant engineer or operator would be able to tap into a network in other nuclear plants in the country to seek assistance. He recommended that this kind of networking could and should be instituted on a global level.